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THE WISDOM OF SCHOPENHAUER

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

SCHOPENHAUER

THE WISDOM
OF
SCHOPENHAUER

AS REVEALED IN SOME OF HIS PRINCIPAL WRITINGS

SELECTED AND TRANSLATED BY
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PREFACE

In these pages Schopenhauer speaks for himself. They consist of translations from his works, so arranged as to make the reader in some measure acquainted with his philosophy and manner of thought. A volume containing but the sixth part of his writings must needs sacrifice much; and the notable sacrifice that has here been made is in respect of his metaphysics of Art. To those who would make this a subject of complaint, the translator would humbly reply that only so could an adequate presentation, within moderate compass, of the ethical side of our author's philosophy be duly attained; and that the remainder of his works lies ready translated, and only awaits publication.

The complete works consist of the following:—

Vol. I. (*a*) The Fourfold Root of the Principle of Sufficient Reason;
(*b*) Vision and Colour;
(*c*) Theoria colorum physiologica (a Latin version of Vision and Colour).[1]

Vol. II. The World as Will and Presentment, in the Appendix to which is contained a Criticism of the Kantian Philosophy.

Vol. III. The Supplements to the W. as W. and P.

Vol. IV. (*a*) The Will in Nature;
(*b*) The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics (consisting of two Essays, (1) on the Freedom of the Will, (2) on the Basis of Ethics).

[1] As this is almost identical with the German original, it has not been translated.

Vols. V. and VI. Parerga and Paralipomena (Odds and Ends).

It remains but to define the technical terms employed:—

PRESENTMENT (*Vorstellung*, a placing before the mind's eye): Mental picture; also, though rarely, the process of forming mental images.

PERCEIVANCE (*Anschauung*): Immediate sensible perception; direct perception through the senses; observation at first hand. *E.g.* I have a perceivance of an object at which I am looking—which I am touching—and so of the other senses.

PERCEPT: That which is perceived by the senses through the understanding—opposed to concept. A percept is an individual presentment; a concept, a general presentment — a presentment of that which is common to several objects. *E.g. this* particular house is a percept; *house* (any house) is a concept. The percept is apprehended at once by the senses and the understanding; the concept, derived from the percept by aid of the reason, is a product of comparison and reflection.

PERCEPTIVE: Obtained by perception through the senses—opposed to discursive (= obtained by reasoning). German *intuitiv* (Eng. intuitive, in the philosophical sense) is translated "perceptive" throughout.

PERCEPTUAL (*anschaulich*): Directly perceived by the senses.

PERCEPTIVE FACULTY (*Erkenntnisskraft, Erkenntnissvermögen*): The faculty which apprehends external things; otherwise called cognitive faculty, perceptual faculty, faculty of knowledge, intellect, understanding. It apprehends the outside world by means of the senses and in accordance with the law of

causality; it furnishes percepts or concrete presentments, and out of these the reason fashions abstract presentments.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON declares that an object in the widest sense—*i.e.* a thing or event—must be the consequent of some other object; in other words, that everything is consequent of some reason (ground). It has four modes: (1) *Fiendi*, law of causality; (2) *cognoscendi*, conclusion from logical premisses; (3) *essendi*, law of relation; (4) *agendi*, law of motivation.

In the first, given the cause and the effect must follow.

In the second, given certain premisses and the conclusion must follow.

In the third, given one relation and another must follow: *e.g.* left implies right, and equality of sides in a triangle implies equality of angles.

In the fourth, given a motive to which the character is susceptible, and the particular action must follow.

APPEARANCE (*Erscheinung*): Phenomenon or object of sense, as opposed to noumenon or thing-in-itself; sensibly-perceived object; empirically-given object; thing as existing *for us*.

FORM (in its technical sense): Conditioning element; the mental element of an object, as opposed to matter, the sensuous element; function or special mode of operation; appanage. In the phrase "form of perceivance," and the like, it means mode of perceivance; mould in which perceivance is cast; that without which there would be no perceivance; indispensable condition of perceivance.

IDEAS: Always in Schopenhauer the Platonic ideas, *i.e.* the original forms or archetypes, of which, respectively, all visible things are the imperfect copies or ectypes. "Always," I say; but on rare occasions, in such phrases as "association of ideas," he slips into the current mode of speech and uses the word as equivalent to presentments.

W. J.

March, 1911.

BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

A FEW REMARKS UPON MY OWN PHILOSOPHY

[1 *Par.* § 14.]

PERHAPS no philosophical system is so simple as mine, and it can be taken in at a glance. This depends in the last instance upon the complete unity and agreement of its fundamental thoughts, and argues its truth—truth being nearly allied to simplicity: *simplex sigillum veri.* My system might be termed an *immanent dogmatism;* for its principles are certainly dogmatic, though they never transcend the world given in experience, but merely explain what this world is by reducing it to its ultimate elements. The old dogmatism that Kant overthrew (and the windy nonsense of the three modern university-sophists[1] is in like case) is *transcendent;* for it transcends the world in order to explain it from something else, making it the consequent of a ground, and arguing from the former to the latter.[2] My philosophy, on the contrary, starts with the proposition that grounds and consequents exist only *in* the world, which world it takes for granted; for the Principle of Sufficient Reason,[3]

[1] Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

[2] From the universe to a ground or cause of the universe.

[3] The Principle of Sufficient Reason declares that an object in the widest sense—*i.e.* a thing or event—must be the consequent of some other object; in other words, that everything is consequent of some reason (ground). Its four modes are: (1) *fiendi*, law of causality; (2)

in its four modes, is merely the most general form of the intellect, while it is in this intellect alone, as the true *locus mundi*,[1] that the objective world exists.

In other philosophical systems the conclusion is established by deducing proposition from proposition. But to do this, the real content of the system must of necessity be already existent in the primary propositions; and therefore the deductions can hardly fail to be monotonous, poor, empty, and tedious, because they only develop and repeat what was already expressed in these basal propositions. This lamentable result of demonstrative deduction is felt most strongly in Wolf; but even Spinoza, who rigorously followed this method, has not been able to escape its disadvantages entirely, although his genius is a compensating factor. My propositions, on the contrary, depend for the most part not on chains of reasoning, but immediately upon the perceptual (*anschaulich*) world itself; and the strict consequentness, which is to be found in my system as much as in any other, is, as a rule, not won upon the merely logical path, but is rather that natural agreement of propositions which is inevitably brought about by the circumstance that these propositions are all of them founded upon intuitive knowledge, *i.e.* upon the perceptual apprehension of the same object (contemplated, however, successively from different sides), viz. the real world with all its phenomena, due regard being had to the consciousness in which that world exhibits itself.

cognoscendi, conclusion from logical premisses; (3) *essendi*, law of relation; (4) *agendi*, law of motivation.

In the first, given the cause and the effect must follow.

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In the third, given one relation and another must follow: *e.g.* left implies right, and equality of sides in a triangle implies equality of angles.

In the fourth, given a motive to which the character is susceptible, and the particular action must follow.

[1] Place in which the world (as presentment) originates.

I have therefore never needed to trouble myself about the agreement of my propositions, even in cases where some of them—as not infrequently happened—seemed for a time to be irreconcilable: for the agreement afterwards came of itself, when the propositions were all brought into focus; because with me this agreement is nothing but the agreement of the reality with itself, and this can never fail. All this may be compared to the feeling we sometimes experience on contemplating a building for the first time from one side only; though unable to take in the due relation of all its parts, yet we are certain that such relation exists, and that the symmetry of the whole structure will reveal itself when we have walked right round it. Now this kind of symmetrical agreement is perfectly safe, because it is at first hand, and is constantly controlled by experience; whereas the derivative kind, which proceeds from syllogisms alone, may easily be wrong—as it is, for instance, whenever any link of the long chain is spurious, slackly attached, or in any other way defective. My philosophy consequently has a broad base, upon which all rests immediately and therefore securely, while other systems are like lofty towers; if *a single* support breaks, the whole edifice falls. To sum up all in a word, my philosophy is analytic in its origin and exposition—not synthetic.[1]

Let me mention this peculiarity about my philosophy: it endeavours always *to get to the bottom of things*, and so never rests till it has followed them up to the ultimate real datum. This is owing to my nature, which will hardly allow me to be satisfied with any knowledge in a general and abstract, and therefore still indefinite shape:

[1] The analytic method assumes the consequent and leads back to the antecedent or ground: it is the ascending or inductive method. The synthetic method proceeds from the antecedent or datum to the consequent or quæsitum: it is the descending or deductive method.

mere concepts do not satisfy me—still less, words. No; my nature drives me on,—does not rest till the ultimate basis of all concepts and propositions lies naked before me. This ultimate basis is always perceptual, and, if it is not an original phenomenon, which I must perforce leave alone, I resolve it again into its elements, following the essence of the thing up to its last retreat. For this reason people will one day—not in my lifetime, of course—come to see that my treatment of the old subjects is deeper than that of any of my predecessors in philosophy. Mankind has therefore learnt much from me that it will never forget, and my writings will not perish.

Theism derives the world, the courses of the planets in their orbits, and the development of Nature upon the surface of these planets, from a *Will;* but it childishly places this Will outside, and makes it act man-wise upon things mediately, by the intervention of knowledge and matter; whereas with me the Will does not act so much *upon* things as *in* them; indeed, they are nothing but its visibility.[1] The agreement of my views with those of Theism amounts, however, to no more than this, that we can none of us think of the ultimate essence of things except as a *Will. Pantheism* calls the Will that works in things "a god," and I have censured this absurdity often enough and strongly enough. I call it "the Will-to-live," because this expresses the ultimate fact that we can know about it. This same relation of mediateness to immediateness comes in once more in morals. The theists assert that a man's actions and his sufferings will balance in the scale; so do I. But they think that the balance will be struck by means of time

[1] The world-as-presentment is the visibility or objectification of the world-as-Will.

and a requiting judge; whereas I hold the compensation to be immediate, and I show that the doer and the sufferer are the same person. The moral results of Christianity, including the heights of asceticism, are founded by me on reason and the natural order of things, while in Christianity they rest on mere fables. Faith in these is daily waning; therefore recourse must be had to my philosophy. The *pantheists* have no serious system of ethics, for with them all is divine and excellent.

It is made a matter of much reproach that in my philosophising, and therefore theoretically, I have represented life as calamitous and altogether undesirable; and yet whoever practically manifests that he holds it in no esteem is praised and admired, while the man who is over-careful to preserve it is despised.

Hardly had my writings begun to attract the attention of a few readers when someone discovered that their fundamental thought was not new—that Schelling had once said, "Willing is the primal being," and much more in this strain. As to this, let me say, first, that my philosophy is founded upon Kant's; it is derived in large measure from his doctrine of the empirical and intelligible characters, but above all from my discovery that wherever Kant brings the thing-in-itself somewhat nearer to the light, it always reveals itself through its veil as *Will*. All this I have explicitly declared in my Criticism of the Kantian philosophy, and consequently I have described my philosophy as only a consummation (*zu-Ende-denken*[1]) of his. It is, therefore, nothing wonderful if Fichte and Schelling, who likewise derived their philosophemes from Kant, show traces of the same fundamental thought, though they did nothing towards deepening and developing it; and anything they may say is to

[1] A thinking through to the end.

be regarded, therefore, as nothing but a premonition or adumbration of my doctrines. But, to take a more general view of this matter, let me say that of every great truth, before it was discovered, there is to be found an anticipation, a presage, a hazy image as through a mist, and an abortive attempt to seize it; because the onward march of time has made the due preparations. There will, therefore, always be some premonitory declarations of it. But he alone is to be called the discoverer of a truth who has known it from its grounds and thought it out in its consequences, developed its whole content, surveyed the extent of its sphere, and then, with full consciousness of its value and importance, plainly and coherently set it forth. If, however, a truth—be it yesterday or long ago—has been expressed on some occasion with only a partial sense of its value, and as it were muttered in a dream, and is to be found in some existent book when a search is afterwards made for it; even if it should be discovered there *totidem verbis*, this has scarcely more significance than if it were there *totidem litteris;* just as the discoverer of a thing is the man who, knowing its worth, picks it up and keeps it—not he who takes it by chance into his hands and drops it again; or as Columbus is the discoverer of America, and not the first shipwrecked mariner who happened to be cast by the waves upon its shores. This is the meaning of Donatus's "*Pereant qui ante nos nostra dixerunt.*"[1] If chance expressions are to be given the weight of priority against me, those who cried "plagiarism" might have gone much further back. They might have told, for instance, how Clemens Alexandrinus (*Strom.*, ii. 17) says: "Willing takes precedence of all things; for the rational powers are by nature servants of the Will." Or they might have

[1] A malison on those who said our good things before us.

quoted Spinoza's "Desire is of the very essence of every man" (*Eth.*, P. iii, prop. 57), or his words to the same effect in P. iii, prop. 9, schol. Helvetius (*De l'esprit*, iv. 7) is quite right in saying: "Il n'est point de moyens que l'envieux, sous l'apparence de la justice, n'emploie pour dégrader le mérite.....C'est l'envie seule qui nous fait trouver dans les anciens toutes les découvertes modernes. Une phrase vide de sens, ou du moins inintelligible avant ces découvertes, suffit pour faire crier au plagiat."[1] One more passage from Helvetius, but let it not be supposed that I advance it out of overweening vanity; I merely ask the reader to say whether the author is right, and I leave it to him to decide whether it applies to me or not: "Quiconque se plaît à considérer l'esprit humain voit, dans chaque siècle, cinq ou six hommes d'esprit tourner autour de la découverte que fait l'homme de génie. Si l'honneur en reste à ce dernier, c'est que cette découverte est, entre ses mains, plus féconde que dans les mains de tout autre; c'est qu'il rend ces idées avec plus de force et de netteté; et qu'enfin on voit toujours à la manière différente, dont les hommes tirent parti d'un principe ou d'une découverte, à qui ce principe ou cette découverte appartient"[2] (*De l'esprit*, iv. 1).

In consequence of the old implacable war that has always been waged by incapacity and stupidity against genius and understanding (the former represented by

[1] On pretence of being just, the envious man will employ any means to detract from merit....It is envy alone that finds all our modern discoveries in the ancients. An empty phrase, that, prior to these discoveries, was quite unintelligible, suffices to raise the cry of plagiarism.

[2] Investigators of the human mind see some five or six men of talent in every century hovering around the discovery which is finally made by the man of genius. If the honour rests with the latter, it is because this discovery is more fruitful in his hands than in those of others; because he has put the thought more forcibly and clearly; for by the different way in which men turn a principle or a discovery to account we can always tell whose it really is.

légions, the latter by a few), everyone who makes a valuable and genuine discovery has to fight stoutly against want of understanding, dulness, bad taste, private interests, and envy, all leagued together in that worthy alliance described by Chamfort where he says: "En examinant la ligue des sots contre les gens d'esprit, on croirait voire une conjuration de valets pour écarter les maîtres."[1] But besides this, I had a quite unusual enemy to fight; for many of those whose business it was to lead the judgment of the public in matters of philosophy were employed and paid to disseminate and laud to the skies the worst thing the world has ever seen—Hegelianism. But to cry up the bad is of no use, if the good is allowed at the same time to obtain some degree of circulation. This may explain to puzzled readers of the future how it was that my contemporaries knew no more about me than about the man in the moon. However, the fact that its author devoted a long life of unceasing, strenuous, and unremunerative labour to a system of thought that failed to enlist the sympathies of any of his contemporaries is a sufficient witness to its value and its truth. Not a soul gave me any encouragement; but the love of my work was the one thing that sustained me throughout a long life and kept me from tiring, and I could afford to despise the noisy fame enjoyed by the bad. For the Genius that presided at my birth gave me the option either of knowing truth and pleasing no one, or of following others and teaching the false to an applauding band of adherents; and it was not hard to choose. My philosophy had, therefore, the opposite fate of that accorded to Hegelianism—so entirely different a fate, indeed, that the two philosophies, so far

[1] The league of the foolish against the wise reminds us of servants conspiring to eject their master.

as their constitution is concerned, may be looked upon as the reverse sides of a leaf. Hegelianism, false, unintelligible, devoid alike of genius and of common-sense, and clothed moreover in a garb of the most sickening gibberish that ever was heard, became a protected and privileged University philosophy, and so its nonsense enabled its author to live. My philosophy, which was contemporary with it, possessed, indeed, all the qualities which Hegel's lacked; but it was shaped for no higher (!) aims, was totally unsuited to the Universities in their then condition, and so, to use a vulgar phrase, was "no go." Of course, therefore, Hegelianism became the standard to which everyone rallied, while my philosophy not only found no applause, no adherents, but was systematically, intentionally, and utterly ignored by all—was hushed up and, as far as possible, stifled, because its presence would have spoilt their profitable game as surely as daylight puts an end to the pictures of a magic-lantern. And so I became the man in the iron mask, or, as my good Dorguth[1] puts it, the Caspar Hauser of the professors of philosophy: I was shut out from air and light lest anyone should see me, lest my rightful claims should be asserted. But lo! their prisoner has escaped, the dead has come to life, to the consternation of the professors of philosophy, who are now at their wits' end to know what attitude they had best adopt.

[1] An early and staunch adherent of Schopenhauer's.

Chapter II.

OF PHILOSOPHY AND ITS METHOD

[2 *Par.* § 21.]

As to the various heads under which Philosophy should be divided—a very important thing in lecturing and writing—my point of view leads me to make the following suggestions.

Though Philosophy takes experience for its subject-matter, it does not, like the other sciences, take this or that definite experience, but experience in general, and as such, in regard to its possibility, its range, its essential content, its inner and outer elements, its form and matter. Philosophy must, therefore, certainly have empirical foundations, and cannot be spun out of pure abstract concepts, as I have shown in detail in the Supplements to my chief work.[1] From the nature of its subject, it follows further that philosophy must first consider the medium in which *experience in general* exhibits itself, together with the form and constitution of that medium. This medium is the presentment,[2] perceptive knowledge,[3] *i.e.* the intellect.[4] Every philosophy has, therefore, to begin by investigating the faculty of knowledge, its forms and laws, and also its sphere of action and its limits. Such an investigation constitutes a *philosophia prima.* It divides into (1) the consideration of the primary (perceptual) presentments, to which part the name *Dianoialogy* (science of the understanding) may be given; (2) into

[1] *The World as Will and Presentment.*
[2] Mental picture.
[3] The knowledge that comes through the senses.
[4] Sensation alone does not produce knowledge, which comes through the working up of the raw material of sensation by the intellect or understanding.

that of the secondary (abstract) presentments, including their systematic arrangement, which is termed *Logic* (science of the reason).[1] This general part comprises, or rather takes the place of, what used to be called *Ontology*, which professed to be the science of the most general and essential qualities of things as such; for what attaches to things only in consequence of the form and nature of our faculty of presentment—seeing that all existences that can be apprehended by this faculty must necessarily exhibit themselves under this form, and so be invested with certain qualities common to them all—used to be attributed to the things themselves. This is like attributing blueness to objects seen through blue glass.

These investigations are followed by *Metaphysics* in its narrower sense—the science which not only makes acquaintance with the existent (Nature, that is), and reduces it to order and system, but apprehends it as a given, though in some way conditioned, appearance, in which there exhibits itself an essence different from that appearance—namely, the thing-in-itself. This thing-in-itself it is that Metaphysics seeks to know more of; and this further knowledge is to be attained, partly by combining outer and inner experience; partly by getting to understand the whole appearance through discovery of its sense and inner connexion—much as we decipher the enigmatic characters of an unknown tongue. By this path Metaphysics[2] gets from the appearance to the underlying reality—to that which lies behind the appearance. It will thus divide into three parts:—

[1] The understanding apprehends percepts; it is common to animals and men. Reason, a distinctively human faculty, apprehends and deals with concepts.

[2] The name given to those books (chapters) of Aristotle which came *after* (*meta*) the books of "the Physics." The title was afterwards taken to mean that which lies beyond or behind physics.

Metaphysics of Nature,
Metaphysics of the Beautiful,
Metaphysics of Morals.

This division, however, could never have been made without taking Metaphysics for granted, for it is Metaphysics that discovers the thing-in-itself, the inner ultimate essence of the appearance, in our *Will*. Having observed how Will[1] exhibits itself in external Nature, it next investigates its quite different and immediate manifestation[2] within us, and this leads to the Metaphysics of morals. But previously to this we have to consider the completest and purest apprehension of the Will's outer (objective) appearance, and this gives the Metaphysics of the beautiful.

There can be no such thing as rational Psychology (science of the soul), for, as Kant has shown, the soul is a transcendent and therefore unproven and unjustifiable hypostasis; we therefore leave the antithesis "Spirit and Nature" to Philistines and Hegelians. The essence-in-itself of man can only be understood in conjunction with the essence-in-itself of all things, *i.e.* of the world. Hence Plato (*Phædrus*, p. 270) makes Socrates expect a negative reply to his question, "Is it possible, think you, to give a satisfactory account of the nature of the soul without ascertaining the nature of the universe?" Microcosm and macrocosm thus throw light upon each other, and prove to be essentially the same. This contemplation of man from his inner side runs through the whole of Metaphysics, and must not be made a separate science of soul, Psychology. But Anthropology *is* a separate experimental science, compounded, in part, of Anatomy and Physiology, and, in part, of merely empirical

[1] Which is primarily unconscious. [2] Conscious Will.

Psychology, *i.e.* of acquaintance—the result of observation—with (1) the moral and intellectual manifestations and peculiarities of the human race, and (2) the difference of individualities in respect of intellect and morals. The most important elements of anthropology will necessarily be taken, as empirical raw-material, from the three divisions of Metaphysics and worked up in them. That which still remains over requires a fine mind to observe and grasp it; indeed, it must be considered from a somewhat higher standpoint—I mean, from that of a certain superiority—and is therefore only to be enjoyed in the writings of distinguished men like Theophrastus, Montaigne, La Rochefoucauld, La Bruyère, Helvetius, Chamfort, Addison, Shaftesbury, Shenstone, Lichtenberg, and such; and is not to be sought—for it is there quite unbearable—in the manuals of Professors of philosophy, who, possessed of no brains themselves, dislike them in others.

Chapter III.

WILL AND NATURE

[2 *Par.* § 72.]

Instead of adopting the English plan, and demonstrating the wisdom of God from the works of Nature and the mechanical instincts of animals, we should learn from these that everything that comes about through the medium of the *presentment*, *i.e.* of the intellect—even when this intellect has risen to the heights of reason—is mere bungling as compared with that which immediately proceeds from the Will as thing-in-itself without the

intermediation of any presentment, as is the case with the works of Nature. This is the theme of my Essay on the Will in Nature, which I earnestly beg my readers to study, for therein is set forth more plainly than anywhere the real kernel of my teaching.

[2 *Par.* § 67.]

The fundamental characteristic of all things is transitoriness: we see everything in Nature, from the metal to the organism, wearing itself out and consuming itself, in part by its own existence, in part by the conflict with other existences. How, then, could Nature continue untiringly to maintain the forms, renew the individuals, and keep up the countless repetition of the life-process throughout infinite time, were it not that her inner kernel is timeless and therefore completely indestructible—a thing-in-itself differing entirely in kind from its appearances—a metaphysical entity of a nature altogether different from the physical? This is the *Will* in us and in everything.

[2 *Par.* § 66.]

When we contemplate some natural being—an animal, say—in its existence, life and actions, it lies before us, despite all that zoology and zootomy can tell us about it, as an unfathomable mystery. But would Nature—think you?—stand for ever dumb before our questionings out of pure mulishness? Is she not—like everything great—frank, communicative, and even naïve? Is it not, therefore, that she refuses to answer because the question is a wrong one—because it starts from wrong hypotheses, or contains a contradiction? For is it conceivable that there should be a concatenation of grounds and consequents which must needs remain undiscoverable for ever? Surely not! The unfathomableness, of which

we complain, must be the result of our seeking grounds and consequents in a region which knows nothing of them; and to persist in interpreting the essence of things by following up the causal chain is to go upon a completely wrong tack. For this is attempting to reach by the path of the why-rule[1] that inner essence of Nature which so obviously lies hidden behind every appearance: but the why-rule is the mere form by which our intellect apprehends the appearance, *i.e.* the outside of things; and yet we want to pass with it beyond the appearance. Within the realm of the appearance it is applicable and sufficient. For instance, it can explain the existence of a given animal—from its generation, a thing at bottom no more mysterious than the following of any other effect from its cause, where even in the very simplest case the explanation is brought up at last against the brick wall of the incomprehensible. That in generation there are a few more missing links makes no essential difference; for even if we had them, we should still be face to face with the incomprehensible. All because appearance remains appearance, and cannot become thing-in-itself.

The inner essence of things is not within the jurisdiction of the why-rule. It is the thing-in-itself, and that is *Will* pure and simple. The Will *is* because it wills, and it wills because it is. It is the absolutely real in every being.

[1] The Principle of Sufficient Reason.

BOOK II.

Chapter I.

EXTRACTS FROM "THE WILL IN NATURE"

[*W. in N.—Introduction.*]

From the empirical testimony of outsiders to the truth of my doctrines I shall here cite only such passages as bear upon the kernel and central point of my system, its Metaphysics properly so called—to wit, the paradoxical fundamental-truth that what Kant opposed as *thing-in-itself* to the mere appearance (to which appearance I give the more explicit name of "presentment") and held to be absolutely unknowable—that this thing-in-itself, I say, this substratum of all appearances, *i.e.* of all Nature, is no other than that which is immediately and perfectly familiar to us, in the inmost depths of our being, as *Will;* that consequently this *Will*, far from being, as all former philosophers assumed, inseparable from *Knowledge* and a mere result thereof, is radically different from and completely independent of knowledge (which is of quite secondary and later origin), and can therefore exist and manifest itself without it, as in point of fact it actually does in every department of Nature below the animal kingdom; that this Will, as the sole thing-in-itself, the only truly real, the alone original and metaphysical, in a world where all else is appearance merely, *i.e.* mere presentment, lends to everything whatsoever the force by which it comes to exist and

operate; consequently, that (1) not only the voluntary actions of animals, but also the organic machinery of their living body, and even its form and peculiar constitution, (2) the vegetative principle in plants, (3) aye, and in the inorganic kingdom crystallisation and every original force that manifests itself in physical and chemical phenomena, nay, even Gravity itself, are in-themselves and apart from the phenomenal appearance—which merely means, apart from our brain and its presentment — exactly identical with that which we find within ourselves as *Will*, with which *Will* we are as immediately and intimately acquainted as it is possible to be; further, that the particular manifestations of this Will are set in motion in knowing or percipient, *i.e.* animal, beings by motives, while in the organic life of the animal and the plant they are set in motion by stimuli, and in the inorganic kingdom by mere causes in the narrowest sense of the word, the difference being concerned merely with the appearance; that, on the other hand, knowledge, and its substratum the intellect, is a phenomenon totally different from Will, merely secondary, an accompaniment of none but the higher stages of the objectification of the Will, of which it forms no essential part—a phenomenon depending upon the appearance of the Will in the animal organism, and therefore physical—not metaphysical, as is the Will itself; that consequently we can never argue from absence of knowledge to absence of Will; on the contrary, the Will can be pointed to also in all appearances of unconscious Nature, whether vegetable or inorganic; hence Will is not conditioned by knowledge, as was formerly supposed on all hands, but *vice versa*.

Chapter II.

PHYSIOLOGY AND PATHOLOGY

[*W. in N.—Chapter on Physiology and Pathology.*]

The fundamental trait of my teaching, which puts it in opposition to all previous systems, is the complete separation of Will from Knowledge, which all my predecessors in philosophy looked upon as inseparable; indeed, they regarded the Will as conditioned by Knowledge (the fundamental material of our intellectual being), and even for the most part as its mere function. But this separation, this resolution of the Ego or soul, which had so long been looked upon as indivisible, into two heterogeneous elements, is to Philosophy what the decomposition of water is to Chemistry, although it may be long before this is acknowledged. With me the eternal and indestructible element in man—that which constitutes the principle of life in him—is not the soul, but, if I may be allowed a chemical expression, the radical of the soul; and this is the *Will.* The so-called soul is a compound: it is a conjunction of Will with νους, Intellect. This intellect is the secondary, the *posterius* of the organism, and is, as a mere cerebral function, conditioned by it; whereas the Will is primary, the *prius* and conditioning basis of the organism. For the Will is that essence-in-itself which in the presentment (that mere cerebral function) first comes to exhibit itself as such or such an organic body. It is only by means of the forms of knowledge (or cerebral function), *i.e.* only in the presentment, that the body of each one of us is given as something possessing extension, limbs, organs;[1] but apart from this presentment, immediately

[1] The eye is the objectified (*i.e.* brought into visibility as an object)

in self-consciousness, it is not so given. As the actions of the body are only the particular volitions (acts of Will) reflected in the presentment, so is their substratum, the fashion of this body, the image of the Will as a whole. Hence the Will is the *agens* in all the organic functions of the body, just as it is in all the external actions thereof. True Physiology, at its best, shows the spiritual[1] part in man—in other words knowledge—to be the product of his physical part: no one has proved it so conclusively as Cabanis; but true Metaphysics teaches us that this physical part is itself merely a product, or rather appearance, of a spiritual[2] (the Will)—nay, that matter itself is conditioned by the presentment, in which alone it exists. Perceivance[3] and thinking will be ever more and more explained from the organism, but willing never: on the contrary, the organism will be explained from it, as I shall show in the following chapter. The order of things according to me is, therefore, as follows: first the *Will as thing-in-itself*, completely original and underived; secondly, its mere visibility, objectification—the body; thirdly, knowledge, as a mere function of one organ of this body. This organ is the objectified Will-to-know, the Will-to-know become presentment, for the Will requires knowledge in order to carry out its ends. But this function in its turn conditions the whole world as presentment, consequently also the body itself in so far as it is perceptual object—nay, even matter at large, which exists in the presentment alone. For an objective world apart from a subject in whose consciousness it exists, is, if we think carefully, something utterly

Will-to-see; the hand, the objectified Will-to-grasp; the teeth and throat, the objectified Will-to-eat; and so on.

[1] *geistig*, in the sense of intellectual.

[2] *geistig*, in the sense of immaterial.

[3] Direct perception through the senses.

inconceivable. Knowledge and Matter (subject and object) exist, therefore, only relatively for each other, and together constitute the *appearance*. Hence, through the fundamental change introduced by me, the question stands as it never stood before.

When outwardly directed to a known object, when therefore it has passed through the medium of knowledge, we all know that the active principle is the *Will*, and give it its right name. But it is equally the Will that is active in the inner processes which precede and condition these outer actions—the processes which create and maintain organic life and its substratum; and the circulation of the blood, secretion, and digestion are likewise its work. But just because we only recognised it where, leaving the individual from which it proceeds, it directs itself to the outside world, which now for the behoof of this very individual exhibits itself in perceivance—we take knowledge to be its essential condition, its sole element, and even the very substance of which it consists, and thus is committed the greatest *ὕστερον πρότερον*[1] that the world has ever seen.

But before all we must distinguish Will from Freewill[2] (*Willkühr*) and understand that the former can exist without the latter, which of course is the keynote of my whole philosophy. Freewill is Will enlightened by knowledge; and therefore motives—presentments, that is—are its moving causes. Objectively expressed, this means that there is freewill when the influence from without, which causes the act, is conveyed through a *brain*. *Motive* may be defined as an outer stimulus, the first operation of which is to produce a *picture* in the *brain*, by means of which picture the Will consummates

[1] Reversal of the true order by placing the last first.
[2] Elective decision: not to be confused with self-determining freewill.

the real effect, an outer action of the body. But in man the place of this picture may be taken by a concept abstracted from former pictures of the kind by omission of their differences, and consequently no longer perceptual, but merely denoted and fixed by words. Since, therefore, with him the operation of motives is not confined to contact, they can measure their effective strength upon the Will against each other, *i.e.* they allow a certain choice. In the animal this choice is confined to the narrow range of view which embraces only what is *directly perceptible* to it; whereas in man it has the wide range of all that he can *think*, *i.e.* of his concepts. We call those movements voluntary, therefore, which neither, like the movements of inorganic bodies, ensue from *causes* in the narrowest sense of the word, nor from *mere stimuli*, like those of plants, but from *motives*. Motives, however, presuppose Knowledge, which is the *medium-of-motives*, behind which causality, whose complete necessity remains unimpaired, may be seen at work. Physiologically the difference between stimulus and motive may be distinguished as follows: Stimulus provokes *immediate* reaction, for this proceeds from the very part upon which the stimulus acts; whereas Motive is a stimulus which must go round through the brain, where its first effect is to produce a picture, and not until this is formed does it call forth the ensuing reaction, which is then called a volition or voluntary act of Will. The difference between voluntary and involuntary movements has consequently to do, not with the essential and primary, which in both is the Will, but only with the secondary, the evocation of the manifestation of the Will: it depends upon whether this manifestation is the result of causes proper, or of stimuli, or of motives, *i.e.* causes that have passed through knowledge. In human consciousness—which is distinguished from that of the animal by containing not

merely perceptual presentments, but abstract concepts also, which, independent of temporal distinctions, work coincidently and concomitantly, thus making deliberation, *i.e.* conflict of motives, possible—there enters freewill (in the narrowest sense of the word), "elective decision" I have called it, which, however, only consists in this—that the motive which happens to be the *most powerful* for the given individual-character overcomes the others and determines the act, as a blow is overcome by a stronger counter-blow; and thus the consequence always ensues with as complete necessity as the motion of a stone that has been struck. On this point all the great thinkers of all ages are agreed; and it is equally certain that the masses will never understand, never grasp, the great truth, that the work of our freedom is to be sought, not in the particular actions, but in our existence and essence itself. All this is set forth in the plainest way in my Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will. Accordingly the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*,[1] which is supposed to be the distinctive mark of movements that proceed from the *Will*, is altogether inadmissible; for it is an assertion of the possibility of effects without causes.

As soon, therefore, as we have arrived at distinguishing between Will and Freewill, and have come to regard the latter as a particular species, or mode of appearance, of the former, we shall find no difficulty in discovering the Will in unconscious processes also. That all movements of our body, even those that are merely vegetative or organic, proceed from the *Will*, by no means implies that they are voluntary, for that would mean that they were occasioned by motives; but motives are presentments, and their seat is the brain. Only the parts in direct nerve-connexion with the brain can be moved by it, *i.e.*

[1] Liberty of indifference, or self-determining free-will.

by motives, and such movement alone is called voluntary. The movement of the inner economy of the organism, on the other hand, is guided by *stimuli*, as is that of plants; only, that the complexity of the animal organism—a complexity such that it necessitated an outer sensorium for the apprehension of the external world and for the reaction of the Will upon this—required also a *cerebrum abdominale*, the sympathetic nervous-system, to direct in like manner the reaction of the Will upon the inner stimuli. The former may be compared to the Foreign Office, the latter to the Home Office; but the Will remains the autocrat, who is present everywhere.

The progress of Physiology since the days of Haller has put it beyond doubt, that not only the outer activities accompanied by consciousness (*functiones animales*), but also the perfectly unconscious vital-processes (*functiones vitales et naturales*), are entirely under the guidance of the *nervous-system;* and the only reason why we are conscious of the one and not of the other is, that the former are guided by nerves proceeding from the brain, the latter by nerves which do not communicate directly with that chief-centre of the nervous system whose main business it is to attend to the affairs of the outside world, but with subordinate small-centres, the ganglions (nerve-knots) and their plexuses, which superintend, as does a Governor, the various provinces of the nervous system, and regulate the inner processes that take place in response to inner stimuli (as the brain regulates the outer activities that take place in response to outer motives), and which thus receive impressions from within and thereupon duly react, as the brain receives presentments and thereupon forms its resolves; only, that each of them is confined to a narrower sphere of activity. On this depends the *vita propria* of each system, in regard to which Van Helmont said that every organ has, as it were,

its own Ego. Hence is explicable the continued life of abscised parts in insects, reptiles, and other lowly organised animals, whose brain has no considerable preponderance over the ganglions of its individual parts; as likewise the fact that many reptiles will live for weeks, and even months, after the excision of their brain. Now, as we know from the most certain experience that, in actions accompanied by consciousness and directed from the chief centre of the nervous system, the real agent, known to us in the most immediate consciousness and in a quite other way than the outside world, is *Will;* so we can hardly help coming to the conclusion that the life-sustaining actions proceeding from that very same nervous-system, only under the guidance of its subordinate centres, are likewise manifestations of the Will; especially as the reason why they are not, like the former, accompanied by consciousness, is perfectly well known to us; viz. because consciousness has its seat in the brain, and therefore is confined to those parts whose nerves go to the brain, and, even in these, ceases when these nerves are severed. This perfectly explains the difference between conscious and unconscious, and with it the difference between voluntary and involuntary in the movements of the body; and there is no further reason to assume two quite different principles of movement—especially as "principles are not to be unnecessarily multiplied." All this is so obvious that, on considering the matter without bias from this standpoint, it seems almost absurd to try and make the body serve two masters, by deriving its actions from two radically different sources and ascribing the movements of arms and legs, of eyes, lips, throat, tongue, and lungs, of facial and abdominal muscles, to the Will, and on the other hand deriving the movement of heart and veins, the peristaltic action of the bowels, the sucking of the

connivent valves and the glands, and all the movements that subserve secretion, from a quite different, unknown, and undiscoverable principle arbitrarily termed vitality, archæus, *spiritus animales*, vital force, constructive impulse, all which names amount to no more than *x*. We can hardly refuse to admit that in the organs of secretion there is a kind of choice of that which is proper to each of them—consequently a *freewill*—and that they are aided by some sort of dull sensation, which leads each of them to take from the selfsame blood only that which is suitable to it and nothing else: thus from the inflowing blood the liver absorbs bile alone and passes the rest of the blood on; the salivary glands and the pancreas, nothing but ptyalin; the kidneys, urine only—and so on. We may therefore compare the organs of secretion to different kinds of cattle browsing in the same pasture, where each one crops only the herb that corresponds to *its* appetite.

Chapter III.

COMPARATIVE ANATOMY

[*W. in N.—Chapter on Comparative Anatomy.*]

From my proposition that Kant's thing-in-itself—in other words, the ultimate substratum of every appearance—is the Will, it not only followed that the Will is the agent in all the inner unconscious functions of the organism, but likewise, that this organic body is itself nothing but the Will that has stepped into the presentment—the Will itself directly perceived in the knowledge-form of Space. I therefore said that as each particular momentary act of

Will forthwith exhibits itself immediately and infallibly, in the outer perceivance of the body, as a corporeal action, so must the entire willing of every animal, the totality of all its efforts, be faithfully reflected in the whole body, in the constitution of its organism, and that between the aims of its Will as a whole and the means for attaining them which its organisation supplies there must be the most perfect accord.....In point of fact, every organ is to be regarded as the expression of a universal, *i.e.* a once-for-all-made manifestation of the Will—of a fixed longing, a volition, not of the individual but of the species. The form of every animal is a longing of the Will-to-live—a longing called forth by circumstances: *e.g.* the Will was seized with a longing to live upon trees, to hang on their branches, to feed on their leaves, without doing battle with other animals and without ever coming down to the ground; and this longing exhibits itself throughout endless time in the form (Platonic idea) of the Sloth. It can hardly walk at all, because it is only adapted for climbing; helpless upon the ground, it is agile on trees, where it looks just like a moss-grown bough and so escapes the observation of the hunter. But let us now look at the matter in a more prosaic and methodical way.

The evident fitness, down to the minutest detail, of every animal for its mode of life, for the outer means of procuring subsistence, and the exceeding perfection of its organisation supply the richest materials for teleological speculations, to which from time immemorial the mind of man has been fond of devoting itself, and which, when extended to inanimate Nature also, have furnished the argument of the physico-theological[1] proof. The adaptation in every particular, the evident intentionality

[1] The argument from design.

in all parts of the animal organism, announces too plainly that here no chance and haphazard forces of Nature were at work, but that a Will was active, for any serious mistake ever to have been made on this head. But from the standpoint of empirical information the working of a Will can only be thought of as guided by knowledge.[1] For, as explained in the preceding chapter, my predecessors one and all regarded Will and knowledge as absolutely inseparable, and indeed took Will to be a mere operation of knowledge, this supposed basis of all that is spiritual. It was accordingly held that where Will acted, knowledge must direct it, and that consequently it directed it here also. But such is the nature of the medium of knowledge—which, as such, is essentially directed outwards—that a Will deriving its activity from it can only work outwardly, *i.e.* only from *one* being upon *another*. Hence the Will, unmistakable traces of which had been discovered, was not sought where these were found, but was transferred to without, and the animal was made the product of a foreign Will guided by knowledge, which knowledge had then to be a very clear and calculated concept of purpose, and this concept was supposed to precede the existence of the animal, and was placed, together with the Will whose product the animal is, outside it. The animal was therefore regarded as existing earlier in the presentment, than in actuality, in itself. This is the basis of the train of thought upon which the physico-theological proof depends. But this proof is not, like the ontological,[2] a mere sophism of the schools: nor does it harbour an unweariable natural adversary within itself—as does the cosmological[3] proof—in that very law

[1] The substitution of "mind" for "knowledge" may help the reader here.

[2] God can be defined; therefore he exists. To see its fallacy, think of a centaur, a mermaid.

[3] Here is the world; therefore somebody (God) made it.

of causality to which it owes its existence; but it is actually for the cultured man what the ceraunological[1] proof is for the vulgar, and its plausibility is so great, so immense, that even the most eminent and at the same time most unbiassed of minds, such as that of Voltaire, for instance, were deeply involved in it—of Voltaire, I say, who, after all sorts of other doubts, always comes back to it, sees no possibility of getting over it, and considers the evidence for it as being almost mathematical in its certainty. Even Priestley (*Disquis. on Matter and Spirit*, § 16, p. 188) declares it to be incontrovertible: Hume's reflective and sagacious mind alone stood the test. In his very interesting *Dialogues on Natural Religion* (part 7 and elsewhere), this genuine predecessor of Kant reminds us that at bottom there is no similarity whatever between the works of Nature and those of Art working in accordance with design. Where so many failed, Kant's services appear all the more brilliant, both in the *Critique of Judgment* and in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, where he severs the *nervous probandi*[2] not only of the other two proofs, but also of this exceedingly insidious one. By refuting the physico-theological proof Kant performed a great service; for nothing so militates against the true conception of Nature and the essence of things as the taking it to be the work of wise calculation. Let a Duke of Bridgewater bequeath large sums of money as prizes for the confirmation and perpetuation of such fundamental errors; but I, with no reward save that of truth, will tread in the footsteps of Hume and Kant, and work unflinchingly for their destruction. Truth is worthy of honour; not that which

[1] The proof *a terrore*, as indicated by the old saying of Petronius, "*Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor*" (Fear first brought Gods into the world).—Au.

[2] Nerve of the argument.

opposes it. Here also, however, Kant has confined himself to negative disproof; but this will not have its full effect until supplemented by a regular positive proof, which alone affords complete satisfaction and of itself drives out error; as Spinoza says, Sicut lux se ipsam et tenebras manifestat, sic veritas norma sui et falsi est.[1] First and foremost, then, I say: The world was not made by the help of knowledge—consequently not from without, but from within; and in the next place I must do all I can to show the *punctum saliens* (starting-point) of the world-egg. Evident to the uncultured understanding as may be the physico-theological view, that an Intellect must have arranged and moulded Nature, it is none the less fundamentally wrong. For the intellect is known to us from animal nature alone—consequently as an altogether secondary and subordinate principle in the world, a product of comparatively recent origin: it can therefore never have been the condition of the world's existence. Nor can a *mundus intelligibilis*[2] precede the *mundus sensibilis*,[3] since from the latter alone does the former take all its materials. It is not an Intellect that has produced Nature, but Nature that has produced the Intellect. The aboriginal is everywhere the Will, which fills all and in everything manifests itself immediately, thereby proclaiming that everything is appearance of the Will. This is just why all teleological facts find their explanation in the Will of the being itself in which they are met with.

For the rest, the physico-theological proof is already invalidated by the empirical observation, that the works done by animals from mechanical instinct—the spider's

[1] As light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so is Truth a standard both of itself and the false.

[2] Intelligible world, *i.e.* world as apprehended by the intellect.

[3] Sensible world, *i.e.* world as apprehended by the senses.

web, the bee's comb, the termite's nest, etc.—though to all appearance the result of a conception of the aim for which they are constructed—the result of foresight and rational reflection—are in fact obviously due to blind instinct, *i.e.* to a Will which has no knowledge to guide it. From this it follows that the conclusion from such things to such an origin as the proof assumes is uncertain, as is always the case when we argue from consequent to ground. An exhaustive investigation of mechanical instinct will be found in the 27th chapter of the Supplements to my chief work, and this, together with the chapter on Teleology, which precedes it, may be taken as supplementing my present remarks.

I spoke above of the fitness of the organisation or bodily structure of every animal to its mode of life, and to the procuring of means for the maintenance of its existence. On examining this matter rather more closely, the first question that meets us is: Does the mode of life depend upon the organisation, or does the organisation depend upon the mode of life? At first sight the former would seem to be the more correct assumption; for in Time bodily structure precedes mode of life, and we might think that the animal has adopted that way of life to which its conformation is best suited, and has turned to the best account the organs with which it finds itself provided. We might therefore suppose the bird to fly because it has wings, the ox to butt because it has horns; and not *vice versa*. This view is held by Lucretius (always a doubtful sign for an opinion):

> Nil ideo quoniam natum est in corpore, ut uti
> Possemus; sed, quod natum est, id procreat usum;[1]

and he enlarges upon this in Bk. iv. 825–843. But this

[1] Not with a view to use was aught prepared
In our frame; but when produced, it leads
To using.

assumption fails to explain how it is that the quite different parts of the organism of an animal correspond one and all exactly to its mode of life; that no organ interferes with another, but on the contrary each one supports the other, none remains unemployed, and no subordinate organ would serve better for another mode of life; added to which, though the main organs alone would have determined the kind of life the animal actually leads, we nevertheless see every part of the animal corresponding as nicely to every other part as it does to its mode of life: *e.g.* the claws are in every instance so arranged as to be most suitable for the grasping of the prey which the teeth are calculated to tear and crush, and the intestinal canal is able to digest; the organs of locomotion are suited to carry the animal to places where the prey is to be found; and no organ ever remains unemployed. Thus, for example, the Ant-bear not only possesses long claws on its front paws wherewith to tear open the termites' nests, but also, in order to get into them, a long cylindrical snout terminating in a small mouth furnished with a long thread-shaped viscous tongue, which it thrusts far into the nests and withdraws covered with ants; but it has no teeth, for it needs none. Who can fail to see that the form of the Ant-bear is related to termites, as a volition to its motive? At the same time, so extraordinary is the apparent contradiction between the powerful paws of the animal, with their strong, long, curved claws, and its total lack of teeth, that to a new race of rational beings unacquainted with termites a fossil Ant-bear would be an insoluble riddle. Both in birds and quadrupeds the neck is, as a rule, of the same length as the legs, thus enabling them to pick their food from the ground; but in aquatic birds it is often much longer, for they swim about and bring up their food from beneath the surface of the water. "I

have seen," says Cabanis (*Zooplast.*, 1860), "a humming-bird with a beak as long as itself, head and tail included. Now it is quite clear that this creature must get its food from some depth, were it only a deep corolla of a flower (Cuvier, *Anat. Comp.*, iv. 374); for, unless obliged, it would not have gone to the expense of such a beak, with all the inconvenience it entails." Marsh-birds have exceedingly long legs, in order to enable them to wade without drowning or getting wet, and therefore their necks and beaks are very long, and the latter are strong or weak according as they have to crush reptiles, fish, or worms, while their intestines likewise correspond always to the nature of their prey; but they have neither talons like birds of prey nor webbed feet like ducks, for the *lex parsimoniæ naturæ*[1] allows them no superfluous organ. It is just this law—coupled with the fact that no animal ever lacks an organ required for its particular way of living, but all, even the most various organs, are in agreement and as it were calculated for a quite specially determined mode of life, for the element in which the prey lives, for the pursuit, conquest, mastication, and digestion of the same—that shows us that it was the mode of life that this animal wanted to lead, in order to find its subsistence, that determined its structure, and not *vice versa;* and that things turned out just as they would have, if a knowledge of its mode of life and outer circumstances had preceded that structure, and every animal had consequently chosen its equipment prior to its incarnation; precisely as the sportsman, before setting out, chooses his equipment—gun, shot, powder, game-bag, hunting-knife, and clothing—according to the game he means to shoot. He does not shoot at a wild-boar because he carries a rifle; but he took the rifle, and

[1] Nature's law of parsimony.

not a fowling-piece, because he was going after wild-boar. So the ox does not butt because it has horns, but it has horns because it wants to butt. To complete the proof, we have this additional evidence: that in many animals, while they are still in process of growing, the effort of Will which some part is to subserve shows itself before the part is there, and thus its use precedes its existence. Thus rams, calves, and young males of several species butt with their bare polls before they have any horns; the young boar strikes sideways, though he has as yet no tusks to gore with, whereas he leaves unused the smaller teeth which he has cut already and with which he really could bite. Thus his mode of defence is not determined by the weapons he has, but by those he is going to have. Galen (*De usu partium anim.*, i. 1) had already remarked this, as had Lucretius (v. 1032–1039) before him. All this convinces us that the Will does not—as would something adventitious, something that has sprung from knowledge—take advantage of organs which it finds ready-made and make use of parts simply because they and no others exist; but that the effort to live in this way, to fight after this fashion, is primary and aboriginal —which effort exhibits itself not only in the use, but in the very existence of the weapon; so much so that the use often precedes its existence, thus showing that the weapon makes its appearance because the effort is there —not *vice versa;* and so with every part of the organism. Aristotle (*De part. animal.*, iv. 6) told us this long ago, for of stinging insects he says: "Because they have anger, they have a weapon"; and further on (c. 12), in general: "Nature creates the organ for the function; not the function for the organ." The conclusion is: The organic structure of every animal is shaped by its Will.

So evident is this truth to the thoughtful zoologist and zootomist that, unless his mind is purified by a deeper philosophy, it may lead him into strange errors, as actually happened in the case of a zoologist of the first rank, the great Lamarck, who has made his name immortal by his sagacious and admirable division of animals into *Vertebrata* and *Invertebrata*. For in his *Philosophie Zoologique*, vol. i., c. 7, and in his *Hist. nat. des animaux sans vertèbres*, vol. i., Introd. pp. 180–212, he seriously asserts and labours to prove that the form, the peculiar weapons and outwardly-directed organs of every kind in each species of animal cannot have originated with the animal, but *owe their existence* to the endeavours of its Will—endeavours called forth by the nature of its environment—and have gradually arisen (in course of time and by hereditary transmission) through its own repeated efforts and the habits consequent thereupon. Thus, according to him, aquatic birds and mammals gradually acquired webs on their feet by stretching their toes apart in swimming; marsh-birds got their long necks and long legs in consequence of wading; horned cattle gradually won their horns because, having no serviceable teeth, they fought with their heads alone, and the desire to fight in this way gradually produced horns and antlers; the snail, like other mollusks, had no horns at first, but, as it needed them to feel surrounding objects, they gradually came into existence; the whole cat-tribe developed claws in course of time because they required to tear their prey, and, since they needed to spare them as they walked and at the same time to avoid being hindered by them, they acquired sheaths and claw-contractility; the giraffe, grazing on the leaves of trees in dry grassless Africa, stretched its forelegs and neck until it attained its present strange form, twenty feet high in front. And so he goes through a multitude of

species, which he declares to be evolved on this principle; taking no heed of the obvious objection that before they had gradually, in the course of untold generations, produced the organs necessary for their subsistence, they must meanwhile have perished from want and died out. So completely are men blinded by a hypothesis that takes possession of them. This particular hypothesis, however, arose from a perfectly correct and very deep apprehension of Nature, and is an error of genius, which, notwithstanding its inherent absurdity, does Lamarck honour. The truth that lies in it belongs to him as an investigator of Nature: he rightly saw that the Will of the animal is the primary and has determined its bodily structure. The falsehood, on the other hand, is the fault of the backward condition of Metaphysics in France, where even down to the present day Locke and his feeble follower Condillac reign paramount, and therefore bodies are things-in-themselves, and Time and Space qualities of things-in-themselves; for France is a country to which the great and pregnant doctrine of the ideality of Space and Time, and consequently of all that presents itself in them, has never penetrated. Lamarck was therefore unable to think of his animals as constructed otherwise than in Time through succession. From Germany Kant's profound influence has for ever banished errors of this kind, as likewise the crass, absurd atomism of the French and the edifying physico-theological speculations of the English. So beneficent and lasting is the influence of a great mind, even upon a nation that could leave him to run after windbags and charlatans.[1] But Lamarck could never reach the thought that the Will of the animal, as thing-in-itself, lies outside time, and in this sense can be more primitive than the animal itself. He therefore assumes

[1] Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

the animal to be without definite organs at first, but also without definite strivings, and to be provided with perception alone. This perception makes it acquainted, as he supposed, with the conditions under which it has to live, and from this knowledge arise its strivings, *i.e.* its Will, while from this come finally its organs or definite corporeal-structure—and all by the help of generation, and therefore in measureless time. If he had had the courage to follow this scheme to an end, logic would have compelled him to assume a primitive animal which, originally devoid of form or organs, would afterwards have proceeded, in accordance with climatic and local conditions and the knowledge thereof, to transform itself into myriads of animal forms of every sort, from the midge to the elephant. Really and truly this primitive animal is the *Will-to-live;* as such, however, it is not physical but metaphysical. No doubt every animal species has determined its form and bodily structure by its own Will, to suit the conditions under which it willed to live; not, however, as something physical in time, but as something metaphysical outside time. Will has not proceeded from knowledge, nor did knowledge, together with the whole animal, exist before the Will came in as a mere accident, a secondary or even tertiary. No; the Will is the primary, the essence-in-itself: its appearance (mere presentment in the knowing intellect and its forms, Space and Time) is the animal, provided with all the organs which exhibit the Will-to-live-under-these-special-conditions. Among these organs is the intellect, knowledge itself, and it is, like the rest, exactly suited to the mode of life of each animal; whereas Lamarck makes the Will arise from it.

Look at the countless forms of animals, and see how each is altogether nothing but the reflected image of its willing, the visible expression of the strivings of the Will

which constitute its character. Of this diversity of characters the diversity of forms is merely the portrait. The carnivores, fashioned for fighting and preying, are provided with formidable teeth and claws, with powerful muscles: they have long sight—especially those of them which, like the eagle and the condor, have to espy their prey from dizzy heights. Timid animals, which will to find their safety in flight and not in battle, have, instead of weapons, light swift feet and sharp hearing—which in the most timid of them all, the hare, has even necessitated an extraordinary prolongation of the outer ear. To the external structure the internal corresponds: the carnivores have short intestines, the herbivores long ones, adapted to a longer process of assimilation; to great muscular strength and irratibility[1] are attached, as necessary conditions, vigorous respiration and quick circulation, represented by appropriate organs, and no contradiction is anywhere possible. Each particular striving of the Will exhibits itself in a particular modification of form. Hence *the form of the pursuer is determined by the place which the prey inhabits:* if the latter withdraws to spots difficult of access, to remote hiding-places, to night and darkness, the pursuer assumes the requisite form, and there is no shape so grotesque that the Will-to-live will not appear in it in order to attain its aims. To extract the seeds from the scales of the fir-cone, comes the crossbill (*Loxia curvirostra*), with its abnormally-shaped beak. To find the reptiles in their swamps, come marsh-birds, with exaggeratedly long legs, necks, and bills—the strangest figures. To dig out termites, comes the four-foot-long ant-bear, with its short legs, powerful claws, and long narrow muzzle, toothless but provided with a thread-shaped viscous tongue. The pelican goes

[1] That property of muscle which makes it respond to stimulus.

a-fishing with a monstrous pouch under its beak, into which it can pack a quantity of fish. To fall upon the sleepers of the night, out fly the owls, with enormously large pupils, enabling them to see in the dark, and with quite soft feathers, so that their flight may be noiseless and not waken the sleepers. The Silurus, Gymnotus, and Torpedo have brought with them a complete electrical apparatus, to stun their prey before they can secure it, and also to act as a defence against *their* pursuers. For wherever a living thing breathes, straightway there comes another to devour it,[1] and each of these is furnished with peculiar means intended and exactly calculated, as it were, for the destruction of some other creature. In the insect world, for example, ichneumons deposit their eggs, for the future sustenance of their young, in the bodies of certain caterpillars and similar larvæ, which they pierce for this purpose with their ovipositors. Now those which lay their eggs in larvæ which crawl about openly have quite short ovipositors of about one-eighth of an inch; whereas *Pimpla manifestator*, which specially affects *Chelostoma maxillosa*, whose larva lies hidden deep in old timber into which it cannot penetrate, has one of two inches in length; and almost as long is that of *Ichneumon strobillæ*, which deposits its eggs in larvæ inhabiting fir-cones. With this instrument they reach the larva, pierce it and lay an egg in the wound, which egg on hatching devours the larva (Kirby and Spence's *Introd. to Entomology*, i. 355). No less plainly does the Will-to-escape-

[1] So convinced was R. Owen of this truth that after attentive examination of the many fossil marsupials of Australia, some of which are as big as a rhinoceros, he came, as early as the year 1842, to the correct conclusion that there must have been a contemporary species of large carnivore. This has since been confirmed; for in 1846 he received a portion of the fossil skull of a carnivore as big as a lion, which he has named *Thylacoleo*, *i.e.* Pouch-lion, for it is a marsupial also. (See Owen's Lecture at the Government school of mines in the article headed "Palæontology" in the *Times* of May 19, 1860.)—Au.

an-enemy manifest itself in defensive armature. Hedgehogs and porcupines raise aloft a forest of spears. Clad in armour from head to foot, and inaccessible to tooth, beak, and claw, appear armadillos, pangolins, tortoises, and likewise upon a small scale the whole class of crustaceans. Others have sought to defend themselves, not by physical resistance but by baffling the pursuer: thus the cuttlefish has provided itself with a substance adapted for the raising of a dark cloud, which in the moment of danger it spreads around it; the sloth deceptively resembles a moss-clad bough; the tree-frog, a leaf; and vast numbers of insects resemble their surroundings; the louse of the negro is black. True, our flea is black too, but it trusted to its prodigious and erratic leaps, when it devoted to them an apparatus of such unexampled power. But the anticipation found to exist in all these preparations will become comprehensible to us when we examine that which manifests itself in mechanical instinct. The young spider and ant-lion have as yet no knowledge of the prey for which they construct their first traps. And so of defensive measures: according to Latreille, the Bombex stings the Parnope to death, although it neither eats nor is attacked by it; but it does so because the Parnope will by and by lay its eggs in the nest of the Bombex and thus hinder the development of its eggs—though of this it knows nothing as yet. In such anticipations is once more confirmed the ideality of time, which invariably comes to the fore whenever the Will as thing-in-itself is in question. In the matters here touched upon, and in many others as well, the mechanical instinct of animals and the physiological functions throw light upon each other, because in both Will without knowledge is at work.

Not only has the Will provided itself in each animal form with every organ and every weapon for offence and

defence, but it has also provided itself with an *Intellect*, whereby to maintain the individual and the species; hence the ancients called the intellect the ἡγεμονικον, *i.e.* the director and leader. The intellect is accordingly destined solely for the service of the Will, to which it is always exactly suited. Carnivores needed it more, and have evidently far more of it, than herbivores. The elephant, and to a certain extent the horse also, are exceptions; but the marvellous intelligence of the elephant was necessary because, with its life-term of two hundred years and its very slow rate of increase, provision had to be made for the longer safeguarding of the individual—and that in countries which swarm with the greediest, sturdiest, and most active beasts of prey. The horse, too, has a longer term of life and a slower rate of increase than the ruminants: besides which, having no horns, tusks, or trunk, and no weapon of offence except its hoofs, it needed more intelligence and greater swiftness in order to escape its pursuers. The extraordinary intelligence of apes was necessary, partly because, with a duration of life that even in those of moderate size reaches to fifty years, they have a slow rate of increase, producing only a single young one at a time; but mainly because they have *hands*, which had to be directed by an intellect that knew how to use them properly, both for defence by means of extraneous weapons such as sticks and stones, and also for the procuring of food, which necessitates all sorts of artificial devices, chief among which stands an elaborately-organised system of robbery, in which they aid each other, passing the stolen fruit from hand to hand, posting sentries, etc. It should be observed that this intelligence belongs chiefly to their period of youth, in which the muscular powers are still undeveloped: *e.g.* the young pongo, or orang-outang, has in its youth a relatively preponderant brain and much greater intelli-

gence than in its adult state, when the muscular powers have reached their full development and take the place of the intellect, which accordingly sinks very low. This applies to all apes: the intellect thus comes in here as a temporary substitute for the future muscular powers. Speaking generally, there is a gradual rise of intelligence in mammals from the rodents, who in this respect occupy the lowest place, through the pachyderms and carnivores, to the quadrumana, who stand highest; and this result of empirical observation is confirmed by anatomy, which shows (according to Flourens and Cuvier) that the gradual development of the brain follows the same order. Of reptiles, snakes are the most intelligent, and they can even be trained: they need intelligence because they are predatory[1] animals and increase but slowly—especially the venomous kinds, which are less prolific than the others. As in regard to physical weapons, so also in respect of intelligence we everywhere find the Will to be the *prius*, and its tool, the Intellect, the *posterius*. Carnivores do not hunt, nor do foxes steal, because they have more intelligence; but it is because they willed to live by hunting and stealing that they possess not only stronger teeth and claws, but also more intelligence. The fox has more than made up for his deficiency in power of muscle and strength of teeth by exceeding acuteness of intellect. We have a peculiar illustration of our theme in the Dodo (*Didus ineptus*), a bird which used to live in the island of Mauritius, and which has died out, as everyone knows: its Latin specific-name shows that it was remarkably stupid, which explains its extinction. In this case it seems that for once Nature carried her *lex parsimoniæ*

[1] Among birds, too, none are so intelligent as the birds of prey, many of which—falcons especially—are susceptible of a high degree of training.—Au.

too far, and brought forth a kind of abortion in the species (as she often does in the individual), which, as such, could not survive. If anyone should be led to ask whether Nature should not have given insects as much intelligence as might suffice at least to keep them from rushing into the flame of the candle, the answer is: Why should she?—seeing that she did not know that men would mould and light candles, and *Natura nihil agit frustra*.[1] Hence the intelligence of insects does not extend to a wholly unnatural environment.[2]

Intelligence no doubt depends first of all everywhere upon the cerebral system, and this stands in necessary relation to the rest of the organism; hence cold-blooded animals are far inferior to the warm-blooded, and invertebrates to vertebrates. The organism, however, is simply the Will become visible; to which Will, as the absolute primary, everything constantly points back: its needs and ends supply in every appearance the measure for the means, and these cannot fail to be in mutual agreement. The plant has no apperception,[3] because it has no locomotivity; for of what use would apperception have been if it did not enable it to seek the beneficial and shun the noxious?—and, conversely, locomotivity would avail it nothing in the absence of apperception to direct its steps. Therefore in the plant we do not yet find the inseparable dyad of Sensibility and Irritability; but it slumbers in its groundwork, the reproductive faculty,[4] in which alone the Will here objectifies itself. The sunflower, and every flower, desires light; but its movement towards the light is not yet separated from its perception

[1] Nature does nothing in vain.

[2] The reason why slaves are almost always negroes is because they have less intelligence than the rest of the human race—not that this justifies slavery.—Au.

[3] Perception, with the added consciousness that it is *I* who perceive.

[4] Vegetative life.

of it, and both coincide with its growth. In man the Understanding,[1] which in him is so greatly superior to that of all other beings, is fortified by the addition of Reason (the faculty of non-perceptual presentments, *i.e.* concepts—reflection, power of thought), which, however, is only just proportionate (1) to his needs, which far exceed those of animals, and to the increase of which there is no limit; (2) to his total lack of natural weapons and natural covering, and to his relatively weaker muscular powers, in respect of which he is greatly inferior to apes of the same stature, and likewise to his incapacity for flight, since all four-footed animals are swifter; and (3) to his slow rate of increase, his protracted childhood and lengthy term of life, which make the safeguarding of the individual necessary. All these important requirements had to be covered by intellectual powers, and it is for this reason that they are so preponderant in man. But everywhere we find the Intellect to be secondary and subordinate, its vocation being merely to serve the ends of the Will. Faithful to this vocation, it remains as a rule always in the service of the Will. In particular cases, however, an abnormal preponderance of cerebral life makes it break away from this service, and there ensues pure objective knowing, which may rise even to genius, as I have described at length in the Third Book (the æsthetic portion) of my chief work, and later in the *Parerga*, ii. §§ 51–58 and § 210.

If now, after all these observations on the complete agreement between the Will and the bodily structure of every animal, we go through a well-arranged osteological collection from this point of view, we shall seem to see one and the same being (Lamarck's aboriginal animal—more properly, the Will-to-live) changing its form in

[1] That faculty of the mind which apprehends outer objects.

accordance with circumstances and producing, from the same number and arrangement of its bones, by the lengthening and shortening, strengthening and stunting of the same, all this multiplicity of forms. This number and arrangement of bones, which Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire (*Principes de philosophie zoologique*, 1830) calls the "anatomical element," remains in all essential points —as he has exhaustively proved—unchanged throughout the whole series of vertebrates: it is a constant quantity, a datum absolutely given beforehand and irrevocably established by an inscrutable necessity, and I would compare its immutability to the persistence of matter under all physical and chemical changes. To this point I shall return presently. In conjunction with this invariability of order and arrangement, however, we find the greatest variability, plasticity, and ductility of these same bones, as well in regard to size and shape as to the ends to which they are applied—all this being determined, as we see, with aboriginal power and freedom by the *Will*, in conformity with the ends prescribed to it by external conditions: it makes of them whatever is required by its need of the moment. If it wills to clamber on trees as an ape, it forthwith seizes the boughs with four hands, and in so doing stretches the *ulna* and *radius* very considerably; at the same time lengthening the *os coccygis* to an ell-long prehensile tail, with which to hang on the boughs and swing from one to another. Contrariwise, it shortens these arm-bones out of all recognition, if it wills to crawl as a crocodile in the mud, or to swim as a seal, or to dig as a mole—in which last case it broadens out the *metacarpus* and *phalanges* into enormous shovel-paws at the expense of all the other bones. But if it wills to traverse the air as a bat, not only are the *os humeri*, *radius*, and *ulna* prodigiously prolonged, but the *carpus*, *metacarpus*, and *phalanges*

digitorum, which in other animals are quite small and subordinate, extend themselves, as in the vision of St. Anthony, to a monstrous length exceeding that of the creature's body, and are bespread with a wing-membrane. Or if, in order to browse as a giraffe on the crowns of Africa's trees, it places itself on immensely high fore-legs, those same invariable seven cervical vertebræ, which in the mole were so crowded up together as to be unrecognisable, are now prolonged to such an extent that here too, as always, the length of the neck equals that of the fore-legs, so that the animal can reach down to drink. When, however, it appears as an elephant, a long neck could not possibly bear the weight of the enormous massive head, with its added burden of fathom-long tusks, and so this member remains exceptionally short and it helps itself out with a trunk, which it lets down to the earth to draw up food and water, and also rears to the tops of trees. In harmony with all these changes we see the skull, the receptacle of the intellect, expanding, developing, arching, in proportion as the more or less difficult way in which the animal procures its subsistence requires more or less intelligence; and the practised eye can clearly determine its different degrees of intellect from the amount of arching.

Now it must be admitted that this "anatomical element," which I spoke of above as being firmly fixed and unchangeable, remains a puzzle, inasmuch as it does not fall within the province of teleological explanation, which cannot begin until we take this element for granted; for in many cases the organ under observation would have served its purpose equally well with a different number and arrangement of bones. We perfectly understand, for instance, why the human cranium is composed of eight bones, viz. to admit of compression at birth by means of the fontanelles; but we do not see why the

chick, which breaks through its egg, should have the same number of cranial bones. We must therefore assume that this anatomical element depends partly upon the unity and identity of the Will-to-live in general, and partly upon the circumstance that the primary forms of animals have proceeded one from the other (*Parerga*, ii. § 93), and therefore the fundamental type of the whole race was kept. Aristotle's expression for this anatomical element is "necessary Nature," and the variability of its forms according to the ends in view he calls "Nature guided by reason" (see the close of his *De partibus animalium*, iii. 2), and he explains that in horned cattle the material for the upper incisors has gone to the making of the horns: quite rightly; for only those ruminants that have no horns, such as the camel and the musk-deer, have upper incisors, whereas in all that possess horns these are wanting.

There is no hypothesis which explains the exact correspondence of the osseous structure of the animal to its aims and outer conditions of life, and also the amazing adaptation and harmony in the mechanism of its inner economy, half so well, as the truth (which has been already established by me elsewhere) that the body of the animal is nothing but its *Will itself* viewed as presentment—consequently under the forms of space, time, and causality—in the brain; that is, the mere visibility, objectivity, of the Will. For under this supposition everything in and about it must conspire to the ultimate aim, the life of this animal. Thus nothing useless, nothing superfluous, nothing deficient, nothing ill adapted, nothing insufficient or imperfect of its kind, will be found in it; but everything necessary must exist, just so far as it is necessary, but no farther. For here artist, work, and material are one and the same. Therefore every organism is an exceedingly perfect masterpiece.

The Will has not here first cherished its purpose, known its end, and then accommodated the means to this end and subdued the material; but its willing is immediately the end and immediately the attainment: it consequently needed no foreign means, which had first to be overcome, but here willing, doing, and attaining were one and the same. Therefore the organism stands there as a marvel, and is not to be compared with any human work elaborated by the lamplight of knowledge.

Our wonderment at the infinite perfection and suitability to their purpose displayed in the works of Nature comes in reality from our regarding them from the point of view of our own works. In these the Will-to-work and the work are two separate things, to begin with; next, between these two lie two other things, (1) the medium of presentment, which is foreign to the Will as such, and through which the Will has to pass before it takes actual shape[1] in the world, and (2) the material, which is foreign to the Will here acting, and upon which a foreign form has to be forced—a form against which it struggles, because it already belongs to another Will, viz. to its natural constitution, its *forma substantialis*,[2] the (Platonic) idea that expresses itself in it. This material must first be overcome, and, no matter how deeply the artificial form may have penetrated, it will continue to struggle against it within. With the works of Nature all is quite different; for they are not, like ours, a mediate, but an immediate manifestation of the Will. Here the Will is acting in its original condition, *i.e.* without knowledge: Will and work are separated by no mediating presentment; they are one. And the very material is one with them; for Matter is the mere visibility of the Will.

[1] Only by passing through the intellect does the invisible Will become visible.

[2] Substantial or essential form.

Consequently we here find matter thoroughly permeated by form, or rather they have an identical origin, exist only for each other, and are in so far one. That even here (in Nature's works) we separate them, as we do in a work of art, is a mere abstraction. Pure absolute matter, devoid of form and quality, which we conceive as the material from which Nature's product is made, is a mere figment of the mind and can be present in no experience; whereas the material of a work of art is empirical (*i.e.* already formed) matter. Identity of form and matter is the distinguishing mark of the product of Nature; diversity of these, that of the product of art.

That is a great truth which Bruno (*De immenso et innumerabili*, 8, 10) proclaims: "Art handles alien matter; Nature, its own. Art deals with matter from without; Nature is within matter."....

If we would understand the working of Nature, we must avoid attempting to explain it by a comparison with our works. The true essence of every animal form is an act of Will outside the presentment, and consequently outside its forms (Space and Time)—an act which for this very reason knows no succession and concomitancy, but has indivisible unity. But if that form is apprehended by our cerebral perceivance, and its interior parts dissected with the scalpel, there then comes to the light of knowledge that which, though originally and in-itself foreign to the mind and its laws, must needs now present itself there—of course in accordance with the mind's forms and laws. The original unity and indivisibility of this act of Will, of this truly metaphysical being, now appears lengthened out into a concomitancy of parts and a succession of functions, which nevertheless exhibit themselves as strictly bound one to the other, mutually helping and supporting each other as means and end. The understanding that apprehends this is amazed at the

marvellous (*tief durchdachte*) arrangement of parts and combination of functions, because, when it perceives how the restoration of the original unity from the multiplicity which its own knowledge-forms first introduced is effected, it cannot help concluding that this animal-form arose in the same manner. We now see the meaning of the great Kantian doctrine, that the suitableness of things to their end is first brought into Nature by the understanding, which accordingly stands amazed before a miracle of its own creating. (Cf. *W. as W. and P.*, Supp. p. 375.) If I may venture to explain so deep a matter by a trivial simile, the understanding is here in the position of a mind which is astonished at finding that, on adding the digits of all multiples of 9, it gets 9 again or a number whose digits added together come to 9, although it has prepared this marvel for itself in the decimal system.

The physico-theological argument holds that the world existed in an intellect before it really existed: a world in which means are adapted to ends must, it says, have existed as presentment before actually existing itself. But I say with Kant: A world that exists as presentment *must* look as if means were adapted to ends; and this notion of adaptation arises first in our intellect.

It follows, of course, from my doctrine, that every being is its own work. Nature, which can never lie and is as naïve as genius, says the same thing straight out; for every being can only kindle the spark of life in another being which is exactly like it, and then makes itself before our eyes, taking the material for this being from without, and the form and motion from itself: this we call growth and development. But we do not understand Nature's speech, because it is too simple.

Chapter IV.

THE PHYSIOLOGY OF PLANTS

[*W. in N.—Chapter on the Physiology of Plants.*]

The reluctance of [modern] writers to attribute Will to plants, notwithstanding the actual empirical evidence of it, proceeds from their still labouring under the old delusion that consciousness is a requirement and condition of Will—and of course plants have no consciousness. It never occurred to them that the Will is the primary, and therefore independent of knowledge, with which, as the secondary, consciousness first enters. Of knowledge, presentment, plants have merely an analogon, a surrogate; whereas Will they have actually and quite immediately, for it, as thing-in-itself, is the substratum of their, as of every appearance. Proceeding realistically, and therefore starting from the objective, we may also say: When that which lives and moves in vegetable Nature and the animal organism has gradually climbed to a point, in the hierarchy of beings, at which the light of knowledge falls immediately upon it, it exhibits itself, in the consciousness that now arises, as Will, and is here more immediately, and consequently better known than anywhere else; and this knowledge must therefore supply the key to the understanding of every being that stands lower on the scale; for in this knowledge the thing-in-itself is veiled by no other form save the single one of the most immediate perception. This immediate perception of our own willing has been called the "inner sense." In-itself the Will is without perception, and so remains in the inorganic kingdom and in that of plants. As the world would be dark notwithstanding the sun, if there were no bodies to reflect its light; or, as the

vibration of a string requires air, and even some kind of resonance-box, in order to become sound; so does the Will first become conscious of itself by the advent of knowledge—Knowledge being, as it were, the resonance-box of the Will, and Consciousness the resulting tone. This coming of the Will to a consciousness of itself has been ascribed to the so-called "inner sense," because it is our first and most immediate knowledge. The only things cognisable by this inner sense are the various affections of our own Will: for mental picturing cannot itself be done twice over; at most it can only come a second time into consciousness in rational reflection (that second power of the presentment), *i.e. in abstracto.* Hence simple mental-picturing (direct perceiving) is related to thinking proper, *i.e.* to knowing in abstract concepts, as willing-in-itself is to awareness of this willing, *i.e.* to consciousness. Therefore perfectly clear and distinct consciousness, both of our own existence and of that of other beings, enters first with Reason (the faculty of concepts), which raises man as high above the animal as the merely perceptual faculty of presentment of the animal raises it above the plant. Now that which, like the plant, has no presentment we call unconscious, and we regard it as differing but little from the non-existent; for its existence[1] is really only in the consciousness of some other being, whose presentment it is. It, however, does not lack the primary of existence, the Will, but only the secondary; yet without this the primary, which nevertheless is the being of the thing in-itself, seems to us to pass over into nothingness. Immediately we cannot clearly distinguish an unconscious existence from non-existence, although we have an empirical example of it in deep sleep.

[1] Existence as an object, that is.

If the reader remembers from the last chapter that the faculty of knowledge, like every other organ, has only come into being in order to preserve the animal, and therefore stands in exact relation—a relation admitting of countless gradations—to the needs of each species, he will then understand that the plant, having so much fewer needs than the animal, requires no knowledge. Therefore, as I have often said, knowledge is, on account of its being that which conditions movement in response to motives, the true and essentially distinguishing characteristic of animality. Where animality ceases, knowledge proper, whose nature is so well known to us from our own experience, disappears, and we can henceforth only make comprehensible to ourselves by analogy that which intervenes between the influence of the outside world and the movements of beings,[1] while the Will, which we have recognised as the basis and kernel of every being, always and everywhere remains one and the same. At the lower grade of the plant-world, as also of the vegetative life in the animal organism, the place of knowledge is taken by *Stimulus*, which now determines the particular manifestations of this omnipresent Will, and becomes the mediator between the outside world and the changes of the being in question [*i.e.* plant or internal animal-organ]; and at the lowest grade of all, the inorganic world, knowledge is replaced by Physical Influence of some kind. Thus Stimulus in the first case, and, in the second, Physical Influence of some kind, exhibits itself—when we look, as we do here, from above to below—as a surrogate of knowledge, and consequently as something analogous thereto. We cannot say that plants really perceive light and sun: only, we see that in various ways they feel their presence or absence—that they bend and turn towards them; and even admitting that this motion does for the most part

[1] Comprehensive term for things animate and inanimate.

coincide with their growth, as the moon's rotation with its orbital course, yet, like this, it is none the less present, and the direction of that growth is as much determined and systematically modified by light as is an action by a motive, while the place and form of climbers is likewise determined by the support they chance to find. Since, then, the plant *has* needs, although not such as make the paraphernalia of a sensorium and intellect necessary, it must have, in place of this, something analogous thereto which shall enable the Will, if not to seek, at any rate to grasp the satisfaction offered to it. Such a thing is the susceptibility to *stimulus*, whose difference from knowledge I should like to express as follows: In knowledge the motive that appears as presentment, and the consequent volition, *remain distinctly separate one from the other*, and all the more distinctly the more perfect the intellect is; whereas, in mere susceptibility to stimulus, perception of the stimulus is no longer distinguishable from the willing excited by it, and both melt into one. Finally, in inorganic Nature, susceptibility to stimulus, the analogy of which to knowledge is not to be mistaken, also ceases: there remains, however, a different reaction of every body to the influence acting upon it, and this, from our standpoint, which follows things from above to below, still exhibits itself here also as a substitute for knowledge. If the body reacts in a different way, it can only be that the influence is different and provokes a different affection in it, which, notwithstanding its indistinctness, has yet a distant analogy to knowledge. Thus if, for example, pent-up water finally discovers an outlet, upon which it seizes with avidity and through which it pours furiously, it has, of course, no knowledge of this outlet, any more than the acid has perception of the alkali which is brought into contact with it, and for which it lets go the metal, or than the fragment of paper perceives the rubbed amber

to which it leaps; and yet we cannot but admit that that which in all these bodies causes such sudden changes must always have a certain resemblance to that which takes place in us on the advent of an unexpected motive. Considerations such as these have hitherto served me as evidence of the *Will* in all things; but I now employ them as showing the sphere to which *Knowledge* proves itself to belong when regarded, not in the usual manner from within, but realistically as a foreign object from an outside standpoint, *i.e.* when we take the objective point of view, which is of such extreme importance as a supplement to the subjective. (Cf. *W. as W. and P.*, Supp., ch. xxii., "Objective View of the Intellect.") We see that it then presents itself as the *medium of motives*, *i.e.* of causality acting upon the percipient being; in other words, as that which receives changes from without, whereupon a change must follow within—the mediator between the two.[1] Now upon this slender line hangs the *world as presentment*, *i.e.* the whole material-world stretched out in space and time, which material-world *as such* can no more be present elsewhere than in the brain, than can dreams, which for the time of their duration have a precisely similar existence. The same office which is performed for animals and men by knowledge as the medium of motives, is performed for plants by sensibility to stimulus, and for inorganic bodies by susceptibility to causes of every kind; and in each case the difference is, strictly speaking, one of degree only. For it is only because the animal's needs have raised its susceptibility to outer impressions to a point at which a nervous system and brain must perforce develop themselves for the satisfaction of these needs, that there arises, as a function of this brain, consciousness, and in it the objective world,

[1] *I.e.* between the external cause (motive) and the internal effect (volition or act of Will).

whose forms (time, space, and causality) are the way in which this function is performed. We thus find knowledge to be originally calculated entirely for the subjective—to be determined merely for the service of the Will, and consequently of a quite secondary and subordinate character; nay, as if it only entered *per accidens*, so to speak, as the condition of the influence of bare motives instead of stimuli—this influence becoming necessary at the stage of animality. The picture of the world in space and time which now comes into being, is merely a field on which motives exhibit themselves as ends: it also conditions the spatial and causal interconnexion of the objects contemplated, and yet is merely the mediator between the motive and the act of Will. But what a leap it would be to take this picture of the world which thus accidentally arises in the intellect, *i.e.* in the cerebral function of animal beings, through the means to their ends presenting themselves to them and so becoming a light to the steps of these ephemeræ upon their planet—to take, I say, this picture, this mere cerebral phenomenon, for the real ultimate essence of things (thing-in-itself), to regard the concatenation of its parts as the absolute order of the world (relations of things-in-themselves), and to assume that all this also exists independently of the brain! Surely this assumption would seem to be in the highest degree over-hasty and presumptuous, and yet it is the foundation whereon all the systems of pre-Kantian *Dogmatism* are reared; for it is taken for granted in all their ontology, cosmology, and theology, as well as in the *æternæ veritates* to which these appeal. But this leap was always taken tacitly and unconsciously: to have made us plainly aware of it is Kant's immortal achievement.

Through our present realistic way of looking at things we thus unexpectedly gain the *objective standpoint* for Kant's great discoveries, and arrive on the empirical-

physical path at the spot from which his transcendental-critical investigation starts. For the latter takes the *subjective* for its standpoint, and regards consciousness as given; but from consciousness itself and its *a priori* ordering, the conclusion is reached that all that takes place in it can be nothing but mere appearance. We, on the contrary, from our outside realistic standpoint, which takes the *objective*, the beings in Nature, as the absolutely given, see what the intellect is so far as its aims and origin are concerned, and to what class of phenomena it belongs; and hence we know *a priori* that it *must* be confined to mere appearances, and that what exhibits itself in it can never be other than something which in the main is *subjectively* conditioned, *i.e.* a *mundus phænomenon*[1]—the order of the nexus of its parts being likewise subjectively conditioned—and can never be a knowledge of things-in-themselves and of the connexion of things-in-themselves. For in the system of Nature we have found the faculty of knowledge to be a conditioned thing, and its statements can for this very reason never have unconditioned validity. On rising from the perusal of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, to which our standpoint is essentially foreign, the student who has understood it will, however, still feel as if Nature had purposely designed the intellect for a puzzle-glass, and as though she were playing hide and seek with us. But we, on our realistic-objective path, *i.e.* starting from the objective world as our datum, have now reached the same conclusion at which Kant arrived on the idealistic-subjective path, *i.e.* through contemplation of the intellect itself as constituting consciousness; and we have discovered that the world-as-presentment hangs on the slender line between the external cause (motive) and the effect

[1] Phenomenal world—world of appearances.

produced (act of Will) in the knowing (animal) being, in whom the distinct separation of the two first arises. *Ita res accendunt lumina rebus.*[1] Not until it has been reached by two quite opposite paths does Kant's grand conclusion become perfectly plain, nor does his whole meaning become clear until it is thus illuminated from two sides. Our objective standpoint is a realistic and therefore conditioned one, inasmuch as, taking the beings in Nature as given, it omits to take account of the fact that their objective existence presupposes an intellect whose presentment they are in the first instance; but Kant's subjective and idealistic standpoint is likewise conditioned, inasmuch as with him a start is made from the intelligence, which, however, itself presupposes Nature, for it is only in consequence of having pushed development so far as to reach animal existences that intelligence was able to enter.

Holding fast to this realistic-objective standpoint of ours, we may say of Kant's doctrine that after Locke, in order to know things-in-themselves, had withdrawn from things-as-they-appear the contribution made by the functions of sense, the secondary qualities as he called them, Kant with far greater acumen withdrew that much more considerable contribution made by the cerebral function, viz. that which constitutes Locke's primary qualities. But all I have done here is to show why all this must be so; and I have done it by pointing out the place taken by the intellect in the complex of Nature when one starts realistically from the objective as given —taking, however, that which alone is quite immediately known to us, the Will, that true που στω[2] of Metaphysics, for my support, as the primary reality, of which all else is mere appearance.

[1] Thus does one thing throw light upon another.

[2] Give me, said Archimedes, a που στω—a place whereon to stand, and with a lever I will move the world.

There are a few matters that require further explanation. For instance, I said above that where knowledge exists, the motive that appears as presentment and the resulting volition *are distinguished one from the other the more distinctly* the more perfect the intellect is, *i.e.* the higher we go in the scale of beings. In explanation of this I would say: Where, as in plants, the Will's activity still proceeds from a mere stimulus and does not yet become a presentment, there is no line of demarcation between the reception of the impression and the being-determined-by-that-impression. In the lowest animal intelligences of all, such as the *Radiaria*, *Acalepha*, and *Acephala*, etc., things are but little different: a feeling of hunger, a vigilance consequent thereupon, a perception of the prey and a snap at it, still constitute the whole content of consciousness; and yet there is here a first dawning of the world as presentment, whose background, *i.e.* all except the motive which is acting on each occasion, still remains perfectly dark. Consequently the sense-organs are here very imperfect and incomplete, for they only have to afford to an embryonic understanding excessively few perceptual data. Wherever there is sensibility, however, it is always accompanied by an understanding, *i.e.* a faculty for connecting the perceived effect with an external cause; failing which, sensibility would be superfluous and only a source of aimless pains. As we ascend in the series of animals, the senses become more numerous and more perfect, until we get all five: these are possessed by a few invertebrates, but it is only in the vertebrates that we can say they are always present. To this development of the senses corresponds that of the brain, and its function, the understanding: the object now presents itself more plainly and perfectly, and is even seen to be in connexion with other objects, for such connexions now begin to be apprehended for the service of the Will; in

this way the world of presentment gains a certain extent and background. Still, apprehension never goes beyond what is required for the service of the Will: perception and the being-solicited-thereby are not completely separated; the object is only apprehended in so far as it is motive. Even the cleverer animals see in objects only that which concerns them, *i.e.* has connexion with their willing, or at any rate may have some connexion at a future date: *e.g.* cats will take trouble to obtain accurate knowledge of locality, and foxes to seek out hiding-places for the booty of the future. But to everything else they are insusceptible: perhaps no animal has ever yet seen the starry heaven; my dog sprang back in affright when by accident he first caught sight of the sun. Only in the very cleverest animals, that have been educated by taming, do we sometimes see the first weak traces of disinterested contemplation of their surroundings: dogs will go so far as to stare, and we see them seat themselves in the window and attentively watch all that goes on; monkeys, too, sometimes look about them as though they were trying to think about their environment. But not until we come to man is there complete separation between motive and action, presentment and Will. This, however, does not at once abolish the servitude of the intellect to the Will. The ordinary man still clearly apprehends in things only that which directly or indirectly has some connexion with him, interest for him: for all other things his intellect is invincibly lazy; they therefore remain in the background, and do not come brightly and clearly into consciousness. Whatever he may do, he remains a stranger to philosophic wonderment and artistic rapture; at bottom everything appears to him to be a matter of course. Complete detachment and separation of the intellect from the Will and its service is the prerogative of genius, as I have shown in detail in the æsthetic

portion of my work. Genius is objectivity. The pure objectivity and distinctness with which things present themselves in perceivance (that fundamental and most essential kind of knowledge) is always in inverse proportion to the interest taken in these things by the Will, and will-less knowing is the condition—nay, the very essence of all æsthetic apprehension. Why is this landscape by an ordinary painter so bad, notwithstanding all the trouble he has taken with it? Because to his eyes it is not more beautiful. And why is that? Because his intellect is not sufficiently separated from his Will. The amount of this separation sets great intellectual differences between man and man; for knowledge is the purer, and consequently the more objective and correct, just in proportion as it has freed itself from the Will; as that fruit is best which has no taste of the soil in which it grew.

So important and interesting is this matter that it is worth while to make it plainer by casting our eye over the whole scale of beings, thus representing to ourselves the gradual transition from the unconditionally subjective to the highest degree of objectivity of the intellect. We have the unconditionally subjective in inorganic Nature, in which there is as yet not the smallest trace of any consciousness of the outside world. Stones, stocks, blocks of ice, even if they fall upon one another, or knock or rub against each other, have no consciousness of each other or of an external world. And yet they too experience an influence from without, which varies according to their position and movement, and may therefore be regarded as the first step towards consciousness. Again, though plants have no consciousness of the external world, and the mere analogon of a consciousness that is present in them can only be conceived as a dim feeling of self-enjoyment; yet we see them all seeking the light, many of them daily turning their flowers or leaves to

the sun, climbers making their way to a support which is not in contact with them, and some species exhibiting even a kind of irritability. Unquestionably, therefore, there is a connective relation between their environment (even when they are not in actual contact with it) and their movements, and this relation we must accordingly recognise as a weak analogue of perception. Not, however, until we come to animals do we find decided perception, *i.e.* consciousness of other things as contradistinguished from that distinct consciousness of self which first arises therefrom. This is the distinguishing characteristic of animality as contrasted with plant-nature. In the lowest classes of animals this consciousness of the outside world is very limited and dim: it becomes more distinct and extended as we rise on the scale of intelligence, each higher degree of intelligence being adjusted to the degree of the animal's needs; and so it goes on, getting ever clearer with each successive step up the long ladder of the animal series, until in man the consciousness of external objects attains its maximum, and the world consequently presents itself therein more plainly and completely than anywhere else. But even here the clearness of consciousness still has innumerable grades, ranging from that of the stupidest blockhead to that of the genius. In ordinary minds the objective perception of external objects has still a considerable tinge of subjectivity, and knowing continues to show that it exists merely for the behoof of willing. The more eminent the mind, the more it loses this trace of subjectivity, and the more purely objective is the presentation of the outside world, until at last in the genius it reaches perfect objectivity, by means of which the Platonic ideas emerge from the particular things, because that which apprehends them has now risen to be pure subject of knowing. Now since perceivance is the basis of all knowledge, it follows that

thought and insight will feel the influence of this radical difference in its quality, and hence arises that complete diversity in the whole manner of apprehension which invariably distinguishes the common from the eminent mind—I mean the dull gravity, akin to that of the animal, which is characteristic of the ordinary mind that knows only for the behoof of willing, as opposed to the constant frolic with the surplus knowledge that brightens the consciousness of superior minds. It is no doubt from contemplation of the two extremes of the long ladder of intelligence, as here set forth, that the hyperbolical expression "block" or "blockhead" (*Klotz*), as applied to men, has arisen.

But this separation of intellect from Will, and consequently of motive from action—a separation which first appears distinctly in man—leads to a consequence of another kind, viz. the delusive appearance of freedom in individual actions. When causes produce their effect in inorganic objects, and when stimuli produce theirs in plants, the causal nexus is so simple that there is not the smallest appearance of freedom. But in animal life—where that which up to now was cause or stimulus appears as motive, and consequently a second world, the world of presentment, comes into existence, and the cause lies in one sphere, the effect in another—the causal nexus between the two, and with it the necessity, is no longer so evident as it was in the other cases. Nevertheless in the animal, whose merely perceptual presentment lies midway between the organic functions proceeding from stimulus and the deliberate action of man, it is still always unmistakable: the action of the animal inevitably follows the perceptual motive, unless this is counteracted by a likewise perceptual counter-motive, or by training; and yet its presentment is already separated from the act of Will, and comes into consciousness quite by itself.

But in man, in whom the presentment has even risen to the concept, and who is supplied with motives and counter-motives for his actions by the whole invisible world of thought that he carries in his head, and is thus made independent of the present and of his perceptual environment, the causal nexus is no longer visible from without, and even from within it is only knowable through abstract and mature reflection. For to observation from without this motivation by concepts stamps all his movements with the impress of intention, and they thus win an appearance of independence which manifestly distinguishes them from those of the animal—though the only proper conclusion to draw from this testimony is, that man is actuated by a class of presentments not shared by animals: in self-consciousness, again, the volition or act of Will is known in the most direct way, but the motive for the most part very indirectly, for it is often intentionally veiled in order to spare the susceptibilities of self-knowledge. All this, to which must be added the consciousness of that genuine freedom that attaches to the Will as thing-in-itself and outside the appearance, makes it look as if the particular volition were itself entirely independent and free, *i.e.* as if it had no cause; whereas in truth, with a given character and a known motive, it follows with just as strict necessity as the changes whose laws we learn from Mechanics, and, to use Kant's phrase, if character and motive were exactly known we could calculate it with as much precision as an eclipse of the moon—or to quote alongside of this an authority of quite a different kind, Dante, who is older than Buridan,[1] says:

Intra duo cibi distanti e moventi

[1] The reference is to Buridan's ass placed between two bundles of hay.

D'un modo, prima si morria di fame
Che liber' uomo l'un recasse a' denti.[2]
—*Parad.*, iv. 1.

Chapter V.

PHYSICAL ASTRONOMY

[*W. in N.—Chapter on Physical Astronomy.*]

For no part of my doctrine did I less expect confirmation from the quarter of the empirical sciences than for that which applies to inorganic Nature also the fundamental truth that Kant's thing-in-itself is the Will, and shows the active agency in all the primary forces of Nature to be absolutely identical with that which we know in ourselves as Will. All the more gratifying, then, was it to me to find that a distinguished empiricist, vanquished by the might of Truth, had even been led to proclaim this paradoxical proposition in a dissertation on his own science. The empiricist in question is Sir John Herschel, and the book his *Treatise on Astronomy*, which appeared in 1833 and was republished in an enlarged form in 1849 with the title *Outlines of Astronomy*. Herschel, then—who, as an astronomer, knows gravity not merely from the one-sided and really crude part it plays on earth, but from the nobler *rôle* it assumes in infinite space, where heavenly bodies sport with each other, betray inclination, and as it were exchange amorous glances, though never driving matters so far as coarse contact, but, keeping due distance, decorously dance their minuet to the music of

[1] Betwixt wo meats that equally invite,
And placed at equal distance, a free man
Would die of hunger ere he stretched a hand
To either.

the spheres—in a dissertation on the law of gravitation in the 7th chapter (§ 371 of the First Edition) speaks thus:

> All bodies with which we are acquainted, when raised into the air and quietly abandoned, descend to the earth's surface in lines perpendicular to it. They are therefore urged thereto by a force or effort, the direct or indirect result of a consciousness and a *Will* existing somewhere, though beyond our power to trace, which force we term Gravity.

Herschel evidently saw that if we are not to explain Gravity in Descartes' way as an impulse from without, nothing is left for us but to assume a Will dwelling in bodies. *Non datur tertium.*[1]

Herschel's reviewer in the *Edinburgh Review* of October, 1833, whose one anxiety, as an Englishman, is that the Mosaic story shall not be endangered, for this lies nearer to his heart than all the wisdom and truth in the world, takes great exception to this passage. He justly remarks that here there is evidently no reference to the Will of Almighty God, the creator of matter with all its properties, and altogether refuses to allow the statement, saying that it does not follow from the preceding section, from which Herschel professes to derive it. I am of opinion that it certainly would follow from this section (because the origin of a concept determines its content), although the proposition contained therein is false. For it asserts that the concept of causality originates in experience, and in that particular kind of experience which we have when we act upon external bodies by an effort of our own. Only in countries like England, where the day of the Kantian philosophy has not yet dawned—I leave out of account the [German] Professors of philosophy, who fling Kant's

[1] There is no third supposition possible.

doctrines to the wind and look upon me as beneath their notice—can people believe that the concept of causality originates in experience; least of all can such a belief be entertained by those who are acquainted with my proof of the apriority of that concept. This proof differs from Kant's *in toto*, and is based upon the fact that knowledge of causality is the necessary antecedent condition of our perceivance of the outside world, which perceivance is due solely to the understanding *passing* from the sensation in the organ of sense to its cause, which then exhibits itself as an *object* in Space, this Space itself being also immediately perceived *a priori*. Now as the perceivance of objects must precede our conscious operation upon them, experience of this operation cannot originate the concept of causality; for before I operate on things, they must have operated on me, as motives. The whole of this subject has been discussed at length in the fourth chapter of the Supplements to my chief work, pp. 41–46, and in § 21 of the *Fourfold Root*, so I need not go into the matter again here. But even empirically this hypothesis may be refuted, for it would follow from it that a person born without arms or legs could obtain no information about causality, and would consequently have no perceivance of the outside world: this, however, is refuted by Nature herself in an example of an unfortunate case of this kind which I have taken from first-hand sources; it will be found at p. 44 of the above-mentioned fourth chapter of the Supplements. In what he said, therefore, Herschel only shows once more that a true conclusion may follow from false premisses: this will always be the case when we obtain immediate insight into a truth by a correct *aperçu*, but do not succeed in discovering and making clear to ourselves its grounds of knowing, through failure to bring these to distinct consciousness. For in all original insight conviction comes

before proof, which is only afterwards thought out and added.

Owing to the complete mobility of all its parts, fluid matter affords a more immediate manifestation of gravity in each of them than can solid matter. That we may share the *aperçu* which was the true source of Herschel's pronouncement, let us therefore attentively watch the downward rush of a stream over rocks, and ask ourselves whether this decided striving and raging can go on without effort, and whether an effort without Will is conceivable. And just so, wherever we perceive an original and independent primary force, we are compelled to think of its inner essence as Will. This much is certain: that Herschel, like the other empiricists mentioned above, was led in his investigation to that boundary where the physical has nothing behind it but the metaphysical; that this metaphysical brought him to a standstill; and that he, like all of them, recognised that beyond that boundary there was only *Will*.

For the rest, Herschel, like the majority of those empiricists, is here still labouring under the delusion that Will is inseparable from consciousness; but as I have already sufficiently expatiated on this error and its correction by my doctrine, I need say no more about it.

Since the beginning of this century repeated attempts have been made to attribute life to the inorganic, but quite wrongly. Living and organic are interchangeable concepts, and with death the organic ceases to be organic. In the whole of Nature no line is so sharply drawn as that between organic and inorganic, *i.e.* between that wherein Form is the essential and permanent, Matter the accidental and changing—and that wherein the contrary conditions prevail. There is no wavering boundary here, as there is perhaps between animal and plant, solid and liquid, gas and vapour; and to try to

abolish this hard-and-fast line is purposely to introduce confusion into our concepts. On the other hand, I was the first to say that a *Will* must be attributed to the lifeless, the inorganic. For with me Will is not, as had hitherto been thought, an accident of knowledge and consequently of life; but life itself is an appearance of the Will; whereas knowledge is really an accident of life, and this of Matter. But Matter is itself merely the perceptibility of the Will's appearances. We have therefore to recognise a *willing* in every striving which proceeds from—I ought rather to say, constitutes—the nature of a material being, or which manifests itself phenomenally through this nature; and there is therefore no Matter without manifestation of Will. The lowest, and on that account most universal manifestation of Will is gravity, which has therefore been termed a fundamental force essential to matter.

In the view usually taken of Nature it is assumed that there are *two* radically different principles of movement, and that the movement of a body may therefore originate in *two different ways*, viz. may either proceed from within, in which case it is ascribed to *Will*, or from without, in which case it is ascribed to causes.....

But I am here constrained to say with Abelard: *si omnes patres sic, at ego non sic*:[1] for ancient and universal as is this fundamental view, my teaching is, on the contrary, that there are *not* two utterly different origins of movement—that it does *not* proceed on one occasion from Will within, and on another from causes without; but that the two are inseparable and synchronous in every movement of a body. For the movement which confessedly proceeds from the *Will* always presupposes a *cause*: this, in percipient beings, is a motive, and

[1] All the Fathers may say so, but I hold *my* opinion.

without it they cannot move. On the other hand, the movement of a body admittedly resulting from an external *cause* is in itself nevertheless a manifestation of its *Will*, which is simply called forth by the cause. Accordingly there is only one single, uniform, universal, and unexceptive principle of all movement: its inner condition is *Will;* its outward provocative, *cause*, which, according to the nature of the thing moved, may appear in the form either of cause proper, stimulus, or motive.

All that element in things which is known only empirically, only *a posteriori,* is in itself Will; whereas, so far as things are determinable *a priori*, they belong to the *presentment* alone, to the mere appearance. Hence the appearances in Nature are the less intelligible in proportion as the Will manifests itself more plainly in them, *i.e.* the higher they stand in the hierarchy of beings; on the other hand, the less their empirical content, the more intelligible they are; for they remain all the more in the sphere of the mere *presentment*, whose forms, known to us *a priori*, constitute the principle of intelligibility. Accordingly we only have perfect and thorough understanding of things so long as we keep entirely to this sphere, *i.e.* so long as we have before us mere presentment without empirical content, mere form; *e.g.* in the *a priori* sciences—Arithmetic, Geometry, Phoronomy,[1] and Logic. In these all is in the highest degree comprehensible, our insight into them is perfectly clear and sufficient and leaves nothing to be desired; for it is impossible even to conceive that things might be otherwise—all this being the result of our having to do here solely with the forms of our own intellect. Thus the more intelligible things are, the more do they consist in the mere appearance, and the less have they to do

[1] The science which treats of matter as the movable in space.

with the essence-in-itself. Applied Mathematics—*i.e.* Mechanics, Hydraulics, etc.—deals with the lowest step of the Will's objectification, where all still lies mainly in the sphere of the mere presentment, but contains nevertheless an empirical element, in which complete comprehensibility (intelligibility) begins to fail, and with which the inexplicable enters. For the same reason certain parts only of Physics and Chemistry admit of mathematical treatment, and higher up in the scale of beings Mathematics has to be entirely discarded, just because the content of the appearance here outweighs the form. This content is Will, the *a posteriori*,[1] the thing-in-itself, the free, the underived. In the chapter on the Physiology of Plants I have shown how, in living and percipient beings, motive and volition, mental-picturing and willing, are ever more clearly separated as we rise in the hierarchy of beings. And just so in the inorganic kingdom the cause separates itself ever more from the effect in proportion as the purely empirical, which is just the appearance of the Will, comes ever more plainly to the front; but as it does so, intelligibility gets ever less. This subject merits closer investigation, and I beg the reader to give his undivided attention to what follows; for it is calculated to place the fundamental thought of my doctrine in the clearest light both in respect of comprehensibility and conclusiveness. This is all that I can do; but to lead my contemporaries to prefer thought to verbiage is not in my power; my consolation lies, however, in this—that I am not the man of my time [but of the future].

At the lowest grade of Nature cause and effect are entirely homogeneous and similar, and for this reason we here get the most complete understanding of causal

[1] *I.e.* the *a-posteriori*-known: see above.

connexion. For instance, the movement of a ball that is struck is caused by the movement of another ball, which loses as much motion as the other receives. Here causality is at its plainest, and the only mystery is the possibility of the transference of motion—an incorporeal thing—from one body to another. The susceptibility of bodies in this mode is so small that the effect to be produced must pass over entirely from the cause. This is true of all purely mechanical effects, and if we do not understand them all as instantaneously as we do in the case just given, it is only because coincident circumstances hide them from us, or because we are puzzled by the complex conjunction of many causes and effects: in itself mechanical causality is everywhere equally, *i.e.* in the highest degree, comprehensible, because here cause and effect do not differ *qualitatively*, and where they differ *quantitatively*, as in the lower, the thing can be explained from mere spatial and temporal relations. But the moment weights are introduced, there is added a second mysterious element, Gravity; and if we are dealing with elastic bodies, a third, viz. Elasticity.

As we ascend somewhat on the scale of appearances, things already assume a different aspect. A raised temperature as cause, and, as effect, expansion, liquefaction, evaporation, or crystallisation, are not homogeneous: therefore their causal connexion is not intelligible; the comprehensibility of causality has diminished. A substance liquefied by a slight degree of heat will, with a greater, be volatilatised; another, which under slight heat will be crystallised, will be melted if more is applied. Heat makes wax soft; clay, hard. Light makes wax white; chloride of silver, black. Further, if two salts decompose one another and two new ones are formed, the elective affinity that here displays itself is a deep mystery to us, and the qualities of the two new

bodies are not an amalgam of those of their constituents taken by themselves, though we can still follow their combination and show what the new bodies came from, and can also separate the combined substances again and get back the same quantity of each. Thus we here encounter marked heterogeneity and incommensurability between cause and effect; causality has become more mysterious. Still more is this the case when we compare the effects of electricity, or of the Voltaic pile, with their causes—the friction of glass in the first case, and the superimposition and oxidation of plates in the second. Here all similarity between cause and effect has disappeared: causality veils itself in a thick muffler, to lift a corner of which required the utmost efforts of men like Davy, Ampère, and Faraday. Only the *laws* of electrical effects can be discovered and tabulated: we talk of positive and negative electricity, of induction, distribution, shock, ignition, decomposition, charge, insulation, discharge, electric current, and such things, to which we arbitrarily refer the effect; but the process itself remains an unknown x. Here, then, cause and effect are completely heterogeneous, their connexion is unintelligible, and all that we know is that bodies show great susceptibility to a causal influence whose inner nature remains a secret. It seems as though the higher we rise on the scale, the more there is in the effect and the less in the cause. Still more will this be the case when we rise to the organic kingdom, with its phenomenon of life. If, as they do in China, we dig a trench, fill it with decaying wood, and cover this with leaves from the same tree, pouring in a solution of saltpetre every now and then, the result is a large crop of edible mushrooms. Hay soaked in water produces a world of rapidly-moving infusoria. How heterogeneous here are cause and effect, and how much more appears to lie in the latter than in

the former! Between the seed, hundreds and even thousands of years old, and the tree; between the mould of the earth and the specific and so marvellously differing saps of the countless plants—wholesome, poisonous, nutritious—which *one* soil bears, *one* sun warms, *one* rain waters, there is no longer any similarity, and we are at a loss to understand it all. For causality here appears at a higher power, viz. as stimulus and susceptibility thereto. Only the schema[1] of cause and effect remains: we recognise this as cause, that as effect, but of the *modus operandi* of the causality we know nothing whatever. And not only is there here no qualitative resemblance between cause and effect, but there is no quantitative relation either: more and more does the effect appear to be out of all proportion to the cause; the effect, too, of the stimulus does not increase *pari passu* with the heightening of it, but not infrequently decreases. When at last we come to the sphere of *knowing* beings, there is no resemblance or relation whatever between the action and the object which, as presentment, provokes it. Meanwhile in the animal, which is confined to *perceptual* presentments, the *presence* of the object that acts as motive is necessary, and this object then—training, *i.e.* habit enforced by fear, apart—produces its effect instantaneously and infallibly; for the animal does not carry about with it any concept, to make it independent of the impression of the moment, to allow it the possibility of reflection, and to enable it to act with premeditation. This man *can* do. In the rational being the motive is no longer something present, perceptual, existing, real, but a mere concept, having its present existence only in the brain of the agent, though drawn from many perceivances of different kinds, from the

[1] General outline.

experience of past years, or, it may be, communicated through words. The separation between cause and effect has now become so immensely wide, and the effect in relation to the cause has grown so great, that it seems to the untutored understanding as if there were no longer any cause present—as if the act of Will depended on nothing, were groundless, *i.e.* free. It is just this that makes the movements of our body, when we contemplate them reflectively from without, look as if they were uncaused and wear the appearance of an actual miracle. It is only experience and reflection that teach us that these movements, like all others, are impossible without a cause, here called "motive," and that, in our ascent through the scale of beings, the cause has only remained behind the effect in material reality, whereas in dynamical reality, in energy, it has kept even step with it. Thus at this grade, the highest in Nature, we have less understanding of causality than ever. Nothing now remains but the mere general schema, whose applicability and necessity here as elsewhere can only be recognised by the ripest reflection.

But as the passenger through the grotto of Posilipo[1] plunges deeper and deeper into the darkness, until, after passing the middle of the tunnel, the gleam from the further end begins to lighten his steps; so here, just when the outwardly directed light of the understanding (with its form of causality), overborne ever more and more by darkness, diffuses at last nothing but a feeble and uncertain glimmer, it is met by an illumination of quite another kind from an altogether different quarter, from our own breast, through the accidental circumstance

[1] A tunnel through a hill on the outskirts of Naples, through which the roadway passes.

that we, the judges, are ourselves just the very objects that have to be judged. For outer perceivance, and for the understanding whose function this perceivance is, the increasing difficulty of comprehending the causal connexion, which at first was so clear, had gradually become so great that in the actions of the animal we had at last been almost in doubt whether such a connexion existed, and had been tempted to regard them as a kind of miracle; but just at this moment there comes from quite another quarter, from the very self of the observer, the immediate information that the agent in such actions is the Will—that Will which to him is better and more familiarly known than anything that outer perceivance can ever furnish. This knowledge alone it is that affords the philosopher insight into the essence of all those processes of unconscious Nature, in which the causal explanation was, it is true, more satisfying than in those last considered, and clearer in proportion to the lowness of grade of the thing contemplated, although in the lowest there still remained an unknown x; and even in the body moved by impact, or drawn downwards by gravity, the essence of the process was never quite clear. But as we went up the scale of beings this x loomed ever larger, and finally, at the highest grade, drove the causal explanation completely away; when lo! just as this explanation appeared of least use, the x revealed itself as *Will*—as Mephistopheles, in consequence of Faust's learned onslaught, stepped forth from the poodle that had grown to giant dimensions, whose core he was. After this thorough exposition the reader can hardly fail to recognise the *identity of this x* at all stages—whether in the lowest where it is so unobtrusive, or higher up where its shadow creeps more and more over things, or in the highest where it darkens everything and we reach at last the final point where in

our own appearance[1] it announces itself to self-consciousness as Will. The two aboriginally different sources of our knowledge, the outer and the inner, must be conjoined at this point by reflection. Only by such conjunction can Nature and our own self be understood; but, when effected, the inner essence of Nature is disclosed to our intellect, which by itself can only apprehend external things, and the secret which Philosophy has so long been seeking lies open. For then we see clearly what is properly the real (the thing-in-itself), and what the ideal (the appearance); and thus is settled the chief question round which Philosophy has revolved since the days of Descartes—the question as to the relation of those two things whose total diversity Kant's incomparable wisdom so conclusively demonstrated, and whose absolute identity was immediately afterwards proclaimed by windbags on the faith of "intellectual intuition."[2] If, however, we deprive ourselves of this insight, which is really the sole narrow gate leading to Truth, we shall never arrive at the comprehension of the inner essence of Nature, to which we can come by no other path: no, never—but we shall fall victims to an error that can never be set right. People will have it, as I said above, that there are two fundamentally different original principles of movement, between which a great gulf is set—movement from causes and movement from Will. On this supposition the former remains, as to its inmost essence, for ever unintelligible; for no explanation can eliminate that insoluble x, which becomes greater as the object contemplated stands higher on the scale of beings; while the latter, the

[1] *Erscheinung:* phenomenon or object of sense, as opposed to noumenon or thing-in-itself; sensibly-perceived object; empirically-given object; thing as existing for us.

[2] A nonsensical phrase, because intuition (perceivance) is an affair of the *senses*.

movement consequent on Will, is altogether withdrawn from the principle of causality and is considered to be groundless—a freedom of particular actions; that is to say, entirely opposed to Nature and absolutely inexplicable. But if, as required above, we amalgamate outer and inner knowledge at the point where they touch, we then recognise, despite all accidental differences, two identities—that of causality with itself at all grades, and that of the at first unknown x (*i.e.* the forces of Nature and the phenomena of life) with the Will in us. First, I say, we recognise the essence of causality as identical in the various forms it has to assume at different grades, wherein it shows itself (1) as mechanical, chemical, and physical cause, (2) as stimulus, (3) as perceptual motive, (4) as abstract or purely mental motive: we recognise it as one and the same, both where the impinging body loses as much motion as it communicates, and also where thoughts war with thoughts, and the victor, as strongest motive, sets the man in motion, this motion following with no less necessity than that of a ball that is struck. Where we ourselves are the thing moved, where therefore the inner nature of the process is intimately and thoroughly known—instead of being dazzled and bewildered by this inner light, thus becoming blind to the causal connexion that lies before us in all the other departments of Nature and debarred for ever from gaining insight into it, we shall employ the new knowledge derived from within and use it as a key to outer phenomena, and so recognise the second identity, the identity of our Will with that hitherto unknown x which remains over in all causal explanation. And we shall then say: Even where the effect is the result of the most palpable cause, the mysterious x which is even there present, the real inner essence of the process, the true agent, the in-itself of

this appearance—which, after all, is given to us as nothing but presentment and according to the forms and laws of the presentment—is essentially identical with that which in the actions of our body—a thing likewise given to us as perceivance and presentment—is intimately and immediately known to us as *Will.*

This—little as you may relish being told so [, ye Professors of philosophy]—is the basis of true philosophy: even if the present century does not know this, many subsequent centuries will. *Tempo è galantuomo* (*se nessun' altro*)![1] As then, on the one hand, we recognise the essence of causality—which is plainest only at the lowest grades of the Will's objectification (*i.e.* of Nature)—at all grades, even the highest; so, on the other hand, we recognise the essence of the Will at all grades, even the lowest, although we only acquire this knowledge immediately at the highest stage of all. The old error says: Where there is Will, there is no longer any causality, and where there is causality, there is no Will. But I say: Wherever there is causality, there is Will, and no Will acts without causality. The *punctum controversiæ* therefore is, whether Will and causality can and must be coincident in the self-same process. What makes it difficult to recognise this truth is, that causality and will are known in two utterly different ways: causality altogether from without, quite mediately, entirely through the understanding—Will entirely from within, quite immediately; and therefore, in any given case, the clearer the knowledge of the one, the less clear is that of the other. Therefore where causality is most comprehensible, we least recognise the essence of the Will; and where Will most undeniably manifests itself, causality is so completely overshadowed

[1] Time is a gentleman (if no one else is).

that the uncultured understanding can even venture to deny its existence. But, as Kant teaches us, causality is nothing but the *a priori*-knowable form of the understanding, *i.e.* the essence of the *presentment* as such, which constitutes one side of the world: the other side is Will, which is the thing-in-itself. If we inquire why causality and Will stand in this inverse ratio of clearness—why, when one emerges, the other withdraws into the background, the answer is, that the more a thing is given to us merely as appearance, *i.e.* presentment, the plainer is the manifestation of the *a priori* form of the presentment, *i.e.* causality; this is the case in inanimate Nature; whereas, the more immediately conscious we are of the Will, the more the form of the presentment, causality, withdraws into the background; this is the case with ourselves. Thus the nearer one side of the world draws to us, the more we lose sight of the other.

Chapter VI.

ETHICS

[*W. in N.—Chapter on Ethics.*]

All nations have known from time immemorial that, besides its physical, the world has also a moral significance. Yet so indistinct was the consciousness of this in all quarters of the globe that, in seeking expression, it clad itself in all sorts of tropes and myths. These are the various religions. Philosophers, for their part, have always endeavoured to gain a clear understanding of the matter, and, however different their systems, they all—the strict materialists alone excepted—agree that the

most important, the alone essential thing in existence—that on which everything turns, that which really signifies, the crucial point—lies in the morality of human conduct. But why this should be so, and whether such a thing is possible, is a question they all answer in different ways, and an abyss of darkness yawns before their feet. Hence to preach morality is easy; to give it a foundation, difficult. Conscience declares morality to be necessary, and so Ethics becomes the touchstone of systems; for it is rightly demanded of Metaphysics that she should be the support of Ethics. And now arises the hard problem of showing that, contrary to all experience, the physical order of things is dependent upon a moral order—of finding a connecting link between the force whereby, working according to eternal laws of Nature, the world subsists, and the morality in the human breast. Here, then, the best have made shipwreck: by means of sophisms Spinoza now and then tacks a doctrine of virtue on to his fatalistic Pantheism, but more often leaves morals woefully in the lurch. When theoretical reason failed him, Kant brought in his categorical imperative, culled out of mere concepts, as a *Deus ex machina* with its absolute "ought," the impossible nature of which became evident when Fichte, who always took outbidding for surpassing, spun it out with Wolfian prolixity and tediousness into a complete system of moral fatalism in his *System der Sittenlehre*, and then gave a shorter exposition of it in his *Wissenschaftslehre im allgemeinen Umrisse*, 1810.

From this point of view it can hardly be denied that a system which places the reality of all existence and the root of the whole of Nature in the Will, declaring this Will to be the heart of the world, has at any rate strong presumption in its favour. For it reaches by a direct and simple way, and, before any appeal to Ethics, already

holds in its hand, that which other systems try to reach by circuitous and always questionable detours. Besides, this is never to be reached, except by the knowledge that the operative force in Nature which presents this perceptual world to our intellect is identical with the Will in us. No Metaphysics can be really and immediately a support of Ethics, save that kind which is already itself aboriginally ethical and constructed of the very substance of Ethics, the Will; on which account my Metaphysics has a much better right to the title "Ethics" than Spinoza's. With him this title surely savours of irony, and it may be said that his work bears it on the *lucus a non lucendo* principle, for only by sophisms did he manage to tack morality on to a system from which it could never flow logically; indeed, he for the most part directly repudiates morals in the most barefaced way (*e.g. Eth.* iv, prop. 37, schol. 2). In fact, I may boldly assert that never was there a philosophical system constructed so entirely of one piece as mine, for there is no joining or patching in it. It is, as I said in the Preface thereto, the unfolding of a single thought, whereby the old saying "ἁπλους ὁ μυθος της ἀληθειας ἐφυ"[1] is once more confirmed. Besides we must remember that freedom and responsibility, those fundamental pillars of Ethics, may indeed be asserted in words without presupposing the aseity of the Will, but, apart from such presupposition, they are utterly inconceivable. Whoever combats this assertion must first upset the axiom of the schoolmen "*operari sequitur esse*" (*i.e.* every being acts according to its nature), or show its legitimate consequence "*unde esse, inde operari*"[2] to be false. Responsibility presupposes freedom, and

[1] What truth tells is simple.

[2] Whence the being, thence the doing—*i.e.* whoever made the thing, with its essence, is responsible for its doings.

freedom cannot exist without aseity or self-dependent being. For I *will* in accordance with that which I *am;* therefore I must *be* in accordance with that which I *will.* Thus aseity of the Will is the first condition of a serious Ethics, and Spinoza is right in saying: "That thing shall be called free which exists by the sole necessity of its own nature, and is determined in its actions by itself alone" (*Eth.* i., def. 7). Dependence in respect of existence and essence, combined with freedom of action, is a contradiction. Should Prometheus venture to reprove his rather badly-made creatures for their actions, they would have the right to reply: "We could only act according to what we are; for from our nature flow our actions. If we did wrong, it is the fault of our nature: that is thy work; punish thyself" (Cf. *Parerga*, i. 133 f.). Nor is it otherwise with the indestructibility of our real essence by death: except on the presupposition of the aseity or self-origination of that essence, such a notion cannot be seriously entertained, and it can hardly be conceived without a fundamental sundering of Will from intellect. The latter point belongs to my Philosophy; but the former has already been thoroughly examined by Aristotle (*De cælo*, i. 12), who exhaustively proves that only the unoriginated can be imperishable, and that these two concepts [aseity and imperishableness] condition one another. This opinion was held by all the ancient philosophers who taught the immortality of the soul, and it never occurred to any one of them to attribute endless duration to any creature that has *come into being.* The perplexity to which the opposite opinion leads is shown in the ecclesiastical controversies of pre-existencists, creationists, and traducians.

Further, a point intimately connected with Ethics in all philosophical systems is their Optimism, which must accompany them all and never be absent; for the world

likes to be told that it is commendable and excellent, and the philosophers like to please the world. But with me it is otherwise: I have seen what pleases the world, and therefore will not depart a hair's-breadth from the path of truth to please it. Thus in this point also my system deviates from all the rest and stands alone. But when all their demonstrations are ended and they have sung their songs about this best of all worlds, there stalks in rear of their system, as a tardy avenger of this wild dream (*Unbild*), like a spirit from the tombs, like the stone guest in Don Juan, the question as to the origin of evil—of the immense, unutterable evil, of the terrible heart-rending misery in the world—and they are dumb, or have nothing but words—empty, sounding words, wherewith to pay the heavy score. Whereas, if the existence of evil is already interwoven with the world in the basis of a system, then it has no such ghost to fear; as an inoculated child does not dread small-pox. But this is the case when freedom is placed not in the *operari*[1] but in the *esse*,[2] from which freedom proceed wrong, suffering, and the world. For the rest, it is fair to allow me, as a serious man, to speak only of things that I really know, and to use only words to which I attach a definite meaning; for only such an one can make himself comprehensible to others, and Vauvenargues is right in saying: "La clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes."[3] Thus when I say "Will," "Will-to-live," this is no *ens rationis*,[4] no hypostasis of my own making, no word of uncertain, wavering signification; and if anyone asks me what it is, I tell him to look within his own breast, and there he will find it complete—nay, of colossal proportions, as a veritable *ens realissimum*.[5] I have therefore not explained

[1] Doing. [2] Being.
[3] Clearness in philosophers is evidence of good faith.
[4] Figment of the mind.
[5] Most real being.

the world from the unknown; but, on the contrary, from that which of all things is best known, and known to us in a way quite different from all else. Finally, as to the charge of "paradox" which has been levelled at the ascetic results of my Ethics, to which even Jean Paul, who was otherwise so favourable a critic, took exception, and on account of which Herr Rätze (who did not know that "secreting" was the only satisfactory method to be adopted with regard to me) was moved to write a well-meaning book against me in the year 1820, and which has since been the standing theme of cavil at my philosophy, I beg all people to bear in mind that such views as mine can only be called paradoxical in this north-western corner of the old world, and indeed even here only in Protestant countries—whereas throughout the length and breadth of Asia, wherever hateful Islam has not expelled by fire and sword the ancient thoughtful religions of mankind, the only reproach that could have been levelled against them is that of triteness. My consolation, therefore, is, that if judged by the standard of the Upanishad of the Sacred Vedas and the great religion of Buddha, my Ethics is perfectly orthodox, and indeed is not in contradiction with the genuine Christianity of primitive times. Against all other accusations of heresy, however, I am armed with a coat of mail and have triple steel round my breast.

BOOK III.

ESSAY ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL (1839)

Chapter I.

DEFINITIONS

1. What is Freedom? — This concept, when carefully examined, turns out to be *negative*. It conveys merely the absence of hindrances and restraints: these, on the contrary, as manifestations of force, must be positive. This restraining influence is of three kinds, and the concept thus divides into three different sub-species corresponding to these: physical, intellectual, and moral freedom.

(*a*) *Physical freedom* consists in the absence of material hindrances of every kind. Thus we say: free sky, free view, free air, free field, free place, free heat (when it is not locked up in chemical combination), free electricity, free course of a stream, when it is no longer checked by mountains or sluices, etc. Even free lodging, free rations, free press, free (franked) letter, are expressions indicating the absence of burdensome conditions, which, as hindrances to pleasure, are wont to attach to such things. But the concept Freedom is most usually predicated of members of the animal kingdom, whose distinguishing peculiarity is that their movements proceed from *their Will*, are voluntary, and are therefore called *free* when no material hindrance makes them impossible,

Now since these hindrances may be of very different kinds, while that which they hinder is always the *Will*, we prefer, for simplicity's sake, to regard the concept rather from the positive side and to let it cover everything which moves itself by its Will alone, acts from its Will alone; which transformation of the concept changes it in no essential respect. According to this *physical* signification of the concept Freedom, animals and men are called *free* when neither chain, nor prison, nor paralysis, *i.e.* no *physical*, *material* hindrance of any kind, checks their actions; but these are done in conformity with their *Will*.

This *physical signification* of the concept Freedom, as predicated especially of members of the animal kingdom, is the original and immediate, and therefore most usual one. Taken in this way, the concept admits of neither doubt nor controversy, for its reality can always be verified by experience. For when an animal acts from its *Will* alone, it is in this sense *free*, no account being here taken of anything that may have influenced its Will. For the concept Freedom, in this its original, immediate, and popular sense, implies nothing more than *ability* to act, *i.e.* absence of *physical* hindrances to action. Thus we say: the birds of the air and the denizens of the wood are free; man is free by nature; only the free man is happy. A nation, too, is called free, meaning thereby that it obeys laws which it has itself made; for it then in every case follows only its own Will. Thus political freedom comes into this physical category.

But the moment we leave this physical freedom and come to consider the other two kinds, we have no longer to do with the popular, but with a *philosophical* signification of the concept; and this, as we all know, opens the door to many difficulties. Freedom here divides into two quite different species—intellectual and moral.

(*b*) *Intellectual freedom* is here merely introduced for the sake of making the classification complete, and I propose to defer its consideration until the very end of the Essay, by which time the concepts it involves will have found their explanation in the preceding portion of the work, so that it can then be treated quite briefly. In our list, however, it must occupy the second place, for it stands nearest to physical freedom.

(*c*) I therefore turn at once to the third species, *moral freedom*, which is precisely the *liberum arbitrium*[1] mentioned in the Royal Society's question.[2]

This concept is connected with that of physical freedom by a tie which makes its much later—and necessarily later—origin comprehensible. Physical freedom, as already remarked, has relation merely to material hindrances, and comes into existence at once by the mere absence of these. But it was observed in many cases that, without being checked by material hindrances, a man can be restrained from acting according to his Will, as he certainly would otherwise have done, by mere motives, such as threats, promises, dangers, etc. The question therefore arose: Is such a man still *free?*—or does a strong counter-motive actually check and render impossible, as a physical hindrance would, an action to which his Will would naturally lead him? The answer to this question could present no difficulty to the sound understanding, which would reply that a motive could never act in the same way as a physical hindrance; because the latter may easily transcend man's bodily powers completely, whereas a motive can never in itself be irresistible, can never have unconditioned authority, but may always be overcome by a *stronger counter-motive*,

[1] Free Will.

[2] Can the Freedom of the human Will be proved from self-consciousness?

if only this is present and the given man is determinable by it in the individual case. For we often see that even that commonly strongest of all motives, the maintenance of life, may be overcome by other motives—*e.g.* in suicide, or in the sacrifice of life for others, for opinions or for many kinds of interests; and conversely, that all sorts of exquisite tortures are at times cheerfully endured, simply because reflection tells us that only by submitting to them can life be preserved. But though this shows that the motive can have no purely objective and absolute compelling-power of its own, we might yet admit that it has a subjective and relative compulsion, viz. for the person concerned; and this would come ultimately to the same thing. And so the question remained: Is the Will itself free? Here, then, the concept Freedom, which hitherto had been thought of only in connexion with *ability to act*, was now connected with *willing*, and the problem now was: Is willing itself *free?* But the admission of this connexion with *willing* is seen, on closer inspection, to be incompatible with the original, purely empirical, and therefore popular conception of Freedom. For this conception declares "free" to mean "in conformity with *our Will*": so to ask whether the Will itself is free is to ask whether the Will is in conformity with itself—which, though a self-evident truth, is nothing to the purpose. The empirical conception of Freedom tells us: "I am free, if I can *do* what I *will*"; and the freedom is already decided by this "what I will." But if we inquire as to the freedom of *willing* itself, the question would have to assume this form: "Can you also *will* what you will?"—which makes willing depend upon some other willing that lies behind it. If we answer in the affirmative, there immediately arises the further question: "Can you also will what you will to will?"—and so the question is pushed back and back for ever, for each willing will

always be referred to a previous one, and we shall strive in vain in this way to reach an ultimate willing which depends on nothing, and at which we are content to stop. For why stop here? We should do just as well to stop at the first, and so the question would be reduced to the quite simple, "Can you will?" But whether the mere answering of this question in the affirmative decides the freedom of willing is what we want to know, and this remains uncertain. The original, empirical conception of Freedom—a conception taken from doing—thus refuses to combine directly with the notion of willing; and if we are to apply the concept Freedom to the Will, we must so modify it that it may be grasped in a more abstract form. To do this, the concept *Freedom* has to be thought of in a general way as the absence of all *Necessity*. In this manner the concept preserves the *negative* character which I assigned to it at the outset. The concept Necessity, as that which gives *positive* signification to this *negative* one, has therefore in the first place to be examined.

Our question, then, now is: What is meant by *necessary?* The usual explanation, "*Necessary* is that whose opposite is impossible, or which cannot be otherwise," is a merely verbal explanation—a paraphrase of the concept, which does not extend our knowledge. The real explanation is, according to me, as follows: "*Necessary is that which follows from a sufficient ground*"; which proposition, like every correct definition, is susceptible of inversion. Now according as this sufficient ground[1] is a logical, a mathematical, or a physical one—in which last case it is called "cause"—the necessity will be logical (conclusion from given premisses), mathematical (*e.g.* equality of the sides of a

[1] Reason.

triangle when the angles are equal), or physical, real (entry of the effect, the moment the cause is there); but it always attaches with equal strictness to the consequent, when the ground is given. We recognise a thing as necessary only when we apprehend it as following from a given ground; and conversely, the moment we recognise something as a consequent of a sufficient ground, we see that it is necessary: for all grounds are necessitating. This real explanation is so entirely adequate and exhaustive that "necessity" and "following from a given sufficient ground" are convertible terms; *i.e.* wherever the one is found, the other may be put in its place. Consequently absence of necessity is identical with absence of a sufficient determining ground. "Contingent" is, however, always conceived as the opposite of "necessary"; but this is no contradiction, every contingent being only *relatively* so. For in the real world, in which alone the contingent is to be met with, every event is *necessary* in so far as it is referred to its cause; whereas it is *contingent* with regard to all other things coincident with it in space and time. Now the free, since absence of necessity is its distinguishing mark, must be altogether independent of any cause whatsoever, and is therefore to be defined as the *absolutely contingent*—a highly problematical concept, for whose conceivability I will not go bail, though it coincides in a remarkable way with that of Freedom. Be that as it may, the *free* remains that which is necessary in no relation—in other words, which is independent of any ground. Now this concept, if applied to the Will of man, would denote that an individual Will could not be determined in its manifestations (volitions, or acts of Will) by causes or any sufficient grounds; for if it could, then, since the consequent that follows from a given ground (of whatsoever kind this

may be) is always *necessary*, its acts would be not free, but necessary. Hence Kant's definition, according to which Freedom is the power to initiate *of itself* a series of changes. Now this "of itself" means, when reduced to its true signification, "without antecedent cause"; but this is exactly equivalent to "without necessity." So that, although this definition gives the concept Freedom an appearance of positiveness, yet further investigation once more reveals its negative nature.

Thus a Free Will would be one that was not determined by grounds, and, since everything that determines something else must be a ground—in real things a real ground, *i.e.* cause—it would be a Will that was not determined by anything at all—a Will whose particular manifestations (acts of Will) would proceed absolutely and underivedly from itself, without being necessarily introduced by antecedent conditions—that is, without being determined by anything according to a rule. Before such a concept clear thinking is at an end, for the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which, in its various modes, is the essential form of our whole faculty of knowledge, has here to be repudiated. However, we are not left without a *terminus technicus* for this concept, viz. *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*,[1] which is the only clear, distinct, and definite term for Free Will in this sense; and we cannot depart from it without falling into vague, hazy explanations behind which lurks timid insufficiency—as when mention is made of grounds that do not necessarily lead to their consequents. Every consequent from a ground is necessary, and every necessity is a consequent from a ground. If this *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ* is assumed, it follows

[1] Liberty of indifference, or the power to determine the Will at pleasure in any given direction: perfect freedom in the *choice* of our manner of acting.

inevitably that to the possessor of it two diametrically opposite actions are, under definitely-fixed outer circumstances, equally possible.

2. What does self-consciousness mean?—Answer: The consciousness of our *own self* as contradistinguished from the consciousness of *other things*, which latter constitutes our faculty of knowledge. This faculty contains, before ever these other things are represented therein, certain forms which govern this representation and are therefore conditions of the possibility of their objective existence, *i.e.* of their existence as objects for us: these forms, as all the world knows, are time, space, and causality. Now although these forms of knowledge lie within ourselves, this is only to the end that we may be conscious of *other things* as such and come into intimate relation with them: notwithstanding, then, that these forms lie within us, we have not to consider them as belonging to *self-consciousness*, but rather as making the *consciousness of other things* (*i.e.* objective knowledge) possible.

From this it is clear that by far the greatest part of our general consciousness belongs not to *self-consciousness*, but to the *consciousness of other things*, the faculty of knowledge. This faculty, with all its powers, is directed outwardly, and is the theatre—if we go deeper, we must even say the condition—of the real outside-world: this it first apprehends by perceivance, and then works up by rumination, so to speak, what it has won in this way into concepts, in whose endless combinations, elaborated by the help of words, *thinking* consists.

Thus only what remains after withdrawal of this very much larger portion of our whole consciousness, belongs to *self-consciousness*. We see already, then, that the province of the latter cannot be very extensive: if, there-

fore, the data we seek in order to prove the freedom of the Will should really happen to lie in it, we may hope they will not escape us. It has been supposed that an *inner sense* constitutes the organ of self-consciousness, but this is to be taken rather as a figurative than a real description; for self-consciousness is immediate. Be that as it may, our next question is: "What does self-consciousness contain?"—in other words, "How is a man immediately conscious of his own self?" Answer: as a willer, and in no other way. No one who examines his own self-consciousness can fail to see at once that it is concerned with his own willing, and with nothing else. Under this term he will, of course, include not merely the decided volitions that lead at once to deeds, and his formal resolves together with the actions that proceed from them; but whoever is capable of grasping the essential in things, notwithstanding their various modifications of degree and kind, will have no hesitation in admitting all desiring, striving, wishing, longing, yearning, hoping, loving, rejoicing, exulting, etc., as well as all the contrary affections, such as reluctingor repugning, detesting, fleeing, fearing, anger, hatred, grief, suffering—in a word, all emotions and passions, to be manifestations of willing; for these emotions and passions are only more or less powerful or weak agitations—stirrings that are now violent and stormy, now faint and slight—of our own Will, here checked and there given its fling, here satisfied and there unsatisfied; and they all refer in one way or another to the attaining or missing of the thing we desire, and the bearing or overcoming of the thing we abhor: they are thus different affections of that very Will which is the agent in our resolves and actions. To the above list we should even add what are called the feelings of pleasure and displeasure: these, indeed, are present in a great variety of

degrees and kinds, but they can all be reduced to affections of desire or abhorrence, *i.e.* to the Will which becomes conscious of itself as satisfied or unsatisfied, checked or allowed its fling: nay, this extends even to pleasant and unpleasant, and all the countless intermediate, bodily-sensations; for the essence of all these affections is this—that they come immediately into self-consciousness as things accordant with or antagonistic to the Will. If we consider well, we are only immediately conscious of our own body as the outwardly-acting organ of the Will, and as the seat of susceptibility to pleasant or painful sensations, which themselves, however, as I have just said, run back to quite immediate affections of the Will, to which they are accordant or antagonistic. Whether we include these mere feelings of pleasure and displeasure or not, we shall at any rate find that all these stirrings of the Will—these alternations of willing and not-willing, which with their constant ebb and flow constitute the sole matter of self-consciousness, or, if the term be preferred, of the inner sense—stand in complete and universally-recognised connexion with that which is perceived and known in the external world. But this, as already stated, lies no longer in the province of immediate *self-consciousness*, whose limits, where it passes into the domain of the *consciousness of other things*, we reach, the moment we come in contact with the outside world. The things perceived in this external world are, however, the materials and the existing cause of all these stirrings and acts of Will. Let it not be said that there is here a *petitio principii:* for no one can deny that our willing always occupies itself with external objects, is directed to these, revolves round them, and is at any rate set in motion by them in their capacity of motives; otherwise man's Will would be completely cut off from the outside world and imprisoned in the dark depths of his self-

consciousness. It is only the necessity with which these objects of the outer world determine the acts of the Will, that still remains problematical.

We thus find that self-consciousness is greatly, or, we may even say, exclusively occupied with the *Will.* Whether in this its sole material it can meet with data from which the *Freedom* of this same Will, in the above-explained and only clear and definite sense of the word, can proceed, is what we have to determine. Having got our eye upon the point we wish to reach, we will now steer straight for it after all this tacking, in the course of which, however, we have come sensibly nearer to our goal.

Chapter II.

THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

When a man *wills*, he wills something: his volition is always directed to an object, and can be thought of only in connexion with such object. Now what does willing something mean? It means this: The volition, or act of Will, which is itself primarily only a matter of self-consciousness, is caused by something that belongs to the consciousness of *other* things, *i.e.* an object perceived by the faculty of knowledge, which object is in this connexion called *motive* and is at the same time the material of the volition, for this is directed to it, *i.e.* aims at some change in consequence of it and thus reacts in response thereto: its whole essence consists in this *reaction.* From this it is clear that without it the act of Will could not come into being; for in the absence of a motive it would have neither exciting cause nor

material. But the question that concerns us is, whether, when this object is perceived, the act of Will *must* enter, or whether, instead of entering, either nothing may happen, or some quite different and even opposite act may occur; that is, whether this reaction may fail to show itself, or, the circumstances being absolutely the same, turn out different or diametrically opposite. Or, to put the case in fewer words: Is the volition necessarily called forth by the motive?—or, when the motive enters into consciousness, is the Will perfectly free to will or not to will? Here, then, the concept Freedom, in the abstract sense explained above, which was shown to be the only one here applicable, is taken as a mere negation of necessity, and consequently our problem is clearly posited. But we have to seek the data for its solution in immediate *self-consciousness*, and to that end we must carefully examine the testimony of that faculty, and not summarily cut the knot as Descartes did by the offhand pronouncement: "There is nothing of which we are more certain, than that we have a liberty of indifference" (*Princ. phil.*, i., § 41). This assertion was censured by Leibnitz (*Théod.*, i. § 50 and iii. § 292), who, however, is himself but a swaying reed on this point; for, after a series of contradictory statements, he ends by declaring that the Will, though certainly inclined by motives, is nevertheless not necessitated by them. "All actions," he says, "are determined, and never indifferent (free), because there is always given a reason which inclines, but yet does not necessitate, that a thing should be done so and not otherwise" (Leibnitz, *De libertate: Opera*, ed. Erdmann, p. 669). This leads me to remark, that this middle path between the two alternatives propounded above is untenable, and one cannot sit on the fence and say that motives determine the Will only up to a certain point, and that it can then withdraw

itself from their influence. For, the moment we admit the causality of a given force, *i.e.* recognise it as operative, it only needs, in case of opposition, to increase the force in sufficient measure, and it will accomplish its effect. *E.g.* the man who, though not to be bribed with ten ducats, yet wavers when they are offered, can be bought with a hundred.

Turn we, then, with our problem to immediate self-consciousness as defined above. What has it to say about that abstract question of the applicability or non-applicability of the concept *Necessity* to the entry of a volition in response to a given, *i.e.* mentally-pictured, motive?—or about the possibility or impossibility of its non-entry in such a case? We should find ourselves quite out, if we expected self-consciousnes to give us complete information about causality in general and motivation in particular, or about any necessity which may attach to both; for this faculty of man is far too simple and limited a thing to be capable of pronouncing on such matters. No; Causality and Necessity are concepts derived from the pure outwardly-directed understanding, and they can be discussed only before the tribunal of reflective Reason. But this natural, simple[1]—I use the word in its two senses—self-consciousness cannot even understand the question, much less answer it. All it can tell us about the act of Will—let anyone appeal to his inmost self, and he will know it—is, when divested of the foreign and unessential and reduced to its real content, something which may be expressed as follows: "I can will; and when I will an action, the movable limbs of my body forthwith perform it without fail at the instance of my Will alone." In a word: "I can do what I will." That is all that immediate self-consciousness can tell us, no matter how we

[1] *Einfache* (simple = single) *ja*, *einfältige* (simple = silly), in the text.

turn and twist the question. It speaks always and only of *ability to do according to the Will;* but this is that empirical, original and popular conception of Freedom with which we set out, and in which "Free" means "in conformity with the Will." This freedom self-consciousness unequivocally asserts. But it is not this kind that we are inquiring about. Self-consciousness asserts the freedom of *doing*—under presupposition of *willing;* but it is the freedom of *willing* itself that we are discussing. We are asking, I mean, for the relation between willing itself and the motive; and on this head the dictum "I can do what I will" does not enlighten us. The dependence of our doing, *i.e.* of our bodily actions, upon our Will, which self-consciousness no doubt asserts, is something quite different from the non-dependence of our volitions upon outer circumstances, which would constitute absolute freedom of the Will—a point upon which self-consciousness can have nothing to say, for it lies outside its sphere, involving as it does the causal relation of the outside world (which is given to us as a consciousness of other things) to our resolves; and self-consciousness cannot judge of the connexion of that which lies completely outside its sphere with that which lies inside it. For no faculty of the mind can establish a relation between two things, one of which cannot be brought in any way within its purview. But the *objects* of willing, which are just the things that determine the act of Will, clearly lie outside the limits of *self-consciousness* and are situate within the domain of the *consciousness of other things;* the act of Will, however, lies entirely within self-consciousness, and we are inquiring as to the causal relation between outside objects and this act of Will. Self-consciousness is concerned with the act of Will alone, including, of course, the absolute dominion of the volition over the limbs of the body, which is precisely

what is meant by "what I will." It is only the exercise of this dominion, *i.e.* the *deed*, that stamps it as an act of Will for self-consciousness. For so long as the volition is apprehended in the making only, it is called *desire*, and, when fully prepared, *resolve:* but that it is really a volition can be proved to self-consciousness only by its becoming a *deed;* for until then the resolve is capable of being changed. And here we stand already at the very source of that undeniable semblance of freedom which leads the uninitiated (*i.e.* the unphilosophical) to believe that in a given case two opposite acts of Will are possible, and to brag of his self-consciousness, which, as he imagines, tells him so. In fact, he confuses desiring with willing. He may *desire* opposite things, but he can only *will* one; and which this is, does not become known to self-consciousness until the *deed is done.* But as to the necessity, in virtue of whose invariable law, one, and not the other, of two opposite desires becomes an act of Will, a deed, self-consciousness can tell us nothing—simply because it learns the result entirely *a posteriori* and does not know it *a priori.* Opposite desires, with their motives, pass up and down before it alternately and repeatedly, and of each of them it declares that it will become a deed when it becomes a volition. For this latter purely subjective possibility attaches in truth to each desire, and is just the "I can do what I will." But this *subjective* possibility is entirely hypothetical, and merely means: "If I will this, I can *do* it." Only, the determinative influence requisite for willing does not lie therein: for self-consciousness contains willing only, but not the grounds which determine the man to will; these lie in the consciousness of other things, *i.e.* in the faculty of knowledge. On the other hand, it is the *objective* possibility that turns the scale; but this lies outside self-consciousness—in the world of

objects, to which the motive and the man-as-object alike belong—and is therefore alien to self-consciousness and within the sphere of the consciousness of other things. The afore-mentioned subjective possibility is like the ability of the flint to emit sparks, but only on condition of there being also a steel, which contains the objective possibility. I shall return to this from another point of view, in the next chapter, where we shall consider the Will no longer, as here, from within, but from without, and shall thus investigate the *objective* possibility of the volition. By the light thrown on the subject from two different sides we shall get a clear understanding of it, and some examples will be added by way of illustration.

Self-consciousness, then, always contains the feeling "I can do what I will": but this merely means that the resolves, or actions decided upon by our Will, although they spring from the dim depths of our inmost being, always pass over at once to the perceptual world; for to this our body, as well as all else, belongs. This consciousness forms the bridge between the inner and outer worlds, which would otherwise be separated by an impassable gulf; for without it the latter would contain mere percepts—percepts in every sense independent of us—as objects, while in the former there would only be volitions, which, though felt, would be unproductive of consequences.

Ask the first man you meet, and he will discourse of this immediate consciousness, which is so commonly taken to be a consciousness of absolute freedom of Will, in some such terms as these: "I can do what I will; if I want to go to the left, I go to the left; if I want to go to the right, I go to the right. All depends upon my Will; therefore I am free." He here says nothing but what is perfectly true and right: only, the Will is already presupposed: for it is assumed that it has made its decision, and therefore nothing is here settled as to its

own freedom. For he has said not a word about the dependence or non-dependence of the *entry* of the act of Will itself, but has spoken only of the *consequences* of this act at the moment of its entry, or, to put it more correctly, of its inevitable appearance as an action of his body.[1] It is simply and solely the consciousness underlying the above utterance of the unphilosophical man—who, for all his want of philosophy, may be profoundly learned in other branches of knowledge—that gives him so immediate an assurance of the complete freedom of his Will, that he speaks of it as an indubitable fact and really cannot believe that philosophers can seriously doubt it, but thinks in his heart of hearts that all this talk about it is mere dialectical school-fencing, and at bottom pure moonshine. It is just because this no doubt important certainty, of which his consciousness informs him, meets him at every turn, and also because man, who is primarily and essentially a practical and not a theoretical being, is much more clearly conscious of the active side of his volitions, *i.e.* of the effect they produce, than of their *passive* side, *i.e.* of their dependence, that it is so difficult to make the unphilosophical man understand our problem, and to get him to see that the question is not one that concerns *consequences*, but that it turns upon the *grounds* of his willing in every case. His *action* does indubitably depend entirely upon his willing; but what we want to know is this: On what does *his willing itself* depend?—on nothing at all, or on something? No doubt he can *do* one thing if he wills it, and can also *do* another thing if he wills that; but what we want him to tell us is, whether he is equally capable of *willing* both things. Let us, then, put the question to him in this shape: "Of two

[1] In the *W. as W. and P.* it has been explained that an uplifted hand is the outward and visible sign, in time and space, of the non-temporal, non-spatial, inward and invisible Will-to-lift.

opposite desires that have arisen in your breast, can you really gratify one as well as the other? E.g., when two things are offered to you, of which you are allowed to choose only one, can you of your own good pleasure decide which one you will prefer?" His answer will be: "It may be hard to decide; nevertheless, it depends entirely upon me, and upon nothing else, whether I *will* to choose the one or the other; for I am perfectly free to choose the one I *will* to choose, and so I shall always be following my own *Will*." If we rejoin: "But on what does your Will itself depend?"—the man will reply out of his self-consciousness: "Upon nothing but myself! I can will what I will; it is I myself that will it." And this he says without being aware of the tautology, and without leaning in his inmost consciousness upon the principle of identity, which alone makes this true. Nay here, where he is most sorely pressed, he will talk of a willing of his willing, which is like talking of an Ego of his Ego. He has here been driven back to the very citadel of his self-consciousness, where he finds his Ego and his Will to be indistinguishable. Whether in this choice, where his person and the circumstances of the choice are taken as given, his *actual willing* of one alternative rather than the other could possibly have had a different issue from that which it ultimately did have; or whether, with the given data, it was as necessarily determined as is in a triangle the subtending of the greater angle by the greater side; this is a question so remote from the natural *self-consciousness*, that it cannot even understand it, much less have a ready answer (or even the undeveloped germ of an answer) which it has only to give forth naïvely and spontaneously. And so the man who is no philosopher will always try to shelter himself from the perplexity caused by the question when rightly understood, behind the immediate certainty "What I

will I can do, and I will what I will," as explained above. This he will do over and over, so that it will be difficult to pin him down to the real question, which he is always trying to avoid. And we must not blame him for this; for the question is in truth a most embarrassing one. It thrusts a searching hand into the inmost recesses of the man; it wants to know whether he too, like everything else in the world, is a being determined once for all by his original constitution—a being, like every other in Nature, with definite and persistent qualities which oblige him to react to every external excitation, and which consequently, from this point of view, wear an unalterable character and are therefore entirely (in so far as there is anything modifiable in them) determined by outer influences; or whether he alone is an exception to the whole of Nature. If we finally succeed in pinning him down to this perplexing question, and in making it clear to him that we are here inquiring as to the origin of his volition itself, and are asking whether it arises in accordance with some law or entirely irrespective of law, we shall then find that immediate self-consciousness gives no information on this point, for the unphilosophical man will fence with the question and betray his helpless perplexity, first by silent meditation and next by all sorts of attempted explanations drawn now from experience of himself and others, now from general laws of the understanding; but the uncertainty and hesitancy of his explanations will plainly show that his immediate self-consciousness can make no reply to the question when rightly understood, though it was ready enough with an answer when that question was wrongly apprehended. In ultimate analysis this is because the man's Will is his very self, the real kernel of his being; and so it constitutes the ground of his consciousness, as something absolutely

given and present, beyond which he cannot go. For he himself is as he wills, and he wills as he is. To ask him, therefore, whether he could will otherwise than he does will, is to ask him whether he could be another man and not himself; and this he does not know. Nor is it otherwise with the philosopher, the sole difference between whom and the ordinary man is that he is accustomed to deal with problems of this kind. He too, if he is to see his way clearly in this difficult matter, will turn to his understanding which gives him *a priori* cognitions, to his reason which meditates upon these, and to experience which interprets and controls his outward knowledge (*Verstandeserkenntniss*) by placing the actions of himself and others before him, as the final and only competent Court, whose decision, though not so easy, immediate and simple as that of self-consciousness, will for all that be appropriate to the matter in hand and sufficient. The head has propounded the question, and the head must answer it.

Meanwhile we must not be surprised if immediate self-consciousness has no answer to give to this abstruse, speculative, difficult and perplexing question. For self-consciousness is but a fractional part of our total consciousness, which, obscure within, directs all its objective powers of apprehension outwardly. All its perfectly sure (*i.e. a-priori*-certain) cognitions are concerned with the outside world alone, and it can there decide with certainty, according to universal laws rooted in itself, what is there possible, what impossible, what necessary; and in this way it establishes *a priori* pure Mathematics, pure Logic, and even the foundations of pure Physics. The application of its *a-priori*-known forms to the data given by sensation very soon puts it in possession of the perceptual, real outside-world, and of experience along with this: further, the application of Logic, and of the faculty of

thinking on which this reposes, to the outer world will provide concepts, the world of thoughts, and thence proceed the sciences and their achievements. *Outside*, therefore, things are perfectly clear to consciousness. But *within* all is dark, as in a well-blacked telescope: no *a priori* principle lightens the darkness of its interior parts; the lighthouses of knowledge shine outwards only. As explained above, the only thing of which the so-called inner sense has cognisance is our own Will, to whose stirrings all the so-called inner feelings are ultimately traceable. But all that is yielded by this inner perception of the Will runs back, as I said, to willing and not-willing, whereto may be added the much-vaunted certainty "I can *do* what I *will*," which really means "I see every act of my Will forthwith (in some way which to me is quite incomprehensible) exhibiting itself as an action of my body"—and which is, properly speaking, for the knowing subject, a piece of knowledge derived from experience. More than this we cannot find out. The Court of Appeal of self-consciousness is thus incompetent to decide the question; indeed the question, in its true form, cannot be submitted to this Court, for it is incapable of understanding it.

I will now sum up in easier and shorter terms the final answer of self-consciousness to our question. The *self-consciousness* of every man declares very plainly that he can do what he will. Now as two diametrically opposite actions may be thought of as *willed* by him, it follows, no doubt, that he can do either of these actions *if he will*. But the unphilosophical man confuses this with the proposition, that in a given case he can also *will* either action, and this he calls *Freedom of the Will*. But the first proposition does not assert that in a given case he can *will* either action: it only asserts that of two opposite actions he can *do whichever he wills to do;* but

whether he *can*, in the given case, *will* them both equally, remains undecided, and this is a matter which requires further investigation, and which mere self-consciousness is incompetent to decide. Let me embody this conclusion in a scholastic formula, which puts it in the shortest way, and say: The dictum of self-consciousness concerns the Will merely *a parte post*;[1] the question as to freedom, on the other hand, *a parte ante*.[2]
Thus the undeniable dictum of self-consciousness, "I can do what I will," contains in it and decides absolutely nothing as to the freedom of the Will, which would only be proved to exist if the particular act of Will in a particular individual case, *i.e.* with a given individual character, instead of being necessarily determined by the outer circumstances amidst which the man finds himself, could turn out not only as it does turn out, but in some other way also. On this point, however, self-consciousness is perfectly dumb; for the matter lies entirely outside its province, depending as it does upon the causal connexion between the outside world and the man. Ask a person possessed of common sense, but of no philosophical training, upon what grounds he rests the confident assurance of his self-consciousness as to the freedom of the Will, and he will reply: "On the fact that I can do what I will, provided that no physical obstacle prevents me." So it is always the relation of his *doing* to his *willing* that he appeals to; but this, as we saw in the last chapter, is still nothing but *physical* freedom. If we go on to ask him whether, in a given case, he can *will* one thing as well as its contrary, he will say "yes" at the first blush; but when he begins to take in the meaning of the question, he will become doubtful, and at last will get confused, taking refuge from his uncertainty behind his favourite "I can do

[1] Forwards in time. [2] Backwards in time.

what I will," and intrenching himself there against all arguments and reasoning. But the right answer to his dictum, as I hope to put beyond the shadow of a doubt in the next chapter, would be: "You can *do* what you will; but at any given moment of your life you can only *will* one particular thing, and nothing else whatsoever."

What I have advanced in this chapter is really already a reply to the question of the Royal Society, and that a negative one; although only on the main issue, for the true state of affairs in self-consciousness will come out still more clearly in the sequel. But there is one case in which this negative reply of ours is open to verification. I mean, that when we bring our question before that only competent tribunal to which I have already referred—the tribunal composed of the pure Understanding, of the Reason which reflects upon the data furnished by that understanding, and of the Experience which results from both—and find that its decision is, that a *liberum arbitrium* has no existence at all, but that, like everything else in Nature, the action of the man in each given case follows as a necessary effect, it becomes clear that in immediate self-consciousness *there cannot possibly lie* data from which to prove the *liberum arbitrium* about which we are inquiring; consequently by means of the conclusion *a non posse ad non esse*,[1] which is the only one whereby *negative a priori* truths can be established, our decision, which rested hitherto on empirical grounds, will receive a rational foundation and thus be made doubly secure. For it is inconceivable that there should be a direct contradiction between the immediate utterances of self-consciousness and the results proceeding

[1] From impossibility to non-existence—meaning, If a thing is impossible, we are justified in asserting that it does not exist.

from the fundamental principles of the pure understanding, with their application to experience: our self-consciousness cannot be so mendacious as that.

Accordingly this *indirect* investigation upon which we are now about to enter—an investigation conducted within the sphere of the cognitive faculty and of the outside world which is its special province—will at the same time throw much light upon the *direct* research which we have hitherto been prosecuting and thus serve to complete it; for it will disclose the natural illusions arising from the false allegations of the eminently simple testimony of self-consciousness, where this comes into conflict with that consciousness of other things which constitutes the cognitive faculty and is rooted in the self-same subject in which self-consciousness resides. Indeed, not until the close of this indirect investigation shall we see the real meaning of that "I will" which accompanies all our actions, and understand that consciousness of originality and independence which makes them *our* actions. In this way alone will our investigation, which so far has been direct, become complete.

Chapter III.

THE WILL IN THE PRESENCE OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF OTHER THINGS

Turning now to the cognitive faculty with our problem, we know, to start with, that, as this faculty is from its very nature directed outwards, the Will cannot be for it an object of direct perception as it is for our self-consciousness, which, however, we have found to be incompetent in this matter; but that here only will-endowed

beings are under consideration—beings who stand before that faculty as objective and outward appearances, *i.e.* as objects of experience, and who are now to be examined and judged as such, partly according to general *a-priori*-certain laws which condition experience, partly according to facts supplied by experience itself. Thus we have no longer to do, as heretofore, with the *Will* itself as revealed to our inner sense, but with *beings* that will and are moved by the *Will*—beings who are objects of the outer senses. Though this places us at the disadvantage of having to consider the special object of our inquiry indirectly only and at a greater distance; yet this is compensated by the advantage of having a far completer organon wherewith to conduct our investigations, than the dim, dull, one-sided, direct self-consciousness, the so-called inner sense—viz. the *Understanding*, with its panoply of all the outer senses and all the powers necessary for *objective* apprehension.

The most general and fundamentally essential form of this Understanding is the *law of causality*, for by means of this alone is produced that perceivance of the real external world whereby we apprehend the affections and changes perceived in our organs of sense at once and quite immediately as *effects*, and, without preliminary instruction or experience, pass over instantaneously from them to their *causes*, which now, through this very operation of the understanding, exhibit themselves as *objects in space*.[1] Hence there can be no shadow of doubt, that the *law of causality* is known to us *a priori*; that is to say, as a necessary law conditioning experience; and we have consequently no need of Kant's indirect, difficult and insufficient proof of this important truth. The law of causality stands firm *a priori*, as the general

[1] For further particulars see my *Fourfold Root*, § 21.—Au.

rule to which all real objects of the external world without exception are subject. This unexceptiveness it owes to its apriority. It relates essentially and exclusively to *changes*, and declares that where and when in the objective, real, material world anything whatsoever, large or small, much or little, *changes*, something else *must* just *previously* have *changed;* that the change of *this* thing was again the result of an *antecedent* change, and so on for ever. In this regressive series of changes, which fills time as matter fills space, no initial point can be discovered or even conceived as possible, much less presupposed. For the perpetually-renewed question, "What introduced this change?" never allows the understanding a resting-place, however tired it may become with this regressus: and so a first cause is just as unthinkable as a beginning of time or a limit to space. Again, the law of causality declares with equal emphasis, that if the former change (the cause) has occurred, the succeeding change due to this (the effect) must occur without fail, *i.e.* must necessarily follow. By this character of necessity the law of causality proves itself to be a mode of the *Principle of Sufficient Reason*, which is the most general form of our whole cognitive faculty, and which appears in the real world as causality proper, in the world of thought as the logical law of the ground-of-knowing, and even in empty but *a-priori*-perceived space, as the law of the strictly necessary dependence of the position of all its parts relatively to one another—the special and exhaustive exhibition of which necessary dependence forms the sole theme of Geometry. Hence, as I explained at the beginning of this Essay, "being necessary" and "following from a given ground" are convertible terms.

All *changes* that take place in the objects that lie in the real outer world are thus subject to the law of

causality, and therefore always occur, whensoever and wheresoever they do occur, necessarily and inevitably.

To this rule there can be no exception, for the law stands fast *a priori* for all possible experience. But as regards its application to a given case, we have merely to ask whether we are dealing with a *change* in a given real object of outward experience: if so, its changes are subject to the law of causality, *i.e.* must be introduced by a cause, and are thus *necessary*.

If now we go, with our general *a-priori*-certain and therefore unexceptive law, to experience itself, and consider real empirical objects, to the changes of which alone our law applies, we soon perceive fundamental differences, which divide them—the classification is a very old one—into inorganic or lifeless, and organic or living, bodies, which last subdivide again into plants and animals. Animals, again, although they are essentially alike and correspond to their concept, nevertheless present a long and nicely-graduated series, differing in regard to perfection; some being hardly distinguishable from plants, and others corresponding to the most perfect conception of an animal. At the summit of this series stands man —ourself.

Now if, without allowing ourselves to be led astray by this diversity, we regard all these beings together merely as real objects of experience, and proceed to apply our *a priori* unexceptive law of causality to the changes which can be effected in such beings; we shall find that, while experience conforms everywhere to our law, the above-mentioned great *diversity* in the nature of all these empirical objects has an answering and special modification of the way in which causality asserts its right to them. To explain: Answering to the threefold division into inorganic bodies, plants and animals, causality, which introduces all the changes in them, likewise

assumes three forms, viz. *cause* in the narrowest sense of the word, *stimulus* and *motivation*—and yet this modification does not in the least detract from the *a-priori* validity of the law, or impair the necessity with which effect follows upon cause.

A *cause*, in the narrowest sense of the word, is that by virtue of which all mechanical, physical and chemical changes in the objects of experience take place. It is everywhere characterised by two distinctive marks: (1) in it is always fulfilled the third Newtonian law, "Action and reaction are equal," *i.e.* the antecedent state, called cause, undergoes the same change as is undergone by the following state, called effect; (2) Newton's second law is likewise fulfilled, and the degree of the effect is always exactly proportioned to the degree of the cause—thus an augmentation of the former leads to a proportionate augmentation of the latter, so that, when once the mode of operation is known, the degree of intensity of the cause can be forthwith known, measured and calculated from the degree of intensity of the effect, and *vice versa*. In the empirical application of this second criterion, however, we must beware of confusing the actual with the visible effect. For example, where a body is undergoing compression, we must not expect to see its volume diminished in exact proportion to the compressing force: for the space into which the body is squeezed continually decreases, and the resistance consequently increases; and although here the real effect, augmentation of density, does actually increase in proportion to the cause, as Mariotte's law informs us, this cannot be learnt from the visible phenomenon. Again, heat conducted to water will raise its temperature to a certain point, but on the application of more heat the water merely passes quickly into vapour: yet here, too, there exists the same relation between the intensity of the cause and that of

the effect; and so in many other cases. It is *causes in the narrowest sense* such as these, that produce changes in all *inanimate, i.e. inorganic* bodies. Causes of this kind are recognised and presupposed in all mechanical, hydrodynamical, physical and chemical changes. The special and distinctive mark, therefore, of an inorganic or inanimate body is, that it is determinable by causes of this kind alone.

The second species of cause is the *stimulus*, whose characteristic features are (1) that action and reaction are not proportionate; (2) that intensity of effect is by no means commensurate with intensity of cause. Hence the degree of the effect cannot be measured and predicted from the degree of the cause: on the contrary, a trifling increase of stimulus may produce a very considerable augmentation of effect, or, conversely, may altogether neutralise the previous effect, or even produce one that is diametrically opposite. Thus plants, as is well known, can be forced into extraordinarily rapid growth by heat, or by the addition of lime to the soil; for these causes stimulate their vital force. But should the amount of stimulus be overdone by even a little, then instead of a heightened and quickened life, death will ensue. So, too, we may considerably augment our mental powers by wine or opium; but let the right amount of the stimulus be exceeded, and the result will be the very opposite. It is causes of this kind—stimuli, to wit—that determine all changes of organisms *as such.* All changes and developments of plants, and all merely organic and vegetative changes or functions of the bodies of animals, are due to *stimuli.* Light, heat, air, nourishment—every drug, touch, impregnation, etc.—all these act as stimuli. While the life of animals has, in addition to its vegetative part, a totally different sphere, of which I am shortly to speak, the

whole life of *plants* is due to *stimuli* alone. Their assimilation, their growth, the striving of their crowns to the light and of their roots to the richer soil, their impregnation, germination, etc.—all the changes here involved follow upon *stimuli*. In some few species we also meet with a peculiar swift movement which is likewise the result of a stimulus, and which gives the members of these species their name "sensitive plants." The best known of these are *Mimosa pudica*, *Hedysarum gyrans*, and *Dionæa muscipula*. Exclusive and unexceptive determination by *stimuli* is the characteristic feature of plants. Every material object, therefore, whose special and peculiar movements and changes follow always and exclusively upon *stimuli*, is a *plant*.

The third species of motive cause is that which characterises the *animal*: it is *motivation*, *i.e.* causality that passes through *knowledge*. It comes into existence at that point in the hierarchy of natural beings, where the creature, no longer able to satisfy its more complex and manifold needs under excitation of a stimulus which has to be waited for, is compelled to choose, seize, aye and seek out, the means of satisfaction. Hence beings of this kind are possessed (in lieu of mere susceptibility for *stimuli* and of the movement resulting therefrom) of susceptibility for *motives*; *i.e.* they have a presentment-faculty, an intellect, in countless degrees of perfection, exhibiting itself materially as a nervous system and brain, and thus entailing consciousness. That the life of the animal rests upon a basis of vegetative life, which as such is an affair of stimuli only, is well known. But all movements which the animal makes as an *animal*, and which for that very reason depend upon what Physiology calls "animal functions," take place in consequence of a perceived object, *i.e.* in response to *motives*. An *animal*, therefore, is a material object whose peculiar,

special, outward movements and changes always follow upon *motives*, *i.e.* upon certain *presentments* present to the consciousness whose existence they presuppose. Endless as may be the grades of the capacity for framing presentments in the animal-series; endless as may be the differences of consciousness; yet each animal will have at least so much as suffices to supply it with a motive which shall excite it to motion—in which process the inward moving-force, whose particular manifestation is called forth by the motive, will announce itself to self-consciousness, which here first makes its appearance, as that which we call "Will."

Now so obviously different is the manner in which stimuli and motives work, that even to an observer from without—and that is our present standpoint—there can never be any doubt as to whether a given material-object is moved by a *stimulus* or a *motive*. For whenever a stimulus operates, there must always be immediate contact, if not intussusception; and though this may be invisible, as in the case of stimulation by air, light, heat, etc., yet we cannot be at fault if we observe that the effect has an unmistakable relation to the duration and intensity of the stimulus, although this relation may not remain the same in all degrees of stimulus. Whereas, where motion is caused by a *motive*, all such distinctions are completely lost. For here the real and immediate medium of the influence is not the atmosphere, but simply and solely *knowledge*. The object that operates as motive requires only to be *perceived*, *known*; and it matters not how near or far it is, nor how long or how plainly it has come into apperception. Such distinctions do not change the degree of intensity of its effect in the least; let it but be perceived, and it equally produces its effect; provided only that it be competent to determine the Will which is here to be excited. This last is a

prerequisite even in physical and chemical causes, and in stimuli likewise; for these also can produce their effect only when the body to be affected is *susceptible* to them. I just now used the expression "the Will which is here to be excited"; for, as I have already said, that which actually imparts its power of working to the motive, the secret spring of the motion called forth by that motive, here announces itself inwardly and immediately to the animal as that which is betokened by the word "Will." In objects that move in response to stimuli alone (plants), we call this persistent inward condition "vital force"; in those which move merely in response to causes, in the narrowest sense of the word, we call it "force of Nature" or "quality." All explanations take it for granted as the inexplicable; for these beings have no inward self-consciousness, to which this mysterious quality can immediately reveal itself. Now whether—if we look away from the *appearance in general*, and inquire about that which Kant calls the thing-in-itself—this inner condition of their reaction to outer causes in the case of such knowledgeless and even lifeless beings is in essence identical with that which we call *Will* in ourselves, as a modern philosopher[1] actually flatters himself that he has demonstrated, is a point I will not argue, though I do not see my way to contradict him.

But I must not omit to explain the difference caused in motivation by that which distinguishes human from animal consciousness, viz. Reason. Owing to his possession of this faculty man does not, like the animal, have a mere *perceptual* apprehension of the outside world, but from this perceivance he has the power of abstracting general concepts (*notiones universales*), and, in order to

[1] I am here of course speaking of myself, but the required *incognito* [the Essay was written for a prize competition—Tr.] compelled me to avoid the use of the first person.—Au.

fix them firmly in his mind, he denotes them by words and can thus form endless combinations, which, however, though they always relate, as do the concepts for which they stand, to the perceptually-known world, properly constitute what we call "thinking"—that faculty which gives the human race those great advantages over every other, viz. speech, reflectiveness, the power of reviewing the past and providing for the future, purpose, resolution, the concerted action of many men in common, the State, the sciences, the arts, etc. All this is due solely to the capacity for framing those non-perceptual, abstract, general presentments which we call concepts (*Begriffe*), *i.e.* inclusive complexes (*Inbegriffe*), because each of them contains (*begreift*) under it many particular things. This faculty is wanting to the animals, even the cleverest: they have therefore only *perceptual* presentments, and consequently know only the immediately present—live only in the present. The motives by which their Will is moved must therefore be always perceptual and present. Hence an exceedingly limited *choice* is open to them, viz. a choice confined to things lying perceptually before them within their narrow range of view and restricted faculty of apprehension—things which are thus present in time and space, and of which the one that appeals to them most strongly as a motive forthwith determines their Will; thus in their case the causality of the motive is very plain. We have an *apparent* exception in *training*, which is fear operating through the medium of habit; but instinct is, in a certain sense, a *real* exception, viz. in so far as the animal acting under its influence has its whole mode of action set in motion not by motives proper, but by inward impulse, which, however, receives its proximate determination in the *particular* actions of the moment through motives again, and thus comes once more under

the rule. To enter here into a full discussion of instinct would take me too far from my theme: the 27th chapter of the Supplements to my chief work is devoted to it.

Owing to his faculty for *non-perceptual* presentments, by means of which he *thinks and reflects*, man has an infinitely wider range of view, which includes the absent, the past, the future: he is thus susceptible to the influence of a far greater number of motives, and has consequently a much wider choice, than has the animal confined to the narrow present. It is not, as a rule, the things that lie before his sense-perception now and here, that determine his action; but rather mere *thoughts*, which he carries about with him in his head wherever he goes, and which render him independent of the impression of the moment. When his action is not the result of thoughts, we call it irrational, wanting in sense; whereas it is called rational or sensible and commended, when it is exclusively the outcome of ripe thought and is therefore completely independent of the impression of the perceptual present. That the man is actuated by a special class of presentments peculiar to himself (abstract concepts, thoughts), which the animal does not possess, we see even by looking upon him from without; for this circumstance impresses upon all his actions, even the most insignificant—aye, upon his very gait and upon all his movements—the character of *intentionality and purposiveness*. This makes his mode of life so obviously different from that of the animal, that we see at once that his movements are directed by, as it were, slender invisible threads (motives depending upon mere thoughts), while the animal's life is guided by the coarse visible ropes of the perceptual present. Farther than this the difference between them does not go. The thought becomes a motive, just as the percept does, the moment it can act upon the Will to which it is

presented. But all motives are causes, and all causality introduces necessity. It is only that the man, by means of his faculty of thinking, can alternately and frequently represent to himself the motives, whose influence upon his Will he feels, in any order, and can thus put them before his Will—which is what we call *deliberating;* and this capacity for deliberation renders possible a far greater *choice* than is open to the animal. This, no doubt, makes him *relatively free*—free, that is, from the immediate compulsion of the sensibly-perceived objects which at the *particular moment* are acting upon his Will as motives—a compulsion to which the animal is wholly given over; whereas he is determined, independently of present objects, by thoughts, which are *his* motives. It is no doubt this *relative* freedom, that cultivated but not deep-thinking people really have in mind, when they talk of that freedom of the Will which so obviously gives man the advantage over the animal. But it is only *relative*, viz. in respect of the sensibly-perceived present, and only *comparative*, viz. in comparison with the *animal.* It only affects the *mode* of motivation, and does not in the least abolish or even diminish the *necessity* of the operation of motives. The *abstract* motive, consisting in a mere *thought*, is an outer will-determining cause, just as much as the perceptual motive consisting in a real, present object: so it is just as much a cause as any other, and is even, like other causes, always something real and material, inasmuch as it always ultimately depends upon an impression received *from without* somewhen and somewhere. Its only superiority lies in the length of the guiding thread: by which I mean, that it is not, like the merely *perceptual* motive, bound to a certain *nearness* in space and time; but can operate through the greatest distance, through the longest time, by means of a long chain of concepts and thoughts.

This is owing to the constitution and eminent susceptibility of the organ which in the first instance experiences and receives its influence, viz. the human brain or *Reason*. This, however, does not in the least annul its *causality* and the *necessity* that depends thereon. Hence only a very superficial observer can call this relative and comparative freedom an absolute freedom, a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*. The deliberative faculty, which takes its origin from this comparative freedom, leads indeed to nothing but a *conflict*, an often very painful conflict, of *motives* under the presidency of Irresolution—a conflict whose arena is the whole spirit and consciousness of the man, who lets the motives try their strength repeatedly, one against the other, upon his Will, thus putting it into the condition of a body acted on by forces pulling it in different directions, until at last the strongest motive beats the others out of the field and determines the Will: this issue is called "resolve," and is the absolutely *necessary* result of the battle.

If now we once more review the whole series of forms of causality—first, *causes* in the narrowest sense of the word, then *stimuli*, and finally *motives*, which last divide into perceptual and abstract—we shall observe that, as we go through the hierarchy of beings from below to above, cause and effect become ever more widely separated, more clearly differentiated, more heterogeneous, and thus the cause becomes ever less material and palpable, so that less and less seems to lie in the cause, and more and more in the effect; and in consequence the connexion between cause and effect becomes ever less immediately comprehensible and intelligible. For there is least separation, least heterogeneousness, in *mechanical* causality, which is therefore the *easiest understood*: this led, in the eighteenth century, to the mistaken attempt—they go on with it still in France, and of recent years it has come

into vogue in Germany—to reduce every other kind of causality to this, to explain all physical and chemical processes from mechanical causes, and finally to account for the vital process from these. The impinging body moves the body at rest, thereby losing as much motion as it communicates: here we see the cause passing over, so to speak, into the effect; both are perfectly homogeneous, exactly commensurable and at the same time palpable. And this is really the case with all purely mechanical effects. But we shall find that all this is less and less the case as we go higher, and that the separation spoken of above becomes greater and greater as at each successive step we consider the relation between cause and effect; *e.g.* between heat as cause and its various effects, such as expansion, incandescence, fusion, volatilisation, combustion, thermo-electricity, etc.; or between evaporation as cause, and cooling or crystallisation as effects; or between the rubbing of glass as cause, and free electricity, with its strange phenomena, as effect; or between slow oxidation of plates as cause, and galvanism, with its electric, chemical, and magnetic phenomena, as effect. Thus cause and effect *depart* ever further and further from each other, become *more heterogeneous;* their connection becomes *less intelligible;* the effect seems to contain more than could be imparted to it by the cause, which appears to be ever less material and palpable. All this becomes plainer still when we pass to *organic* bodies, where the causes are mere *stimuli* (partly from without, such as those of light, heat, air, soil, nourishment—partly from within, such as those of the juices and of the various parts upon one another), and the effect is life, with its infinite complexity and countless diversity in kind, as exhibited in the manifold forms of the vegetable and animal kingdoms.[1]

[1] For a more detailed exposition of this separation of cause and effect see the chapter on Astronomy in my *Will in Nature.*—Au.

But in this ever-increasing heterogeneity, incommensurability, and unintelligibility of relation between cause and effect, has there been any diminution of the *necessity* that arises from the causal connexion? No, not the slightest. As necessarily as the rolling ball sets in motion the ball at rest, no less necessarily must the Leyden jar, on which one hand is resting, discharge itself when the other hand is brought into contact with it; must arsenic kill every human living being; must the seed, which, when kept in a dry state, showed no change throughout centuries, germinate, grow, and develop into a plant, as soon as it is placed in suitable soil and exposed to the influence of air, light, heat and moisture. The cause is more complex, the effect more heterogeneous, but the necessity with which it enters is not one hair's-breadth less.

In the life of the plant and in the vegetative life of the animal, the stimulus is, indeed, very dissimilar in every respect from the organic function it excites to action, and the two are clearly differentiated: they are not, however, as yet really *separated*, but there must be contact between them, slight and invisible though this may be. Total separation does not take place until we come to the life of the animal, whose actions are called forth by motives: here, for the first time, the cause, which hitherto had been always materially conjoined with the effect, exists completely apart from it, is of quite another nature, a thing primarily immaterial, a mere presentment. Thus in the *motive*, which calls forth the movement of the animal, this heterogeneity between cause and effect, the severance of the two, their incommensurability, that immateriality of the cause which makes it apparently contain less than the effect—all this reaches its highest degree, and the incomprehensibility of the relation between the two would be absolute, if we

knew this causal relation, as we do all others, simply *from without:* but our other knowledge is here supplemented by information of quite another kind, information *from within*, and the process which here takes place as effect, in response to the supervening cause, is intimately known to us; we have a *terminus ad hoc*[1] for it—Will. That the causal relation, however, has lost not a whit more of its *necessity* than was the case when a stimulus was the cause, we are ready to affirm, the moment we recognise it to be a *causal relation* and think it through this essential form of our understanding.[2] Moreover we find motivation to be completely analogous to the two above-discussed modes of the causal relation [where the causes are (1) cause in the narrowest sense; (2) stimulus], and to be simply the highest grade reached by these in their gradual upward ascent. At the lowest grades of animal life the *motive* is still nearly akin to the *stimulus:* zoophytes, radiaria of all kinds, acephala among the molluscs, have only a weak dawning of consciousness, just sufficient to enable them to perceive their food or prey, and to seize it when it presents itself, and also, it may be, to exchange their locality for a more favourable one; at these low grades the effect of the motive is still as clear, immediate, decisive and unequivocal as is that of the stimulus. Small insects are drawn into the flame by the shining light: flies settle confidingly upon the head of the lizard which has just swallowed their brethren before their eyes. Who would dream of freedom here? In the higher and more intelligent animals the effect of motives becomes ever more indirect: the motive, I mean, separates itself more clearly from the action it provokes; so that we may even use this different amount of separation between motive

[1] Special term.
[2] Causality is the form peculiar to the understanding.

and action as a measure of the intelligence of animals. In man it is prodigious, whereas even in the cleverest animals the presentment which becomes their motive for action must still always be a *perceptual* one; true, they have a choice, but it is only a choice between things perceptually present. The dog stands hesitating between the call of its master and the sight of a female of its own species: the stronger motive will determine its movement; but this follows as necessarily as a mechanical effect. Even in this last we may see a body that has been put out of equilibrium, sway for a time alternately from side to side, until the whereabouts of its centre of gravity is determined and it topples down. Now so long as motivation is confined to perceptual presentments, its kinship with the stimulus and the cause in general will still be evident; for the motive, as operative cause, must be real and present, and must act physically upon the senses, though it may be in a very indirect manner, through light, sound, odour. Besides, the cause is here as clear to the spectator as the effect: he sees the motive enter—sees the animal's action follow inevitably, provided only there be no opposition either from some equally obvious motive or from training. There can be no possible doubt as to the connexion between them. And so it would never occur to any one to attribute to animals a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, *i.e.* an action determined by no cause.

But where consciousness is rational—that is to say, capable of non-perceptual knowledge, *i.e.* of concepts and thoughts—the motives become completely independent of the present and of the real environment, and are thus hidden from the spectator. For they are now mere thoughts, which the man carries about in his head, though they originated outside it and very often far away—it may be, in his own experience of bygone years,

or in communications made to him by others either orally or through writings, which may even have come down from the distant past; but in any case *their origin is always real and objective*, although, through the often difficult combination of complex outer circumstances, many errors, many illusions due to transmission, and consequently many follies will be found among the motives. Added to this, a man will often hide the motives of his actions from all the world, and sometimes even from himself, as, for instance, where he is ashamed to acknowledge the motive that really prompts him to do this or that. Meanwhile we see his action and seek by conjectures to fathom the motives which caused it; for that it *is* occasioned by motives we entertain no more doubt, than that the motion of inanimate bodies is always occasioned by a previous cause; being convinced that the one, like the other, is impossible without a cause. And so, conversely, in our own plans and undertakings, we take into account the effect of motives upon men, and, if we know the individual character of our man exactly, our calculation will be as correct as any mechanical computation depending upon the length and thickness of beams, the diameter of wheels, the weight of burdens, &c., &c. Every one makes this assumption who looks into the world, has to deal with men, and pursues practical ends; for these are the purposes for which the human understanding is destined. But if a man tries to judge the matter theoretically and philosophically (a thing really beyond the powers of the human understanding), making himself the object of his own judgment, he will be so led astray by the above-sketched immaterial nature of abstract motives consisting of mere thoughts—seeing that they are not bound to the present and the environment of the moment, and that they are counteracted only by mere thoughts again

—that he will doubt their existence, or at any rate the necessity of their operation, and will imagine that what was done might equally have been left undone, that the Will determines itself without a cause, and that each of his acts was a first beginning of an immensely long series of changes which are the outcome of that act. And nothing is better calculated to confirm this error than the mistaken interpretation of that dictum of self-consciousness, of which we had so much to say in the last chapter, "I can do what I will"; especially if this, as it invariably does, makes itself heard during the struggle of two or three motives that are severally soliciting him at the moment and that mutually exclude each other. All this taken together is the source of the natural illusion from which springs the error, that in our self-consciousness there lies the certainty of a freedom of our Will, in the sense that, contrary to all laws of the pure understanding and of Nature, it determines itself without sufficient grounds, and that under given circumstances, in one and the same individual, its resolves can take either this or that direction.

In order to show in the plainest way how this error, which is so important from the point of view of our theme, originates, and thus to supplement the investigation of self-consciousness to which the last chapter was devoted, let us think of a man who stands, say, in the street and says to himself: "It is six o'clock; the day's work is over. I can take a walk; or I can go to the club; or I can climb the tower and see the sun go down; or I can go to the theatre; or I can pay a visit to one or other of my friends; or I can even go out of the city gate, and wander into the wide world and never come back. I am perfectly free to do any of these things; I will, however, do none of them, but will go home, equally voluntarily, to my wife." Now this is just as if the water said: "I

can mount in high waves (yes, in a storm at sea); I can go tearing down hill (yes, in the bed of a torrent); I can dash down foaming and spouting (yes, in the waterfall); I can soar freely into the air (yes, in the fountain); I can, finally, boil and evaporate (yes, at a temperature of 80° Réaumur); I will, however, do none of these things, but voluntarily remain peaceful and clear in the mirroring pond." As the water can do all these things only when the causes determining it to one or the other of them enter; so is it with this man in respect of the things he imagines he can do. Until the causes enter, he cannot do any of them; but when they enter, he *must:* he is no more a free agent than the water, which *has* to adapt itself to the conditions of its environment. His error, and the whole illusion proceeding from the wrongly-interpreted self-consciousness that he is equally capable of doing anything he pleases, is seen to depend, when we probe it to the bottom, upon the circumstance that only *one* picture at a time can be present to his imagination, and that for the moment this picture excludes every other. If, then, his mind is occupied with the motive which is soliciting him to one of the several actions which he thinks possible, he at once feels its effect upon his Will: *velleitas*[1] is the technical term for this. Now he thinks he can raise this to a *voluntas*,[2] *i.e.* can carry the proposed action into effect; but this is an illusion. For reflection would at once come in and bring to mind the motives drawing him aside or in the reverse direction, and he would discover that it is not carried into effect. In such successive presentation of different and mutually exclusive motives to the mind, while all the time there dwells within the feeling "I can do what I will," the Will turns instantly, like a weather-

[1] Velleity. [2] Volition.

cock on a well-oiled pivot in a changeable wind, to every motive presented to it by the imagination, and the man thinks he can *will* each of them and fix the vane in this or that position; but this is mere illusion. For his "I can will this" is in truth hypothetical and requires to be supplemented by "if I do not rather will something else," which, however, abolishes the other power of willing.

Let us now return to our man whom we left deliberating at six o'clock in the street, and suppose him to be suddenly aware that I am philosophising about him and contesting his freedom to carry out all the actions open to him. He might then very well perform one of them, just to refute me; but here, too, there would be a compelling motive, viz. my denial of his freedom and the effect produced by this upon his spirit of contradiction. This, however, would only move him to carry out one or other of the *easier* of the above-proposed actions: *e.g.* he might go to the theatre; but he would certainly not carry out the last, and go wandering out into the world, for the spirit of contradiction would be an insufficient motive.

Just so, a man with a pistol in his hand is under the erroneous impression that he can shoot himself or not, as he pleases. For the least factor here is the mechanical means of accomplishment; the main one being an excessively strong, and therefore very rare motive sufficient to overcome the desire of life, or rather the fear of death: only when this is present can he actually shoot himself, and then he *must*—unless a still stronger counter-motive, if such is possible, prevents the deed.

"I can do what I will": yes, *provided I will it.* I can give all my goods to the poor and thus become poor myself—if I will! But I have *not* the Will, because the opposing motives are far too strong. If, however, I had another character, if I were a saint, I might will it; but

if so, I could not help willing it, and I should thus be obliged to do it. All this in no wise contradicts the "I can *do* what I *will*" of self-consciousness, in which some brainless philosophasters of recent times imagine they see an absolute freedom of Will, which accordingly they want to give out as an established fact of consciousness. Foremost among these is Mons. Cousin, who therefore deserves "honourable mention" here, for he teaches (see his *Cours d'histoire de la philosophie, professé en* 1819, 1820, *et publié par Vacherot*, 1841) that the freedom of the Will is the most positive fact of consciousness (vol. i. pp. 19, 20), and censures Kant for deriving it merely from the moral law and setting it up as a postulate, when it is in truth a fact. "Pourquoi démontrer," says he, "ce qu'il suffit de constater?.....la liberté est un fait, et non une croyance"[1] (p. 50). Meanwhile there is no lack in Germany of ignoramuses who throw to the winds all that the great thinkers of the last two centuries have written on this head, and who, presuming upon the wrong interpretation of the dictum of self-consciousness analysed in the last chapter, thus ranging themselves with the ignorant mob, vaunt the freedom of the Will as an actual fact. Yet perhaps I am doing them an injustice; for it may be that they are not so ignorant as they seem, but merely hungry, and therefore teach, for the sake of a very dry crust of bread, everything that is likely to be acceptable to the powers that be.[2]

It is neither metaphor nor hyperbole, but sober and literal matter of fact, that a man can no more get up from his chair until a motive pulls or pushes him out of

[1] Why give a demonstration, when an assertion is sufficient?.... freedom is a fact, and not a belief.

[2] The Government, who appointed the Professors of Philosophy, insisted that their teaching should support the established religion.

it, than a billiard-ball can move without being struck: as soon, however, as the motive presents itself, he gets up as necessarily and infallibly as the ball rolls after being struck. And to expect a man to do something without an interested motive, is like expecting a piece of wood to come to one without being drawn by a cord. Should any one who makes this assertion be obstinately contradicted by another at a conversazione, he would be speedily vindicated by getting a third person to shout with conviction "The ceiling is coming down"—and the gainsayer would soon see that a motive can drive people home as effectually as the strongest mechanical cause.

For man, like all objects of experience, is an appearance in time and space, and as the law of causality is valid *a priori* and therefore without exception for all such appearances, he must also be subject to it. This truth is proclaimed by the pure understanding *a priori*, and confirmed by the analogy that runs through the whole of Nature; and experience gives the same testimony every moment of our lives, if only we bethink ourselves that, since the beings of Nature, as they rise in the scale, become more complex and show more and more susceptibility, being amenable not only to merely mechanical, but also to chemical, electrical, stimulative, sensible, intellectual,[1] and finally rational influences, the nature of the *operating causes* must also needs keep even step with this heightened susceptibility and must necessarily correspond at each successive grade to the beings acted upon by them. It is only this that makes the causes look ever less palpable and material, until at last they are no longer visible to the eye, although still within the reach of the understanding, which presupposes them in each particular case with unshakable confidence and does

[1] In the limited sense of "of or belonging to the understanding."

not fail to discover them when it searches carefully. For here the operating causes are sublimed to mere thoughts, which war with other thoughts, until at last the strongest of them turns the scale and sets the man in motion; and all this happens with a necessity of causal connexion just as strict, as when purely mechanical causes in complex conjunction act one against the other and the calculated result follows infallibly. Apparent causelessness, due to the invisibility of the cause, is seen as well in the little electrified pith-balls that dance about in a glass, as in the movements of the man; but judgment is an affair not of the eye, but of the understanding.

On the hypothesis of absolute freedom of the Will, our every action would be an inexplicable marvel—an effect without a cause: and on attempting to represent such a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ* to our mind, we shall at once become aware that the understanding stands stock still; it has no form by which to think such a thing. For the why-rule, the principle of universal determination and of the dependence of appearances upon each other, is the most general form of our cognitive faculty, assuming different modes according to the difference of the objects cognised. But in absolute freedom we have to think of something that determines, without being determined; that depends on nothing, though something else depends on it; that produces A without necessitation, consequently without determining cause, when it might just as well have produced B, C, or D under the selfsame circumstances, *i.e.* without there being anything in A which should give it a preference (for this would imply motivation, *i.e.* causality) over B, C, D. We are here reduced to that concept of the *absolutely contingent* mentioned at the beginning of this Essay. I repeat: before such a notion the understanding stands stock still, even supposing we could entertain it.

But let us call to mind what a cause really is: viz. the antecedent change which makes the subsequent one necessary. No cause can bring its effect entirely out of itself, create it out of nothing. There must always be something upon which it operates, and it merely produces now, here, and in this particular being, a change that is always in keeping with the nature of the being, which must therefore already contain the *force* that brings about this change. Hence every effect is the resultant of two factors, an inner and an outer: viz. (1) the original force that resides in the object affected, and (2) the determining cause which now compels that force to manifest itself here. Original force is presupposed in all causality and in every causal explanation: this is why an explanation from causality never explains everything, but always leaves something unexplained. We see this in the whole of Physics and Chemistry: in the explanations given by these sciences, forces of Nature are always presupposed; these forces manifest themselves in the phenomena, and the explanation consists in referring everything to them. A force of Nature does not itself admit of any explanation, but is the principle of all explanation: it is itself subject to no causality, but is just that which lends every cause its causality, *i.e.* its capacity for producing an effect. It is itself the common substratum of all effects of this kind, and is present in each one of them. Thus the phenomena of Magnetism are reduced to an original force called electricity. At this the explanation stops: it merely gives the conditions under which such a force manifests itself, *i.e.* the causes which call forth its activity. The explanations of celestial Mechanics presuppose gravitation as the force by virtue of which the particular causes determining the orbits of the heavenly bodies here operate. The explanations of Chemistry presuppose the

mysterious forces which manifest themselves as elective affinities, according to certain stoicheiometrical relations —forces whereon ultimately depend all the effects which punctually occur as the result of artificially-instituted causes. In like manner all explanations of Physiology presuppose vital force, which reacts in a definite way to specific stimuli, inner and outer. And so throughout. Even the causes with which so comprehensible a science as Mechanics deals—impact and pressure, for instance—presuppose impenetrability, cohesion, rigidity, density, inertia, gravity, elasticity, which are no less unfathomable forces of Nature than those mentioned above. Thus everywhere causes determine nothing further than the when and where of the *manifestations* of original, inexplicable forces, under the presupposition of which alone are they causes, *i.e.* do they necessarily entail certain effects.

This, which is true of causes in the narrowest sense and of stimuli, is no less true of *motives;* for motivation is not essentially different from causality, but is only a particular form thereof, viz. causality passed through the medium of knowledge. Here too, therefore, the cause only calls forth the manifestation of a force that can be referred to no antecedent causes and consequently cannot be further explained—which force, here called *Will*, is known to us not merely from without, like the other forces of Nature, but, by reason of self-consciousness, also from within and immediately. Only under the presupposition that such a Will is present and is possessed of a particular nature and constitution in the definite case, do the causes directed to it, here called motives, operate. This special and individually-determined idiosyncrasy of the Will, in virtue of which its reaction in response to the selfsame motives differs in different people, constitutes that which we call their

character, and indeed, as it is not known *a priori*, but only comes to be known by experience, their *empirical character*. Through it the mode of action of the various motives on the given man is primarily determined. For it is the substratum of all effects called forth by motives; just as the universal forces of Nature lie at the base of effects due to causes in the narrowest sense, and as the vital force is the groundwork of the effects produced by stimuli. And, like the forces of Nature, it too is original, unalterable, inexplicable. In animals it differs in every species; in man, in each individual. Only in the highest and cleverest animals of all does it show an appreciable individual-character, although the character of the species always remains markedly predominant.

The character of man is (1) individual: it differs in each. True, the character of the species is a base common to them all, and so the main specific-qualities are to be detected in every man: but here there is such a significant more or less of degree, such a diversity of combination and of modification of qualities by each other, that we may assume that men differ as much morally in character as they do intellectually, which is saying much; and both these differences are incomparably greater than the bodily difference between the giant and the dwarf, between Apollo and Thersites. This is what makes the effect of the selfsame motive upon different men so diverse: just as sunlight whitens wax, but blackens chloride of silver; and as heat softens wax, but hardens clay. Therefore knowledge of the motive will not of itself enable us to predict a man's action, but we must also know his character exactly.

(2) The character of man is *empirical*. By experience alone do we come to know it—in ourselves, as well as in others. Hence we are often disillusioned, alike with regard to ourselves and others, on discovering that some

quality—such as justice, unselfishness, courage—is not present in the degree we had fondly imagined. Hence in some difficult choice, our own resolve, as though it were that of another, frequently remains a secret until the decision is taken: we think that it will fall now on this side, now on that, according as this or that motive is held close up to the Will by knowledge and tries its strength upon it, in which process the "I can do what I will" produces an illusion of freedom of the Will. At length the stronger motive prevails with the Will, and the choice often turns out to be contrary to our first expectations. Thus no one can know how he or another will act in a given situation, until he has been placed in it: only after actual experience can he tell. Then, however, he is sure; tried friends, proved servants, are safe. In fact we treat a man we thoroughly know as we do anything else whose qualities we have learnt by experience, and are in no doubt whatever as to what we may expect from him, and what not. Whoever has once acted in a particular way, will, when the same circumstances recur, act again in the same way, whether for good or evil. Hence he who has need of some extraordinary help, will turn to the man who has shown proofs of his nobility of soul; and he who wants to hire an assassin will look for him among those who have already steeped their hands in blood. Herodotus tells us (vii. 164) how Gelon of Syracuse, having occasion to entrust a very large sum of money to a messenger whom he had to despatch abroad with full disposition over it, chose Cadmus, a man who had given proof of rare, nay even unheard-of probity and conscientiousness—and his confidence was completely justified. In like manner, it is only after experience that we come to know ourselves, and discover whether we are really to be trusted or not. It is only after we have manifested presence of

mind, courage, honesty, the ability to keep a secret, delicacy, &c., or have clearly shown that we are deficient in these virtues—only in consequence of the acquaintance we have made with ourselves in some particular case—that we afterwards feel a sense of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with ourselves. Not until a man has become thoroughly acquainted with his empirical character, does he have what is called an *acquired character*, which is the possession of him who knows exactly his own qualities, good and bad, and is therefore certain what he may or may not expect of himself. The part which, in virtue of his empirical character, he formerly played by the light of nature alone, he now plays by the rules of art, methodically, resolutely, and decorously, without ever, as the saying goes, acting out of his character, which always means that a man, in a given situation, made a false estimate of his powers.

(3) A man's character is *constant;* it remains the same for the whole of his life. Beneath the changeful vesture of his years, his circumstances, his knowledge and views even, we have the same identical and unchangeable man. Like the crab, he may change his shell, but himself he can never change. Only in direction, and in the matters wherewith he is occupied, does his character undergo apparent modifications, as a consequence of differences due to his time of life and its needs. *The man never alters:* as he has once acted on a given occasion, so will he, under precisely similar circumstances (among them, however, being a right knowledge of these circumstances), always act again. This truth is confirmed by daily experience; but it is most strikingly displayed when, after a lapse of twenty or thirty years, we meet an old acquaintance and find him entirely unchanged.

It may, indeed, be denied by many in words: nevertheless we see that they assume it in their daily

lives; for never again do they trust the man whom they have *once* found to be dishonest, while they always trust one who on some previous occasion proved himself honest. For on this truth depends the possibility of our knowledge of men, and of our sure confidence in the proved, the tried, the tested. Even when it turns out that this confidence has been misplaced, we never say "His character has changed," but "I was mistaken in him." It is reliance upon this truth that makes us, when we want to judge of the moral worth of an action, seek to discover before all else the motive that prompted it; and then we praise or blame, not the motive, but the character which allowed itself to be determined by this motive, and which is the second factor of the act and the only one that inheres in the man. Again, it is to this truth that we appeal when we say that true honour (not the foolish chivalric kind), once lost, is irrecoverable, because the stain of a single wrong action sticks to the man for ever, and, as we say, brands him. Hence the proverb: "Once a thief, always a thief." Again, where in some important political crisis treason has been resorted to, and a traitor has been sought, made use of, and rewarded, prudence counsels his dismissal when he has done all that is required of him; for circumstances change, but character never. Once more, there is no greater failing in a dramatic poet than inconsequence in his characters: these ought, I mean, to act throughout with the constancy and strict consistency of a force of Nature. In the great poets they do so, as I have shown by an example from Shakespeare in my *Parerga*, ii. § 119, p. 248. Yet again, on this same truth depends the possibility of conscience, which in our later years still often reproaches us for the misdeeds of our youth; as, for example, in the case of J. J. Rousseau, who, forty years after the event, was tormented with the thought

that he had accused the girl Marion of a theft which he had himself committed. This is only possible on the hypothesis of the immutability of our character; seeing that, on the other hand, we are not ashamed in our old age of the most ridiculous mistakes, the crassest ignorance, the strangest follies of our youth. For these were matters of knowledge and have changed: they are over and done with; we have put them off, and shall no more resort to them than to the clothes we wore in our youth.

Finally, it is owing to this same truth that, in spite of the clearest knowledge and even detestation of his moral failings and transgressions—in spite of the sincerest resolve to reform—the man nevertheless does not reform: serious resolutions and sincere promises notwithstanding, he yet, under similar circumstances, falls again into the same old ways—to his own astonishment. His *knowledge* can be amended, but nothing else: thus he may come to see that the particular means formerly employed do not lead to the desired end, or that they bring more disadvantage than profit; and then he changes the means, but not the ends. The American penitentiary-system is based upon this: it does not undertake to reform the convict's *character* or *heart*, but appeals to his *head*, and tries to show him that it is far harder, more troublesome, and more dangerous, to reach the ends which his character obliges him to strive for, on the path of dishonesty which he has hitherto pursued, than on that of honesty, work and contentedness. The way to improvement lies in *knowledge* alone. Character is unalterable: motives operate with necessity; but they have to pass through *knowledge*, which is the medium of motives. But knowledge is capable of extension in all directions, and of constant emendation of all kinds; and to extend, to emend it, is the function of all education. What makes the culture of the mind, the furnishing of it with

knowledge and insight of every description, so important morally, is, that it opens the way to motives to which without it the man would for ever remain a stranger. So long as he does not understand them, they are practically non-existent for his Will. Hence, under similar outer circumstances, the position of a man may in reality be quite different the second time from what it was at first; for in the interim he may have come to a just and perfect estimate of these circumstances, and motives to which he was formerly inaccessible may now influence him. In this sense the schoolmen were quite right in saying: "The final cause (end, motive) moves us not according to its real, but according to its known essence." Moral influence can, however, do nothing more than amend knowledge, and to try to banish failings of character by lecturing and moralising, to hope to transform the man's character itself, his actual morality, is like trying by outer influence to transmute lead into gold, or like hoping by assiduous care to make an oak bear apricots.

We find the conviction of the immutability of character expressed unequivocally by so early an author as Apuleius in his *Oratio de magia*, in which, defending himself against the charge of sorcery, he appeals to his well-known character, and says: "Certum indicem cujusque animum esse, qui semper eodem ingenio ad virtutem vel ad malitiam moratus, firmum argumentum est accipiendi criminis, aut respuendi."[1]

4. The individual character is *innate:* it is no work of art or of accidental circumstances, but the work of Nature herself. It reveals itself already in the child, showing there in small what it will be hereafter in large. Thus,

[1] Every man has a sure witness in his character, which, determined as it is to virtue or vice by its invariable disposition, furnishes a solid reason for entertaining or dismissing any charge against him.

with the selfsame education and surroundings, two children will yet manifest the utmost diversity of character: each has the character that he will carry to the grave. Character is even, in its main features, hereditary, but only from the father, whereas the intellect comes from the mother, as I have shown in chapter xliii. of the Supplements to my chief work.

From this exposition of the nature of the individual character it follows, no doubt, that virtues and vices are innate. This truth may run counter to many a prejudice, and be inconvenient to many an old-maidish philosophy with its so-called practical interests, *i.e.* its petty narrow conceptions and limited infant-school views. It was, however, the conviction of the father of morals, Socrates, who, according to Aristotle (*Eth. magna*, i. 9), maintained: "It is not in our power to be good or bad." Aristotle's own arguments against this thesis are obviously bad: moreover he himself elsewhere shares the opinion of Socrates, which he expresses most plainly in the *Eth. Nicom.* vi. 13, where he says: "It is universally held that each trait of character belongs to us in a sense by nature; for we are just, temperate, courageous, &c., from our very birth." And if we run our eye over Aristotle's short *résumé* of virtues and vices in his *De virtutibus et vitiis*, we shall see that in real life they can none of them be thought of except as *innate* qualities, and only as such would they be genuine. For virtues that proceeded from reflection, and were adopted of set purpose, would really amount to a kind of *dissimulation*—would be spurious—and we could not possibly reckon upon their holding out in times of stress. And it is the same with a virtue unknown to Aristotle and the rest of the ancients—the Christian virtue of brotherly love (*caritas*). How could the unweariable goodness of *one* man and the irreclaim-

able deep-rooted wickedness of another—the character of the Antonines, of Hadrian and of Titus on the one hand, and that of Caligula, Nero, and Domitian on the other—proceed from without, be the work of chance circumstances, or of mere knowledge and education? Besides, was not Seneca Nero's preceptor?—No: the seed of all our virtues and vices lies in the inborn character, that true kernel of the whole man. This conviction, which is natural to every unprejudiced man, guided the pen of Velleius Paterculus (ii. 35) when he wrote the following panegyric on Cato: "A man who was virtue's very self, and in disposition altogether nearer to Gods than to men; one who never did rightly for the sake of appearances, but because he could not do otherwise."[1]

If, on the other hand, we assume the Will to be absolutely free, it would seem impossible to account for virtue and vice; impossible to explain how it is that two men, brought up under precisely the same conditions and exposed to precisely the same influences, can act differently and even do diametrically opposite things. We see characters to be in fact radically different; and this original difference is irreconcilable with the supposition of a freedom of the Will such that any man can, under any circumstances, equally perform either of two opposite actions. For this would require his character to be, like Locke's intellect, a complete *tabula rasa*,[2] and

[1] This passage is gradually becoming a regular weapon in the armoury of the determinists—an honour of which the good old historian of eighteen centuries ago certainly never dreamed. Hobbes was the first to commend it, and Priestley followed. Then Schelling made use of it in his Essay on Freedom, p. 478, garbling it somewhat in the translation to suit his own ends; and so he does not name his author, but says—we hardly know which to admire most, his cleverness or his superior airs—"an ancient writer." Finally I am quoting it, which I could hardly fail to do, seeing how much it is to the point here.—Au.

[2] Clean slate.

to have no inborn inclination to one side or the other; because inclination would abolish the perfect equilibrium which we picture to ourselves as existing in the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*. On the hypothesis of complete freedom of the Will, then, the different way in which two men act depends upon nothing *subjective*. But still less can it depend upon anything *objective;* for in that case objects would determine the actions, and there would be an end of the supposed freedom. The only way out of this difficulty is to place the origin of the actually-observed great diversity in their manner of acting midway between subject and object; in other words, to allow it to originate in the different way in which the objective is apprehended by the subjective, *i.e.* in the way the two men *know* things. But this would be to reduce everything to right or wrong *knowledge* of the circumstances of the moment, thus transforming the moral difference between ways of acting into a mere difference of rightness in judging—and turning Ethics into Logic. The partisans of free-will may, however, make a final attempt to extricate themselves from this grievous dilemma, and say: Though there is, it is true, no inborn difference between characters, nevertheless such a difference will subsequently arise owing to outer circumstances, impressions, experiences, example, education, etc., and when once the character is established in this way, we have an explanation of the diversity of action. To this I reply: (1) that according to this the character would put in a very late appearance (whereas it is, as a matter of fact, recognisable in the child), and most men would die before they had acquired one; (2) that all these outer circumstances, which are supposed to mould the character, lie entirely out of our own power and are introduced, just as we see them, by chance, or Providence if the

expression be preferred; and if they are the origin of our character and of the consequent difference in men's conduct, then all moral responsibility for our actions is completely abolished, for in the last resort they would obviously be the work of chance or Providence. Thus on the hypothesis of free-will we see the origin of the different ways of acting, and therewith of virtue and vice, together with responsibility, floating in air without any support and finding never the smallest corner in which to strike roots into the ground. Hence we see that this assumption, however much it may appeal at the first blush to the uncultivated understanding, is yet really as much opposed to our moral convictions as it is —this has been sufficiently proved above—to the ultimate basal-law of our understanding.

The necessity with which—as I have exhaustively demonstrated above—motives (like all other causes) operate, rests, then, upon the innate *individual character*. As every effect in inanimate Nature is a necessary product of two factors, viz. the general *force of* Nature here manifesting itself and the particular *cause* which here calls forth that manifestation; just so is every act of a man the necessary product of his *character* and the operant *motive*. Given these two factors, and the act follows inevitably. For another act to ensue, there must be either another motive or another character. Every act, then, could be predicted and calculated with certainty, were it not (1) that it is very difficult to get to the bottom of a man's character; and (2) that the motive is often hidden and is always exposed to the counter-influence of other motives, which lie only in the agent's mind and are inaccessible to others. The man's innate character has determined already essentially the main aims for which he will immutably strive: the means adopted will be determined in part by outer

circumstances, in part by his apprehension of these, the justness of which depends in turn upon his understanding and culture. The final outcome of all this is seen in his several acts, *i.e.* in the whole part he has to play in the world. No less accurately, therefore, than poetically has Goethe, in one of his finest stanzas, described the result of the doctrine of the individual character as here set forth :

> Wie an dem Tag, der dich der Welt verliehen,
> Die Sonne stand zum Grusse der Planeten,
> Bist alsobald und fort und fort gediehen,
> Nach dem Gesetz, wonach du angetreten.
> So musst du seyn, dir kannst du nicht entfliehen,
> So sagten schon Sibyllen, so Propheten ;
> Und keine Zeit und keine Macht zerstückelt
> Geprägte Form, die lebend sich entwickelt.[1]

The precondition, then, whereon reposes the necessity of the effects of all causes, is the inner essence of every thing, whether this essence be merely a universal *force of Nature* manifesting itself in this thing, or vital force, or Will: there is no being, of whatsoever kind, that will not react, in accordance with its special nature, to the influence of causes operating upon it. This law, from which nothing in the world is exempt, was expressed by the schoolmen in the formula "*Operari sequitur esse.*"[2] In reliance upon it the chemist tests bodies by reagents, and man tests man by experiments to which he subjects him. In all cases the external causes will necessarily

[1] As on the day which lent thee to the world
The sun received the greeting of the planets,
And thou must needs in strength and stature grow
According to the law that gave thee being;
So must thou be, naught other canst thou do,
The Sibyls and the Prophets have decreed it:
For time and force are powerless to break
The form here stamped, which life doth but develop.

[2] Doing follows being: *i.e.* as a thing is, so must it act.

call forth that which lies in the being; for this being can react only according to its nature.

We must here remember that every *existentia* presupposes an *essentia: i.e.* everything that exists must also be something—must have a definite essence. It cannot *exist* and at the same time be *nothing*, a kind of *ens metaphysicum*,[1] *i.e.* a thing which is and only *is*, without any determinations and qualities, and consequently without the definite mode of action which results therefrom: but just as an *essentia* without *existentia* furnishes no reality (Kant has illustrated this by his famous example of the hundred dollars); so, likewise, there can be no reality in an *existentia* without *essentia*. For every existing thing must have its own essential and peculiar nature, in virtue of which it is what it is, which it is constantly asserting, and the manifestations of which will be necessarily called forth by causes; whereas this nature itself is by no means the work of those causes, nor is it modifiable by them. But all this is just as true of man and his Will, as of all other things in the world. He too has, in addition to his *existentia*, an *essentia*, *i.e.* fundamentally essential qualities: it is just these that constitute his character, and they only require excitation from without in order to appear. Consequently to expect that a man, under the selfsame circumstances, will act at one time in one way and at another time altogether differently, is like expecting the same tree to bear cherries this year and pears next. Absolute freedom of Will means, when closely inspected, an *existentia* without *essentia;* in other words, that something *is* and at the same time *is nothing*, which is equivalent to not being, and is thus a contradiction.

It is insight into this truth, as well as into the *a-priori-*

[1] Metaphysical being.

certain and therefore unexceptive validity of the law of causality, that makes all really deep thinkers of all ages, however different may be their views on other points, agree in asserting the necessary determination of volitions by motives and in rejecting *liberum arbitrium.* The obstinate stand made against this truth by the vulgar—that is to say, by that immense majority of men who are incapable of thinking and are delivered over to illusion and prejudice—has even provoked the thoughtful into asserting it in the most decided and indeed exaggerated way. The most famous example of this exaggeration is Buridan's ass, which, however, a search of a hundred years has not been able to discover in the writings of that author. I myself possess a copy of his *Sophismata*—apparently of the fifteenth century, but giving no indication of its place of origin or of the date of publication, and the pages of which are not even numbered—in which I have often searched for it in vain, although asses are quoted as examples on almost every page. Bayle, whose article "Buridan" is the basis of all that has since been written on this head, says, quite wrongly, that this is the only known *sophisma* of his; for I have a whole quarto volume of them. Besides, Bayle, who goes so deeply into the matter, ought to have known, what nevertheless seems to have escaped observation down to the present day, that this example, which has become a kind of symbol or type of the great truth for which I am here contending, is far older than Buridan. It is to be found in Dante, who was master of all the learning of his age, and who lived before Buridan. He speaks, not of asses, but of men, in the following words with which the fourth canto of his *Paradiso* opens:—

> Intra duo cibi, distanti e moventi
> D'un modo, prima si morria di fame

Che liber' uomo l'un recasse a' denti.[1]

This thought is, indeed, older than Dante even, for in Aristotle (*De cœlo*, ii. 13) we find this: "The dilemma of the man who was raging from hunger and thirst in an equal degree, while things to eat and drink were at an equal distance from him: it was impossible for him to move." Buridan, who no doubt took his example from these sources, introduced an ass instead of a man, simply because it was this poor scholastic's habit to take for his examples either Socrates and Plato—or *asinus*.

The question of the freedom of the Will is in fact a touchstone by which we may distinguish really deep from superficial thinkers, or a boundary-stone marking off their several provinces—the former all asserting that actions necessarily follow when the character and the motive are given, while the latter agree with the multitude and cling to the freedom of the Will. There is also an intermediate party, which in its perplexity tacks hither and thither, shifts the goal at which it and others are aiming from place to place, takes refuge behind words and phrases, or so twists and turns the question that at last we no longer know what it is. This was the plan adopted by Leibnitz, who is far more a mathematician and polyhistor than a philosopher. But to bring these trimmers to the point, let us insist upon their answering the following questions:—

1. To a given man, under given circumstances, are two courses of action equally open, or *only* one?—Answer of all deep thinkers: Only one.

2. As on the one hand his character is unalterable, and as on the other hand the things that influenced him,

[1] Betwixt two meats that equally invite,
And placed at equal distance, a free man
Would die of hunger ere he stretched a hand
To either.

down to the most insignificant, have been necessarily determined by external causes, which always enter with strict necessity, the chain of these causes consisting of absolutely necessary links and running back for ever; could the past life of a given individual have turned out in the minutest particular otherwise than it did turn out —could any event, any scene, have been different?— "No" is the logical and right answer.

The outcome of these two propositions is: *Every event, great or small, happens of necessity. Quidquid fit, necessario fit.*

Whoever finds these propositions startling has still something to learn and something else to unlearn: but mature reflection will show them to be the most fruitful source of consolation and peace of mind. Our acts are in no wise a first beginning, and so they bring nothing new into existence; but *only by what we do, do we learn what we are.*

It is upon this conviction of the strict necessity of all that happens—a conviction felt at any rate, even if not clearly realised—that the conception of Fate, εἱμαρμενη, which was so deeply rooted in the minds of the ancients, rests, as well as Moslem fatalism and that universal belief in *Omina*, which is so hard to eradicate just because we know that even the most trivial accident happens necessarily, and that all events keep time, so to speak, with one another, and thus everything answers harmoniously to everything else. Of a piece with this is the feeling, allied to guilt, experienced by the man who has quite innocently and accidentally wounded or killed another, and who bewails this *piaculum* all his life long, and is in a measure looked askance at by others as a *persona piacularis*, a man who brings bad luck. Indeed, even upon the Christian doctrine of election and predestination this felt conviction has not been without

influence. I cannot leave this point without introducing the following *obiter dictum*, to which each of my readers, according to the opinions he holds on certain subjects, may attach what value he pleases. If in lieu of accepting the strict necessity (as result of the causal chain that binds together all events without exception) of all that happens, we deem it possible for this chain to be broken in countless places by an absolute freedom; then all *prevision of the future*, in dreams, in clairvoyant somnambulism, and in second sight, becomes even *objectively*, and therefore absolutely, *impossible*, and consequently inconceivable; because there could then be no objective actual future to foresee. As things stand now, we are only in doubt about the *subjective* conditions of this knowledge of the future—the *subjective* possibility. And even this doubt can in these days be no longer entertained by those who are conversant with the subject, now that innumerable witnesses, whose testimony is worthy of all credence, have made these anticipations of the future an established fact.

Let me add two remarks as corollaries to the above-established doctrine of the necessity of all that happens.

What would this world become if necessity did not permeate all things and hold them together, and especially if it did not preside over the production of individuals? A monster, a chaos, a hideous thing without sense or meaning—viz. the work of downright chance.

To wish that some event had not taken place, is to torment ourselves foolishly; for it means the wishing of the absolutely impossible, and is as irrational as the wish that the sun might rise in the West. Just because all that happens, great or small, is the result of *strict necessity*, it is altogether idle to think afterwards: "The causes that led to this event were trifling and accidental, and they might so easily have been other than they

were." This is all illusion; for not one of them but entered with as strict necessity, not one of them but operated with a power as complete, as that in consequence of which the sun rises in the East. Rather should we look upon events, as they occur, with the same feelings with which we contemplate the printed words of the book before us, knowing full well that they are there before we read them.

Chapter IV.

MY PREDECESSORS

In support of the assertion made above as to the attitude of all deep thinkers towards our problem, let me now recall to mind a few of the great men who have expressed themselves in favour of determinism.

First and foremost, to reassure those who might be inclined to think that there are religious reasons against the truth I am contending for, let me remind them that Jeremiah (x. 23) has said: "The way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps." But I appeal especially to Luther, who in a book on this very subject (the *De servo arbitrio*) attacks the doctrine of free-will with all his might. A few passages will suffice to show the character of his opinion, which he naturally supports with theological and not philosophical reasons. I quote from the edition of Seb. Schmidt, Strasburg, 1707.—P. 145: "Wherefore it is found written alike in all men's hearts, that there is no such thing as free-will; though this truth be obscured by so many arguments to the contrary and by weighty authority from many quarters."—P. 214: "I would

have the defenders of free-will know that they are deniers of Christ if they assert free-will."—P. 220: "The testimony of Scripture will be found to oppose free-will whenever Christ is spoken of. But such passages are innumerable—I may even say, the whole Bible. Therefore if I plead my cause before the bar of Scripture, I shall win all along the line, seeing that there is no jot or tittle left which does not condemn the dogma of free-will."

Pass we now to the philosophers. The ancients are of hardly any value to us here, for their philosophy, which is, so to speak, still in the state of innocence, had not yet clearly apprehended the two deepest and most perplexing problems of modern philosophy, viz. the question of free-will, and that of the reality of the external world, or the relation of the ideal to the real. Just how far the ancients saw into the problem of the freedom of the Will, we can determine pretty well from Aristotle's *Ethica Nicom.*, iii. 1–8, where we find that he hardly thinks of anything but physical and intellectual freedom, and therefore keeps on speaking only of "voluntary and involuntary"—treating "voluntary" and "free" as synonymous terms. The far harder problem of *moral freedom* never presented itself to him, although he sometimes seems to have an inkling of it, especially in *Eth. Nicom.*, ii. 2 and iii. 7, where, however, he falls into the mistake of deriving character from deeds, instead of *vice versa.* Also he criticises quite wrongly the opinion of Socrates that I quoted above, though in other passages —*Eth. Nicom.*, x. 10, for instance—he adopted it as his own: "It is clear that what comes of Nature is not within our power, but exists in the truly fortunate through some divine causes." And a little further on: "There must exist in us beforehand that character which belongs specially to virtue—loving what is noble and

hating what is base"; which agrees with Socrates and also with the passage following from *Eth. magna*, i. 11: "A man does not reach the heights of virtue by choosing, unless the required nature is in him (to start with); still, he will be the better for the choice." Aristotle deals similarly with the question of free-will in his *Ethica magna*, i. 9–18, and *Ethica Eudemia*, ii. 6–10, where he gets somewhat nearer to the real problem; but he is wavering and superficial throughout. For he never attacks his problems directly by way of analysis, but draws conclusions synthetically from external features: instead of piercing to the heart of things, he keeps to outer characteristics and even to words. Such a method easily leads one astray, and in the deeper problems will never take us to the goal. He here remains before the supposed antithesis of "necessary" and "voluntary" as before a wall, and over this wall there is no possibility of clambering until we understand that the voluntary is *necessary from its very nature*, because of the motive, without which a volition or act of Will is no more possible than it is without a willing subject; for this motive is as much a cause as any mechanical cause, from which it does not essentially differ. Aristotle even says himself (*Eth. Eudem.*, ii. 10): "The final cause is one kind of cause." So then, this antithesis between "voluntary" and "necessary" is a pure delusion, although many so-called philosophers of the present day still see eye to eye with Aristotle.

Cicero sets forth the problem of free-will pretty plainly in his *De fato*, c. 10 and c. 17. His subject leads, of course, very easily and naturally to it. He himself holds with freedom of the Will, but it would appear as though Chrysippus and Diodorus had grasped the bearings of the problem more or less clearly. Noteworthy, also, is the 30th of Lucian's Dialogues of the

Dead, between Minos and Sostratos, in which the freedom of the Will, and with it responsibility, is denied.

The Fourth Book of the Maccabees in the Septuagint (it is not included in Luther's Bible) is in a certain sense a treatise on free-will; in so far as its task is to prove that reason possesses the power of overcoming all passions and emotions, and this the author supports by his account of the Jewish martyrs in the Second Book.

The first author, so far as I know, to recognise our problem clearly is Clemens Alexandrinus, who in his *Strom.*, i. § 17, says: "Praises, reproofs, honours, punishments are alike unjust, if the soul has no power over its impulses, to do or to abstain, and if vice is involuntary." Here follows a sentence referring to something he has said before, and he then continues: "so that above all things God may not be the cause of our sin." This very noteworthy addition shows the attitude at once adopted towards the problem by the Church, and the decision that she forthwith made in advance as most conformable to her interests. Nearly two centuries later we find the doctrine of free-will already treated with considerable fulness by Nemesius in his *De natura hominis* (see the close of c. 35, and cc. 39–41). Here freedom of the Will is without more ado identified with free choice or elective decision, and so is frantically asseverated and triumphantly substantiated. This, however, is to some extent a ventilation of the subject.

But a fully-developed consciousness of our problem, with all that hinges upon it, is first met with in St. Augustine, who for this reason, although he was far more a theologian, must here be considered a philosopher. We at once see, however, that the problem puts him into an evident quandary, and he wavers unsteadily and falls into all sorts of inconsequences and contradictions in the three books of his *De libero arbitrio*. On the one hand, he

will not concede, with Pelagius, so much to the freedom of the Will as to abolish original sin, the necessity of redemption, and free predestination; for this would be to justify man and make him worthy of salvation by his own strength alone. In the *Argumentum in libros de lib. arb. ex Lib. i, c. 9, Retractationum desumtum*, he even gives us to understand that he would have had still more to say for this side of the controversy (so vigorously championed in after days by Luther), had not these books been written before Pelagius came on the scene, to combat whose opinions he forthwith composed his *De natura et gratia*. He does, however, say in the *De lib. arb.*, iii. 18: "Now [being as he is,] the man is not good, nor can he be so; either because he does not see what manner of man he ought to be, or because, though seeing, he does not wish to be as he sees he should be." —And a little further on: "He has no free-will to choose a right course of action, either owing to his ignorance, or owing to the resistance offered by his carnal constitution, which is in some way naturally bound up with his passionate mortal inheritance; so that, though he sees the right course and would pursue it, he is nevertheless unable to do so."—And in the *Argumentum* mentioned above, he says: "Therefore, unless the Will itself is freed by the grace of God from the bondage which has made it the servant of sin, and is helped to overcome vice, it is impossible for men to live right and holy lives."

On the other hand, however, he was moved to defend the freedom of the Will on the three following grounds:—

1. His opposition to the Manicheans, against whom the *De libero arbitrio* was expressly directed, because in denying free-will they assumed another source of moral and physical evil. Allusion is already made to this sect in the concluding chapter of his *De animæ quantitate*: "There is given to the soul a free Will, and those who

by frivolous arguments endeavour to whittle it away are so far blind, that, &c."

2. The natural illusion (explained above) by which "I can do what I will" is regarded as evidence of the freedom of the Will, and "voluntary" is forthwith identified with "free."—"For what falls within the province of the Will, if not the Will itself?" (*De lib. arb.*, i. 12).

3. The necessity of reconciling the moral responsibility of man with the justice of God. For Augustine's acute intellect did not overlook a most tremendous perplexity, the removal of which is so difficult that, so far as I know, all the later philosophers, with the exception of three, to whom we shall therefore pay special attention presently, quietly shut their eyes to it and treated it as non-existent. Not so Augustine, who with noble candour states it quite frankly at the very beginning of his *De lib. arb.*: "Tell me, I pray, whether God be not the author of sin?"—In the second chapter he goes deeper into the difficulty: "The mind is confronted with this problem: If sins proceed from souls which God has created, how can we avoid referring them back to God?" To which the interlocutor rejoins: "You have given expression to the very thought that has been tormenting my mind."

This most perplexing topic was taken up again by Luther and brought into relief with all the fervour of his eloquence (*De servo arbitrio*, p. 144). "Natural reason itself is obliged to confess God's nature to be such, that he imposes necessity upon us by his own freedom.—Granting his foreknowledge and omnipotence, it follows naturally, by an inevitable consequence, that we were not made by ourselves, nor do we live or perform any action save by his all-powerful Will.—The foreknowledge and omnipotence of God are diametrically opposed to our freedom of Will.—All men are forced to

admit, as an inevitable consequence, that we are made not by our Will but by necessity, and therefore, that we do not do what we wish by virtue of free-will, but according as God foreknew and as he *acts* by design and infallible and immutable virtue"; &c., &c.

Vanini, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, is entirely of this opinion. It is the kernel and soul of his persistently antitheistic attitude, which, however, the pressure of the times obliged him to conceal as far as possible. At every opportunity he recurs to it, and is never tired of presenting it from the most different points of view. For example, in his *Amphitheatrum æternæ providentiæ* (Exercitatio 16) he says: "If God wills sins, he makes them: for it is written, He has made whatsoever he willed. If he does not will them, yet for all that they are committed: he must therefore be called improvident, or impotent, or cruel, since he neither knows how, nor is able, nor cares to carry out his decree.—Philosophers say: If it were against the will of God that crimes and sins should flourish in the world, no doubt he could with one nod banish them all beyond the limits of the world; for which of us could resist the divine Will? And how could crimes be committed in despite of God, if it is God who supplies the strength to sinners in each act of sin? Moreover, if man commits sin against the will of God, God will be inferior to man, who opposes him and prevails. Hence they come to this conclusion: God desires to have this world as it is; if he wished it better, he would have it so."—And *ibid.*, Exercitatio 44, we read: "The instrument is moved according as the user directs it: but our Will, in its operations, acts as an instrument in the hands of God; if, therefore, it works wrongly, the fault must be imputed to God.—Our Will depends wholly on God, not only in respect to its motion, but also of its

substance: wherefore there is nothing which can truly be imputed to it, either on the side of its substance or of its operation, but all must be imputed to God who thus created the Will and moves it accordingly.—Since the essence and the motion of the Will are from God, to him must be ascribed the operations both of the good and bad Will, if the latter be related to him as an instrument." In reading Vanini, we must never forget that he always adopts the artifice of putting his own views, of which he professes the utmost horror and detestation, into the mouth of an opponent, who sets them forth in the most solid and convincing manner; and he replies to them in his own person with the shallowest and lamest of arguments, concluding, *tanquam re bene gesta*,[1] with a note of triumph—trusting to the penetration and discernment of his reader. By this ruse he even succeeded in duping the learned Sorbonne, which, taking everything for genuine coin, naïvely gave its official sanction to his most atheistical writings. Great was its rejoicing, therefore, when three years later it saw him burnt alive after previous excision of his blasphemous tongue. This, in fact, is the really forcible argument of the theologians, and from the day it was taken from them everything has gone wrong.

Among philosophers in the stricter sense of the word, Hume was, if I mistake not, the first who, instead of attempting to evade Augustine's difficulty, stated it fairly and squarely (though without a thought of him, or of Luther—still less of Vanini) in his *Essay on Liberty and Necessity*, towards the close of which he says: "The ultimate author of all our volitions is the Creator of the world, who first bestowed motion on this immense machine, and placed all beings in that particular position,

[1] As though he had done excellently well.

whence every subsequent event, by an inevitable necessity, must result. Human actions therefore either can have no turpitude at all, as proceeding from so good a cause, or, if they have any turpitude, they must involve *our Creator* in the same guilt, while he is acknowledged to be their ultimate cause and author. For as a man, who fired a mine, is answerable for all the consequences, whether the train employed be long or short; so wherever a continued chain of necessary causes is fixed, that Being, either finite or infinite, who produces the first, is likewise the author of all the rest." Hume makes an attempt to resolve this difficulty, but ends by confessing that he considers it insoluble.

Kant, too, independently of his predecessors, runs against this same stumbling-block in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (p. 180 of the 4th ed.; p. 232 of Rosenkranz's ed.): "It seems, however, that if we assume God, as the primordial Being, to be also the *cause of the existence of substance*, we cannot but admit that the actions of man have their determining ground in that which is completely out of his power—namely, in the causality of a supreme Being who is distinguished from him, and on whom depend entirely both his existence and the whole determination of his causality.—Man would be a mere Vaucançon's automaton, fashioned and wound up by the supreme Artificer: self-consciousness would indeed make him a thinking automaton, in whom the consciousness of his spontaneity would, if taken for freedom, be a mere delusion, since it only deserves to be called comparatively free, because, though the proximate determining causes of his movements and a long chain connecting these with their determining causes are within him, yet the ultimate and supreme cause lies wholly in another's hand." Kant attempts to solve this great difficulty by means of the distinction

between thing-in-itself and appearance; but so evident is it that this does not touch the essence of the matter, that I am convinced he was not in earnest with this argument. He himself confesses the insufficiency of his solution on p. 184, where he adds: "But is any other solution that has been offered, or can be offered, easier and more comprehensible? Rather must we confess that the dogmatic teachers of Metaphysics showed more of *cunning* than of candour; for they put this difficult point out of sight as far as possible, in the hope that, if nothing was said about it, perhaps no one would think of it."

After this very noteworthy catalogue of opinions, which, though taken from such different quarters, nevertheless all say the same thing, let us return to St. Augustine. The arguments with which he hopes to remove that great difficulty which he was the first to apprehend clearly, are theological, not philosophical, and therefore not of unconditioned validity. They are prompted, as I said, by the third of the grounds mentioned above as moving him to defend a *liberum arbitrium* bestowed by God upon man. Such an absolute freedom of Will, interposing itself between the Creator and the sins of his creatures, would no doubt suffice to remove the whole difficulty; only that, though easy enough to talk about and sufficient for thought that does not go beyond words, such a thing is not really *thinkable* in a serious and deeper sense. For how can we picture to ourselves a being, who in respect of his whole *existentia* and *essentia* is the work of another, and who can yet aboriginally and fundamentally determine himself and so be responsible for his actions? The proposition "*Operari sequitur esse*," *i.e.* the doings of every being are the result of its original constitution, overthrows this supposition, but is itself not overthrown. If a man's

actions are bad, it means that he is bad. But to the aforesaid proposition there is attached the corollary: *ergo unde esse, inde operari.*[1] What should we say of the watchmaker who was angry with his watch because it went badly? However much we may be inclined to make a *tabula rasa* of the Will, we cannot but admit that if, for example, one of two men acts in a moral regard in a way quite different from the other, this difference (which must proceed from somewhere) must have its ground either in external circumstances, in which case guilt obviously does not attach to the men, or in an original diversity of their Will, in which case again no blame or merit can be attached to them if their whole existence and essence is the work of another. After the vain efforts of the above great man to find a way out of this labyrinth, I readily confess that the thought of attaching moral responsibility to the human Will is perfectly incomprehensible to me also, unless we admit its aseity. It was no doubt his inability to conceive such a thing, that dictated to Spinoza the seventh of the eight definitions with which his *Ethics* opens: "That thing is called free, which exists solely by the necessity of its own nature, and of which the action is determined by itself alone. On the other hand, that thing is necessary, or rather constrained, which is determined by something external to itself to a fixed and definite method of existence or action."

If, then, a bad action springs from the nature, *i.e.* the inborn constitution of the man, the guilt clearly lies upon the author of this nature. This is why free-will was invented. But, under the assumption of free-will, where in the world does the bad action come from?—for

[1] *Ergo* Whence the being, thence the doing: *i.e.* whoever made the thing, with its essence, is responsible for its doings.

freedom of Will is really a merely negative quality, and only means that nothing compels the man to act in such or such a way, or hinders him from so acting. We are thus left completely in the dark as to the *quarter from which* the action proceeds in the last resort. It cannot proceed from his inborn nature implanted in him at creation, for in that case the guilt would lie at the Creator's door; nor is it the result of outer circumstances alone, for that would be to impute it to chance, and the man would again be innocent—whereas he is nevertheless held responsible. The natural image of a free Will is an unweighted balance: it hangs there at rest, and will never be brought out of equilibrium unless something is laid in one of the scales. Free Will can no more produce an action of itself, than the scale can move of itself; for out of nothing comes nothing. For the balance to sink to one side, some foreign body must be laid in it, and this is the source of the motion. And just so must the human action have been produced by something which acts *positively* and is something more than mere *negative* freedom. But this can only happen in two ways: either motives, *i.e.* outer circumstances, produce it of themselves; in which case the man is clearly not responsible for the action—and moreover on this hypothesis all men under like circumstances would act in precisely the same way; or it springs from his susceptibility to such motives—that is to say, from his inborn character, *i.e.* from inclinations indwelling originally in the man, differing in different individuals, and by virtue of which the motives operate. But then the Will is no longer free; for these inclinations are the weight laid in the scale of the balance. The responsibility falls upon him who laid them there, *i.e.* upon him who created the man with these inclinations. A man is therefore only responsible for his actions on the

supposition of his aseity, *i.e.* of his being the work of his own hands.

The foregoing shows the immense importance of the doctrine of the freedom of the Will, which digs the indispensable gulf between the Creator and the sins of his creatures; and we now see why the knights of Theology so persistently maintain it, their trusty esquires, the Professors of philosophy, supporting them the while, as in duty bound, with such zeal that, deaf and blind to the most convincing counter-arguments of great thinkers, they cling tightly to free-will and do battle for it as though *pro ara et focis*.[1]

But to return once more to Augustine, his opinion seems on the whole to amount to this: that only previous to the Fall was man's Will absolutely free; subsequently, when he had become infected by the taint of original sin, he could only hope for salvation by predestination and redemption — an utterance truly characteristic of a Father of the Church.

However, it is through Augustine and his contest with the Manicheans and Pelagians, that philosophy woke to the consciousness of our problem. Henceforward the disputes of the schoolmen made it gradually plainer and plainer, as we see from Buridan's sophism and the above-quoted passage from Dante. But the first to pierce to the heart of the matter was in all probability Thomas Hobbes, who devoted a book, the now scarce *Quæstiones de libertate et necessitate, contra Doctorem Branhallum*, to this very subject. It appeared in 1656, and is reproduced in English in a folio volume, *Th. Hobbes: Moral and Political Works*, London, 1750, pp. 469 f., from which (p. 483) I take the following:—

6. "Nothing takes a beginning from itself; but from

[1] For altar and hearth.

the action of some other immediate agent, without itself. Therefore, when first a man has an appetite or will to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will; the cause of his will is not the will itself, but something else not in his own disposing. So that, whereas it is out of controversy, that of voluntary actions the will is the necessary cause, and by this which is said, the will is also necessarily *caused* by other things, whereof it disposes not, it follows that voluntary actions have all of them necessary causes, and therefore are *necessitated.*"

7. "I hold *that* to be a *sufficient* cause, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the *effect.* The same is also a *necessary* cause: for, if it be possible that a *sufficient* cause shall not bring forth the *effect,* then there wanteth somewhat, which was needful to the producing of it; and so the cause was not *sufficient.* But if it be impossible that a *sufficient* cause should not produce the effect; then is a *sufficient* cause a *necessary* cause. Hence it is manifest, that whatever is produced, is produced *necessarily.* For whatsoever is produced has had a *sufficient* cause to produce it, or else it had not been: and therefore also *voluntary* actions are *necessitated.*"

8. "That ordinary definition of a free agent (namely that a free agent is that which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the effect, can nevertheless not produce it) implies a contradiction and is Nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be *sufficient,* that is to say *necessary,* and yet the effect shall not follow."

Again on p. 485: "Every accident, how contingent soever it seem, or how *voluntary* soever it be, is produced necessarily."

In his famous *De cive,* c. 1, § 7, he says: "Every

man is moved to seek what is good for him, and to avoid what is bad for him—especially that greatest of natural ills, death ; and that by the same necessity of Nature as moves a stone to fall."

We find the next great writer, Spinoza, deeply imbued with the same conviction. The following citations will serve to show the nature of his teaching on this point :—

Eth., P. I., prop. 32. "Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause."—Coroll. 2. "For Will, like the rest, stands in need of a cause, by which it is conditioned to act in a particular manner."

Ibid., P. II., Note. "As for the fourth objection (the case of Buridan's ass), I am quite ready to admit, that a man placed in the equilibrium described (namely, as perceiving nothing but hunger and thirst, a certain food and a certain drink, each equally distant from him) would die of hunger and thirst."

Ibid., P. III., prop. 2, Note. "These decisions of the mind arise in the mind by the same necessity, as the ideas of things actually existing. Therefore those who believe that they speak or keep silence or act in any way from the free decision of their mind, do but dream with their eyes open."

Letter LXII. "All things are determined by external causes to exist and operate in a given determinate manner. For instance, a stone receives from the impulsion of an external cause, a certain quantity of motion, by virtue of which it continues to move after the impulsion has ceased. Conceive, now, that the stone, while continuing in motion should be capable of thinking and knowing, that it is endeavouring, as far as it can, to continue to move. Such a stone, being conscious merely of its own endeavour and not at all indifferent, would believe itself to be completely free, and would think that it continued in motion solely because of its own wish.

This is that human freedom, which all boast that they possess, and which consists solely in the fact that men are conscious of their own desire, but are ignorant of the causes whereby that desire has been determined.....I have thus, if I mistake not, sufficiently explained my opinion regarding free and constrained necessity, and also regarding so-called human freedom."

It is noteworthy, however, that Spinoza only came to see this in the closing years of his life—in his fourth decade, that is—for in the year 1665, when he was still a Cartesian, he expressed (in his *Cogit. metaphys.*, c. 12) the very opposite opinion, which he vigorously defends, and, in complete contradiction to the second of the passages quoted above (*Eth.*, P. II, Note at the end), makes this remark on Buridan's sophism: "For if, instead of an ass, we place a man in the equilibrium described, we should surely hold him to be no thinking being, but the sorriest of jackasses, if he died of hunger and thirst."

I shall presently have to report a like change of opinion in two other great men. This shows how difficult it is to get a true insight into our problem.

Hume, in his *Essay on Liberty and Necessity*, from which I have already quoted above, writes with the clearest conviction of the necessity of each volition when the motives are given, and in his lucid way puts the matter with extreme clearness. He says: "Thus it appears that the conjunction between motives and voluntary actions is as regular and uniform as that between the cause and effect in any part of nature." And further on: "It seems almost impossible, therefore, to engage either in science or action of any kind, without acknowledging the doctrine of necessity and this inference from motive to voluntary actions, from characters to conduct."

But no writer has set forth the necessity of volitions or voluntary actions so fully and convincingly as Priestley in his *Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity*, a work devoted exclusively to this subject. The man who is not convinced by this exceedingly clear and comprehensible book, must be one whose understanding is actually paralysed by prejudices. To show the results he arrived at, I quote a few passages from the Second Edition, Birmingham, 1782:—

Preface, p. xx. "There is no absurdity more glaring to my understanding, than the notion of philosophical liberty.—P. 26. Without a miracle, or the intervention of some foreign cause, no volition or action of any man could have been otherwise than it has been.—P. 37. Though an inclination or affection of mind be not gravity, it influences and acts upon me as certainly and necessarily as this power does upon a stone.—P. 43. Saying that the will is self-determined gives no idea at all, or rather implies an absurdity, viz.: that a *determination*, which is an *effect*, takes place, without any cause at all. For exclusive of everything that comes under the denomination of *motive*, there is really nothing at all left to produce the determination. Let a man use what *words* he pleases, he can have no more *conception* how we can sometimes be determined by motives, and sometimes without any motive, than he can have of a scale being sometimes weighed down by weights, and sometimes by a kind of substance that has no weight at all, which, whatever it be in itself, must with respect to the scale be nothing.—P. 66. In proper philosophical language, the motive ought to be called the *proper cause* of the action. It is as much so as anything in nature is the cause of anything else.—P. 84. It will never be in our power to choose two things, when all the previous circumstances are the very same.—P. 90. A man indeed,

when he reproaches himself for any particular action in his past conduct, may fancy that, if he was in the same situation again, he would have acted differently. But this is a mere *deception;* and if he examines himself strictly, and takes in all the circumstances, he may be satisfied that, with the same inward disposition of mind, and with precisely the same view of things that he had then, and exclusive of all others that he has acquired by reflection *since*, he could not have acted otherwise than he did.—P. 287. In short, there is no choice in the case, but of the doctrine of necessity or absolute nonsense."

Be it observed, that Priestley was in the same case as Spinoza and another great man of whom I am going to speak in a moment. For in the Preface to the First Edition, p. xxvii., he says: "I was not, however, a ready convert to the doctrine of necessity. Like Dr. Hartley himself, I gave up my liberty with great reluctance, and in a long correspondence, which I once had on the subject, I maintained very strenuously the doctrine of liberty, and did not at all yield to the arguments then proposed to me."

The third great man to find himself in the same situation is Voltaire, who tells us of his conversion to determinism in his own peculiarly delightful and frank manner. In his *Traité de metaphysique*, chap. 7, he had been a doughty champion of the so-called freedom of the Will. But in his *Le philosophe ignorant*, a work written more than forty years later, he teaches the strict necessitation of voluntary actions in the 13th chapter, which closes thus: "Archimède est également nécessité de rester dans sa chambre, quand on l'y enferme, et quand il est si fortement occupé d'un problème, qu'il ne reçoit pas l'idée de sortir:—

Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt.

L'ignorant qui pense ainsi n'a pas toujours pensé de même, mais il est enfin contraint de se rendre."[1] In his next book, *Le Principe d'action*, chap. 13, he says: "Une boule, qui en pousse une autre, un chien de chasse, qui court nécessairement et volontairement après un cerf, ce cerf, qui franchit un fossé immense avec non moins de nécessité et de volonté: tout cela n'est pas plus invinciblement déterminé que nous le sommes à tout ce que nous faisons."[2]

This conversion of three such eminent minds to our view must surely prove rather disconcerting to the man who would attack solidly-established truths, merely because his simple self-consciousness tells him "but I can do what I will"—a thing which is nothing to the point.

Such being the opinion of his immediate predecessors, we are not surprised that Kant took it for granted that everybody, himself included, subscribed to the doctrine that the empirical character is determined to actions by motives, and thought it unnecessary to prove it afresh. His *Ideen zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte* opens thus: "Whatever conceptions may be formed of the *freedom of the Will* in a metaphysical regard, there can be no doubt that its *appearances*, human actions, are as much determined by general laws of Nature as any other natural event."—In the *Critique of Pure Reason* (p. 548 of the First Edition; p. 577 of the Fifth) he says: "The

[1] Archimedes is equally forced to remain in his room, whether he is locked in, or whether he is so intent upon a problem that it never occurs to him to go out:—

"Fate leads the willing, the unwilling drags."

The ignoramus who makes this declaration was not always of this opinion, but he has at last been obliged to admit its truth.

[2] A ball which strikes another and causes it to roll; a hound which runs necessarily and voluntarily after a stag; this stag who leaps a wide ditch with no less necessity and freewill—all this is as inevitably determined as are we ourselves in all that we do.

empirical character, being necessarily derived, as effect, from appearances and the empirical laws that govern them, all man's actions in the appearance are determined according to the order of Nature from his empirical character and the other causes therewith co-operating; and if we could get to the bottom of all the things that determine his choice, there would be not a single one of his actions which we could not unfailingly predict, and recognise as necessary from its antecedent determinations. So far, therefore, as this empirical character is concerned, there is no freedom; and it is according to this character alone that we can regard men, if we simply *observe*, and, as happens in Anthropology, attempt to discover physiologically from his actions the causes which prompt them."—Again, on p. 798 of the First Edition (p. 826 of the Fifth) of the same work we read: "The Will may indeed be free, but only as the intelligible cause of our willing. For as regards the phenomena of its manifestations, *i.e.* actions, an inviolable fundamental-maxim, without which we cannot use our reason empirically at all, obliges us to explain them always as we do all other appearances in Nature, viz. in accordance with her immutable laws."—Again in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (p. 177 of the 4th, p. 230 of Rosenkranz's Edition): "We may therefore admit, that if it were possible for us to gain so deep an insight into a man's way of thinking (as revealed in his inner as well as his outer actions) that we could know every spring of action down to the very least, as well as all the external causes that influenced it, we should be able to calculate his future conduct with as complete certainty as we can an eclipse of the sun or moon."

But here Kant introduces his doctrine of the co-existence of freedom and necessity—a doctrine depending

upon the distinction between the intelligible and empirical characters—to which, as I entirely subscribe to his view, I shall return by and by. He has expounded it twice over, once in the *C. of Pure R.*, pp. 532–554 of the 1st, pp. 560–582 of the 5th Edition, and again still more plainly in the *C. of Practical R.*, pp. 169–179 of the 4th, pp. 224–231 of Rosenkranz's Edition; and these profoundly wise passages must be studied by those who wish thoroughly to understand the possibility of the union of human freedom with necessity.

My method of treating the subject has so far differed from that adopted by these noble and venerable predecessors in two main points: (1) I have, as the Prize-question seemed to require, drawn a distinct line between the inner perception of the Will in self-consciousness and the outer perception of it, and have treated each of these separately, which is the only way of exposing the illusion that forces itself so irresistibly upon the majority of men; (2) I have regarded the Will as part and parcel of the rest of Nature, which nobody before me has done, and which alone allows of the subject being treated with due thoroughness, methodical insight, and completeness.

I have still a word or two to say concerning a few authors who wrote after Kant, but whom I cannot for all that regard as my predecessors.

Kant's most important doctrine of the intelligible and empirical characters, of which I have just been speaking in such high terms, was paraphrased by Schelling in his *Untersuchung über die menschliche Freiheit*, pp. 465–471. This paraphrase may serve, by the liveliness of its colouring, to give a clearer view of the subject to many than Kant's thorough but dry exposition. My respect for truth and Kant compels me, however, to note that in his reproduction of this, the weightiest, most admirable, and in my opinion most profound of all the Kantian

doctrines, Schelling omits to state clearly that what he is here setting forth is in substance Kant's teaching: he so expresses himself—and this is what I complain of—that most readers, from whose minds the substance of that great man's lengthy and difficult works may have faded, would think that they are here reading Schelling's own thoughts. This was no doubt his intention, and it has answered admirably, as I will show by *one* only of the many examples I might adduce. Only the other day a young Professor of philosophy at Halle, Herr Erdmann, in his *Leib und Seele*, 1837, p. 101, wrote: "Although Leibnitz, like Schelling in his Treatise on Liberty, makes the soul determine itself before all time, &c." Schelling, therefore, here bears to Kant the same fortunate relation that Columbus does to Amerigo Vespucci; another man's discovery is labelled with his name. This, however, is not a matter of chance, but is due to his own cleverness. For he begins thus (p. 465): "It is unquestionably *Idealism* that has raised the doctrine of freedom to this plane," and he then immediately goes on to give us Kant's thoughts. Thus instead of honestly saying "Kant," he cleverly makes use of the ambiguous term "Idealism," which every reader would take to mean Fichte's, and Schelling's first (*i.e.* Fichtian) philosophy, and certainly not Kant's doctrine; for Kant protested against his philosophy being called Idealism (see, for instance, *Prolegomena*, p. 51; p. 155 of Rosenkr.), and in the Second Edition of the *C. of Pure R.*, p. 274, he has even introduced a "refutation of Idealism." On the following page Schelling makes very clever mention, in a subsidiary sentence, of the "Kantian conception," so as to close the lips of those who know that it is Kant's wealth that he is here so pompously displaying as his own. On p. 472, however, he throws truth and fairness completely to the winds, saying that Kant had *not* risen

to this view in his theory, &c.; whereas in the two immortal passages which I recommended above to the reader's perusal, everyone can see that to him alone belongs the honour of having originally taken this view, which without him such minds as those of Messrs. Fichte and Schelling would never have been capable of grasping. As I had to speak of Schelling's treatise here, I could not keep silence on this head, and have now, by claiming for Kant that which incontestably belongs to him alone, performed the duty I owe to that great teacher of mankind, who shares with Goethe the honour of being the true glory of the German nation—and that in an age to which Goethe's saying "the street Arabs are masters of the road (*das Knabenvolk ist Herr der Bahn*)" is peculiarly applicable. I may add that in the same treatise Schelling has not hesitated to appropriate also the thoughts of Jacob Böhme, and indeed even his very words, without indicating the source from which they are taken.

Except the above-mentioned paraphrase of Kant's thoughts, there is nothing in this treatise of Schelling's which throws any new light upon the problem of the freedom of the Will. That this would be so, we can foresee from the definition with which the work opens: "Freedom is the power of doing good or evil." This might do for the Catechism; but in Philosophy it has no sense and can lead to nothing. For good and evil are by no means simple concepts (*notiones simplices*), clear in themselves and needing no explanation and establishment. Then, no more than a fractional part of the treatise is devoted to freedom: it is mainly occupied with a minute description of a God, with whom the worthy author appears to be intimately acquainted, for he even describes his origin. The pity of it is, that he does not give us a single hint as to how he struck up the

acquaintance. The beginning of the treatise consists of a tissue of sophisms, whose shallowness will be at once detected by those who do not allow themselves to be overawed by the writer's presumptuous assurance.

Since Schelling's day, and in consequence of this and similar productions, the place of clear concepts and honest inquiry in German philosophy has been taken by "intellectual intuition" and "absolute thinking": bounce, brow-beating, mystification, a throwing of sand into the reader's eyes by all sorts of artifices—this has been the method adopted, and self-seeking (*Absicht*) rather than truth-seeking (*Einsicht*) has been the order of the day. And so philosophy—if this can be called philosophy—had to sink ever lower and lower, until it finally reached the lowest stage of abasement in that creature of the Government, Hegel, who, in order to choke once more the freedom of thought won by Kant, turned Philosophy, the daughter of Reason and future mother of Truth, into a tool for the carrying out of the aims of the State, and for the building up of obscurantism and protestant Jesuitism. To disguise the outrage, and at the same time to addle men's brains as much as possible, he threw over it a cloak of the hollowest verbiage and the most senseless jargon ever heard outside Bedlam.

In England and France philosophy stands on the whole pretty much where Locke and Condillac left it. Maine de Biran, whom his editor Mons. Cousin calls "le premier métaphysicien Français de mon temps," shows himself in his *Nouvelles considérations du physique et du moral*, 1834, a fanatical partisan of the doctrine of absolute freedom, which he takes to be self-evident. So, too, do many of the latest philosophical scribblers of Germany, for whom the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, or "moral freedom" as they call it, is a settled thing,

just as if all the great men referred to above had never existed. They declare that the freedom of the Will is immediately given in self-consciousness, and is thus so solidly established that all arguments against it can be nothing but sophisms. What sublime confidence!—and all because these good people do not know what freedom of the Will is and signifies. In their innocence they imagine that it means nothing but that sovereign control of the members of the body by the Will which we analysed in our second chapter—a thing that no sensible man has ever dreamt of disputing, and the expression of which is our old "I can do what I will." This they suppose in all good faith to be freedom of the Will, and who so proud as they at finding it unassailable! It is into this state of innocence, that, notwithstanding the great philosophers of the past, the thinking mind of Germany has been replunged by the Hegelian philosophy. To people of this stamp we cannot do better than quote:—

> Seid ihr nicht wie die Weiber, die beständig
> Zurück nur kommen auf ihr erstes Wort,
> Wenn man Vernunft gesprochen stundenlang?[1]

But no doubt many of them are secretly influenced by the theological motives alluded to above.

Look, too, at the modern writers on medicine, zoology, history, politics, and *belles-lettres*, and see how eagerly they seize every opportunity of airing their "freedom of man" and "moral freedom." It makes them feel so proud of themselves! They do not, of course, enter into any explanation of it; but if we could examine them, we should discover that they either mean nothing at all by it, or else it is their new "superior" name for our old,

[1] Are ye not like to women that return
And yet again return to their first word,
Though we have reason by the hour discoursed?

honourable friend, the *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*—that is to say, a concept, of whose inadmissibility the masses indeed can never be convinced, but of which educated people should really not talk in so artless a fashion. Perhaps they feel this, for there are some pusillanimous spirits among them who always amuse me. Not venturing to talk any longer of the freedom of the *Will*, they give it the pretty new name of "the freedom of the spirit (*Geist*)[1] "and hope that this will be allowed to pass. And what do they mean by it? my reader will ask. I am in the happy position of being able to satisfy his curiosity: Nothing, absolutely nothing!—it is just a cleverly-worded, vague, meaningless expression, behind which their vacuity and cowardice can take convenient refuge. The word *Geist* is really a figurative expression, which always denotes *intellectual* qualities as contradistinguished from Will: these, however, are certainly not free in their action, but accommodate themselves and are subject, first of all to the rules of Logic, and then to the *object* contemplated, thus enabling them to apprehend it purely, *i.e. objectively*—and it is never a case of *stat pro ratione voluntas*.[1] In fact this *Geist*, who is always stalking about in the German literature of to-day, is a highly suspicious character, who should be asked for his passport whenever we meet with him. He is generally found serving as a mask to vacuity of intellect conjoined with cowardice. For the rest, the word *Geist* is allied, as we all know, to *gas*, which comes from the Arabs and the alchemists, and signifies vapour or air, as does *spiritus*, πνευμα, and *animus* which is allied to ἀνεμος.

Such, then, is the present state of affairs with regard

[1] Will instead of reason.—The meaning of the line from which the quotation comes is: You ask for a reason; I have none to give, save that thus I will it to be.

to our theme in the philosophical world and in learned circles in general, after all the teaching of the great minds aforesaid—a fresh proof not only that in all ages Nature has produced exceedingly few real thinkers, but that these rare exceptions exist themselves always only for the very few. This is why folly and error are always rampant in the world.

In moral questions the testimony of the great poets is also of weight. They do not adopt a systematic method, but human nature lies open to their penetrating gaze: thus it is that their utterances hit immediately upon the truth. In Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, Act ii. sc. 2, Isabella begs the regent's grace for her condemned brother:—

Angelo. I will not do 't.
Isab. But can you, if you would?
Ang. Look, what I *will* not, that I *cannot* do.

Again in *Twelfth Night*, Act i. sc. 5, we read:—

Fate, show thy force: ourselves we do not owe;[1]
What is decreed must be, and be this so.

Sir Walter Scott, too, that great connoisseur and painter of the human heart and its most secret emotions, has brought this deep-lying truth clearly to light in *St. Ronan's Well*, vol. iii. ch. vi. He is describing a repentant sinner, who on her death-bed seeks to relieve her troubled conscience by confession, and among other things he makes her say: "Go, and leave me to my fate; I am the most detestable wretch that ever lived—detestable to myself, worst of all; because even in my penitence there is a secret whisper that tells me, that were I as I have been, I would again act over all the wickedness I have done, and much worse. Oh! for Heaven's assistance to crush the wicked thought!"

[1] *I.e.* We do not own (owe)—are not masters of—ourselves.

The constancy of character here depicted in a work of fiction, is confirmed to the letter by the following parallel incident from real life. It is taken from the *Times* of July 2, 1845, and the original account comes from the French *La Presse*. Military Execution at Oran, is the heading of the article: "On March 24 the Spaniard Aguilar, *alias* Gomez, was condemned to death. The day before his execution he said to his gaoler: I am not so guilty as they say: they accuse me of thirty murders, but as a matter of fact I have committed only twenty-six. From my very boyhood I thirsted for blood: at the age of seven and a half I stabbed a child. One of my victims was a pregnant woman, and another was a Spanish officer. I fled to France, where I committed two crimes before joining the foreign legion. Of all my crimes, the one that I most regret is the following: In the year 1841 I captured, at the head of my company, a deputy commissary general with his escort of a sergeant, a corporal, and seven men. I had them all beheaded. The death of these people weighs heavily upon my mind. I see them in my dreams, and to-morrow I shall see them in the soldiers who are detailed to shoot me. *Nevertheless, if I recovered my liberty, I should go on murdering people.*"

Take, again, the following from Goethe's *Iphigenia*, Act iv. sc. 2:—

Arkas. Denn du hast nicht der treue Rath geachtet.
Iphig. Was ich vermochte, hab' ich gern gethan.
Ar. Noch änderst du den Sinn zur rechten Zeit.
Iphig. *Das steht nun einmal nicht in unsrer Macht.*[1]

[1] *Arcas.* My faithful counsel[illegible] ou hast not heeded.
Iphig. That which I coul[illegible] y performed.
Arc. 'Tis not too late to [illegible] ge, my lady.
Iphig. *To change lies n[illegible] ver of man.*

And Schiller expresses our fundamental truth in this famous passage from *Wallenstein*:—

> Des Menschen Thaten und Gedanken, wisst!
> Sind nicht wie Meeres blind bewegte Wellen.
> Die inn're Welt, sein Mikrokosmus, ist
> Der tiefe Schacht, aus dem sie ewig quellen.
> Sie sind *nothwendig*, wie des Baumes Frucht,
> Sie kann der Zufall gaukelnd nicht verwandeln.
> Hab' ich des Menschen Kern erst untersucht,
> So weiss ich auch sein Wollen und sein Handeln.[1]

Chapter V.

CONCLUSION AND HIGHER VIEW

It has been a pleasure to me to record the names of the great poets and philosophers who before me so gloriously maintained the truth for which I am here contending. Not authorities, however, but arguments are the philosopher's weapons; so I have relied upon these alone, and have made my case clear enough, I hope, to justify me in drawing the conclusion *a non posse ad non esse*.[2] And so the negative reply to the question of the Royal Society—a reply founded on the direct and actual investigation of self-consciousness, *i.e. a posteriori*—is

[1] The acts and thoughts of man, I'd have you know,
Are not like the blind play of ocean's waves.
The inner world, his microcosm, is
The pit profound [illegible] which they well for ever.
As *necessary* are [illegible] fruit to tree,
To change them [illegible] Chance hath not the power.
Could I pierce [illegible] st heart of man,
His willing a[illegible] I should know.

[2] From impossibility [illegible]

now confirmed also indirectly and *a priori:* for the absolutely non-existent cannot be proved to exist by data drawn from self-consciousness.

Though the truth for which I am here contending may be repellent to the preconceived opinions of the short-sighted masses, and prove a stone of stumbling to the weak and ignorant; yet this has not prevented me from setting it forth without circumlocution and without reserve. For I am here addressing not the vulgar, but an enlightened Academy, which has propounded its very opportune question not for the ratification of prejudice, but for the honour of truth. Moreover, the honest truth-seeker, so long as it is a mere case of establishing and substantiating a truth, will always pay attention only to the evidence for it and care nothing for the consequences, which it will be time enough to discuss when it is itself established. Heedless of the consequences, let him test the arguments, and not begin by asking whether a recognised truth is or is not in harmony with the system of our other convictions; —such is Kant's advice, and I cannot refrain from quoting his exact words: "This confirms the maxim, which I am not the first to recognise and commend, that in every scientific investigation we should quietly pursue our way with all possible precision and straightforwardness, without asking whether our inquiry runs counter to doctrines outside its field, and only prosecuting it faithfully and completely for itself alone, so far as in us lies. Long experience has convinced me, that when I carried my own investigation steadily to an end, much that in the middle of it was wont to appear very doubtful when compared with other doctrines, did finally—if I paid no attention to this difficulty and fixed my mind unwaveringly upon my own work until it was completed —exactly coincide in a most unexpected way with that

which had come to light of itself without any reference to these doctrines, and without partiality or preference for them. Writers would be spared many mistakes and much loss of labour (spent on mere delusions), if they would only make up their minds to go to work more straightforwardly" (*Crit. of Practical Reason*, p. 190 of the 4th, p. 239 of Rosenkranz's Edition).

Our metaphysical knowledge is not so certain in every respect, that we can afford to reject a solidly-grounded truth, because its consequences may not happen to tally with that knowledge. Rather is every hard-won and established truth a piece of territory wrested for science from the domain of the problematical, and a firm point whereon to fix levers which shall move other burdens; aye, and from which we may perhaps, Fortune favouring us, soar all at once to a region that commands a more extensive view of the whole than we have yet obtained. For in every department of science the chain of truths consists of links so intimately connected, that he who has secured complete possession of one may always hope to go on to the conquest of all. As in a difficult algebraical problem a single positively-given value is of inestimable worth, because it makes a solution possible; so in that hardest of all human problems, Metaphysics, the certain knowledge (both *a priori* and *a posteriori*) of the strict necessity with which actions follow from a given character and given motives, constitutes such an inestimable datum, starting from which alone is a solution of the whole problem to be arrived at. Therefore whatsoever cannot point to a secure scientific verification must yield on encountering a solidly-grounded truth, and not *vice versa;* and the last thing in the world to be thought of is the accommodation and limitation of such a truth, in order to make it harmonise with unproven and perhaps erroneous assertions.

Let me here be allowed yet another general observation. A review of the results of our inquiry leads me to remark, that in so far as concerns the two problems which in the previous chapter were denominated the deepest in modern philosophy, whereas the ancients were not clearly conscious of them—viz. the problem of the Freedom of the Will, and that of the relation of the ideal to the real—ordinary common-sense is not only incompetent, but will almost certainly lead its possessor into error, to reclaim him from which there is need of a philosophy that has already advanced far. For in regard to *knowing*, such a man will be sure to attribute far too much to the *object;* and it required a Locke and a Kant to show him what a large portion of sense-perception springs from the *subject.* With regard to *willing*, on the contrary, he does the opposite, and is inclined to attribute too little to the *object* and far too much to the *subject*, deriving willing entirely from this and almost neglecting the objective factor, the motives, which in truth determine the quite individual nature of the actions, while only that which is of their general essence, viz. their moral fundamental character, proceeds from the *subject.* This native wrongheadedness of the understanding in speculative inquiries must, however, not surprise us; for this faculty is intended originally for practical and by no means for speculative ends.

Having recognised, then, as the result of the foregoing exposition, that man's action has not a particle of freedom, but is invariably under the dominion of the strictest necessity, we are hereby led to the point at which we can grasp *true moral freedom*, which is of a higher species.

I mean this: There is one fact of consciousness, which, to avoid disturbing the course of our investigation, I have so far left entirely out of account. This is

the perfectly clear and certain feeling of *responsibility* for that which we do, of accountability for our actions —a feeling that depends upon the unshakable certitude that we are ourselves the *doers* of *our* deeds. The consciousness of this will prevent any one, no matter how firmly convinced he may be of the necessity of our actions, as set forth above, from urging this necessity as an excuse for his transgressions, and from throwing the blame on the motives because they made the deed inevitable. For he sees perfectly well that this necessity is a subjective condition, and that here objectivé—that is to say, under existing circumstances, *i.e.* under the influence of the motives that determined him—a quite different action, nay, one that is diametrically opposite, was perfectly possible and might have been performed, *if only he had been another man:* it only depended on this. To him, because he is himself and not another, because he has such and such a character, no other action was, of course, possible; but itself, *i.e.* objectivé, it was possible. The responsibility, of which he is conscious, attaches therefore only proximately and ostensibly to the deed, but in the last resort it falls upon *his character: this* it is for which he feels himself responsible. It is for this, too, that others hold him responsible; for their judgment passes at once from the deed to the moral qualities of the doer: "He is a bad man," they say, "a villain"; or, "he is a rogue"; or, "he is a mean, false, vile creature": such is their verdict, and it is on his character that their reproaches fall. The deed, and with it the motive, is regarded as a mere witness to the character of the doer —serves, however, as the certain symptom of that character, establishing it irrevocably and for ever. Very rightly, therefore, does Aristotle (*Rhetorica*, i. 9) say: "We applaud men who have done things, since their

works are signs of their character. For are we not ready to applaud a man even though he has not done a thing, if only we feel confident that he is the kind of man to do it?" Hatred, abhorrence, and contempt are poured, therefore, not upon the passing deed, but upon the abiding qualities of the doer, *i.e.* his character, from which it proceeded. And so in all languages the opprobrious epithets launched at moral turpitude are predicates of *men* rather than of actions. They are addressed to the *character;* for this must bear the guilt, of which it is merely convicted by the deeds.

Where the *guilt* lies, there must the *responsibility* also lie: and as this is the sole datum that justifies us in arguing to moral freedom, *freedom* too must lie there, *i.e.* in the *character* of the man; all the more, as we have sufficiently convinced ourselves that it is not to be met with immediately in our particular actions, which, given the character, are strictly necessitated. But the character, as was shown in the third chapter, is inborn and unalterable.

Having discovered that freedom in this sense—the only one for which data exist—is a fact of consciousness whose whereabouts we can determine, let us examine it more closely and try, as far as possible, to get a philosophical notion of it.

In the third chapter we saw that every action of a man is the product of two factors: his character and the motive. This does not mean that it is an intermediate thing, a sort of compromise between the two: on the contrary, it satisfies both completely, depending for its possibility upon both at once; the influencing motive must meet with this character, and this character must be determinable by this motive. Character is the empirically-known, permanent, and unalterable constitution and quality of an individual Will. Now it is

because this character is just as necessary a factor of every action as the motive, that we feel that our deeds emanate from ourselves: this explains that "I *will*" which accompanies all our actions, and in virtue of which every man must recognise them as *his* deeds, for which he therefore feels himself morally responsible. We here come once more upon that "I will, and never will anything but what I will" that met us above in our investigation of self-consciousness — a dictum which betrays the unphilosophical understanding into obstinately asserting an absolute freedom of doing or leaving undone, a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*. But it is nothing more than the consciousness of the first factor in the action, which by itself would be utterly incapable of bringing the action about, whereas when the motive enters there is no possibility of leaving it undone. Not, however, until the character is set in action in this way, does it announce its true nature to the cognitive faculty, which, directed essentially outwards and not inwards, only comes to know the nature of its own Will empirically by seeing the deed performed. It is really this nearer and ever nearer acquaintance with ourselves that we call "conscience," and this is why conscience never makes its voice *directly* heard until *after* the action; *previously thereto* it at most speaks *indirectly*, being mentally taken into account, through reflection and remembrance of the similar cases in which it has already enlightened us, as something that will come in by and by.

And here I must remind the reader of the Kantian distinction, referred to in the last chapter, between the empirical and intelligible characters, which gives the key to the compatibility of freedom with necessity, and is one of the finest and profoundest discoveries of that great genius—I might even say, the greatest discovery

ever made. I must content myself with appealing to it, for to repeat his words would take up too much of my space. Suffice it to say that, so far as such deep things can be understood of men, it gives a satisfactory account of the way in which the strict necessity of our actions can nevertheless coexist with that freedom to which the feeling of responsibility bears witness, and by virtue of which we are the doers of our deeds and are morally responsible for them. Kant's differentiation of the empirical from the intelligible character depends entirely upon that which forms the groundwork of his whole philosophy—viz. the distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself; and as with him the perfect *empirical reality* of the world of experience coexists with its *transcendental ideality*, so does the strict *empirical necessity* of the action coexist with its *transcendental freedom*. To explain: The empirical character, like the whole man, is, as an object of experience, a mere appearance, and is therefore bound to the forms of all appearance—time, space, and causality—and subject to their laws: on the other hand, as that condition and basis of this whole appearance which, as thing-in-itself, is independent of these forms and therefore subject to no time-distinction, consequently permanent and unchangeable, we have the man's *intelligible character*, *i.e.* his Will as thing-in-itself, to which, in this capacity, there indubitably attaches absolute freedom, *i.e.* independence of the laws of causality, that mere form of appearances. But this freedom is *transcendental*, *i.e.* does not come forth in the appearance, but is only present in so far as we leave out of account the appearance and all its forms, in order to get to that which, outside all time, is to be thought of as the inner existence-in-itself of the man. By virtue of this freedom all the man's deeds are his own, however necessarily they may proceed from his

empirical character under the influence of motives; because this empirical character is merely the appearance of the intelligible character in our *cognitive faculty*, which is bound to time, space, and causality—*i.e.* the mode and manner in which the very essence of our own self exhibits itself therein. Therefore, though the *Will* is indeed free, yet it is so only in itself and outside the appearance; whereas in the appearance it exhibits itself with a definite character, to which all its deeds must be conformable, and must therefore, when particularly determined by the influencing motives, necessarily turn out *such as they are* and not otherwise.

Now all this plainly shows us that we must seek the work of our *freedom* no longer, as is usually done, in our particular actions, but in the whole existence and essence (*existentia et essentia*) of the man himself, and this must be regarded as his free act, which merely exhibits itself for the cognitive faculty—bound to time, space, and causality—in a multiplicity and diversity of actions, which, however, by reason of the original unity of that which exhibits itself in them, must all wear precisely the same character and must therefore appear as strictly necessitated by the motives which call them forth and determine them in the particular case. There is therefore no exception, in the world of appearance, to the law *operari sequitur esse*. Every thing works according to its nature, and the way in which it reacts in response to the causes that act upon it reveals this nature. Every man acts according to what he is, and each of his therefore necessary actions is determined in the individual case by motives alone. *Freedom*, which is consequently not to be met with in the *operari*, must therefore lie in the esse. It has been the fundamental error, the ὕστερον πρότερον, of all ages, to attribute necessity to the *esse* and freedom to the

operari. But on the contrary, *freedom lies in the* esse *alone*, while from this and the motives the *operari* follows of necessity, and *from what we do we learn what we are.* On this, and not on a supposed *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*, depend the consciousness of responsibility and the moral tendency of life. All depends upon what we *are*: what we *do* flows from this as a necessary corollary. The undeniable consciousness of absolute independence and originality, that accompanies all our deeds (notwithstanding their dependence upon motives) and makes them *our* deeds, will therefore not lead us astray: really it goes beyond the deeds and originates higher up, including as it does our existence and essence itself, from which, under the influence of motives, all deeds necessarily proceed. In this sense that consciousness of autonomy and originality, as also of responsibility, which accompanies our actions, may be compared to a hand that points to a more distant object than that nearer one in the same line, to which it seems to point.

To sum up: Man always does only what he wills, and yet he does it of necessity. This is because he already *is* what he wills; for from what he is, all that he can ever *do* flows necessarily. If we regard his course of action objectivé, *i.e.* from without, we know apodictically that, like the action of every being in Nature, it must be strictly subordinated to the law of causality; whereas subjectivé every one feels that he always does only what he wills. But this merely means that his action is the pure manifestation of his own very essence. Every being in Nature, therefore—even the lowest—would feel this, if it were capable of feeling.

Freedom, then, is not abolished by the considerations I have urged, but merely thrust back from the domain of individual actions, where it demonstrably is not to be

met with, into a higher region, which, however, is not so easily accessible to our knowledge ; *i.e.* it is transcendental. And this is the sense in which I would have Malebranche's motto "La liberté est un mystère" understood—the motto under the ægis of which the present treatise has endeavoured to solve the problem propounded by the Royal Society.

APPENDIX, SERVING AS AMPLIFICATION OF CHAPTER I.

At the commencement of my treatise I divided freedom under the three heads of physical, intellectual, and moral. The first and third of these have been duly discussed, but I have yet to consider the second. This is done only for the sake of completeness, and need therefore not occupy us long.

The intellect, or cognitive faculty, is the medium of motives—the medium, I mean, through which motives act upon the Will, which is the real kernel of the man. It is only when this medium of motives is in a normal condition, only when it correctly discharges its functions and thus submits motives in all their native purity, as they exist in the real external world, to the Will, that this Will can make its decision in accordance with its nature, *i.e.* the individual character of the man, and thus manifest itself *unhindered* in conformity with its own essence. Under these circumstances the man is *intellectually free ;* that is, his actions are the pure result of the reaction of his Will to motives which lie in the

outside world before him and all his fellows. Such actions, therefore, are to be imputed to him morally, as well as juridically.

This intellectual freedom is *abolished*, (1) when the medium of motives, the cognitive faculty, is permanently or temporarily deranged; (2) when external circumstances in the particular case prevent the motives from being properly apprehended. The former is the case in madness, delirium, fits, and drowsiness; the latter, when some obviously innocent mistake has been made, such, for instance, as the administration of poison instead of medicine, or the shooting of a servant at night owing to his being mistaken for a burglar. For in both cases the motives have suffered distortion, and so the Will is unable to decide as it would have done if the intellect had placed the existing circumstances before it in the right light. Crimes committed under such conditions are therefore not punishable by law. For the laws start from the right assumption, that the Will is not morally free in a case where it could not be *directed*. They recognise that it is subject to compulsion by motives; and therefore to all the various motives that incite to crime, they endeavour to oppose stronger counter-motives—the threatened penalties—and a criminal code is nothing but a catalogue of counter-motives to criminal deeds. But should the intellect, through which these counter-motives have to act, be incapable of taking them in and presenting them to the Will, their effect is *nil;* they are for it non-existent. It is as if one of the driving-bands of a machine were broken. In such a case the guilt passes over, therefore, from the Will to the intellect, which latter, however, is subject to no penalty; for it is with the Will alone that laws, and ethics in general, are concerned. It [the Will] alone is the man himself; the intellect is merely

its organ, its outwardly-directed feelers, *i.e.* the medium through which motives act upon it.

Nor is the man held *morally* responsible for deeds done under such circumstances. For they are no index of his character: he has either done something he had no intention of doing, or his mind was incapable of taking in what would have kept him from thus acting, viz. the counter motives. It is as though a chemist, in exposing some substance he is investigating to the influence of several reagents, in order to ascertain for which of them it has the strongest affinity, should discover, after the experiment is over, that owing to some chance obstacle one of the reagents had not been able to exert its influence at all; and so the experiment becomes null and void.

Intellectual freedom, which we have here regarded as completely in abeyance, may also be *lessened* or partially suppressed. This is especially the case with those who are under the influence of an affect, or of intoxication. An *affect*[1] is a sudden, violent stirring of the Will by a presentment that breaks in from without and becomes a motive—a presentment so vivid that it eclipses all others which might act as counter-motives and prevents them from coming clearly into consciousness. These last, which for the most part are only of an abstract nature, mere thoughts—while the first is a perceptual and actual presentment—never get a chance, or, as the English say, do not have *fair play*: the deed is done before they can exercise their counteractive influence. It is like a duellist who shoots before the signal is given. Here too, therefore, the juridical as well as the moral responsibility is, according to the nature of the circumstances, more or less abolished, though always in part

[1] Or perturbation of the soul.

only. In England a murder committed in the heat of sudden passion, and without premeditation, is called "manslaughter" and is only lightly punished; sometimes, indeed, the offender gets off scot free.

Intoxication is a state which disposes a man to affects, for it heightens the vividness of perceptual presentments, whereas it weakens abstract thinking, while at the same time it augments the energy of the Will. Instead of being held responsible for his deeds, the man is here blamed for his state of intoxication: therefore he is not excused juridically, although his intellectual freedom is partly abolished.

There is a reference to this intellectual freedom, "the voluntary or involuntary in respect of the intellect," in Aristotle's *Ethic. Eudem.*, ii. cc. 7 and 9, although a very brief and insufficient one, and a somewhat fuller account of it is to be found in his *Eth. Nicom.*, iii. 2. Allusion is made to it when, in a court of law, *Medicina forensis*[1] is called in to decide whether the accused was free and consequently accountable for his actions.

In general, therefore, we may regard as committed in the absence of intellectual freedom all those crimes in which the doer either did not know what he was about, or was absolutely incapable of representing to himself what would have kept him from them, viz. the consequences of his act. In such cases, therefore, he escapes punishment.

To those who think that on the theory of the non-existence of *moral* freedom and of the consequent inevitability of all the actions of a given man, no criminal ought to be punished, I would reply, that this is to take a wrong view of punishment and to regard it as being a chastisement of sin for its own sake, a requital of evil

[1] Forensic medicine; medical jurisprudence.

with evil on moral grounds. But although Kant has preached this doctrine, such a course would be absurd, purposeless, and altogether unjustifiable. For what right has a man to constitute himself the absolute judge of another in a moral regard, and as such to torture him for his sins? No; the law, *i.e.* the threatening of penalties, aims at setting up such a counter-motive as shall prevent the crime. If in the particular case it fails to do this, the threatened punishment must nevertheless be carried into effect, for otherwise it would not act as a deterrent on future occasions. In this case the wrong-doer, on his side, suffers the penalty in consequence of his moral nature, which, in conjunction with the circumstances that acted as motives and with his intellect which deceived him into thinking that he would escape punishment, inevitably produced the deed. The awarding of punishment would only be unjust, if his moral character were not his own work, his intelligible deed, but the work of another. There is a similar connection between the act and its sequel, when his vicious conduct is punished, not by human but by natural laws: as, for example, when dissolute excesses produce fearful illnesses; or when a man, in trying to break into a house, meets with an accident; *e.g.* when, having broken at night into a hog-cote with a view to abstracting its usual inmates, he falls into the arms of a bear, who is spending the night with his master in this hostelry.

BOOK IV.

EXTRACTS FROM "THE BASIS OF ETHICS"

INTRODUCTION

[*B. of E.* § 1.]

THE basis on which I intend to place ethics will prove a very narrow one; and of the much that in the actions of men is lawful and worthy of praise and approbation, only the smaller portion will turn out to be derived from purely moral motives, while the major part must be ascribed to motives of another kind. This is less satisfactory, less showy, than (say) a categorical imperative that is always at our command, and in its turn issues its commands and tells us what ought to be done and what left undone—not to mention other and more material foundations of ethics. Nothing remains for me, then, but to call to mind that verse of the Preacher (Eccles. iv. 6): "Better is an handful with quietness, than both the hands full with travail and vexation of spirit." In all knowledge there is never much that is genuine, sterling, and indestructible: a hundredweight of ore contains, after all, but a few ounces of gold. But whether those whom I address will, with me, really prefer *secure* to *great* possessions—the few ounces of gold at the bottom of the crucible, to the mass of refuse from which it has been extracted; or whether they will, as is more likely, accuse me of having withdrawn rather than

supplied the basis of ethics, when I point out that the lawful and praiseworthy actions of men have often uncommonly little morality about them, but depend in chief upon motives whose efficacy is at bottom attributable to the egoism of the agent; all this I must leave undecided, not without misgiving, but still with resignation; for I have long been of Ritter von Zimmermann's opinion (*Ueber die Einsamkeit*, Pt. I. ch. iii., p. 93): "Be persuaded that nothing in the world is so rare as a good judge."

A FRESH START

[*B. of E.* § 12.]

Thus Kant's foundation of ethics, which for sixty years has been held to be its firm basis, also sinks before our eyes into the deep and perhaps never-to-be-filled abyss of philosophical errors; for we see it to be an inadmissible assumption and nothing but theological ethics in disguise. That the earlier attempts to give ethics a foundation are still less satisfactory, I am, as I said, at liberty to assume. They are for the most part unproved random assumptions, and at the same time, like Kant's foundation itself, artificial subtleties demanding the finest discriminations and depending upon the most abstract concepts, difficult combinations, heuristic[1] rules, hair-splitting propositions and stilted maxims, from whose heights we can no longer discern the actual life of man with its storm and stress. Therefore they are no doubt admirably suited for the display of intellectual gymnastics in the lecture-room; but it can be nothing of this kind that actually summons each

[1] Serving to find or discover: rules by aid of which we seek to discover.

one of us to do justly and well, that counterbalances the strong inclination to injustice and harshness, and that lies at the base of the reproaches of conscience. To refer these to the infraction of such hair-splitting maxims, is only to make them ridiculous. Artificial concept-combinations of this kind can thus never, if we take the matter seriously, contain the true incentive to justice and kindliness. This must rather be something that requires little reflection, and still less abstraction and combination—something that, independently of mental culture, may appeal to every one, even the rudest, depend upon perceptual apprehension and force itself upon our notice immediately out of the reality of things. So long as Ethics is unable to point to a basis of this kind, so long may it show itself off and be the subject of dispute in lecture rooms, but actual life will have none of it. I must therefore give the moralists this paradoxical counsel, that they should first look round for a moment on human life.

SCEPTICAL VIEW

[*B. of E.* § 13.]

Or are we to assume, perhaps, on reviewing the fruitless attempts of more than twenty centuries to find a secure basis of ethics, that there is no natural ethics independent of human ordinances, and that this is a purely artificial system, a means invented for the better taming of the egoistic and wicked race of men—a system therefore that, but for the support of positive religions, would fall, because it has no inner attestation and no natural basis? Regulations of the law and police cannot suffice everywhere: there are crimes too difficult to discover—nay, some whose punishment is too delicate

a matter; so that here we are left without public protection. Besides, civil law can at most enforce justice-but not kindliness and beneficence, because herein every one would wish to be the passive, and no one the active party. This has given rise to the hypothesis that ethics depends upon religion alone, and that it is the object of both to make up for the necessary deficiency of State-enactments and legislation. A natural ethics—a system founded, that is, simply upon the nature of things or of man—cannot therefore, it is said, exist; and this explains the failure of philosophers to discover its basis. This opinion is not devoid of plausibility. It had been advanced by the Pyrrhonists, as we learn from Sext. Emp., *Adv. math.*, xi. 140: "Nothing is by nature good or bad, but, according to Timon, the distinction exists only in man's judgment"; and distinguished thinkers of modern times have held it. It therefore deserves careful testing, although it would be more convenient to set it aside by an inquisitorial side-glance at the conscience of those in whom such a thought could arise.

It would be a great and very childish error to suppose all right and lawful actions of men to be of moral origin. The real truth is, that justice, as practised among men, bears to genuine probity much the same relation that the outward manifestations of courtesy bear to those of genuine love of our neighbour, which latter overcomes egoism not apparently as does the former, but actually. The outwardly-displayed probity of disposition, the recognition of which by others in himself every man insists upon, being highly indignant at the slightest suspicion cast upon him in this respect, and ready to be furiously angry at it—all this none but the inexperienced and simple will take for true coin and imagine to be the effect of a tender moral-feeling or conscience. In truth, however, the probity so universally practised in

social intercourse and so generally asserted to be a maxim firm as adamant, depends mainly upon two exterior necessities: first, upon that legal order by means of which the public arm protects each man's right; secondly, upon the acknowledged necessity of a good name, or of civic honour, in order to our advancement in the world—a necessity that places every man's steps under the eye of public opinion, which with inexorable sternness never pardons even a single slip in this regard, but remembers it against the offender as an indelible stain to his dying day. In this, public opinion shows true wisdom; for it starts from the principle "*Operari sequitur esse*,"[1] and consequently from the conviction that character is immutable, and that the man who has *once* done a thing will inevitably do it again under like circumstances. It is these two sentinels, then, that stand guard over public probity, and without them, to tell the plain truth, we should fare ill, especially as regards property, that central point of human life around which man's activities mainly revolve. For the purely ethical motives to honesty, supposing these to exist, are applicable for the most part to a man's property in a roundabout way only. They attach, I mean, primarily and immediately to *natural* right alone; to *positive* right, however, they attach mediately only, in so far, namely, as the former underlies it. But natural right is inherent in no other property than that obtained by labour, and an attack upon this robs the possessor of the energies he bestowed upon it. The right of first possession I unconditionally reject, though I cannot enter upon a refutation of it here.[2] No doubt all ownership founded on positive right must, however many hands the property may have passed through, finally and in the

[1] Doing follows being: *i.e.* as a man is, so will he act.
[2] See *W. as W. and P.*, § 62, p. 396, and Supp., ch. xlvii. p. 684.—Au.

last instance rest upon natural right of possession. But how far in most cases our property lies from this original source! As a rule it is very hard, nay perhaps impossible, to prove its connexion with this: our property is inherited, acquired by marriage, won in the lottery, or, if otherwise come by, is yet gained not by our own labour in the sweat of our brow, but by clever thoughts and lucky hits, *e.g.* by speculation—aye and sometimes by stupid notions which by chance the *Deus Eventus*[1] has crowned with success. It is very seldom the fruit of actual exertion and labour, and when it is, this is often purely mental, as in the case of barristers, physicians, public officials, teachers—seeming in the eyes of the uneducated to cost but little trouble. It needs a considerable amount of culture to recognise the ethical right to wealth thus gained, and consequently to respect it from purely moral motives. Hence many secretly regard the property of others as held only in accordance with positive right. If, therefore, they find a way of taking it for themselves by help or even circumvention of the law, they will not scruple to do so; for it seems to them that the possessors would only be losing it by the same means by which they originally acquired it, and they consider their own claims to it to be every whit as good as theirs. From their point of view, in civil life the right of the cleverer takes the place of the right of the stronger. Meanwhile the *rich* are often really men of scrupulous integrity, since they are wholeheartedly attached to a rule and honestly observe a maxim, on the following of which the whole of their wealth, with all the advantages that this gives them over others, depends; and so they hold *suum cuique*[2] for their maxim in perfect earnest and do not budge from it.

[1] God Eventus (Good Luck).

[2] To every man his own.

Why is there here such an *objective* attachment to good faith, such a determination to keep it inviolably? Simply because good faith is the basis of all free human intercourse, of good order and security of possession, and therefore very often turns out to *our own* advantage, so that, even if it entail *sacrifices*, it must be maintained; just as good land must have something *spent* upon it. Honesty that rests on these foundations is, however, rarely to be met with except among the well-to-do, or at any rate among those engaged in some profitable occupation, notably merchants, who have the clearest conviction that in their business mutual confidence and credit are indispensable: this makes of commercial honour a thing apart. On the other hand the *poor*, who come off second best, and, owing to the unequal distribution of wealth, see themselves condemned to want and severe labour, while others are living before their eyes in affluence and idleness, will hardly recognise this inequality as based upon a corresponding inequality of desert and honest acquisition. And if they do *not* recognise it, where shall they find purely ethical motives to honesty that shall keep them from laying hands on the superfluity of others? As a rule, it is the law alone that restrains them. But suppose there should arise an occasion when the poor man, screened by some rare chance from the effects of the law, should have it in his power to cast from his shoulders by a single act the heavy load of want which the sight of the superfluity of others makes still more painful, and to put *himself* in possession of the enjoyments he has so often envied—what is there to restrain his hand?—Religious dogmas? Faith is seldom strong enough. A pure moral impulse to justice? Perhaps, in exceptional cases; but in the great majority it will only be that care for his good name, his civic honour, which is so potent an influence

with the man of low estate also, and the evident danger there is that such a deed would expel him for ever from the great masonic lodge of the honest people who follow the law of rectitude and have divided and managed property according to it all the world over—the danger of a single dishonest action making him a pariah for life from civic society, a man whom no one will trust again, no one consort with, and whose chances of getting on in the world are therefore at an end—in a word, "a fellow that has stolen," to whom applies the proverb "Once a thief, always a thief."

These, then, are the guardians of public rectitude, and those who are conversant with the world and keep their eyes open will admit that to them alone we owe by far the greater portion of the honesty in human intercourse, and that there are plenty of people who even hope to elude *their* vigilance, and who therefore regard justice and honesty merely as a device or flag under the protection of which they may the better carry out their privateering schemes. We are not, therefore, to fly at once into a righteous rage when a moralist happens to propound this problem, that all honesty and justice are perhaps at bottom purely conventional, and goes on to trace back all the other virtues to remote, indirect, and ultimately egoistic grounds, as Holbach, Helvetius, d'Alembert, and others of their time have cleverly attempted to do. Of the greater part of our right actions this is even actually true, as I have shown above. That it is also true of a considerable portion of deeds of kindliness or charity, there can also be no doubt; for they are frequently done out of ostentation, and very often from a belief in a future repayment in square and even cubic measure, not to mention still other egoistic reasons. But no less certain is it, that there are acts of unselfish benevolence and quite spontaneous justice. As

examples of these—not to appeal to facts of consciousness, but only to those of experience—there are exceptional but indubitable cases, in which not only the danger of legal prosecution but also of discovery, and even of all suspicion, are completely excluded, and yet a rich man's property is restored to him by a poor one: *e.g.* such restitution has been faithfully made (1) in the case of a thing lost and found; (2) of something deposited with another by a third party, since deceased; (3) of property left by a fugitive from his country, for safe custody, in the hands of a poor man. Such cases there have doubtless been: only, the surprise, the emotion, the esteem elicited by such actions, clearly prove that we have here to do with unexpected things and rare exceptions. There are, in point of fact, really honest people, as there really are four-leaved shamrocks; nevertheless Hamlet does not exaggerate when he says: "To be honest, as this world goes, is to be one man pick'd out of ten thousand." To meet the objection that such actions rest ultimately upon religious dogmas, and are consequently done out of regard to reward and punishment in another world, cases could no doubt be cited in which those who did them were of no religious faith—which is less rare than public recognition of the fact.

As against the *sceptical view*, appeal is made first of all to *conscience*. But it is doubtful whether conscience has a natural origin. At any rate there is also a *conscientia spuria*, which is often confounded with the true species. The repentance and anguish of mind experienced by many a man, is often at bottom nothing but the fear of what may happen to him in consequence of his act. The breach of external, arbitrary, and even absurd rules may torment him with reproaches indistinguishable from those of conscience. Thus, for

example, many a bigoted Jew may reproach himself for having violated the command in Ex. xxxv. 3, "Ye shall kindle no fire throughout your habitations upon the Sabbath day," by smoking a pipe indoors on a Saturday evening. How often does a nobleman or an officer reproach himself in secret for having on some occasion failed to obey the laws of that fool's code called chivalric honour; and so far is this carried, that many a man in this station of life if placed in circumstances which make it impossible for him to keep his pledged word of honour, or to comply with the provisions of that code in his disputes, will blow his brains out. I have seen a case of the kind myself. And yet the same man will break his word every day and think nothing of it, if only the shibboleth "of honour" be not added.

In short, every inconsequence, every piece of heedlessness, every action done against our intentions, principles, and convictions, of whatsoever kind these may be—nay, every indiscretion, every wrong notion, every stupid thing said or done, afterwards torments us secretly and leaves a sting in our heart. Many people would be surprised, if they could see of what that conscience of theirs, which they think so much of, is really composed. Its constitution is something of this sort: one-fifth, fear of man; one-fifth, fear of God; one-fifth, prejudice; one-fifth, vanity; one-fifth, custom: so that they are not in much better case than that Englishman who said right out, "I cannot afford to keep a conscience." To religious people of all creeds "conscience" generally means nothing but the dogmas and precepts of their religion, and the self-examination undertaken in connexion therewith; and it is in this sense that the terms "coercion of conscience," "liberty of conscience," are to be understood. The theologians, schoolmen, and casuists of the Middle

Ages and of more recent times, held a like opinion: with them *conscience* was made up of all that a man knew of the rules and precepts of the Church, together with the determination to believe and act up to his knowledge. Accordingly there was a doubting, an opining, an erring conscience, etc., to rectify which there was need of a director of conscience. How little the concept "conscience" is established, like other concepts, by its object—what different notions people have of it, and how wavering and unsteady its signification appears to be in various authors, may be seen in brief from Stäudlin's *Geschichte der Lehre vom Gewissen.* All this is not calculated to give us confidence in the reality of the concept, and has led to the asking of this question, "Is there really such a thing as an innate conscience?" I have already—see § 10, On the Doctrine of Freedom[1]—had occasion to give a short definition of my notion of conscience, and I shall come back to it by and by.

All these sceptical difficulties, though they by no means suffice to make us deny the existence of genuine morality, do nevertheless suggest that we should moderate our expectations with regard to the moral disposition in man and be content with a not very wide natural basis of ethics; for much that has been ascribed to natural morality proceeds demonstrably from other springs of action, and the spectacle of the moral depravity of the world sufficiently proves that the impulse to good cannot be very powerful, more especially as it often remains ineffectual even where the opposing motives are not strong, although here the individual difference of characters counts for much. Meanwhile

[1] It is placed later in this volume. The definition in question is this: "Conscience is simply that better acquaintance with oneself which is revealed to us by the way we act."—Tr.

the knowledge of this moral depravity of the world is rendered all the more difficult, because its outward manifestations are checked and masked by the law, by the necessity of keeping our honour intact, aye, and by courtesy as well. Add to this, that when in the education of children we imagine we are furthering the cause of morality by teaching them that rectitude and virtue are maxims generally followed in the world; and when experience afterwards teaches them, often to their grievous hurt, that it is quite otherwise; it may be that the discovery that the preceptors of their youth were the first to deceive them, may act more prejudicially upon their own morality, than if these teachers had themselves given them the first example of candour and honesty, and had said without concealment: "The world lieth in wickedness, and men are not what they ought to be; but let not this mislead thee; be thou better." All this, as I said, makes it difficult for us to attain to the knowledge of the real immorality of the human race. The State, that *chef-d'œuvre* of the intelligent, sensible, aggregated-egoism of all, has handed the defence of the rights of every man to a power which, being immeasurably superior to the might of each individual, compels him to respect the rights of all others. Thus the boundless egoism of almost all, the wickedness of most, the cruelty of many, cannot get free play: coercion keeps them all in check. The consequent illusion is so great, that when, in certain cases where the power of the State is unable to afford protection or is eluded, the insatiable greed, the sordid avarice, the deeply-concealed guile, the spiteful malice of man, discloses itself, we often start back in affright and make a terrible outcry, as though we had stumbled across a monster never before seen; and yet, were it not for the coercion of the laws and the need of civic honour,

such things would be the order of the day. We must read the histories of crimes and the descriptions of anarchic conditions, if we would know what in a moral regard man really is. These thousands who pass shoulder to shoulder in friendly intercourse before our eyes, are to be regarded as so many tigers and wolves, who are only kept from biting by a strong muzzle. Take the muzzle off, *i.e.* remove the restrictions imposed by the State, and every man of insight shudders at the spectacle that would ensue—which shows how little faith he really has in the influence of religion, conscience, or the natural basis of ethics, whatever that may be. But when the immoral powers are let loose, then is just the moment for the true moral springs of action in man to show their efficacy, and they will then be most easily recognised; and at the same time will be plainly revealed the incredibly great moral diversity of characters, which will prove to be not a fraction less than the intellectual difference between minds—and this is certainly saying much.

It will, perhaps, be objected that Ethics has nothing to do with the way in which men really act, but that it is the science which points out how they *ought* to act. But this is precisely what I deny, and in the critical portion of this treatise I have sufficiently demonstrated that the concept "ought,"[1] the imperative form of Ethics, is valued in theological Ethics alone, outside the limits of which it loses all sense and significance. I assert, on the contrary, that the aim and object of Ethics is to interpret, explain, and trace to their ultimate ground man's very diverse ways of acting in a moral regard.

[1] "Shall" would be better here, but it would be inadvisable to translate "*sollen*" sometimes by "ought" and sometimes by "shall," and the former is the most generally suitable. *Sollen* applies alike to the commander and the commanded: the former says, Thou shalt; the latter feels, I ought.—Tr.

To discover the basis of Ethics, therefore, we have nothing for it but to go to experience: we must try to find out whether there *are* actions to which we must ascribe *genuine moral worth;* such actions, I mean, as those of voluntary justice, pure love of our neighbour, and real nobility of soul. These are then to be regarded as a given phenomenon which it behoves us to explain, *i.e.* to trace back to its true grounds, by pointing out the particular spring that moves men to act in this particular way, so different from every other. This spring of action, together with a susceptibility to it, will be the ultimate ground of morality, and when we know it we shall know the basis of Ethics. This is the modest way I propose to take. Let those who despise it as containing no "construction *a priori*," no absolute legislation for all rational beings *in abstracto*, who think it not superior,[1] cathedralish,[2] and academic enough, return to the categorical imperative; to the shibboleth of the "dignity of man"; to the empty phrases, brain-cobwebs, and soap-bubbles of the Schools; to principles flouted by experience at every step, and never known or felt outside the four walls of the lecture-room. My basis of Ethics, on the contrary, has experience always by its side, and, daily and hourly, experience bears secret testimony to its truth.

ANTI-MORAL[3] SPRINGS OF ACTION

[*B. of E.* § 14.]

As in the animal, so in man the great mainspring of

[1] A cut at Schelling.
[2] Combining "ecclesiastical" with "*ex cathedra*."
[3] I crave leave to introduce this improperly compounded word, because "anti-ethical" would not have the right signification.—Au.

action is *egoism*, *i.e.* the craving to exist and be happy. This egoism is, alike in the animal and in man, most intimately bound up with his inmost essence and constitution; nay, it *is* that very essence itself. Hence, as a rule, all his actions spring from egoism, and the explanation of a given action is always primarily to be sought therein, while upon egoism likewise is invariably founded the calculation of all the means made use of to guide men to any end. *Egoism* is, from its nature, boundless: the man wills unconditionally to maintain his existence, wills to have it absolutely free from pain (in which word is included all want and deprivation), wills the greatest possible amount of well-being, and wills every pleasure of which he is capable—nay, even seeks, where he can, to develop within him ever new capacities for enjoyment. Everything that opposes itself to the striving of his egoism arouses his displeasure, his anger, his hatred: he sees in it an enemy that must be destroyed. He wills, if possible, to enjoy everything, to have everything; but, as this is impossible, at least to control everything. "All for me and nothing for anybody else," is his motto. Egoism is colossal; it dominates the world. Give a man the choice between his own annihilation and that of the whole of his fellow-men, and I need hardly say what the decision of ninety-nine out of a hundred would be. Every man thus makes himself the centre of the world, refers everything to himself, regards all events — for example, prodigious changes involving the fate of nations—primarily from the point of view of *his* interests, and, though these may be quite small and indirect, will think of them before aught else. There can be no greater contrast than that between the deep and exclusive interest taken by each man in his own self, and the indifference with which, as a rule, that same self is regarded by others. The thing

has its comic side: for is it not amusing to contemplate countless individuals, each of whom, in a practical regard at least, esteems himself the only *real* being, and looks upon the rest as in a way mere phantoms? The reason of which is, in the last resort, that every man is given to himself *immediately*, while others are given to him *mediately* only, through the picture he has of them in his mind; and the immediacy carries the day. Let us look at this a little. In consequence of that subjectivity which is of the very essence of every consciousness, each man is himself the whole world; for everything objective exists only mediately, as mere presentment of the subject, so that everything depends always on self-consciousness. The only world that everyone actually realises and knows about, he carries within him as his presentment, and of this world he is therefore the centre. And this is why each man is all in all to himself: he finds himself the proprietor of all reality, and nothing can be more important to him than himself. Now while to his subjective view his self assumes these colossal proportions, it shrinks objectively to almost nothing, viz. to about the thousand-millionth part of the total of mankind now living. At the same time he knows perfectly well that this all-important self, this microcosm, as whose mere modification or accident the macrocosm appears, and which is therefore his whole world, must perish in death, which for him is consequently synonymous with the perishing of the world. Such are the elements wherefrom, on the basis of the Will-to-live, grows that egoism which always lies, like a broad ditch, between man and man. When any one actually jumps over it and helps another, it is regarded as a marvel, exciting wonder and winning applause. In § 8 above,[1]

[1] Not included in this volume.

in my explanation of the Kantian principle of ethics, I had occasion to dwell upon the way in which egoism shows itself in every-day life, where, in spite of the fig-leaf of outward courtesy, it nevertheless always peeps out from some corner or other. Courtesy, it seems, is the conventional and systematic disavowal of egoism in the trifles of daily intercourse: it is, to be sure, recognised hypocrisy, though for all that insisted upon and commended, because the egoism it hides is so indecent and nasty that we want to avoid seeing it, although we know it is there: just as we like to have repulsive objects hidden at least behind a curtain. Since egoism, if not counteracted either by some outward force—under which designation is to be included all fear both of natural and supernatural powers—or by the genuinely moral spring of action, pursues its way regardless of everything; the order of the day would, in view of the countless multitudes of egoistic individuals, be *bellum omnium contra omnes*,[1] to the damage of everybody. And so reflecting reason very soon devised the machinery of Government, which, springing from the fear every man has of the power of all the rest, obviates the detrimental consequences flowing from universal egoism, so far as this can be done *negatively*. Where, however, the two[2] powers adverse to egoism do not become effective, it will forthwith show itself in all its fearful proportions—a phenomenon the reverse of beautiful. In searching for a short expression to convey the intensity of this anti-moral power—an expression that should hyperbolically sketch the magnitude of egoism with one stroke and without circumlocution—I finally hit upon this: Many a man is capable of killing another for no other purpose than to get fat to grease

[1] A warring of all against all.
[2] *I.e.* justice and love of our neighbour.

his boots with. My only doubt is, whether it *is* an exaggeration. *Egoism*, then, is the first and chiefest, though not the only power, that the *moral spring of action* has to combat. We see here already that, if it is to compete with such an adversary, it must be something more real than a hair-splitting piece of sophistry or an *a priori* soap-bubble. Meanwhile, in war, the great point is to recognise the enemy. In the forthcoming fight *Egoism*, as the Goliath of its side, will have to battle most fiercely with the virtue of *Justice*, which in my opinion is the chief cardinal virtue, the virtue *par excellence*.

On the other hand, the virtue of *Charity*[1] has more often to contend with *Ill-will* or *Malevolence*, the origin and various degrees of which we will now proceed to consider. In its lower grades Malevolence is so common, that we may even call it usual, and it easily reaches higher grades, so that Goethe is perfectly right in saying (*Wahlverwandtschaften*, Pt.I. ch. iii.) that in this world indifference and antipathy are quite at home. It is very lucky for us that prudence and courtesy fling their mantle over it and do not allow us to see how universal is the malevolence of each one towards his neighbour, and how the *bellum omnium contra omnes* is everywhere waged, in thought at least. But at times it comes to light, *e.g.* in that backbiting which is so common and so unsparing; but most visible of all is it in those outbreaks of wrath which are generally out of all proportion to the cause that excites them, and which could not be so violent, were it not that they have been compressed, like powder in a gun, in the shape of hatred long cherished in secret. Malevolence proceeds in most cases from the unavoidable collisions

[1] This word is to be taken throughout in the Biblical sense.

that take place at every step between contending displays of egoism. Then, too, it is objectively excited by the spectacle of vices, failings, weaknesses, follies, defects, and imperfections of every kind, which all men more or less present to others, at least occasionally. So far may things go, that, especially when in a hypochondriacal mood, the world may perhaps look to us, when viewed from the æsthetic side, like a roomful of caricatures; from the intellectual, like a madhouse; and from the moral side, like a den of thieves. If such a mood becomes permanent, the outcome is misanthropy.

Finally, one main source of malevolence is *Envy;* or rather, this is already malevolence excited by the happiness, wealth, or advantages of others. From this no man is completely free, and Herodotus (iii. 80) has said: "Envy lies in the original constitution of man." Its degrees, however, are very different. It is most rancorous and poisonous when directed to personal qualities, because here there is no hope for the envious man; and at the same time it is here at its vilest, for he hates what he ought to love and honour. But so it is; and

> Di lor par più, che d'altri, invidia s'abbia
> Che per se stessi son levati a volo,
> Uscendo fuor della commune gabbia,[1]

is the wail of Petrarch. In a certain respect the antithesis to Envy is *Schadenfreude*,[2] or malicious pleasure in the misfortunes of others. The difference is this: Envy is human; *Schadenfreude* is diabolical. There is no more unfailing sign of a thoroughly bad

[1] 'Twould seem as though they chiefly envy stir,
Who by themselves have soared on their own wings,
And 'scaped from out the common cage of man.

[2] Ἐπικαιρεκακια, a compound affection of Joy and Hate, when we rejoice at other men's mischief, and are grieved at their prosperity (Burton: *Anatomy of Melancholy*).—Tr.

heart and profound moral turpitude, than a single trait of genuine heartfelt *Schadenfreude.* The man in whom it has once been perceived, should be for ever avoided: "*Hic niger est, hunc tu, Romane, caveto.*"[1] Envy and *Schadenfreude* are in themselves merely theoretical: in practice they become Malice and Cruelty. Egoism may lead to crimes and offences of any kind, but the pain and damage which it causes to others is not of its essence—is merely means and not end—a mere accident; whereas to malice and cruelty the suffering and pain of others is an end in itself, and the compassing of it affords pleasure. Therefore these constitute a higher power of moral turpitude. The maxim of the extremest egoism is: *Neminem juva, imo omnes, si forte conducit* (*i.e.* conditionally only), *læde.*[2] That of malice is: *Omnes, quantum potes, læde.*[3] As *Schadenfreude* is only theoretical cruelty, so is cruelty only practical *Schadenfreude*, which becomes cruelty the moment occasion offers.

A complete treatise on Ethics would point out the special vices flowing from these two fundamental powers. It would probably derive greed, gluttony, lust, selfishness, avarice, covetousness, injustice, hard-heartedness, pride, arrogance, &c., from Egoism; while it would hold Malevolence responsible for grudgingness, envy, ill-will, malice, *Schadenfreude*, prying curiosity, slander, insolence, petulance, hatred, anger, treachery, spite, revengefulness, cruelty, &c. The root of the first is more brutish; of the second, more diabolical. The predominance of one or the other, or else of that moral spring of action presently to be mentioned, determines the chief lines of classification of characters in a

[1] Beware of him, O Roman; he is black.

[2] Help no one, but rather injure all men if this will procure you advantage.

[3] Injure all men as much as you can.

moral regard. No man but has in him a tincture of all three.

Here concludes the no doubt terrible review of the anti-moral powers, which reminds us of that of the princes of darkness in Milton's Pandemonium. My plan, however, obliged me to consider first this darker side of human nature, whereby the course I pursue does indeed differ from that of all other moralists and resembles that of Dante, who takes us first of all to hell.

From this survey of the anti-moral powers we clearly see how difficult is the problem: no less a one, namely, than to discover a spring of action capable of moving a man to conduct totally opposed to all the inclinations so deeply rooted in his nature; or, if we should happen to find such conduct in actual experience, capable of giving us a sufficient and ungarbled account thereof. So difficult is the problem, that, to resolve it for mankind at large, the machinery of help from another world has always been requisitioned. Gods have been pointed to, whose Will and commands were supposed to determine the conduct required of us, and who emphasised these commands by penalties and rewards, either in this world or in another to which we are to be translated after death. Assuming that belief in a doctrine of this kind takes general hold, and early inoculation no doubt makes this possible: assuming further, what is far more difficult and has much less warrant from experience, that it produces the desired effect; then the legality of actions even beyond the limits to which the law and police regulations can reach, would indeed be established. But every one must feel that this is by no means what we understand by morality of disposition, for actions done from motives *of this sort* would clearly have their root in pure egoism. How can disinterestedness be

talked of, when I am enticed by a reward or deterred by a threatened punishment? A reward which I firmly believe will be bestowed in another world, is to be looked upon as a perfectly good bill maturing at a distant date. Gratified beggars all the world over assure the giver that his gift will be reimbursed a thousandfold in the world to come, and this will move many a niggard to give generous alms, which he distributes with pleasure, looking upon it as a good investment and firmly convinced that in the resurrection he will be a millionaire.

For the great mass of the people incentives of this kind must, perhaps, be allowed to pass; and that is why they are held out to them by the various religions, which are just the metaphysics of the people. Here, however, it is to be remarked that we are sometimes quite as much mistaken about the true motives of our own actions, as about those of other people; and undoubtedly many a man, while attributing his noblest actions to motives of the above kind, is really actuated by impulses far nobler and purer—though he finds difficulty in making them clear to himself—and he actually does from immediate love to his neighbour what he can only explain to himself as done at the bidding of his God. But here, as everywhere, philosophy seeks for the true ultimate solution of the problem before us—a solution founded on the nature of man, and independent of all mythical interpretations, religious dogmas, and transcendent hypostases—and insists upon finding it in outward or inward experience. Our task is a philosophical one, and we must therefore entirely discard all solutions conditioned by religions: I have only reminded my reader of them here, in order to make clear to him the extreme difficulty of the problem.

CRITERION OF THE MORAL WORTH OF ACTIONS

[*B. of E.* § 15.]

We have first to answer the empirical question, Are actions of voluntary justice and disinterested charity—which justice and charity may rise to nobility and greatness of mind—to be found in experience? Unfortunately no decisive answer can be given from bare experience, because in experience nothing is given but the *deed*, and the *incentive* is hidden: there is therefore always the possibility that an egoistic motive may have exerted its influence in the production of a just or good action. This being a theoretical discussion, I will not avail myself of the inadmissible artifice of leaving the matter to the reader's conscience. Yet I believe there will be very few who are not convinced from their own experience that just actions, done simply and solely in order that others may not suffer wrong, are not uncommon, and that there are people in whom the principle of giving others their due is as it were *innate*, and who therefore never purposely do their neighbour a wrong, do not unconditionally seek their own advantage, but at the same time consider the rights of others—and who, when entering into engagements with one of their fellow-men, are not intent merely upon his *doing* his part, but are also careful that he should *receive* his due, sincerely desiring that whoever deals with them should not come off a loser. These are the *really fair-dealing people*, the few *æqui*[1] out of the host of *iniqui*;[2] but there are such people. It will also be admitted, I think,

[1] Just. [2] Unjust.

that many a man will help and give, will do and forbear doing, without cherishing in his heart any intention save that of helping the man whom he sees to be in trouble. Let who will believe that Arnold von Winkelried, when he cried "After me, my good comrades, and have a care of my wife and children!" and then clasped to his breast all the spears of the enemy that he could, was actuated by self-interest: I, for my part will never believe it. In § 13 I have cited cases of spontaneous justice, which only the most obstinate captiousness can deny. If, however, any one should persist in denying that such actions do occur, it means that for him Ethics, like Astrology and Alchemy, is a science which has no real object, and to dispute further about its basis would be time thrown away. To such persons, therefore, I have nothing to say, and I address myself only to those who admit their reality.

None but actions of the above kind, then, can be admitted to have real *moral worth.* Their distinguishing characteristic is the exclusion of that class of motives by which all other human actions are called forth—I mean, *self-interested* motives, in the widest sense of the word. Therefore the discovery of a self-interested motive would, if it were the sole one acting, totally abolish the moral worth of an action, and, if accessory or contributory, would diminish it. Absence of all egoistic motivation is therefore the *criterion of an action that has moral worth.* It may indeed be objected that acts of pure malice and cruelty are also *disinterested;* yet it is clear that these cannot be thought of here, for they are diametrically opposed to the actions we are now considering. But to those who insist upon strictness of definition, let me say that those acts are expressly excluded by a mark characteristic of them, which is, that they aim at inflicting suffering upon others. There is another

wholly inward and therefore less obvious characteristic of actions that have moral worth, which is, that they leave behind a certain satisfaction with ourselves, known as the approval of conscience; while the opposite actions of injustice and uncharitableness, and still more those of malice and cruelty, are disapproved by our inward self-judgment. And there is, besides, this secondary and accidental outward characteristic: that actions of the first kind call forth the approbation and esteem of unprejudiced spectators, while those of the second kind do the reverse.

We may take it, then, as a well-established fact, that actions possessing moral worth *are* done. We have to regard them as an existent phenomenon requiring explanation, and must therefore inquire what it is that can move men to actions of this sort. Should this inquiry be successful, it must necessarily reveal the genuine moral spring of action, and, as it is upon this that Ethics must be founded, our problem will be solved.

STATEMENT AND PROOF OF THE ONLY GENUINELY MORAL SPRING OF ACTION

[*B. of E.* § 16.]

After the above indispensable preparations I am now in a position to point out the true spring of action that underlies all genuinely moral deeds, and it will turn out to be one whose solidity and unquestionable reality removes it far from all those hair-splittings, subtleties, sophisms, chimerical assertions, and *a priori* soap-bubbles, which have hitherto been regarded as the source of moral conduct and made to serve as the basis of Ethics. Now as this moral spring of action is no

arbitrary *assumption* of mine, but is to be actually *proved* as the only one possible, and as this proof requires the putting together and simultaneous apprehension of many thoughts, let me begin by setting down a few premisses as the groundwork from which I shall argue. These may be regarded as axioms—all but the last two, which are derived from the explanations given above.

1. An action can no more occur without a sufficient motive, than a stone can move without a sufficient push or pull.

2. An action to which an agent is impelled by a motive that makes due appeal to his character, must be performed, unless a stronger counter-motive obliges him to leave it undone.

3. The Will is moved only by weal and woe in general, and in the widest sense of the words; and conversely, weal signifies that which is according to one's Will—woe, that which is contrary thereto. Thus every motive must have a connexion with weal and woe.

4. Consequently every action has, as its final aim, a connexion with a being susceptible to weal and woe.

5. This being is either the agent himself, or another—who then plays a *passive* part, for the action either damages or profits him.

6. Every action whose final aim is the weal or woe of the agent himself, is *egoistic*.

7. All that is here said of actions applies equally to abstention therefrom under the influence of motive and counter-motive.

8. As explained in the foregoing sections, *egoism* and the *moral worth* of an action are mutually exclusive concepts. If an action is prompted by an egoistic end, it can have no moral worth; to have moral worth, it must not be prompted by any egoistic end, immediate or mediate, near or remote.

9. In consequence of the complete elimination, in § 5,[1] of the supposed duties to ourselves, the moral significance of any action can lie only in its connexion with other people; in respect of these alone can it have moral worth or reprehensibleness, and so be an act either of justice and charity or of injustice and hard-heartedness.

From these premisses it clearly follows that the *weal and woe* which, according to premiss 3, must underlie, as its final aim, every action or omission to act, are either those of the agent himself or of some other person who remains passive during that action. *In the first case* the action is necessarily *egoistic*, because it is grounded upon an interested motive. This is so not only in actions evidently undertaken, as almost all are, for the agent's own profit and advantage; but it is equally so, wherever he has the expectation of getting anything *for himself* at some distant date, either in this world or another; or where he is looking for honour, reputation, esteem, the sympathy of the onlookers, &c.; as also, where the action is done because the doer wants to have a maxim observed, from the universal following of which he *eventualiter* expects advantage *for himself*—such as the maxim of justice, of universal mutual-helpfulness, &c.; or where he holds it advisable to obey some absolute command laid upon him by an unknown, it is true, but evidently superior Power, his compliance being due solely to the *fear* of the disastrous consequences of *disobedience*, although these may be only generally and indefinitely conceived; or where he strives, by some act of omission or commission, to maintain his own high opinion of himself, his worth and dignity (whether this be perceived

[1] Not included in this volume.

clearly or not clearly), which he would otherwise have to give up, and so see his pride wounded; or finally, where he desires to work, on Wolfian principles, for his own perfecting. In a word, whatever the ultimate spring of action in the cases above-cited, we shall always see that in some roundabout way or other it is invariably in the last instance *the weal and woe of the agent himself;* consequently the action is *egoistic*, and therefore *destitute of moral worth.* There is only one case in which this is not so: namely, where the ultimate incentive to an action or its pretermission lies directly and exclusively in the *weal and woe* of some *other* person who remains passive, and thus the active party, in his act of omission or commission, is thinking simply and solely of the weal and woe of *another*, and his whole aim and object is that this other shall remain unhurt, or even receive aid, support, and relief. *Such aim alone* stamps an act of omission or commission with the seal of *moral worth*—this depending entirely upon whether the action is done or left undone with a view to the profit and advantage of *the other* only. If this is *not* the case, the *weal and woe* which drive the agent to do the action or leave it undone, are *his own;* but then the action, or abstention from action, is always *egoistic*, and consequently *devoid of moral worth.*

But if my action is done simply and solely *on account of another, his weal and woe* must be *my immediate motive*, as in all other actions *my* weal and woe are. This brings our problem into a narrower compass, namely this: How is it possible that the weal and woe of *another* can immediately—*i.e.* just as my own weal and woe formerly did—move my Will and thus directly become my motive—and even sometimes to such an extent that I more or less disregard in comparison my own weal and woe, that hitherto unique source of my

motives? Clearly, only by that other person becoming the *final aim* of my Will, just as I myself originally was; in other words, by my willing *his* weal and not willing *his* woe with the same complete immediacy as I formerly willed or did not will *my own*. But this necessarily presupposes that I directly sympathise with *his* woe as such, feel *his* woe as I formerly felt my own, and therefore immediately will his weal as I formerly willed only my own. But this presupposes that I should in some way or other be *identified with him*, *i.e.* that that complete *distinction* between me and every other person, which is precisely that upon which my egoism depends, should be abolished, at least in part. Now as I cannot slip *into his skin*, it is only the *knowledge* I have of him, *i.e.* the presentment of him in my head, that enables me to identify myself with him so completely that my deed announces this distinction to be abolished. The process here analysed is no imaginary and chimerical one, but one taken from actual experience and of no rare occurrence: it is the every-day phenomenon of *compassion*, *i.e.* of the quite immediate and entirely disinterested *sympathy* with the *suffering* of another, and the consequent desire to prevent or abolish that suffering, on the successful accomplishment of which ultimately depend all satisfaction, well-being, and happiness. It is this compassion alone that constitutes the real basis of all *spontaneous* justice and all *genuine* charity. Only in so far as an action springs from this, has it moral worth; and an action done from any other motives has none. No sooner is this compassion excited, than my heart thrills immediately to the weal and woe of my neighbour, as formerly it thrilled to my own, albeit perhaps less strongly: thus the distinction between him and myself is no longer absolute.

This process is, no doubt, astonishing—mysterious

even. It is, in truth, the great mystery of Ethics, its primal phenomenon, and the frontier post beyond which metaphysical speculation alone dares to venture its foot. In this process we see the party-wall, which the light of Nature—as the old theologians called the Reason—erects between one living being and another, demolished, and the Non-ego become in a certain sense the Ego. Let us for the moment turn away from the metaphysical explanation of the phenomenon, and first see whether all actions of spontaneous justice and genuine charity do actually flow from this process. Our problem will then be solved, for we shall have discovered the ultimate basis of morality in human nature itself: this basis cannot, however, in its turn be a problem of *Ethics*, but—like all else that exists *of itself*—of Metaphysics. Only, the metaphysical explanation of the ethical primal-phenomenon lies quite outside the Royal Society's question, which is directed to the basis of ethics, and to add it is merely a work of supererogation. Before proceeding to the deduction of the cardinal virtues from the spring of action here set forth, I have to make two supplementary, but very necessary remarks.

1. For the sake of clearness I have simplified the above deduction of compassion as the sole source of actions that possess moral worth, by expressly excluding the incentive to *malice*, which, no less disinterestedly than compassion, makes our neighbour's *pain* its final aim. But we may now take this also into consideration, and give a more complete and stringent *résumé* of the above proof as follows:

There are, in point of fact, only *three fundamental springs* of human action, and no motives can operate except by setting one or other of these in motion. They are:

a. Egoism—which wills our own weal: it is boundless.

b. Malice—which wills the woe of another being: it may rise to extreme cruelty.

c. Compassion—which wills the weal of another: it may rise to nobility and greatness of mind.

Every human action may and must be traced back to one of these springs, although in certain cases two may be implicated together. Now as we have assumed actions possessed of moral worth to be matters of fact, they too must proceed from one of these fundamental springs. But, from premiss 8, they do not owe their origin to *a*—still less to *b*; for actions due to the latter are all morally reprehensible, while those proceeding from the former are in part morally indifferent. Therefore they must proceed from *c*. This will be confirmed *a posteriori* hereafter.

2. Immediate sympathy with another is evoked only by his *suffering*, and will not—directly at least—be aroused by his *well-being*, which, *by itself*, leaves us indifferent. This is also the opinion of J. J. Rousseau, who in Emile (bk. iv.) says: "Première maxime: Il n'est pas dans le cœur humain de se mettre à la place des gens qui sont plus heureux que nous, mais seulement de ceux qui sont plus à plaindre, etc."[1]

The reason of this, is that pain, suffering—which includes all want, privation, need, and indeed every desire—is *positive and immediately felt*, whereas the nature of satisfaction, pleasure, happiness, consists solely in the removal of a privation, the stilling of a pain. These, therefore, work *negatively*, every pleasure being essentially conditioned by need and desire. Plato was aware of this, and the only exceptions he allowed were sweet scents and mental pleasures (*De rep.*, ix. pp.

[1] First maxim. It is not in the power of the human heart to sympathise with those who are happier than ourselves, but only with those who are in worse case, &c.

264 f., ed. Bip.). Voltaire, too, says: "Il n'est de vrais plaisirs qu'avec de vrais besoins."[1] Thus the *positive*, that which manifests itself by itself, is pain; satisfaction and pleasure are *negative*, the mere removal of the pain. Hence our sympathies are aroused only by the suffering, want, danger, helplessness, directly and as such, of our neighbour. The happy and contented man, *as such*, leaves us indifferent: really because his condition is a negative one—depending upon absence of pain, want, and distress. We may, it is true, rejoice over the happiness, the well-being, the pleasure of others; but this is secondary, and merely results from our having been previously troubled by their sufferings and privations; or we sympathise with the happy joyous man, not *as such*, but because he is our child, father, friend, relation, servant, employé, &c. But the happy joyous man does not, *purely as such*, awaken our immediate sympathy, as does the suffering, distressed, unfortunate man *purely as such*. If even *in our own case* our activity is excited really only by our suffering (in which term is to be included every want, need, desire—ennui even), while a condition of satisfaction and happiness leaves us inactive and lazily restful; must it not be the same with regard to others?—since our sympathy depends upon our identifying ourselves with them. The sight of a happy joyous man, *purely as such*, may very easily excite our envy, a disposition to which lies in every man, and which, as we saw above, has its place among the anti-moral powers.

My view of compassion, as immediately prompted by the suffering of another, leads me to censure the error of Cassina, who, in his *Saggio analitico sulla compassione*, 1788, says—and he has often been echoed since—that

[1] Real pleasures imply real needs.

compassion arises from a momentary illusion of the imagination, whereby we put ourselves in the place of the sufferer and then fancy that we are suffering *his* pains in *our own* person. But this is not true, for we are perfectly well aware the whole time that he is the sufferer, not *we;* and it is *in his person*, not in ours, that we feel the suffering that disquiets us. We suffer *with* him and thus *in* him; we feel his pain as *his*, and are not the least under the illusion that it is ours; indeed, the happier our own condition, and consequently the greater the contrast between the consciousness of our state and his, the more susceptible to compassion are we. But the explanation of the possibility of this highly important phenomenon is by no means easy, and it is not to be reached in the merely physiological way attempted by Cassina. The explanation must be a purely metaphysical one, and this I shall attempt to give in the final chapter.

For the moment, however, I turn to the deduction of actions possessing genuine moral worth from the source indicated above. I have already stated the general maxim of such actions, and consequently the fundamental principle of Ethics, to be "*Neminem læde; imo omnes, quantam potes, juva.*"[1] This maxim consists of *two* parts, and the actions corresponding to these fall of themselves into two classes.

THE VIRTUE OF JUSTICE

[*B. of E.* § 17.]

On nearer examination of this Compassion, which I have designated the ethical primal phenomenon, we see at

[1] Injure no one, but rather help all men as far as you can.

once that there are two clearly separated degrees in which the suffering of another can immediately become my motive, *i.e.* determine me to perform an action or leave it undone: (1) a lower degree, in which compassion, counteracting the egoistic or malicious motives, restrains me from causing suffering to another—that is, from bringing about a state of affairs which does not yet exist, and from becoming myself the cause of suffering to others; (2) a superior degree, in which compassion operates positively and urges me on to active help. The distinction between the so-called obligations of right and obligations of virtue—or between justice and charity, as I prefer to say—which with Kant was so forced,[1] here flows forth quite of itself, thus testifying to the correctness of my principle: it is the natural, unmistakable, and sharp boundary-line between negative and positive, not harming and helping. The old names "obligations of right" and "obligations of virtue," the latter of which were also called "duties of love" and "imperfect duties," have this fault to begin with, that they make the genus co-ordinate with the species; for justice is itself a virtue. Further, they give far too wide an extension to the concept "duty" or "obligation," which by and by I shall set back within its proper limits. In place of the above two duties I therefore put two virtues, Justice and Charity, which I call cardinal virtues, because from them all the rest may be practically derived and theoretically deduced. Both have their root in natural compassion. Now this compassion itself is an undeniable fact of human consciousness, to which it essentially belongs, and does not depend upon hypotheses, notions, religions, dogmas, myths, education, or culture; but is original and immediate, lies in human nature itself, and therefore

[1] This matter was discussed in an earlier section of the treatise.—Tr.

holds its ground under all circumstances and shows itself in all ages and countries. Appeal is therefore everywhere confidently made to it, as to something necessarily present in every man, and it is never one of those things that belong to the "strange Gods." On the other hand, anyone who seems to lack it is called inhuman, and "humanity" is often used as a synonym for compassion.

In its first degree, then, this genuine and natural ethical spring of action operates merely *negatively*. We are all originally prone to injustice and violence, because our need, our greed, our anger and hatred, step immediately into consciousness and therefore have the *jus primi occupantis*;[1] whereas the suffering caused to others by our injustice and violence can come into consciousness only in a secondary way, viz. by a *presentment* through experience, *i.e. mediately*. Hence Seneca says: "Ad neminem ante bona mens venit, quam mala"[2] (Ep. 50). The first operation, then, of compassion is to prevent the suffering which the anti-moral powers dwelling in me would lead me to inflict upon others: it calls out "Stop!"—and spreads itself as a shield before my fellow-man, preserving him from the injury which otherwise my egoism or malice would drive me to do him. Thus from the first degree of compassion springs the maxim "*neminem læde*,"[3] *i.e.* the fundamental principle of *Justice*, which virtue has here alone and nowhere else its genuine, purely moral, unsullied origin, for, if taken from any other source, it must of necessity be tainted with egoism. Compassion will, if my heart be susceptible to this degree of it, always restrain me, whensoever and wheresoever I am tempted to attain my

[1] Right of the first occupant; right of prior occupation.
[2] Bad sentiments first; good after. [3] Injure no one.

ends by causing suffering to others, whether directly and at the moment, or indirectly and through a chain of intermediate links. I shall then no more attack the property than the person of my neighbour; shall as little cause him mental as bodily suffering; thus shall not only restrain myself from doing him physical injury but also from wounding him mentally by vexing and disquieting him, provoking or traducing him. And yet it is by no means requisite that compassion should be actually excited in each particular case, where it might often come too late; but from the knowledge, once for all acquired, of the suffering necessarily entailed upon others by every unjust action—suffering which is vividly brought home to us when the superior power of another makes us feel it in our own person—in every noble heart there will be engraven the maxim "*neminem læde*," and rational reflection will lead the possessor of such a heart to the firm determination to respect the rights of all other men, to permit himself no encroachment upon them, to keep himself free from the self-reproach of being the cause of suffering to others; thus he will not, by force or fraud, shift to their shoulders those burdens and sufferings of life which circumstances bring to every one, but will himself bear his allotted portion, so as not to double that of his neighbour. For although *principles* and abstract knowledge in general are by no means the ultimate source and basis of morality, yet they are indispensable to the leading of a moral life, as the cistern, the reservoir, in which is kept the disposition of mind derived from the feeding spring of all morality—a spring that is not always flowing—so that, when required, a sufficient supply may be drawn thence by conduits. In the moral world it is, therefore, as in the physiological, where, for instance, the gall-bladder, the reservoir of the hepatic secretions, is necessary—to cite but one case.

Without firmly-established principles we should inevitably fall victims to the anti-moral springs of action, when these are raised to passions by external influences. The firm holding to and following of principles, notwithstanding the motives opposed to them, is *self-control*. And here we see why it is that women, who on account of the weakness of their reason are much less capable than men of comprehending, maintaining, and following general *principles*, are for the most part inferior to men in the virtue of justice, and consequently of honesty and conscientiousness. Hence injustice and falseness are their commonest vices, and lying is their proper element; while *per contra* they surpass men in the virtue of *charity*, for the incentive thereto is commonly *perceptual* and so appeals immediately to compassion, to which women are decidedly more susceptible than men. But only the perceptual, present, and immediately real truly exists for them, and they can only dimly apprehend the distant, absent, past, and future, which are discernible only by means of concepts. So here, too, there is compensation: justice is the man's—charity, the woman's virtue. To think of a woman discharging the office of a judge, is ludicrous; but sisters of mercy are superior even to hospitalers. Now the *animal*, having no abstract or rational knowledge at all, and being capable of no premeditation (*Vorsätze*), let alone principles (*Grundsätze*), and therefore of no *self-control*, is helplessly given over to impressions and passions. And so it has no conscious *morality*, although marked differences of goodness and badness of character are shown by species, and in the higher races even by individuals. From all this it follows that in the individual actions of a just man compassion has only an indirect influence, viz. by means of principles, and is present not so much *actu*[1] as *potentiâ*;[2]

[1] Actually. [2] Potentially.

much as in Statics the greater *velocity* of the longer arm of a steelyard, in virtue of which the lesser mass counterbalances the greater, is only there *potentiâ* in a state of rest, and yet operates just as effectively as it does *actu*. For all that, however, compassion is always ready to emerge *actu* also: hence, if in any particular case the maxim of justice we happen to have selected wavers, no motive—egoistic motives being supposed away—can more effectually give it support and quicken just resolutions, than that derived from the original fountain-head itself, Compassion. And this holds good, not only where injury to the person is concerned, but also where it is a question of property: as, for instance, where some one feels an inclination to keep some valuable article he has picked up. In such a case—setting aside all motives of worldly wisdom and religion—nothing is so well calculated to bring him back to the path of justice, as the mental representation of the anxiety, grief, and lamentation of the loser. It is the feeling of this truth, that so often makes the advertiser of lost money add, that the loser is a poor man, a servant, &c.

These considerations will, I hope, make it clear that, little as it might appear to be so at first sight, justice, as a genuine and disinterested virtue, has its origin in compassion. Let those to whom this seems too poor a soil for this supreme cardinal-virtue to root in, recall from the preceding pages how slender a measure of genuine, voluntary, disinterested, and unvarnished justice we find among men; how this pure kind is met with only as a surprising exception, bearing the same proportion, both in quality and quantity, to that spurious and widely-advertised sort that depends upon mere worldly wisdom, that gold bears to copper. I should like to call the latter δικαιοσυνη πανδημος,[1]—the former δικαιοσυνη

[1] Earthly justice.

οὐρανια ;[1] for it is this kind that, according to Hesiod, leaves the earth in the age of iron, to dwell with the Gods in heaven. For this rare and on earth purely exotic plant, the root indicated above is strong enough.

Injustice or *wrong* consists, therefore, always in the *harming* of others. Hence the concept of Wrong is *positive*, and precedes that of Right, which is *negative* and merely denotes actions which may be done without harming others, *i.e.* without doing wrong. It is easy to see that to this category belong also all actions whose aim and object it is to ward off attempted wrong. For no sympathy with another, no compassion for him, can require me to allow myself to be harmed by him, *i.e.* to suffer wrong. That the concept "right" is *negative*, as contra-distinguished from the *positive* concept "wrong," may be seen from the first definition given of it by Hugo Grotius, the father of philosophical jurisprudence, at the beginning of his *De jure belli et pacis*, I. 1. § 3: "Jus hic nihil aliud, quam quod justum est significat, idque negante magis sensu, quam ajente, ut jus sit, quod injustum non est."[2] The negativity of justice is proved, appearances notwithstanding, even from the ordinary definition, "To give every one his own." But if it is his own, we need not give it to him: so this can only mean, "To take his own from no one."

As the requirement of justice is merely negative, it may be enforced, for the "*neminem læde*" may be practised by all together. The institution which compels the observance of this injunction is *the State*, whose sole aim is to protect each from all, and the whole community from foreign enemies. Some German philosophasters of this mercenary age have sought to

[1] Heavenly justice.
[2] *Jus* (right) here merely signifies what is just, and that rather in a negative than a positive sense; so that *jus* is that which is not unjust.

turn it into an institution of education in morality and of edification. Behind this attempt lurks the jesuitical aim of abolishing personal freedom and individual development, in order to make each man a mere wheel in a Chinese governmental and religious machine. But this is the way which formerly led to Inquisitions, *autos da fe*, and religious wars. Frederick the Great would not pursue it, as evidenced by his saying: "In my dominions every man shall go to heaven his own way." Now, however, we see the State everywhere—America is an apparent rather than a real exception—undertaking the care of the metaphysical needs of its members. Governments seem to have adopted as their principle the motto of Quintus Curtius: "Nulla res efficacius multitudinem regit, quam superstitio: alioquin impotens, sæva, mutabilis; ubi vana religione capta est, melius vatibus, quam ducibus suis paret."[1]

The concepts "Wrong" and "Right," being equivalent to harming and not harming, to which latter belongs also the warding off of harm, are clearly independent of and antecedent to all positive legislation. Thus there is a purely ethical right, or right of Nature, and a pure—*i.e.* independent of all positive ordinances—theory-of-right, whose principles have indeed so far an empirical origin, that they arise from the concept "harming," yet in themselves they depend upon the pure understanding, which supplies us with the *a priori* principle, *Causa causæ est causa effectûs*.[2] Applied to the present case, this means that what I am obliged to do in self-defence is occasioned by the man who would do me a harm, and not by me: therefore I may withstand

[1] Nothing more effectively controls the multitude than superstition. Without this it is ungovernable, cruel, fickle; but when caught in the delusions of religion, it obeys the priests better than its leaders.

[2] The cause of the cause is the cause of the effect.

all encroachments from his side, and yet do him no wrong. We here have, as it were, a moral law of repercussion. Thus from a combination of the empirical concept "harming" with this rule supplied by the pure understanding arise the fundamental concepts of wrong and right, which every one apprehends *a priori* and forthwith applies when experience affords him the occasion. If any empiricist denies this, we may point —as he takes his stand upon experience alone—to savages, who all distinguish perfectly, and often very nicely and exactly, between wrong and right, as is evident from their transactions, in the way of barter and otherwise, with European seamen, and from their visits to their ships. They are bold and confident when in the right; diffident and nervous, when in the wrong. In disputes they submit to an equitable arrangement, while injustice provokes them to fight. The *theory of right* is that part of Ethics which prescribes the actions that must not be done if we want to avoid harming others, *i.e.* doing wrong. Ethics has here the *active* party in view. But legislation takes this chapter of Ethics and applies it on the contrary to the *passive* party—contemplating these same actions as those that no one, since no wrong should be done to him, need suffer. Against such actions the State erects the bulwark of the laws, as positive right. Its intention is, that no one shall *suffer* wrong; whereas the moral law wants to prevent the *doing* of wrong.[1]

In every unjust action the wrong is *qualitatively* the same, viz. the harming of another, whether in his person, his freedom, his property, or his honour.

Quantitatively, however, it may be very different.

[1] For a detailed account of the theory of right, see *W. as W. and P.*, § 62.—Au.

Moralists do not seem to have taken sufficient account of this diversity of the *amount of wrong*, although in actual life it is everywhere recognised, the amount of censure incurred being proportional to it. So, too, with the *justice* of actions. As illustrations, take the following: A starving man who steals a loaf, does wrong; but how slight is his injustice, as compared with that done by a rich man who in some way or other deprives a poor one of his last penny! Again, the rich man who pays his day-labourers, acts justly; but how small is this justice, as compared with the voluntary restitution to him of a purse of gold by a poor man! The measure of this important difference in the *quantity* of justice and injustice —the quality being the same—is, however, not direct and absolute, like that of a carpenter's rule; but mediate and relative, like that of sine and tangent. Here is my formula: The amount of injustice in my action is equal to the amount of wrong I inflict, divided by the amount of advantage thereby accruing to me; and the amount of justice in my action is equal to the amount of advantage that the harming of another might bring me, divided by the amount of damage that he would suffer thereby. But there is, besides, a *double injustice*, specifically different from any single unjust action, however great, as is evident from the indignation it excites in impartial witnesses—which indignation is always proportional to the amount of injustice, and reaches the highest degree only in this double kind, which it abhors as something revolting and atrocious—a crime, an ἀγος (abomination), at which the Gods veil their faces as it were. This *double injustice* takes place when any one, having expressly undertaken to safeguard the interests of another, so that the non-fulfilment of this undertaking would of itself harm the other and therefore be wrong, not only neglects the duty

he has engaged to perform, but actually attacks and harms him in the very point where he ought to have defended him. This happens, for instance, where the appointed protector and guide murders his charge, the trusted watchman turns thief, the guardian despoils his ward of her property, the advocate prevaricates, the judge allows himself to be bribed, the counsellor purposely gives pernicious advice; all of which may be grouped under the concept "treachery," a thing hated of all men. Accordingly Dante puts traitors in the lowest depths of hell, the abode of Satan himself (*Inf.*, xxxiv. 61–67).

This mention of *obligations undertaken* reminds me that this is the place to establish the concept "duty," which is so commonly spoken of both in Ethics and ordinary life, but to which too wide an extension has been given. We have seen that Wrong consists always in the harming of another, whether in his person, freedom, property, or honour. Hence it seems to follow that every wrong must be a positive aggression, a deed. But there are actions, the mere *omission* of which is a wrong: such actions are called "duties." This is the really philosophical definition of the concept "duty," which altogether loses its distinctive individuality when applied, as in all previous ethical systems, to every praiseworthy mode of action—those who so apply it forgetting that "duty" is tantamount to *that which is owing*. Duty, *το δεον*, *Pflicht*, *le devoir*, *is thus an action*, *the mere pretermission of which harms another*, *i.e. is wrong*—the wrong clearly consisting in this, that the man who neglects to do this action has *pledged* himself to perform it. Duties, therefore, all depend upon a previous undertaking to perform them. This undertaking is, as a rule, an express mutual contract—such, for example, as that between prince and people, Government and officials,

master and servant, advocate and client, physician and patient—in a word, between the man who has undertaken to do something, and his employer in the widest sense of the word. Hence every duty confers a right; because no one can undertake it without a motive, which in this case is some advantage to himself. There is, so far as I am aware, but *one* obligation which is *not* undertaken under a contract, but arises immediately from a simple action, since the person to whom it is owed was not there when it was undertaken; and that is, the duty of parents to their children. It is the *bounden duty* of every one who brings a child into the world, to support it until it is capable of supporting itself; and should this time—as in the case of a blind child, a cripple, a crétin, &c.—*never* come, his duty never ceases. For through merely withholding help, and thus by an act of omission, he would harm his child and even cause it to perish. The moral duty of parents, on the other hand, is not so immediate and decided. It consists in this: that, as every duty confers a right, parents must have a right in regard to their children. This right imposes upon the children the duty of obedience—a duty which ceases with the cessation of the right from which it arose. In its place there will then arise gratitude for that which the parents have done for them over and above the strict measure of their duty. Hateful, however, and often revolting as is the vice of ingratitude, gratitude is not on this account to be called a *duty*, because its omission does not harm another, and is therefore no *wrong*. Otherwise we must suppose the benefactor to have intended secretly to make a good bargain for himself. Reparation for damage done might be viewed by some as an obligation immediately arising from a harmful action. Yet such reparation, as that which abolishes the consequences of an unjust

action and merely endeavours to extinguish it, is something purely negative and depends upon the fact that the action itself ought to have been left undone. Let me add that equity is the foe of justice, which it often rudely attacks: we should therefore not concede too much to it. The German loves equity; the Englishman holds to justice.

The law of motivation is just as strict as that of physical causality, and brings with it a compulsion no less irresistible. Accordingly it opens two paths to the perpetration of wrong—that of *force* and that of *trickery*. As by force I can kill or rob another, or compel his obedience; so can I also do any of these things by trickery, by suggesting to his understanding false motives, in consequence of which he has to do what otherwise he would not have done. This is effected by *lying*, whose whole wrongness consists in its being made the tool of deception, *i.e.* of compulsion through motivation. But this is its usual employment. For in the first place, I do not lie without a motive; but, except in very rare cases, this motive is an unjust one, viz. the intention to lead others, over whom I have no control, to obey my Will—in other words, to compel them to act by means of motivation. This intention is at the base of even those lies that are told out of mere bragging—the object here being the attempt to stand higher in the esteem of others, than circumstances warrant.

The obligatoriness of the *fulfilment of contract* depends upon this: That, if unfulfilled, it is a lie of the most solemn kind, whose intention—that of exercising moral compulsion over others—is all the more evident here, because the motive of the lie, the demand that the other party to the bargain shall fulfil his part of the contract, is expressly proclaimed. What is so despicable in such trickery is, that before attacking his man the offender

disarms him by double dealing. It reaches its highest pitch in *treachery*, a thing so deeply abhorred because it comes under the category of *double injustice*. But as without doing wrong, *i.e.* quite rightly, I may repel force by force; so may I also repel it, where my strength is insufficient, or where it seems to me more convenient, by trickery. Therefore in cases where I have the right to use force, I have also the right *to tell lies;* for example, against robbers and all others who make unjustifiable use of their power. Such people may legitimately be led into a trap; and for the same reason promises made under compulsion are not binding.

But the *right to lie* goes, in point of fact, still further, and may be exercised whenever an improper question is asked; such a question, for instance, as would pry too curiously into my private or my business affairs, and the true answer to which—or even the avoidance of an answer by saying "I cannot tell you," whereby suspicion would be aroused—would turn to my prejudice. A lie is here the legitimate protection against unauthorised curiosity, whose motive is little likely to be a benevolent one. For, as I have the right to oppose physical force to the presumed evil Will of others and to their physical force, even though this may involve danger to them; as I am entitled to take precautionary measures—to top my garden wall with spikes, to let a savage dog loose in my yard at night, and even to set man-traps and spring-guns, for the evil consequences of which the aggressor has no one but himself to thank; so have I also the right to withhold knowledge which would expose me to the attacks of others, when I have reason, as is too often the case, to suspect that their intentions are bad, and thus am forced to guard myself against them by preventive measures. Hence Ariosto (*Orl. Fur.*, iv. 1) says:

Quantunque il simular sia le più volte
Ripreso, e dia di mala mente indici,
Si trova pure in molte cose e molte
Avere fatti evidenti benefici,
E danni e biasmi e morti avere tolte:
Che non conversiam' sempre con gli amici,
In questa assai più oscura che serena
Vita mortal, tutta d'invidia piena.[1]

I am justified, then, in having recourse to trickery myself when I suspect trickery in others, and to the man who wants to pry unwarrantably into my private affairs I need not reply, "That is my secret," thereby showing him my weak place, where he may perhaps attack me to his own advantage, or at any rate gain power over me:

Scire volunt secreta domûs, atque inde timeri.[2]

No: I am entitled to put him off with a lie, even if this should turn to his own prejudice. For here a lie is the only means I have of meeting his suspicious curiosity, and it is a legitimate defence. "Ask me no questions, and I'll tell you no lies," is here the right maxim; and among Englishmen, to whom nothing is so offensive as to be called liars, and who for this very reason are more truthful than the inhabitants of other countries, all impertinent personal questions are regarded as improper, as is indicated by the expression "Ask no questions." Every sensible person, even the man of strictest probity, will act on the above principle. For instance, suppose he is coming back from some remote

[1] Dissimulation, though 'tis often blamed,
As index of a mind that's sick, has yet
Proved beneficial in a host of cases,
Where blame, loss, death have been averted:
For not always with friends do we hold converse
In this our life, where envy reigns supreme,
And darkness is the rule rather than light.

[2] They want to know the secrets of the house, in order to be feared.

place with his pockets full of money, and he is joined by a stranger, who, after asking him, as is usual, first where he is *going*, then where he *has come from*, proceeds to inquire what took him to that place, he will certainly tell him a lie to avoid being robbed. Again, when discovered in the house of a man to whose daughter he is paying his addresses, and asked what brings him there, he will unhesitatingly tell a falsehood unless he has taken leave of his senses. And there are many more cases, in which any sensible man will tell lies without the slightest scruple of conscience. Only on this view is it possible to remove the glaring discrepancy between Ethics as taught, and as practised daily even by persons of unimpeachable honesty. But recourse to lying is admissible as a defence only; otherwise this doctrine would lend itself to terrible abuse, for a lie is in itself a very dangerous instrument. But as, even in time of peace, the law allows every man to carry weapons and to use them in self-defence; so also for self-defence, but for no *other* purpose, does Ethics permit lying. Apart, however, from its employment in this way against force or treachery, every lie is wrong; and this is why justice demands habitual truthfulness. But lying is not in itself always and invariably reprehensible. For there are occasions on which it is even a *duty*—notably in the case of physicians. Then, too, there are such things as *noble* lies, such as that of Marquis Posa in *Don Carlos*, that of the *Gerusalemme Liberata*, ii. 22—in short, wherever one man is trying to take upon his shoulders the fault of another. Finally, even Jesus Christ once purposely told an untruth (John vii. 8[1]). Accordingly, in his *Poesie filosofiche* (Madr. 9) Campanella says right out: "Bello è il mentir, se a far gran ben' si trova."[2] On the

[1] The "yet" is not in the best MSS.—Tr.
[2] Lying is grand, when used for splendid ends.

other hand, the current doctrine of the white lie is a miserable patch on the robe of poverty-stricken Ethics.

Following in Kant's footsteps, many compendiums derive the wrongness of lying from man's faculty of speech; but the arguments employed are so feeble, puerile, and absurd, that one feels inclined, out of sheer contempt for them, to fling oneself into the arms of the devil and say with Talleyrand: "l'homme a reçu la parole pour pouvoir cacher sa pensée." Kant's paraded, reiterated, unconditional, and boundless detestation of lying is due either to affectation or prejudice. In the chapter on lying in his *Tugendlehre*, though he applies to it every abusive predicate he can think of, he does not show us wherein its reprehensibility consists; and yet this would have been more to the purpose. It is easier to declaim than to prove; to moralise, than to be sincere.

Kant would have been better advised to pour out the vials of his wrath upon *Schadenfreude*: this, and not lying, is the really diabolical vice. For it is the direct antipode to sympathy, and is nothing but impotent cruelty, which, unable itself to bring upon others the suffering it so gladly beholds, thanks Chance for acting in its stead. That, according to the principle of chivalric honour, the reproach of a lie is so dreadful a thing that it can only be wiped out by the blood of the accuser, does not depend upon the wrongness of lying; for were this so, the accusation of a wrong done by force would be just as wounding—and this, as we all know, is not the case. No: it depends on this, that according to the principle of chivalric honour might makes right; he, therefore, who commits an unjust act by help of a lie, shows that he is deficient either in might or in the courage necessary to apply it. Every lie is thus a sign of fear: hence its condemnation.

THE VIRTUE OF CHARITY

[*B. of E.* § 18.]

Justice, then, is the first and most essential of the cardinal virtues. As such it was recognised by the philosophers of antiquity, who, however, somewhat incongruously placed alongside of it three other virtues. On the other hand, they had not yet made a virtue of charity, *caritas*, ἀγαπη; even Plato, with his high standard of morals, does not go beyond voluntary, unselfish justice. Practically and as a matter of fact, however, charity has always existed; but its formal enunciation as a virtue, and that the greatest of all, and the extension of it even to our enemies, was reserved for Christianity, whose greatest merit consists in this, although only in respect of Europe. For in Asia, some ten centuries earlier, boundless love of one's neighbour was both preached and practised, as witness the repeated mention of it in the Veda and Dharmashastra, the Itihasa and Purana, and the teaching of the Buddha Sakya-Muni. Strictly speaking, we may also find traces of the recommendation of charity among the ancients; for instance in Cicero (*De fin.*, v. 23), and even in Pythagoras, if we may trust Iamblichus (*De vita Pythagoræ*, c. 33). I have now to give the philosophical deduction of this virtue from my principle.

The second degree in which, through the phenomenon of Compassion (as to the real existence of which, despite its mysterious origin, we have seen that there can be no doubt), the suffering of others, in itself and as such, immediately becomes my motive, is clearly distinguished from the first by the *positive character* of the actions proceeding therefrom; for compassion now no longer

merely restrains me from harming another, but even incites me to help him. Now according as on the one hand this immediate sympathy is vividly and deeply felt, while on the other my neighbour's distress is great and pressing, this purely moral motive will lead me to make a greater or smaller sacrifice for him, which will take the shape of expenditure of my bodily or mental powers, of my property, health, freedom—of my life even. Here, then, in immediate sympathy, founded upon no long chain of arguments, and requiring none, lies the only pure fountain-head of charity, *caritas*, ἀγαπη—the virtue whose maxim is *Omnes, quantum potes, juva*,[1] and from which flow all the obligations prescribed by Ethics under the names "moral duties," "duties of love," "imperfect duties." "This quite immediate and indeed instinctive participation in the suffering of others, Compassion as it is called, is the sole source of such actions as *possess moral worth, i.e.* as are free from all admixture of egoistic motives, for which very reason they awake in us that inward contentment known as a good, quiet, and approving conscience, while in the spectator they are wont to call forth peculiar approbation, respect, and admiration, though it is undeniable that they make us think very modestly of ourselves. If, however, a beneficial action has any other motive, this must be an egoistic, if not a malicious one. For, corresponding to the above-mentioned original springs of all actions, viz. Egoism, Malice, Compassion, there are three great general classes under which may be ranged all *motives* whatsoever that can influence men: (1) our own weal; (2) the woe of others; (3) the weal of others. Now, if the motive that prompted a beneficial action is not of the *third* class, it must of necessity belong either to the *first*

[1] Help all men as far as you can.

or the *second*. Not infrequently it does belong to the *second: e.g.* when I do something for one man in order to vex another for whom I do nothing, or to make him more sensible of his suffering; or in order to shame a third person who did nothing for the man I am helping; or in order to humiliate the man on whom I am conferring the benefit. But it will far oftener belong to the *first* class; as, for instance, where, in doing a good deed, I have an eye, in no matter how remote and roundabout a way, to *my own weal;* whether it be a reward in this or another world; or the esteem it may bring me, and the reputation of a noble heart; or the conviction that the man I am helping to-day will help me to-morrow, or render me some other aid or service; or the thought that maxims of magnanimity and beneficence ought to be upheld, since they may turn to my profit some day; in a word, wherever my aim is any other than the purely *objective* one of wishing to know that my neighbour is helped, extricated from his distress and embarrassment, and freed from his suffering. This, and this alone, should be my wish. Only then, only thus, do I really show that Charity, *caritas*, ἀγαπη, the preaching of which is the great and distinctive merit of Christianity. Clearly those precepts which the Gospel adds to its injunction of charity—such as "Let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth," and the like—are founded upon the feeling which I have here deduced, viz. that, if my action is to have moral worth, my sole motive must be my neighbour's distress and nothing else whatsoever. Quite rightly is it there (Matt. vi. 2) said, that ostentatious givers have their reward—in their ostentation itself. But here also the Vedas strike, as usual, an even deeper note, for they repeatedly assure us that he who desires any reward for his works is still treading the path of darkness and is not yet ripe for

salvation. If an almsgiver should ask me what he will get for his action, I could conscientiously reply: "The relief afforded to that poor fellow, and beyond that absolutely nothing. If that does not serve your purpose, if that is nothing to you, then you did not really bestow an alms, but meant to make a good bargain for yourself —and you have been cheated out of your money. But if your heart is set upon giving a little relief to this poor sufferer, then you have gained your object, for you know that your gift is its own recompense."

But how is it possible for suffering that is not *mine*, and does not actually concern *me*, to become nevertheless, as immediately as my own formerly did, a motive stirring me to action? Merely (as I said) because, although given to me only as something outside myself by means of outward perceivance or information, I yet *sympathise* with it, *feel* it as *mine*, and yet not *in me* but *in another;* and thus it comes about, as Calderon has it, that suffering seen is tantamount to suffering felt:

> que entre el ver
> Padecer y el padecer
> Ninguna distancia habia.
> (*No siempre el peor es cierto*, Jorn. ii. p. 229.)

But this presupposes that I have in some sense identified myself with my suffering neighbour, and have thus for the moment broken down the barrier between Ego and Non-ego. Then, and not till then, do his concerns, his need, distress, and suffering, become immediately my own: I then no longer regard him in the light in which empirical perceivance places him, as a stranger, a man indifferent to and altogether distinct from me, but I suffer *with and in him*, although his skin does not enclose my nerves. Only in this way can *his* woe, *his* distress, become a motive *for me;* failing this, I can be stirred to action only by my own. This

phenomenon is, I repeat, *mysterious:* Reason has no immediate account to give of it, and its grounds are not ascertainable from experience. And yet we see it every day. No man but has often experienced it in himself, and even to the most selfish and hard-hearted it is not unfamiliar. We see it daily in individual cases and upon a small scale, wherever from immediate impulse and almost unreflectingly a man hastens to the assistance of another —aye, sometimes risks his life for a perfect stranger, his only thought being that here is one in evident and urgent distress and danger. And on a large scale we see it when, after long consideration and heated debates, the noble-hearted British nation devotes twenty millions sterling to the freeing of the negro slaves in its colonies, while the rest of the world looks on applauding. If any one should be minded to deny that compassion was the spring of this magnificent action; if he thinks it should be attributed to Christianity; let him remember that in the whole of the New Testament there is not one word against slavery, universal as it then was—while in America, even in 1860, a speaker in the slavery debates appealed to the fact that Abraham and Jacob owned slaves.

Ethics may write sections and chapters on duties of virtue, duties of love, imperfect duties, or whatever it likes to call them, in explanation of the practical results of this mysterious inward phenomenon in each particular case; but the root, the basis of them all, is that which I have pointed out—Compassion—whence springs the maxim "*Omnes, quantum potes, juva.*" From this all can be as easily deduced, as can the duties of Justice from the "*Neminem læde*" of the first half of my principle. Ethics is in truth the easiest of all sciences, as might be expected, seeing that every one has himself to construct it, and, from the supreme principle that lies

deep down in his heart, to deduce the rule for every case that occurs; for few have the time and patience to learn a ready-made system of ethics. From Justice and Charity flow all the other virtues. These two are therefore the cardinal virtues, and if they are rightly deduced, the corner-stone of Ethics is laid. The whole ethical content of the Old Testament is Justice; that of the New, Charity. This is the "new commandment" (John xiii. 34), in which according to St. Paul (Rom. xiii. 8–10) all the Christian virtues are contained.

CONFIRMATIONS OF THE BASIS OF ETHICS HERE SET FORTH

[*B. of E.* § 19.]

The truth here proclaimed, that Compassion, as the only non-egoistic, is also the sole genuinely moral spring of action, is strangely and indeed almost incomprehensibly paradoxical. I shall therefore endeavour to wean the reader from convictions that may make it difficult of acceptance, by showing that it is supported by experience and by the testimony of human sentiment in the gross.

1. To this end I shall first take as an example a purely fictitious case, which may serve in this investigation as an *experimentum crucis*.[1] I will not make my task too easy by choosing a case of charity, but will take one in which right has been violated, and that in the most grievous way. Imagine, then, that two young men, Jack and Tom, are both passionately in love with two girls, and that each of them has been thrown over

[1] Crucial experiment.

for a rival, who is preferred on account of the external advantages he possesses. Each is determined to put his rival out of the way, and each is absolutely secured from discovery or even suspicion. They are on the point of carrying out their murderous designs, when, after an inward struggle, they think better of it. They shall now tell us sincerely and plainly what made them forgo their resolution. Jack shall give whatever reasons the reader pleases. These may be religious, *e.g.* he was deterred by the Will of God, future retribution, the judgment to come. Or he may say [with Kant]: "I bethought myself that the maxim of my conduct in this case would not be calculated to serve as a universally valid rule for all possible rational beings, since I should have been treating my rival as means only and not at the same time as end." Or he may say with Fichte: "Every human life is a means to the realisation of the moral law; therefore I cannot, without showing myself indifferent to the realisation of the moral law, take the life of a man who is destined to contribute thereto" (*Sittenlehre*, p. 373)—although, be it remarked in passing, this scruple might be got over by the thought of the hopes he had, when once in possession of his beloved, of straightway producing a new instrument of the moral law. Or he may say with Wollaston: "I considered that this act would be the expression of an untrue proposition." Or, with Hutcheson: "The moral sense, whose sensations, like those of every other sense, are not further explicable, made me refrain." Or, with Adam Smith: "I foresaw that such an action would most certainly not have gained me the sympathy of those who witnessed it." Or, with Christian Wolf: "I knew that by so doing I should neither be working towards my own perfectioning, nor helping forward that of another." Or, with Spinoza: "Homini nihil utilius

homine: ergo hominem interimere nolui."[1] In short, let him argue as the reader will. But Tom, who will give expression to my way of looking at the matter, will say: "When I came to the final preparations, and had to do for the moment not with my own passion but with my rival, I then realised for the first time what was going to happen to him; I was seized with compassion and pity; I felt sorry for him and could not find it in my heart to take his life—and so I could not do the deed." Now I ask any honest and impartial reader: Which of the two is the better man? To which would he prefer to entrust his own destiny? Which of them was restrained by the purer motive? Where, then, does the basis of Ethics lie?

2. Nothing is so utterly revolting to our moral sense as cruelty. Other crimes we can pardon; this, never. The reason is, that cruelty is the very opposite of compassion. When we hear of any very cruel deed, such for instance as that lately recorded in the papers, of a mother who killed her five-year-old boy by pouring boiling oil down his throat, and then buried a younger child alive; or the case reported only the other day from Algiers, where, after a chance dispute and fight between a Spaniard and an Algerian, the latter, who proved the stronger, tore the other's lower jaw clean off and carried it before him as a trophy, leaving the man still alive; we are seized with horror and exclaim, "How is such a thing possible?" Now what does this question mean? Does it mean, How is it possible that the fear of punishment in a future life should be so slight?—Hardly. Or: How is it possible to act according to a maxim which is so evidently not calculated to become a universal

[1] Nothing is more useful to man than man: therefore I would not slay man.

law for all rational beings?—Certainly not. Or: How is it possible so completely to neglect the perfecting of ourselves or others?—Not this either. The meaning of the question is simply this: How is it possible to be so entirely without compassion?—Thus it is the utter lack of compassion that impresses on a deed the stamp of the deepest moral turpitude and enormity. Consequently compassion is the real moral spring of action.

3. In short, nothing save that which I have pointed out as the basis of ethics and mainspring of morality can be credited with real and far-reaching efficacy. Efficacy can hardly be asserted of the other moral principles set up by philosophers; for these consist of abstract and often over-subtle propositions, having for all foundation nothing but an artificial combination of concepts, so that we can hardly help smiling at the notion of applying them in actual life. A good deed done merely out of regard to the Kantian moral principle would in point of fact savour of philosophical pedantry; or it would amount to self-deception, seeing that the mind of the doer would explain a deed which perhaps had a nobler origin, as a product of the categorical imperative and of the unfounded concept of duty. But not only are *philosophical* moral principles, which are professedly simply theoretical, often demonstrably ineffective; but even *religious* moral principles, with their purely practical aim, are equally so—as may be seen in the first place from this, that, notwithstanding the great diversity of the world's religions, the degree of morality, or rather immorality, does not appreciably differ in different quarters of the globe, but is approximately everywhere the same. Only, we must not confuse refinement and coarseness with morality and immorality. The religion of the Greeks had next to no moral tendency, being practically restricted to the enforcement of oaths:

no dogma was taught, no ethics publicly preached; yet we do not find that, taken as a whole, the Greeks were less moral than the men and women of the Christian era. The ethics of Christianity is of a far higher kind than that of any other religion that has ever found a footing in Europe; and yet to think that European morality has proportionately improved, or at least that it is now better than that of other countries, is a delusion. Not only would it be easy to convince those who labour under it, that among Mohammedans, Parsees, Hindus, and Buddhists there is at least as much honesty, fidelity, tolerance, tender-heartedness, benevolence, magnanimity, and self-denial to be found, as among Christians: but, when we consider the long list of inhuman cruelties that have accompanied Christianity, the numerous religious wars; the inexcusable crusades; the extermination of the major part of the aboriginals of America, and the peopling of this quarter of the globe with negro slaves, forcibly torn, without right or the shadow of a right, from their families, their country, their native Africa, and condemned to perpetual hard-labour; the untiring persecution of heretics and the unspeakably abominable doings of the Inquisition; the massacre of St. Bartholomew; the execution by the Duke of Alva of eighteen thousand Netherlanders, &c., &c., the scale will hardly incline in favour of Christianity. In short, when with the excellent morality preached by Christianity and more or less by all religions, we compare the practice of those who profess them, and represent to ourselves what the state of things would be if the secular arm of the State did not prevent crime, and what we might only too surely expect if all laws were abolished for even a single day—we cannot but acknowledge that the influence of all religions upon morality is virtually *nil*. Weakness of faith is no doubt to blame for this.

Theoretically, and so long as it remains a matter of pious speculation, every one imagines his faith to be strong. But works are the stern touchstone of all our convictions: when it comes to these, and faith has to be tested by great renunciations and heavy sacrifices, then we see its weakness. The man who seriously meditates a crime has already broken through the barriers set up by pure genuine morality, and is now only to be restrained in the first instance by the thought of the law and the police. Should the hope of evading these lead him to pay no attention to them, the second barrier that stands in his way is regard for his honour. If this too goes down, it is ten to one, now that he has surmounted these two formidable obstacles, against any religious dogma having strength enough to prevent his committing the crime. For the man who is not deterred by near and certain dangers will hardly be kept in check by remote perils depending upon faith alone. Besides to any good action performed simply and solely from religious convictions it may be objected that it is not disinterested, but is done with an eye to reward and punishment, and so possesses no moral worth. This truth is strongly expressed in a letter of the famous duke Karl August of Weimar, in which he says: "Baron Weyhers gave it as his opinion, that a man who was good from religion and not by nature was a great rascal. *In vino veritas*[1]" (*Briefe an J. H. Merck*, Br. 229).

But look now at my moral spring of action. No one, I think, will venture to deny for a moment, that in all ages, among all nations, in all situations of life, even in times of anarchy and amid the horrors of revolutions and wars, on a large scale as well as on a small, every day and every hour, it does manifest a decisive

[1] When a man is in his cups, the truth will out.

and truly wonderful influence, does daily prevent much injustice, does bring forth many good deeds without hope of reward and often quite unexpectedly—and that where it and it alone has been the operant motive, we all admit without reserve, and with hearts full of emotion and esteem, that this is veritably a deed possessing genuine moral worth.

4. Boundless compassion for all living beings is the surest and safest warrant for good moral behaviour, and needs no casuistry to recommend it. The man whose heart is full of it may be trusted to harm no one, wrong no one, grieve no one. On the contrary, he will show indulgence to every one, forgive every one, help every one to the best of his ability, and all his actions will bear the impress of justice and charity. But should it be said: "This man is virtuous and yet knows not compassion," or, "He is an unjust and malicious man, but compassionate withal," the contradiction becomes palpable. Tastes differ, but to mine the most beautiful prayer—answering to the old-fashioned prayer for the king at the end of an English play—is that with which the Indian plays conclude: "May all living things be free from pain."

5. A few special cases will show us that Compassion is the true moral mainspring of action. For instance, to defraud a rich man of twenty pounds by a legal trick to which no punishment attaches, is no less unjust than to do the same to a poor one; and yet, in the eyes of the impartial spectator, the latter is the more heinous offence and will more certainly be condemned by conscience. Hence Aristotle (*Probl.*, xxix. 2) says: "It is a more horrible thing to injure an unfortunate than a fortunate man." On the other hand, the reproaches of conscience will be even fainter than in the first case, when it is the public exchequer that is defrauded; for this can be no

object of compassion. We thus see that it is not immediately the violation of right, but first and foremost the suffering caused by this to another, that brings upon us our own self-reproach and the condemnation of others. Mere violation of right as such, *e.g.* the defrauding of the exchequer as in the above example, will indeed be condemned by conscience and by others, but only in so far as it infringes the maxim which makes a man truly honourable, viz. the maxim "To respect *every* right": thus the disapproval will be indirect and slight. If, however, the public funds in question had been *entrusted* to some one *for safe keeping*, the case is altogether altered; for here comes in that *double injustice* of which I spoke above, with its specific qualities. According to the explanation here given, the worst accusation that can be brought against greedy extortioners and fraudulent lawyers is, that they have applied to their own purposes money wrung from widows and orphans; because the very helplessness of these poor people should have awakened compassion, lack of which convicts a man of extreme wickedness.

6. Charity is more obviously based upon compassion than even Justice. No one can receive proofs of genuine charity from others, so long as things go well with him. A prosperous man may, indeed, have manifold experience of the goodwill of his kinsmen and friends; but the manifestations of that pure, disinterested, objective sympathy with the condition and lot of others which proceed from charity, are reserved for the fellow-creature who is suffering in some way or other. For with the prosperous man *as such* we do not sympathise; *as such* he rather remains a stranger to our heart: *habeat sibi sua.*[1] An unusual degree of prosperity is apt in fact to

[1] Equivalent to "Ah! he is quite well off."

excite envy, and upon his subsequent downfall this envy threatens to turn to *Schadenfreude*—a threat, however, that in most cases remains unfulfilled and stops short of the Sophoclean γελωσι δ'ἐχθροι.[1] For the fall of the prosperous man completely changes the attitude of the onlookers, and effects a revolution which has an important bearing on this discussion. For in the first place he discovers the nature of the interest that bound the friends of his prosperous days to him: "*diffugiunt cadis cum fæce sicca is amici*";[2] while on the other hand that which he feared more than misfortune itself, and the very notion of which was insupportable—viz. the exultation of those who envied his prosperity, the derisive laughter of *Schadenfreude*—does not as a rule follow. Envy is appeased: it disappears along with that which gave rise to it, and charity is begotten of the compassion which takes its place. His quondam enviers and enemies are often transformed by his fall into indulgent, comforting, and helpful friends. There are few, I think, who have not had some small experience of this: when overtaken by misfortune, they have been surprised to find that those who formerly looked upon them with coldness, if not with actual hostility, are now genuinely sympathetic. For misfortune engenders compassion, and compassion is the source of charity.

In like manner nothing so quickly allays anger, even when justly excited, as the suggestion that the man who has aroused it is unfortunate; for as rain to fire, so is compassion to anger. Therefore, to those who would avoid doing what they will one day regret, let me give this piece of advice: When in the heat of your anger you are minded to inflict suffering on another, imagine it already inflicted; see your victim writhing there in

[1] The enemy laughs. [2] When the casks are dry, the friends fly.

the agony of mental or bodily pain, realise his distress and misery, and say to yourselves "This is my doing." If anything can quench your anger, this will. For compassion is the right antidote to anger, and this artifice will make you feel, while there is yet time,

> la pitié, dont la voix,
> Alors qu'on est vengé, fait entendre ses lois.[1]
> (Voltaire: *Sémiramis*, Act v. sc. 6.)

In a word, nothing can so quickly dispel an attitude of animosity towards others, as to regard them from a point of view which makes them claimants to our compassion.

Why do parents, as a rule, love a sickly child best of all? Is it not because it constantly excites compassion?

7. That my moral spring of action is the true one, may be seen, further, from this: that it also takes *animals*, which the other ethical systems of Europe so unpardonably neglect under its protection. The supposition that animals have no rights, the delusion that our conduct towards them has no moral significance, or, as these systems themselves express it, that we have no duties towards animals, is direct evidence of the shocking rudeness and barbarism of the West—the source of which is to be traced to Judaism. In philosophy it depends upon the assumption, against all evidence, of the complete diversity of man and beast—an assumption the harshest expression of which is to be found, as we all know, in Descartes, of whose errors it was the necessary consequence. The Cartesio-Leibnitzo-Wolfian philosophy built rational psychology out of abstract concepts, and constructed an immortal *anima rationalis;* but the natural claims of the animal world stood out

[1] The pity, whose soft voice,
When vengeance has been taken, breathes her laws.

[2] Rational soul.

visibly against the confining of this monopoly and patent-of-immortality to the human race alone, and Nature, as she always does in such cases, entered her quiet protest. This resulted in such a troubling of their intellectual conscience, that the philosophers made an attempt to support rational by empirical psychology, and therefore did their utmost to deepen the gulf between man and animal, and, in despite of all evidence, described them as totally different. These attempts were satirised by Boileau in the lines:

> Les animaux ont-ils des universités?
> Voit-on fleurir chez eux les quatre facultés?[1]

The end of all this was, that animals were supposed incapable of distinguishing themselves from the outer world and were declared to have no self-consciousness, no Ego! To refute such preposterous assertions, we need only point to the boundless egoism that dwells in every animal, even the smallest and meanest: this is clear evidence that they are perfectly conscious of their Ego as contradistinguished from the Non-ego of the surrounding world. Put a Cartesian between the claws of a tiger, and he will soon know the sharp line drawn by this animal between the Ego and the Non-ego! To these sophistications of the philosophers the people added a second set, and we find many languages—notably German—adopting the trick of applying special words to the eating, drinking, pregnancy, parturition, death, and dead body of animals, in order to avoid the use of those which denote the same functions in man, and thus under diversity of words to hide the perfect identity of the thing. Now as this distinction is not found in ancient languages, which quite frankly denote

[1] Have animals their universities, and do they cultivate the four faculties [*i.e.* law, medicine, theology, and philosophy]?

the same things by the same words, we can hardly doubt that this miserable device of dual nomenclature is the work of the European clergy, which, in its profanity, thinks it can never go far enough in the calumnious denial of the eternal essence that dwells in all animals; thereby laying the foundation of that harshness and cruelty towards them which is customary in Europe, but which the dweller in Upper Asia can only contemplate with righteous horror. In English we do not find this unworthy trick; no doubt because the Saxons, when they conquered England, were not yet Christians. It has, however, its analogue in the English custom of making animals of the neuter gender, and calling each of them "it," as though an inanimate thing was being spoken of. In the case of the primates, such as dogs, apes, &c., this is really shocking, and is unmistakably an ecclesiastical device intended to degrade animals to the level of things. The ancient Egyptians, to whom religion was the all in all of life, deposited in the same tombs the mummies of human beings and those of the ibis, crocodile, &c.; but in Europe it is reckoned an abominable offence to bury by the side of his master the faithful dog, who, with a fidelity and attachment unknown to the human race, has perhaps laid himself down to die on that master's grave. Nothing leads so surely to the knowledge of the identity of essence in the phenomenal appearance of animals and men, as an acquaintance with zoology and anatomy. What then are we to say, when in this year of grace 1839 a canting zootomist has the audacity to maintain that there is an absolute and radical difference between men and animals, and goes so far as to attack and calumniate honest zoologists who, holding themselves aloof from priestly influence, eye-service, and Tartuffism, pursue the way of Nature and truth?

We must really be bereft of all our senses, or totally chloroformed by the *fœtor Judaicus*,[1] if we fail to see that the essence of man and animal is the same; and that the distinction between them lies, not in the primary, the principle, the *archæus*, the inner constitution, the kernel of the two appearances, which in the case of both is the *Will* of the individual—but only in the secondary, the intellect, the degree of mental power, which in man, through the added faculty of *abstract* knowledge, called Reason, is incomparably higher, though demonstrably only in consequence of a greater cerebral development, *i.e.* in virtue of the somatic diversity of a single organ, the brain, especially in the matter of quantity. On the other hand, the points in which animals and men agree, both psychically and physically, are far more numerous. Let me remind the occidental judaised despiser of animals and idolater of reason, that as *he* was suckled by *his* mother, so also was the dog by *his*. That even Kant fell into this grievous mistake of his contemporaries and compatriots, I have mentioned above. The ethics of Christianity is open to the same reproach. Its disregard of animals is a shortcoming which it is better to confess than to perpetuate; and it is the more remarkable, because in all other points the Christian ethical system is in the closest accord with that of Brahmanism and Buddhism—only, its expression is less strong and it is not carried to extremes. Hence we can scarcely doubt that it, as likewise the notion of a God-man (avatar), came originally from India to Judæa by way of Egypt; so that Christianity was a reflection of the primitive light of India from the ruins of Egypt—a reflection which unfortunately fell upon Jewish soil. What more pertinent *symbol* of the above-censured shortcoming of

[1] Smell of the Jew.

Christian ethics, which in all other respects is in such complete harmony with that of India, can we have than this, that John the Baptist, who to all intents and purposes was an Indian *sanyasi*,[1] was nevertheless clad in the skins of animals—an abomination, as we know, to every Hindu? So revolting is it to Indian notions of right, that the Royal Society of Calcutta received a copy of the Vedas only on the distinct understanding that it was not to be bound in leather according to European fashion; and to this day it may be seen on the shelves of the library, bound in silk. A similar characteristic contrast is afforded by the Gospel story of the miraculous draught of fishes (Luke v.) with which the boats were laden to the sinking point, and the story of Pythagoras, who, versed in the wisdom of Egypt, buys the fishermen's haul before it is drawn out of the water and gives the imprisoned fish their liberty (Apul., *De magia*, p. 36, ed. Bip.). Compassion for animals is so intimately bound up with goodness of character, that we may confidently assert that a man who is cruel to animals cannot be good: it is the same virtue, whether shown towards animals or men. Thus, for example, people of fine feeling, when from ill-humour, or anger, or under the influence of drink, they have undeservedly, unnecessarily, or over-severely chastised their dog, horse, or monkey, feel the same regret, the same dissatisfaction with themselves as is experienced at the recollection of wrong done to men, where it is called the voice of accusing conscience. I remember reading of an English sportsman who shot a monkey in India, and was so affected by the dying look the creature gave him that he never shot another. A similar case is that of William Harris, a veritable Nimrod, who in the years

[1] Ascetic and mendicant.

1836 and 1837 plunged into the heart of Africa, simply to enjoy the pleasures of sport. In his book, published at Bombay (1838), he describes the shooting of his first elephant, a female. He tells us how, when he went to look for his quarry the next morning, he found that the whole herd had fled, leaving only one tiny fellow who had spent the night with his dead mother, and who, putting all fear aside, advanced to meet the hunters with the liveliest and most evident indications of inconsolable grief, and wound his little trunk round them as though imploring their help. "Then," says Harris, "I truly repented of my act, and felt as if I had committed a murder." We find this English nation, with its fine sensibility, distinguished above all others by its remarkable compassion for animals, which shows itself on all occasions, and, notwithstanding its in other respects degrading "cold superstition," fills up by legislation the gap left in ethics by religion. For it is because of this gap, that societies for the protection of animals are required in Europe and America, which societies can do effectual work only by the aid of the law. In Asia animals are sufficiently protected by religion, and nobody thinks of starting such societies there. Meanwhile Europe, too, is becoming more and more sensible of the rights of animals, as the strange notion of an animal-world created solely for the use and enjoyment of man, with the consequent treatment of animals as mere things, gradually fades away. For this notion is the source of the barbarous and utterly inconsiderate treatment of animals in Europe, and I have pointed out its Old Testament origin in the second volume of the *Parerga*, § 178. To the honour of the English, be it remarked that among them first did the law seriously protect animals against cruel treatment, and in England the miscreant who ill-treats one of them, even though

it be his own, has to suffer. Not content with this, there is in London a Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, which, with its large income from voluntary contributions, does much good work. Its secret emissaries are always on the watch for any acts of cruelty towards dumb sentient beings, and such acts are pretty sure to be detected and punished at their instance. How earnestly the matter is taken up may be seen from the following recent example culled from the *Birmingham Journal* of December, 1839: "Capture of 84 Dog-baiters.—Having learnt that there was to be a dog-fight yesterday in the open space in Fox Street, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals took precautionary measures, and a strong body of police was marched to the spot and arrested the whole party as soon as the proceedings began. They were handcuffed in pairs, and a long rope passed down the middle secured them all together. In this way they were taken to the Police Station, where the Mayor and Magistrate held a sitting. The two ring-leaders were each condemned to a fine of one pound and eight-and-sixpence costs, or, in default of payment, fourteen days' imprisonment with hard labour. The rest were let go.....The patrons of this noble sport must have felt rather uncomfortable as they were marched along the streets." But a still better and more recent[1] example is this from the *Times* of April 6, 1855, that journal itself taking an important part in the proceedings. It describes the trial of a wealthy Scotch baronet's daughter, who cruelly ill-treated a horse by flogging it and cutting it with a knife, for which she was fined five pounds. This was, of course, a fleabite to a girl in her position, and she would have gone

[1] Added in a note to the second edition.—Tr.

practically unpunished, had not the *Times* followed it up with a well-merited castigation that could hardly fail to be felt, by publishing the girl's full name in large letters twice over, and adding: "We cannot help saying that a couple of months' imprisonment, and a good whipping administered in private by the most stalwart woman in Hampshire, would have been a far more suitable punishment for Miss N. N. A wretched creature of this sort has forfeited all the privileges of her sex, and we can no longer regard her as a woman."……At the steep approaches to the bridges of the English metropolis the London Society keeps a team of horses, to give gratuitous help to heavily-laden waggons passing up the incline. Is not that splendid? Does it not compel our admiration, as much as if it were a benefit conferred on mankind? Further, in the year 1837, the London Philanthropic Society offered a prize of £30 for the best exposition of the moral reasons against cruelty to animals—a task made doubly difficult by the condition that these reasons should be derived mainly from Christianity. In 1839 the prize was adjudged to Mr. Macnamara. In Philadelphia an Animals' Friends Society has been started, with similar aims. To the president of this Society Mr. T. Foster, an Englishman, has dedicated his *Philozoia: Moral Reflections on the Actual Condition of Animals, and the Means of Improving the Same* (Brussels, 1839). The book is original and well written. As an Englishman, the author naturally endeavours to support his exhortations to the humane treatment of animals from the Bible, but this is slippery ground: so much so, that he finally has recourse to the argument that, as Jesus Christ was born in a stable, where there was an ox and an ass, this means symbolically that we should regard animals as our brethren and treat them accordingly. All this shows that the

moral strings (*Saite*), of which we are here speaking, are at last beginning to make themselves heard in the Western world also. Compassion for animals, however, need not be carried so far as the renunciation, after the fashion of the Brahmans, of a meat diet: for in Nature susceptibility to suffering goes hand in hand with intelligence; and mankind, in the North especially, would suffer more by abstention from meat than the animal would by a swift and always unexpected death, which, however, should be rendered still easier by the administration of chloroform. Without meat the human race could not exist in the North. Similarly, man may allow animals to work for him, and there is no cruelty so long as he refrains from giving them an excessive amount to do.

8. If now, leaving out of account for the moment the perhaps metaphysically discoverable ultimate ground of that compassion from which alone non-egoistic actions can proceed, we regard this compassion from the empirical standpoint, as a thing of Nature's arrangement merely, it will be obvious to everyone that, for the greatest possible alleviation of the numberless and varied sufferings of all kinds to which our life is exposed, and from which no man is entirely exempt, and at the same time as a counterpoise to that burning egoism which fills all beings and often passes over into malice, Nature could have devised nothing more efficacious than the planting in the human breast of that wonderful disposition, in virtue of which the suffering of one is felt by another, and from which proceeds on due occasion the voice that loudly and audibly cries "Spare!" on the one hand and "Help!" on the other. From the mutual aid hence arising there was assuredly more to be hoped for the welfare of all, than from a strict moral-law of a general and abstract kind—from an

imperative resulting from certain rational considerations and concept-combinations, wherefrom the less was to be expected inasmuch as the uncultured man is wholly incapable of taking in general propositions and abstract truths, the concrete alone existing for him; and mankind, with the exception of a very small fraction, has always been uncultured and must so remain, because the manual work necessary for the support of the community leaves the mass of the people no time for mental culture. On the other hand, for the awakening of that compassion which in my opinion is the *sole source of disinterested actions, and therefore the true basis of morality*, no abstract knowledge is required, but only the perceptual sort, the mere apprehension of the concrete case, which calls forth an immediate response without the further intervention of thought.

9. The following circumstance will be found in complete accord with the above. While the foundation on which I establish Ethics does, indeed, separate me from all the philosophers of the schools, and even looks paradoxical when placed alongside of their doctrines: for many of them—*e.g.* the Stoics (Seneca, *De clem.*, ii. 5,, Spinoza (*Eth.*, iv. prop. 50), Kant (*C. of Pract. R.*, p. 213; R. p. 257)—expressly reject and condemn compassion; yet my basis has for it the authority of the greatest moralist of modern times, for this title undoubtedly belongs of right to J. J. Rousseau, than whom no one had a more profound knowledge of the human heart. Here was a man who took his wisdom not from books but from life, who taught not for the lecture-room but for mankind—the enemy of prejudices, the pupil of Nature, to whom alone she granted the ability to moralise without being tedious—a gift vouchsafed to him because he hit the truth and touched the heart. As I have hitherto been so sparing of quotations,

let me be allowed to cite from him a few passages that confirm my views.

In the *Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité* (ed. Bip., p. 91) he says: "Il y a un autre principe, que Hobbes n'a point aperçu, et qui ayant été donné à l'homme pour adoucir, en certaines circonstances, la férocité de son amour-propre, tempère l'ardeur qu'il a pour son bien-être par une *répugnance innée de voir souffrir son semblable.* Je ne crois pas avoir aucune contradiction à craindre en accordant à l'homme la *seule vertu naturelle* qu'ait été forcé de reconnaitre le détracteur le plus outré des vertus humaines. Je parle *de la pitié*, etc.[1]—P. 92: Mandeville a bien senti qu'avec toute leur morale les hommes n'eussent jamais été que des monstres, si la nature ne leur eut donné *la pitié* à l'appui de la raison: mais il n'a pas vu, que *de cette seule qualité découlent toutes les vertus sociales*, qu'il veut disputer aux hommes. En effet qu'est-ce que la générosité, la clémence, l'humanité, sinon *la pitié* appliquée aux faibles, aux coupables, ou à l'espèce humaine en général? La bienveillance et l'amitié même sont, à le bien prendre, des productions d'une pitié constante, fixée sur un objet particulier; car désirer que quelqu'un ne souffre point, qu'est-ce autre-chose, que désirer qu'il soit heureux?.....La commisération sera d'autant plus énergique, que *l'animal spectateur s'identifiera* plus intimement *avec l'animal souffrant.*[2]—

[1] There is another principle—Hobbes has overlooked it—which, given to man in order to soften, under certain circumstances, the fierceness of his egoism, tempers his ardour for his own well-being by an *innate dislike of the sight of suffering in his fellow-man.* I think I need fear no contradiction in assigning to man the *sole natural virtue* which even the most extravagant depreciator of human excellences will hardly disown: I mean pity, &c.

[2] Mandeville has rightly recognised that, with all their ethics, men would never have been anything but monsters, had not Nature given them *pity* as a support to their reason; but he did not see that from this quality alone flow all the social virtues, the possession of which he denies to men. What, I should like to know, are generosity, clemency, humanity,

P. 94: "Il est donc bien certain, que la pitié est un sentiment naturel, qui, modérant dans chaque individu l'amour de soi-même, concourt à la conservation mutuelle de toute l'espèce. C'est elle, qui dans l'état de nature, tient lieu de lois, de mœurs et de vertus, avec cet avantage, que nul ne sera tenté de désobéir à sa douce voix: c'est elle, qui détournera tout sauvage robuste d'enlever à un faible enfant, ou à un vieillard infirme, sa subsistance acquise avec peine, si lui même espère pouvoir trouver la sienne ailleurs: c'est elle qui, au lieu de cette maxime sublime de justice raisonnée 'fais à autrui comme tu veux qu'on te fasse,' inspire à tous les hommes cette autre maxime de bonté naturelle, bien moins parfaite, mais plus utile peut-être que la précédente 'fais ton bien avec le moindre mal d'autrui qu'il est possible.' C'est, en un mot, *dans ce sentiment naturel plutôt que dans les arguments subtils, qu'il faut chercher la cause de la répugnance qu'éprouverait tout homme à mal faire*, même indépendamment des maximes de l'éducation."[1] Compare with this what he says

but pity applied to the feeble, the guilty, the human race in general? What really are kindness and amity but the results of a constant pity centred on a particular object?—for is not the desire that a man should not suffer, a desire that he should be happy?.....Commiseration will be all the stronger, the more intimately the *spectator* identifies himself with the *sufferer*.

[1] No doubt, then, pity is a natural sentiment, which, moderating the self-love of each individual, contributes to the mutual conservation of the whole species. It is Pity, which in the state of Nature stands in the place of laws, morals, and virtues—with this advantage, that no one will wish to disobey her gentle voice. Pity it is, that will prevent the stalwart savage, who can find provision for himself elsewhere, from robbing the feeble child or the infirm greybeard of his hard-won subsistence. Where the sublime maxim of reasoned justice, "Do to others as you would be done by," has not yet been thought out, pity will inspire men with this other maxim of natural kindness—a maxim far inferior indeed to the other, yet perhaps more useful—"Do what is of service to you with as little harm to others as possible." In a word, it is *in this natural sentiment, rather than in subtle arguments, that we must seek the cause of the repugnance to wrong-doing felt by every man*, even the uneducated.

in *Émile*, bk. iv. pp. 115–120—this passage among others: "En effet, comment nous laissons-nous émouvoir à la pitié, si ce n'est en nous transportant hors de nous et en nous *identifiant avec l'animal souffrant; en quittant, pour ainsi dire, notre être, pour prendre le sien?* Nous ne souffrons qu'autant que nous jugeons qu'il souffre: *ce n'est pas dans nous, c'est dans lui que nous souffrons*.....offrir au jeune homme des objets, sur lesquels puisse agir la force expansive de son cœur, qui le dilatent, qui l'étendent sur les autres êtres, qui le fassent partout *se retrouver hors de lui;* écarter avec soin ceux qui le resserrent, le concentrent, et tendent le ressort *du moi humain*, etc."[1]

Having, as I observed above, no authority in the Schools to support me, let me add that the Chinese acknowledge five cardinal virtues (*Tchang*), Compassion (*Sin*) ranking highest. The other four are Justice, Courtesy, Wisdom, and Sincerity. Similarly, among the virtues inscribed by the Hindus on the commemorative tablets of their deceased princes, compassion to man and beast occupies the first place. In Athens there was an altar to Compassion in the agora (*Paus.*, i. 17): Lucian also makes mention of this altar in the *Timon*, § 99.—A saying of Phocion's, preserved to us by Stobæus, describes compassion as the holiest quality in man: "Take not the altar from a temple, nor compassion from human nature."—In the *Sapientia Indorum*, which is a Greek translation of the *Panchatantra*, we

[1] For how are we moved to pity, if not by going out of ourselves and *identifying ourselves with the suffering animal; leaving, so to speak, our being*, and taking his? We only suffer in so far as we imagine that he suffers: *it is not in ourselves, but in him that we suffer*....to put before the young man objects upon which the expansive force of his heart can act; objects which dilate it, extend it to other beings, place it everywhere *outside himself:* to remove carefully those objects which contract it, concentrate it, and confine it to *self*, &c.

read (Sect. 3, p. 220): "Compassion is accounted the chief of virtues." We thus see that the fountain-head of morality has been always and everywhere recognised, save only in Europe—the fault being attributable to the *fœtor Judaicus*, which here penetrates everything; and so obedience is paid to a command of duty, a moral law, an imperative—in a word, an order and commandment. This is held to stoutly, and nobody sees that such a thing can never be based upon anything but egoism. A few reflective minds have, indeed, hit upon the truth: Rousseau, for instance, as we saw above. Lessing, too, in a letter of 1756, writes: "The most compassionate man is the best man, and the one most disposed to all the social virtues, to magnanimity of every sort."

OF THE ETHICAL DIFFERENCE OF CHARACTERS

[*B. of E.* § 20.]

The basis of ethics that I have proposed is as yet incomplete. We have still to answer the question, Whereon depends the immense difference between men in a moral regard? If compassion is the mainspring of all genuine, *i.e.* disinterested, justice and charity, why does it move one man and not another?—Can Ethics, when it has disclosed the moral spring of actions, also set this in motion? Can it turn the hard-hearted man into a compassionate and therefore a just and humane one? By no means: the difference of character is innate and ineradicable. Malice is as much inborn in the malicious man, as are the poison fangs and glands in the snake, and he can no more change his nature than

can this creature. *Velle non discitur*,[1] said Nero's preceptor. Plato enters into a long argument in the *Meno*, as to whether virtue can be taught or no. He quotes this passage from Theognis:

> "teach as you may,
> You'll never make the bad man good,"

and arrives at this conclusion: "Neither is virtue natural, nor can it be acquired; but in whomsoever it is found, it is a gift of God, independent of reason." See also what Socrates, the father of ethics, says, according to Aristotle (*Eth. mag.*, i. 9): "It is not in our power to become good or bad." And Aristotle himself (*Eth. Nicom.*, vi. 13) expresses the same opinion: "All are agreed that each trait of character belongs to us in a sense by nature; for we are just, temperate, courageous, &c., from our very birth." We likewise find a distinct expression of this conviction in the certainly ancient, though doubtfully genuine fragments of Archytas the Pythagorean, preserved to us by Stobæus in the *Florilegium*, tit. i. § 77. The passage I allude to runs thus: "Those virtues which employ reasoning and proof may legitimately be called sciences; but by virtue we mean that ethical and best state of the irrational part of the soul whereby we are said to possess certain qualities of character, such as liberality, justice, and temperance." If we scan Aristotle's shorter list of the virtues and vices in his *De virtutibus et vitiis*, we shall see that they can none of them be thought of except as inborn qualities: indeed, only as such can they be genuine; for were they assumed of set purpose as the result of rational reflection, they would really amount to dissimulation and would be spurious, and therefore by no means to be reckoned upon in times of storm and stress. So is it also with the virtue of charity,

[1] Willing can never be learnt.

which, as usual among the ancients, is absent from his list. Montaigne, too (L. ii. c. 11), is speaking in the same sense in the apparently sceptical words: "Seroit-il vrai, que pour être bon tout-à-fait, il nous le faille être par occulte, naturelle et universelle propriété, sans loi, sans raison, sans exemple?"[1]—while Lichtenberg (*Vermischte Schriften*, "*Moralische Bemerkungen*") says right out: "Virtue born of precepts is not worth much. Feeling or habit is the thing." But even the primitive teaching of Christianity agrees with this view, for in the Sermon on the Mount, according to Luke vi. 45, we read: A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is good; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart bringeth forth that which is evil—this following upon the figurative account of the two preceding verses, which describe how the fruit always depends upon the nature of the tree.

But Kant it is who first made this important point perfectly clear by his great doctrine, that at the base of the *empirical character*, which, as an appearance, exhibits itself in time and in a multiplicity of actions, lies the *intelligible character*, which is the in-itself or kernel of that appearance and is therefore independent of space and time, plurality and change. This alone makes clear that astonishing rigid immutability of character so well known to every man of the world—an immutability which actuality always victoriously opposes to the promises of an Ethics that thinks it can improve men and talks of progress in virtue, while experience shows that virtue is innate and cannot be preached into us. If the character, as the primordial essence, were not immutable and therefore insusceptible to improvement by instruction conveyed by knowledge; if, as that commonplace Ethics

[1] Is it then true that, to be altogether good, we must be good by secret, natural, and universal property, independent of law, reason, and example?

asserts, an improvement of the character by a moral system, and, as a consequence, "a constant advance towards the good" were possible; then would not—unless we are to suppose that the many religious institutions and moralising efforts have all failed in their object—the elder portion of mankind be, on the average at least, better than the younger? But of this there is so little evidence, that on the contrary we expect something good from the young rather than the old, whom experience has only made worse. It may indeed happen that, as he advances in years, one man may seem to be somewhat better than he was in his youth, and another to be worse; but this is only because in age riper knowledge, with the many corrections it brings, makes the character emerge more purely and clearly; whereas in youth ignorance, errors, and chimeras at one time put forward wrong motives, while at another they kept the real ones out of sight, as shown in paragraph 3 of the preceding Essay.[1] There are, it is true, many more young convicts than old, but the reason of this is, that where there is a disposition to crime in the character, it soon finds an opportunity of committing it and attains its end, the hulks or the gallows; and contrariwise, those who have lived long without being moved to crime will not readily be led to commit it later. Therefore the true reason of the reverence paid to age appears to me to lie in this, that age has stood the test of a long life and kept itself blameless; for this blamelessness it is, that conditions that reverence. According to this view we must never allow ourselves, in actual life, to be misled by these promises of the moralists; but when a man has once shown himself bad, let us be persuaded that we can never trust him again, while, whatever else may have

[1] On the Freedom of the Will.

changed, we may confidently look for nobleness of mind in the man who has once given proof of it. *Operari sequitur esse*[1] is a fruitful[2] proposition of the Schools: everything in the world works according to its immutable nature, which constitutes its essence *(essentia)*—and man is no exception. As a man is, so will he, so must he, act; and a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ*[3] is a long-since exploded fiction, dating from the childhood of philosophy, though a few old women in doctors' hoods still persist in dragging it about with them.

The three ethical springs of human action—egoism, malice, compassion—exist in each individual in extraordinarily different proportions, and these proportions will determine the motives which act upon the man and lead him to do such or such things. An egoistical character will feel the power of egoistic motives alone, against which those that advocate compassion or malice will make no headway; he will no more dream of sacrificing his interests to take vengeance on his foe, than to help his friend. Another, who is highly susceptible to malicious motives, will often not shrink from doing himself great damage, if only he can injure somebody else. For there are characters who find so intense a pleasure in causing suffering to others, that this outweighs their own: "*dum alteri noceat, sui negligens*"[4] (Sen., *De ira*, i. 1). They plunge with passionate bliss into the fray, in which they know they will receive as great injuries as they inflict; and, as experience often shows, they will even deliberately murder a man who has done them a mischief, and then kill themselves to avoid the penalty. On the other hand, *goodness of heart*

[1] As a thing is, so will it act.
[2] *I.e.* not like most of their propositions, barren and leading to nothing. —Tr.
[3] Liberty of indifference, or absolutely free will.
[4] Unmindful of himself, if only he can injure another.

consists in a deeply-felt universal compassion for all that lives, but above all for man; because the higher the intelligence, the greater the susceptibility to suffering; and so the innumerable sufferings, mental and bodily, of man have a far greater claim on our compassion than the merely bodily and less poignant pain of the animal. Goodness of character will therefore first abstain from harming another in any way, and will then also prompt us to help wherever we see another suffering. And here again—as in the opposite direction with malice—self-sacrifice may be carried so far, that characters of exceptional goodness may even take the misfortunes of others more to heart than their own, and do things for them that entail more suffering on themselves than that which they relieve. Where several or many are to be helped at the same time, they will, in case of need, sacrifice themselves entirely—as did Arnold von Winkelried. During the incursion of the African Vandals into Italy in the fifth century Joh. v. Müller (*Weltgeschichte*, bk. x., ch. 10) relates of Paulinus, bishop of Nola, that "after giving as ransom for the prisoners all the treasures of the church and all the money of which he and his friends were possessed, he felt such sorrow at the grief of a widow whose only son was being carried off, that he offered himself as a substitute and went into bondage. For every adult that had not fallen by the sword, was taken captive to Carthage."

Conformably with this incredibly great, inborn, and original diversity of character, every man will be stirred to action by those motives alone for which he feels peculiar susceptibility; just as *one* body reacts only to acids, *another* only to alkalis—this being their unalterable nature and disposition. Philanthropic motives, which are such potent incentives to the good character, have no

power at all as such over the man who is susceptible to egoistic motives only; and if we would lead such a man to philanthropic actions, it can only be by deluding him (which is just what most moral systems attempt to do) into the belief that the alleviation of the sufferings of others will turn indirectly, in some way or other, to *his own advantage*. But in this manner his Will is merely misled, not improved. Real improvement could only be effected by completely changing his susceptibility to motives, so that, for instance, A should no longer be indifferent to the sufferings of others; B, no longer find satisfaction in causing them; C, not be such a man that any, even the slightest, increase of his own well-being should far outweigh and render inoperative all other motives. But this is more utterly impossible than the transmutation of lead into gold. For it would require that the man should, so to speak, change the very heart in his body, remodel his inmost being; whereas all we can do is to enlighten his *head*, correct his *knowledge*, lead him to a right apprehension of the objectively present, the true relations of life. And what will be the result of this? Only, that the peculiar constitution of his Will will evince greater consistency, will come out more clearly and decidedly, and will show itself as it really is. For, as many good actions rest at bottom upon false motives, upon sincere though illusory expectation of advantages to be obtained by means of them for oneself, either in this world or the world to come; so do many misdeeds rest merely upon a misconception of the circumstances of human life. The American penitentiary-system is based upon this: its object is not to improve the criminal's *heart*, but merely to set his *head* right—to get him to see that work and honesty are a surer and easier way to his own welfare, than rascality.

By motives *legality*[1] may be enforced, but not *morality:* we may revolutionise conduct, but not *willing* proper, to which alone moral worth attaches. We cannot change the goal for which the Will strives, but only the way taken by the Will in order to reach it. Education may change the choice of means, but not the choice of the ultimate general aims, which is determined by the original nature of each particular Will. We may show the egoist, that by giving up small advantages he will gain greater; the malicious man, that by inflicting suffering upon others he will bring worse suffering upon himself: but we can no more argue a man out of his egoism, his malice, than we can argue the cat out of her mousing propensities. So, too, goodness of character can be brought to a more consistent and perfect manifestation of its essence by increased depth of insight, by knowledge of the conditions of life—that is to say, by mental illumination: *e.g.* by the realisation of the more remote consequences entailed upon others by our acts—the suffering, say, that will be brought upon them indirectly and in course of time by this or that action which we had never dreamt was wrong; or by learning the disadvantages following upon many a kind-hearted action, *e.g.* the pardoning of a criminal; and above all by conviction of the superiority, in all cases, of the *Neminem læde* over the *Omnes juva.* In this respect, no doubt, there is a moral culture, an ethics of improvement; but it goes no further than this, and its limitations are easily seen. The head is enlightened; the heart remains unimproved. The primitive and essential, the decisive element, in the moral as in the intellectual and physical, *is the innate:* art can never be more than a helper. Every man is what he is "by the grace of God" as it were, *jure divino*, θειᾳ μοιρᾳ.

[1] A law-abiding state; obedience to law.

Du bist am Ende—*was du bist.*
Setz' dir Perrücken auf von Millionen Locken,
Setz' deinen Fuss auf ellenhohe Socken,
Du bleibst doch immer was du bist.[1]

But all this time I seem to hear the reader asking, What about guilt and merit, then?—By way of answer let me refer him to § 10,[2] which I beg him to peruse once more. That section would have found its place *here*, were it not so intimately connected with Kant's doctrine of the compatibility of freedom with necessity. From it the reader will see that the *operari*[3] is always necessitated by the entry of motives; freedom, therefore, which announces itself solely by the sense of *responsibility*, can lie only in the *esse*.[4] The reproaches of conscience, it is true, are primarily and ostensibly addressed to what *we have done*, but they really and ultimately relate to what *we are*—and this, viz. what we are, we find out for certain only from our deeds, which are to our character what symptoms are to disease. In this *esse*, then, in what we *are*, must guilt and merit lie. What we esteem and love, or despise and hate, in others, is not something variable and negligible, but something that abides steadfastly for ever—that which they *are;* and should we abandon our first opinion of them, we do not say that they have changed, but that we are mistaken in them. And just so, it is *what we are*, irrevocably are and always will be, that causes us satisfaction or dissatisfaction; and this extends to intellectual qualities—nay, even to facial traits. How, then, can guilt and merit lie elsewhere

[1] *You are just what you are*—nay—never doubt it,
Heap lying curls in millions on your head;
On socks—a cubit high—plant your proud tread,
You are just what you are—that's all about it.
Faust: Anster's Trans.

[2] See next section.

[3] What we do.

[4] What we are.

than in *that which we are?* Conscience is the nearer and nearer acquaintance with ourselves, the *protocol of deeds* to which each day adds its quota. It occupies itself first of all with our actions, for it is in these that we either, under the influence of egoism or malice, turn a deaf ear to Compassion bidding us at least to harm no one, aye even to afford them aid and succour —or, resisting these evil monitors, obey its voice. In either case is seen the amount of distinction that we make *betwixt ourselves and others.* On this distinction depend, in the last analysis, the degrees of morality or immorality, *i.e.* of justice and charity, or their opposites. The ever-increasing store of recollections of significant actions in this regard, goes to round off the picture of our character and makes us better and better acquainted with ourselves. And from this grows satisfaction or dissatisfaction with ourselves, with what we *are*, according as egoism, malice, or compassion has prevailed, *i.e.* according as the distinction we make between our own person and that of others has been greater or less. By the same standard, too, we judge others, with whose character we likewise become acquainted, though less perfectly than with our own, through experience. Here appears as praise, approbation, esteem, or as blame, displeasure, contempt, that which showed itself, in the judgment pronounced upon ourselves, as satisfaction or dissatisfaction, which last may even rise to remorse. That the reproaches addressed to others are directed only *primarily* to their deeds, but *in reality* to their immutable character, and that virtues and vices are regarded as inherent permanent qualities, is evident from such common phrases as "Now I see what you are"; "I was mistaken in you"; "No, I am not that sort of man"; "I am not the man to impose upon you." And here are more phrases of like import: "*les ames bien nées*"; "*bien*

nacido"; εὐγενης, εὐγενεια, for virtuous, virtue; "*generosioris animi amicus*"—and yet more might be quoted.

Conscience is conditioned by reason; but this is only because the latter procures it a clear and connected recollection of things. From its very nature conscience never makes its voice heard until *after the event*, and this is why it is spoken of as *judging*. It cannot be said *to speak beforehand*, except in an improper sense and indirectly—by reflection recollecting similar cases and arguing from them to future disapprobation of the projected deed. So much for the ethical fact as a fact of consciousness: the fact itself remains a metaphysical problem, which, though it does not immediately form part of our present task, will nevertheless be touched upon in the final chapter. In perfect keeping with the knowledge that conscience is only the acquaintance that we make with our own immutable character through our deeds, is the following: that the extremely different *susceptibility* in different men to motives of self-interest, malice, and compassion, whereon depends the whole moral worth of the man, is not further explicable from something else, nor to be arrived at by education—as though it were something arising in time, something changeable, and even depending upon chance—but is innate, unchangeable, and not further explicable. Hence our life-story itself, with its manifold activities and events, is nothing more than the outward dial of that inward original mechanism; or, to use another figure, the mirror in which alone can be revealed to the intellect of each one of us the nature of his own Will, which Will is the kernel of his being.

Whoever will take the trouble to study carefully what I have said here and in § 10 will discover in my basis of ethics a consistent and logical completeness possessed by no other, and also an agreement with the facts of

experience, which in the other proposed bases is still more conspicuously absent. For naught save truth can be always in accord with itself and Nature; while all false fundamentals are at variance inwardly with themselves and outwardly with experience, which enters its quiet protest against them at every step.

I am perfectly aware that these truths, and especially those last enunciated, run full tilt against many deeply-rooted prejudices and errors—and, above all, against a certain infant-school ethics much in vogue at the present day. Not that I regret or repent it. For, in the first place, I am here addressing neither children nor the masses, but an enlightened Academy, whose purely theoretical question[1] is directed to the ultimate fundamental truths of Ethics, and which to its exceedingly serious question expects a serious answer. And, in the second place, I hold that there are no such things as privileged, or useful, or even innocuous errors; for in my opinion every error breeds infinitely more harm than good. But if there should be any notion of making existing errors the measure of truth, or of setting them up as a frontier-stone beyond which the exposition of truth must not go, it would be more honest to do away with philosophical faculties and Academies altogether; for what is not, should not appear to be.

KANT'S DOCTRINE OF THE INTELLIGIBLE AND EMPIRICAL CHARACTERS

[*B. of E.* § 10.]

Kant's great and conspicuous service to Ethics consists

[1] Is the source and basis of Ethics to be sought in an idea of morality lying immediately in consciousness,....or in some other principle of knowledge?

in the doctrine which shows that freedom is not incompatible with necessity—a doctrine first propounded in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (pp. 533–554 of the 1st, and pp. 561–582 of the 5th edition), and still more plainly set forth in the *C. of Practical R.* (4th ed., pp. 169–179; R. 224–231).

Hobbes, to begin with, then Spinoza, then Hume, and also Holbach in his *Syst. d. la nat.*, and finally and most thoroughly of all Priestley, had so clearly proved the complete and strict necessity with which acts of Will follow upon motives, that there could no longer be any doubt as to this being one of the most firmly established truths. Henceforward only the ignorant and the uncultured could continue to talk of freedom in the particular actions of man—of a *liberum arbitrium indifferentiæ.* So irrefutable were the arguments adduced by his predecessors, that Kant took the complete necessity of our acts of Will as a settled thing admitting of no dispute, as may be seen in all passages in which he speaks of freedom from the purely *theoretical*[1] point of view. Nevertheless it is undeniable that our actions are accompanied by a consciousness of autonomy and independence, which makes each of us feel that they are our work, that we are the actual doers of our deeds and are morally *responsible* for them. But as *responsibility* presupposes a possibility of having acted otherwise, and consequently some kind of freedom, there lies in the consciousness of responsibility an indirect consciousness of freedom also. This contradiction, which proceeds from the very nature of the case, was finally solved by Kant's profoundly wise distinction between appearance and thing-in-itself—a distinction which constitutes the inmost kernel of his whole philosophy and is its chief merit.

[1] *I.e.* of or belonging to our perception of things.

The individual—with his unalterable innate character and the strict determination of all his outward acts by the law of causality, which here, passing through the medium of the intellect, is called "motivation"—is *appearance* only. The *thing-in-itself* which underlies this, is, as existing outside space and time, free from all succession and multiplicity of acts, one and unalterable. The man's constitution-in-itself is the *intelligible character*, which, uniformly present in all his deeds and stamping itself upon them all as does the signet in a thousand seals, determines the *empirical character* (this empirical character presenting itself in time and a succession of acts) of this appearance, which must therefore in its outward manifestations, all of which are occasioned by motives, exhibit the constancy of a law of Nature; on which account all its acts follow of strict necessity. Hence that immutability, that unbending rigidity of every man's empirical character—which had always been clear to thinking minds, while the rest of the world supposed that a man's character could be transformed by judicious remonstrances and moral admonitions—was now traced back to a rational ground and made good for philosophy also. Thus philosophy was brought into line with experience and had no longer to stand ashamed before the wisdom of the multitude, which had long since expressed this truth in such proverbs as "*Lo que entra con el capillo, sale con la mortaja*" (That which comes in with the infant's cap goes out with the winding-sheet), and "*Lo que en la leche se mama, en la mortaja se derrama*" (What we suck in with the milk is poured out into the shroud).

I hold this Kantian doctrine of the co-existence of freedom with necessity to be the greatest of all the achievements of human wisdom. It and the Transcendental Æsthetic are the two great diamonds in the crown

of Kant's fame, the lustre of which will never pass away.

Schelling, in his Essay on Freedom, has, as everyone knows, given a paraphrase of this Kantian doctrine, which, owing to the liveliness of its colouring and the clear way in which the theory is set forth, makes it more intelligible to many people; and I should give him all praise, if only he had had the honesty to state that what he was here propounding was Kant's wisdom, and not his own, as a section of the philosophical public still believes.

But we may make this Kantian doctrine and the essence of freedom in general more comprehensible in another way, viz. by connecting it with a universal truth, the concisest expression of which is in my opinion the oft-repeated formula of the schoolmen "*Operari sequitur esse*"; *i.e.* everything in the world acts according to what it is, according to its nature or original constitution, in which therefore all its outward manifestations are already included *potentiâ*,[1] though they only enter *actu*[2] when external causes call them forth, and then that nature reveals itself. This is the empirical character, whereas its inner ultimate ground, which is inaccessible to experience, is the *intelligible character*, *i.e.* the *essence-in-itself* of this thing. In this respect man forms no exception to the rest of Nature: he too has his immutable character, which, however, is altogether individual and varies in every person. This is empirical for our apprehension, but on that very account is *appearance* only; whereas what it may be in respect of its essence-in-itself is called the *intelligible character*. All its actions, which in so far as regards their outward constitution are determined by motives, can never be other than actions appropriate to this immutable individual character: as a

[1] Potentially. [2] Actually.

man is, so must he act. To a given individual, therefore, in a given particular case, only *one* action is possible: *operari sequitur esse*. Freedom belongs not to the empirical, but to the intelligible character alone. The *operari* of a given man is necessarily determined, from without by motives, from within by his character; hence all he does occurs of necessity. But it is in his *esse* that freedom lies: he might have *been* a different man, and in what he *is* lies the guilt or merit. For all he does is a matter of course, and follows as a mere corollary.

Kant's theory has opened our eyes to the fundamental error of supposing that necessity lies in the *esse* and freedom in the *operari*, and has taught us that the exact contrary is the truth. And therefore, though a man's moral responsibility is primarily and ostensibly concerned with what he does, it is really based upon what he *is*; for, given his *esse*, his *operari* cannot, when the motives are there, be other than it is. But however strict the necessity with which in a given character deeds are called forth by motives, it will never occur to any one, convinced though he may be of the fact, to plead this as an excuse for himself and to put the blame on the motives; for he knows full well that here, so far as his case and the outward excitations are concerned, *i.e. objectivé*, a quite different and even diametrically opposite action was perfectly possible and would have occurred, *if only he had been another man*. But that he is, as his action proves, such a man and not another—this is what he feels himself responsible for: here, in the *esse*, is the place where the sting of conscience pricks. For conscience is simply that better acquaintance with ourself which is revealed to us by the way we act. Therefore it is really the *esse* that is impeached by conscience, although at the instance of the *operari*. As we are conscious of *freedom* through *responsibility* alone, both

must lie in the same place, viz. in the *esse:* the *operari* is strictly necessitated. But as with others, so with ourselves we get to know what we are through *experience* only, and have no *a priori* knowledge of our character. At first we entertain an excellent opinion of it; and as in courts of law, so also at the bar of our inmost heart, *quisque præsumitur bonus, donec probetur contrarium*[1] holds good.

A METAPHYSICAL EXPLANATION NEEDED

[*B. of E.* § 21.]

In the foregoing I have established the moral spring of action as a fact, and have shown that from it alone can proceed those two cardinal virtues, unselfish justice and genuine charity, upon which all the rest depend. This suffices for the foundation of Ethics, which must needs be supported upon some actual and demonstrable fact, whether of outward or inward experience; unless, like many of my predecessors, we arbitrarily adopt some abstract proposition and from it derive our ethical rules, or, like Kant, proceed in the same way with a mere concept, that of law. But though the problem propounded by the Royal Society appears to me to be solved, since its question is directed to the basis of ethics and not to any metaphysical system lying behind this; yet I know full well that the human mind cannot find any lasting satisfaction unless it can rest upon Metaphysics. At the end of every investigation, of every real science, we come to a primal phenomenon which explains everything else, but itself remains unexplained. And as there, so here too is felt the need of a *Metaphysics*, *i.e.* of

[1] A man is presumed to be good, until the contrary is proved.

a final explanation of the primal phenomena as such and of the world taken as a whole. Here, too, we are met by the question in regard to that which exists and is perceived by the understanding: Why is it so and not otherwise, and how does the character that we have found in the phenomenal appearance proceed from the essence-in-itself of things? Indeed, in Ethics the need of a metaphysical basis is all the more urgent, inasmuch as philosophical and religious systems are agreed that the ethical significance of actions is at the same time metaphysical, *i.e.* stretches beyond the mere appearance of things and consequently beyond all possibility of experience, and must therefore be most intimately connected with the whole existence of the world and the lot of mankind; for the all-important culminating point of existence is undoubtedly ethical. In proof of this, let me cite the undeniable fact that at the approach of death the course of every man's thoughts, whether he is a subscriber to any religious dogmas or not, takes a *moral* direction, and his one anxiety is to balance the accounts of his past life from the point of view of *morality*. The witness of the ancients is here especially valuable, for they are not under the influence of Christianity. Let me point out, then, that we find this fact already enunciated in a passage attributed by Stobæus (*Floril.*, tit. 44, § 20) to the very ancient lawgiver, Zaleucus, but which Bentley and Heyne assign to some Pythagorean: "We must set before our eyes the moment of our final departure from life. For the dying always experience a feeling of repentance when they think upon their unjust actions in the past, and they wish—oh, so earnestly!—that they had always acted justly." Likewise, to recall a historical example, Pericles, when on his death-bed, would not hear of his heroic deeds, but seemed to find consolation in this—that he had never brought mourning

into the house of any citizen (Plutarch: *Life of Pericles*). Turning now to something very different, I remember reading, in a case before an English jury, that a rough negro sailor-lad of fifteen, who was at the point of death from an injury just received in a scuffle, sent hurriedly for his shipmates in order to ask them whether he had ever vexed or offended them, and appeared greatly comforted when they said that he had not. We invariably see a desire, on the part of the dying, to be reconciled with everybody before their departure. My position is further corroborated in another direction by this well-known fact, that while for intellectual achievements, though these may be the greatest masterpieces in the world, the author is glad to receive a reward if he can get it, yet almost every one will refuse to be recompensed for any fine moral deed that he has performed. This is especially the case in acts of heroism—where, for instance, life has been risked to save another or many other lives, and we shall here find that, however poor the man, he will hardly ever accept a reward, because he feels that the metaphysical worth of his deed would thereby be depreciated. Bürger gives us a poetical representation of this at the close of his ballad of the brave man: but in actual life it is also the rule, as I often see from English newspapers. These facts are world-wide, and have nothing to do with religion. Life has so undeniably an ethico-metaphysical tendency, that no religion which interpreted it otherwise than ethically and metaphysically could gain a footing; for it is by its ethical side that every religion seats itself in the hearts of men. Every religion bases its dogmas upon moral springs of action—springs that are felt by all, but for that very reason not understood—and binds them so closely together that they appear to be inseparable: indeed, the priests do all they can to identify unbelief

with immorality. Hence in the eyes of a believer the unbeliever is a bad man, as witness the employment of such words as "godless," "atheistic," "unchristian," "heretic," &c., as synonyms for "immoral." This is all very well for religions, which start from *faith* and absolutely require this for their dogmas—under penalties. But philosophical systems have a less easy task; and an examination of them shows that they find it just as hard to join their Ethics to a given Metaphysics, as to supply it with a basis. And yet, as I have shown in the Introduction, where I fortified myself with the opinions of Wolf and Kant, Ethics must derive its support from Metaphysics.

Now of all problems that occupy the mind of man, that of Metaphysics is so much the hardest, that many thinkers have held it to be absolutely insoluble. Moreover, I labour here under the peculiar disadvantage which a detached monograph brings with it—namely, that I cannot start from any definite metaphysical system and profess myself a follower of this; for I should either have to expound and establish it, which would take too long, or to assume it, which would be exceedingly improper. So that here, as in the preceding part of my Essay, I am again debarred from using the synthetic method, and must have recourse once more to the analytic; in other words, I must not proceed from ground to consequents, but from consequents to ground. But this stern necessity, which obliged me to take nothing for granted and forced me to start from the standpoint common to all, made the exposition of the basis of ethics so difficult a matter that, on looking back upon it, it seems to me as arduous a work as the painting of a great picture without a mahlstick. And now that a metaphysical explanation of the ethical basis has to be given the difficulty caused by having nothing to rest

upon becomes so overwhelmingly great, that I see only one way out of it, and that is to be content with a quite general sketch; to give vague hints, rather than elaborate details; to indicate the way that leads to the goal, but not to pursue it to the end; in a word, to say only a fraction of that which under other circumstances I might have to advance.

THE METAPHYSICAL GROUNDWORK

[*B. of E.* § 22.]

Hitherto we have kept our feet on the *terra firma* of experience. This we are now to abandon for regions to which experience cannot possibly reach, in order to seek final theoretical satisfaction—happy if we can get a hint, a fleeting glance, that may bring us a certain measure of contentment. But what shall not be abandoned is our former honesty of procedure: we shall not, after the manner of the so-called post-Kantian philosophers, indulge in dream-fancies, bluster with mere words, regale our reader with fairy tales and seek to throw dust in his eyes. This much at any rate we promise—that the little we have to offer will be genuine.

That which has hitherto been our ground of explanation becomes now our problem—viz., that inborn and ineradicable natural compassion which, as we have seen, is the sole source of *non-egoistic actions*, the only kind that have worth. The way in which many modern philosophers treat the concepts "good" and "bad" as *simple*, *i.e.* as requiring no explanation and admitting of none, and then go on to talk very mysteriously and piously of an "idea of the good," which they use as a support to their ethics, or at least as a cloak to cover its nakedness, compels me to explain here in passing, that

these concepts, far from being simple, farther still from being given *a priori*, are relative terms drawn from everyday experience. Anything that conforms to the strivings of an individual Will is called, in respect of this Will, *good*—good food, good roads, a good omen; anything that does not so conform, *bad*. A man whose character is such that, rather than hinder the strivings of others, he will do all he can to favour and further them—who will therefore not harm others, but will rather afford them aid and succour whenever he can—will be called by them a *good* man: thus the concept "good" will be applied to him from a standpoint that is relative, empirical, and resident in the passive subject. But if we consider the character of such a man, not merely in regard to others, but in itself, we know from the foregoing that it is from immediate sympathy with the weal and woe of others—a sympathy that proceeds, as we have seen, from compassion—that the virtues of justice and charity arise in him. If now we go back to the essential of such a character, we cannot doubt that it lies in this, *that he makes less than the customary distinction between himself and others*. So great is this *distinction* in the eyes of the bad man, that to him the suffering of others is an immediate pleasure, which he therefore seeks simply for its own sake, even though it may bring him harm. In the eyes of the egoist, again, this *distinction* is still considerable enough to lead him to use the great damage of others as a means for the procuring of a small advantage for himself. With both, therefore, there is a deep gulf set, a wide *distinction* drawn, between the *Ego*, which is limited to their own person, and the *Non-ego*, which takes in the rest of the world: *Pereat mundus, dum ego salvus sim*,[1] is their

[1] So long as I am safe, the world may go to ruin.

motto. To the good man, on the contrary, this *distinction* is by no means so great: indeed, in noble actions it appears to be abolished, for here the weal of our neighbour is furthered at cost to oneself, and his Ego is thus put on an equality with our own; and where *many* others are to be saved, the Ego of the individual is completely sacrificed, and he will even give up his life for them.

It may now be asked, Is this latter view of the relation between his own Ego and that of others—a view whereon depend the actions of the good man—a pure mistake and illusion? Does not the mistake rather lie on the side of the opposite conception, whereon egoism and malice rest?

The view lying at the bottom of egoism is, *empirically*, strictly justified. Empirically the *distinction* between myself and another seems absolute. The diversity due to space, which separates me from him, separates me also from his weal and woe. But let it be here observed in the first place, that the knowledge we have of ourselves is by no means exhaustive, is by no means clear to the very bottom. By perceivance, a cerebral and therefore mediate production from data supplied by the senses, we know our own body as an object in space; and through the inner sense we know the uninterrupted series of our strivings and volitions, which are consequent upon outer motives, and also those manifold stronger and weaker motions of our own Will to which all inward feelings may be traced back. That is all: for the knowing subject cannot itself be in its turn known. On the other hand, the real substratum of this whole appearance, our inward *essence in itself*, the willer and knower itself, is inaccessible to us: we can see outwards only; within, all is dark. Hence the knowledge we have of ourselves is by no means complete and

exhaustive, but rather very superficial, and as to the greater and main part we are to ourselves an unknown enigma, or as Kant says, "The Ego knows itself only as appearance, not according to that which it may be in itself." In that other part which falls within our knowledge, everyone is indeed totally different from everyone else; but it by no means follows that this is true of that great and essential part which remains hidden from and unknown to each of us. This may not impossibly be identical in all.

Whereon does the multiplicity, the numerical diversity of beings depend? On time and space: through these alone is it possible; for the multiple can only be represented in thought as either concomitant or successive. Now as in any species the multiple is a congeries of individuals, I call space and time, in so far as they make *multiplicity* possible, the *principium individuationis*, without troubling to inquire whether this is exactly the sense in which the schoolmen used this expression.

Of the disclosures made to the world by Kant's marvellous profundity of thought, none, I suppose, is so undoubtedly true as the Transcendental Æsthetic, the doctrine of the ideality of space and time. So clearly is it set forth, so completely proved, that nobody has been able to raise even an apparent objection to it. It is Kant's triumph, a real conquest in the field of Metaphysics, and is one of those very few metaphysical doctrines which may be considered as solidly established. According to it space and time are the forms of our perceptual faculty, belong to this and not to the things known through it: they can thus never be a determination of things in themselves, but attach to the *appearance* of these alone, which is all that can be apprehended by our physiologically-conditioned consciousness of the outside world. But to the thing-in-

itself, to the true essence of the world, *time* and *space* are strangers, as likewise must *multiplicity* also be: consequently that which manifests itself in the countless appearances of this sensible world can be only one—the one and identical essence. And conversely, that which presents itself as multiple, consequently in time and space, cannot be thing-in-itself, but is *appearance* only. Now this appearance, as such, exists only through our consciousness—a consciousness restricted in many ways and dependent upon an organic function—and, apart from this consciousness, is not there.

This doctrine—that all multiplicity is only apparent—that in all the individuals of this world, innumerable as may be their number concomitantly and successively, it is one and the same really and truly existing essence, present and identical in them all, that manifests itself—existed, no doubt, long before Kant—indeed, may be said to have existed from time immemorial. For in the first place, it is the main and fundamental doctrine of the oldest book in the world, the Sacred Vedas, whose dogmatic part, or rather esoteric doctrine, lies before us in the Upanishads. We there find this great doctrine on almost every page: it is repeated over and over in all sorts of different ways, and is illustrated by a variety of figures and comparisons. That it likewise formed the basis of the wisdom of Pythagoras, is, notwithstanding the scanty accounts of his philosophy that have come down to us, indubitable; while it is well known that it forms the nucleus of the Eleatic philosophy. The neo-Platonists of a later day were saturated with it, for we find them teaching "The oneness of all things makes all souls one." In the ninth century it makes its unexpected appearance in Europe in the writings of Scotus Erigena, who, under its inspiration, attempts to clothe it in the forms and expressions of the Christian

religion. Again, in the Moslem world we find it in the inspired mysticism of the Sufis. But in the West, Giordano Bruno had to expiate by an ignominious and painful death his inability to refrain from proclaiming this truth. And yet we see every one of the Christian mystics involved in its toils in spite of themselves. Spinoza's name is identified with it. In our own day, finally, when the world was standing aghast at the smoking ruins of the ancient dogmatism which the hand of Kant had laid low, this knowledge was again awakened by the eclectic philosophy of Schelling, who, amalgamating the doctrines of Plotinus, Spinoza, Kant, and Jacob Böhme with the latest results of Science, speedily constructed a whole which satisfied for a while the pressing needs of his contemporaries, and treated us to a series of variations upon the same theme, in consequence of which this doctrine was accepted by the learned world of Germany, and even spread throughout the cultured classes.[1] The only people who stand out against it are the University philosophers of our day, who have the hard task of combating the so-called "Pantheism," and who, in their terrible distress and perplexity, have recourse at one time to the most miserable sophisms, at another to the most bombastic phrases, in their attempt to patch together a decent harlequin suit in which to clothe their beloved, State-protected petticoat philosophy. In a word, the Ἓν και παν[2] has always been a subject at which fools make mock, while it provides the wise with endless matter for meditation. However, only from Kant's doctrine can it

[1] On peut assez longtems, chez notre espèce,
Fermer la porte à la raison.
Mais, dès qu'elle entre avec adresse,
Elle reste dans la maison,
Et bientôt elle en est maîtresse.—*Voltaire.*

[2] One and all.

be rigorously proved, as has been done above; although Kant himself did not do it, but, after the manner of clever orators, gave the premisses only, leaving to his hearers the pleasure of drawing the conclusion.

If, then, multiplicity and separateness belong to the *appearance* only, and it is the selfsame essence that exhibits itself in all living beings, must not the view which abolishes the distinction between the ego and the non-ego be right, and the view that maintains this distinction wrong? And so we find the latter termed "*Maya*" —*i.e.* illusion, delusion, phantasm—by the Hindus; while the former is that which we have found to lie at the base of the phenomenon of compassion, which is its actual expression. Here, then, we get to the metaphysical basis of ethics, which would consist in this, that *one* individual would immediately recognise himself, his own true essence, in *another*. In this way practical wisdom, *i.e.* rectitude and beneficence, would correspond exactly in result with the profoundest doctrine of the most advanced theoretical wisdom; and the practical philosopher, *i.e.* the just, beneficent, noble-minded man, would express by his deeds the same knowledge that the theoretical philosopher arrives at by his deepest thought, his most toilsome investigation. Meanwhile, moral excellence stands higher than any theoretical wisdom, which is always imperfect work, reaching, by the slow way of reasoning, the end which the other attains at a leap; and the morally noble man, poor though he may be in intellectual capacity, shows by his action that he is possessed of the profoundest knowledge, the highest wisdom, and puts to the blush the greatest genius, the most learned man, who by his conduct makes it clear that this great truth has ever been a stranger to his heart.

"Individuation is real; the *principium individuationis*,

with the diversity of individuals thence resulting, is the order of things in themselves. Each individual is totally different from every other. In my own self alone have I my true being; everything else is non-ego and a stranger to me."—This is knowledge, to the truth of which my flesh and blood testify: it is the underlying principle of all egoism, and expresses itself outwardly in every loveless, unjust, or malicious action.

"Individuation is mere appearance, arising through space and time, which are nothing but the cerebrally-conditioned forms of all the objects perceived by my mind: hence the multiplicity and diversity of individuals is mere appearance, *i.e.* exists only in my *presentment.* My true inward essence dwells in every living being no less immediately than it does as revealed to myself alone in my self-consciousness."—This knowledge, for which in Sanskrit the standing formula is *Tat tvam asi*, *i.e.* "This thou art," is that which breaks forth as *compassion*—that whereon depends therefore all genuine, *i.e.* disinterested virtue—that which finds actual expression in every good deed. It is to this knowledge that every petition for clemency, for charity, for mercy in lieu of strict justice, is directed in the last resort; for such appeals are reminders to those we address, that we are all the self-same essence. On the other hand, egoism, envy, hatred, persecution, harshness, vengeance, *Schadenfreude*, cruelty, appeal to the first kind of knowledge and rest satisfied with this. Why, on hearing of, still more on seeing, and most of all on doing a noble action, are we touched and filled with bliss? Is it not, in the last analysis, because beyond that multiplicity and diversity of individuals set before us by the *principium individuationis* we feel certain that there is a unity of all—a unity really present and indeed accessible to us, seeing that it has just given actual evidence of itself?

According as the one or the other mode of knowledge prevails with us, we see either the φιλια (love) or the νεικος (strife) of Empedocles arising between being and being. But if a man, animated by νεικος, should succeed in thrusting home to the inmost essence of his most hated opponent, judge of his surprise when he there discovers—himself! For just as in our dreams we ourselves exist in all the people who appear to us, so it is also in our waking hours. True, it is here less easy to see; but *Tat tvam asi.*

The predominance of one or other of these two modes of knowledge shows itself not only in individual actions, but also in that whole manner of consciousness and mood which makes the *good* character so essentially different from the *bad.* The latter feels everywhere that there is a thick wall of partition between himself and all that is external to him. The world is to him an *absolute non-ego*, and his relation to it is inherently (*ursprünglich*) hostile; and so the fundamental tone of his disposition is hatred, mistrust, envy, *Schadenfreude.* Whereas the good man dwells in an external world that is homogeneous with his own essence; to him others are not *non-ego*, but "myself over again." His fundamental (*ursprünglich*) relation to others is therefore an amicable one: he feels that in essence he is allied to all beings, and therefore he sympathises immediately with their weal and woe, and at the same time is fully persuaded that they feel similarly towards him. Hence the deep peace within him, and that cheerful, calm, contented disposition, which makes all those about him happy.

The bad man cannot count in his distress upon the assistance of others: if he calls for it, he does so without confidence; if it is given, he is not really grateful for it, but simply regards it as an act of folly on the part of those that help him. For he is incapable of

recognising his own essence in that of others, undoubted as may be the evidences of it: it is this that makes ingratitude so shocking. Then, too, the moral isolation, in which from the very nature of the case he cannot but find himself, is very liable to lead him to despair.

The good man has not the least hesitation in appealing to others for assistance, because he knows how ready he himself is to help them. For, as I said, to the one the world of men is *non-ego;* to the other it is "myself over again." The magnanimous man, who pardons his enemy and requites evil with good, is sublime, and receives the highest praise; for he recognised his own essence even where it decidedly disavowed itself.

Every quite pure kindness, every aid rendered solely out of pity for another's distress and without any motive of self-interest, is really, when we look into it, a mysterious action—mysticism carried into practice, we might call it, inasmuch as it springs ultimately from the same knowledge that constitutes the essence of all mysticism proper, and in no other way does it admit of adequate explanation. For the giving of alms, without any other motive than the desire of relieving the want from which a fellow-creature is suffering, can be explained only by the knowledge of the donor that it is his own self that appears in this pitiable plight; and his action would be impossible, did he not recognise his own essence-in-itself in the appearance of another. This is why I called compassion the great mystery of ethics.

The man who sacrifices his life for his country has become freed from the illusion that restricts existence to his own person: he extends his own essence to his compatriots, lives on in them and in the future generations for whom the sacrifice is made; and so he regards death as a wink of the eye which does not interfere with sight.

He to whom all others are always non-ego, and who even regards his own person as alone truly real, while he looks upon others as mere phantoms, who have only a relative existence in so far as they are means or hindrances to his ends, so that between him and all this non-ego there is an immeasurable distinction, a wide gulf; who thus exists solely in his own person;—such a man, in death, sees all reality and the whole world perishing with himself. Whereas he who in all other men—nay, in all living beings, discerns his own essence, his own self; whose existence therefore coalesces with that of all living creatures;—such a man loses in death but a small part of his existence: he continues to live on in all others, for in them he has ever recognised and loved his own essence, his own self, and the illusion which severed his consciousness from that of others disappears. Hereon may depend, not entirely indeed but in great measure, the different way in which extremely good and exceptionally bad men face death.

There is no epoch in which poor Truth has not had to blush for being paradoxical: and yet this is not her fault. She cannot assume the form of the prevalent error, and so with a sigh she looks to her tutelary god, Time, who with a nod assures her of victory and renown; only, his wing-strokes are so ample and slow, that in the meanwhile the individual dies. I, too, am fully aware how paradoxical this metaphysical explanation of the ethical primal-phenomenon must look to the eyes of the cultured Western world, which is accustomed to such very different bases of ethics; and yet I cannot do violence to Truth. All I can do is to support my position by a quotation which shows how this Metaphysics of ethics lay tens of centuries ago at the base of the wisdom of India: to this I point back, as did Copernicus to the cosmology of the Pythagoreans which had been rejected

by Aristotle and Ptolemy. My quotation comes from the *Bhagavadgita* (Lectio 13; 27, 28), and runs thus in A. W. v. Schlegel's translation: "He sees truly, who sees one sovereign lord existing in all animated beings and living on while they perish. Moreover he who sees this same lord everywhere present, does not injure himself by his own fault: thence he fares forward to the supreme way."

With these mere allusions to the Metaphysics of ethics I must rest content, although much still remains to be said. To say it, however, would first require a further step to be taken in *Ethics* itself; and here my road is barred, because in Europe the highest goal of ethics is placed in the two branches of moral philosophy, and all that goes beyond these is either not known or not allowed. I can therefore say no more, and to this disability must be ascribed the impossibility of showing even from afar, by the above outline of the Metaphysics of ethics, the keystone of the whole arch of Metaphysics, the real order and connexion of the *Divina Commedia.* To do this lay neither in the problem nor in my plan. For all cannot be said in one day, and it is well to confine one's answer to the question asked.

In seeking to deepen human knowledge and insight, we have always to encounter the opposition of the age, which is like a burden on our shoulders, pressing heavily to the ground and thwarting all our efforts. But let us console ourselves with the certainty that, though prejudices are against us, Truth is for us—Truth, who, when joined by her ally Time, is sure of victory, if not to-day —well, to-morrow.

BOOK V.

EXTRACTS FROM THE "PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA," VOL. II. 323

Chapter X.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE INDESTRUCTIBILITY OF OUR TRUE BEING BY DEATH

[ii Par. Chapter X.]

§ 135.

Although I have discussed this question very fully and exhaustively in my chief work,[1] it may not be amiss to add a few remarks which may serve to throw further light upon it.

One must read Jean Paul's *Selina* to see how a man of eminent intellect can struggle with the absurdities of a false notion which force themselves upon him, and which he cannot give up because they are very dear to him, while he is nevertheless all the time troubled by the inconsistencies which he is unable to digest. The false notion to which I refer is that of the individual continuance of our whole personal consciousness after death. Jean Paul's very struggles show that such notions compounded of truth and falsehood are, not (as he asserted) wholesome, but rather decidedly noxious errors. For not only do the false opposition of soul to body, and the

[1] *The World as Will and Presentment.*

raising of the whole personality to a thing-in-itself which will exist for ever, render impossible the true recognition of the indestructibility of our real essence, which is untouched by time, causality, and change—a recognition depending upon the opposition between appearance and thing-in-itself; but this false notion can never be firmly held as a surrogate of the truth, because reason always rebels anew against the absurdity herein contained, and with this absurdity sees itself compelled to reject also the truth that is bound up with it. For in the long run truth must be perfectly pure: alloyed with errors, it becomes partaker of their frailty; as granite falls to pieces when its feldspar weathers away, although quarz and mica are not subject to this weathering. Such a surrogate of truth is therefore in a parlous state.

§ 136.

If in the course ot conversation one of those many people who would like to know everything, but will learn nothing, makes inquiry as to our continued existence after death, the most appropriate and correct reply is: "After your death you will be what you were before your birth." For this answer implies the wrong-headedness of the demand that the kind of existence which has a beginning is to be without an end; besides which it intimates that perhaps there are two kinds of existence, and consequently two kinds of nothing.

Another good answer would be: "Whatever you may become after your death—even if this were nothing—will then be as natural and suitable to you as your individual organic existence is now; therefore at most you have only to fear the moment of transition. Indeed, as mature consideration shows that complete non-existence would be preferable to an existence such

as ours, the thought of ceasing to be, *i.e.* of a time in which we shall no longer exist, can, if we are reasonable, no more trouble us than the thought of never having come into existence. Now as this existence is essentially a personal one, it follows that the end of personality is not to be regarded as a loss."

The man, on the other hand, who, on the objective and empirical path, has followed the plausible lead of Materialism, and now turns to us in terror over the total annihilation by death that stares him in the face, will perhaps be reassured more quickly, and in the way best suited to his empirical apprehension of things, if we clearly point out the difference between matter and the always metaphysical force which is in temporary possession of it; taking, for example, a bird's egg, and showing him how, as soon as the requisite temperature is reached, its homogeneous and formless fluidity assumes the exceedingly complex and definite form of the peculiar species of bird whose egg it is. In a sense this is, however, a kind of *generatio æquivoca;*[1] and it is exceedingly probable that each new member of the upward-climbing series of animal forms arose, in some favourable hour of far-off primitive times, by a spring to a type higher than that of the creature to which the egg belonged. Be that as it may, there here appears something obviously differing from matter—more especially as it fails to make its appearance, if the circumstances are in the least degree unfavourable. Hence we feel that, after the accomplishing or the subsequent hindrance of its operations, this something may depart from matter uninjured; and this points to a quite other kind of permanence than the persistence of matter in time.

[1] Spontaneous generation.

§ 137.

To a being—if we can conceive such—who knew, understood, and took in everything, the question, "Do we continue after death?" would probably convey no meaning at all: for beyond our present temporal, individual existence "continuing to be" and "ceasing to be" would have no significance and be indistinguishable concepts; and so, neither the concept "perishing" nor the concept "continuance"—both of them being borrowed from time, which is merely the form of the appearance—would apply to our real true being—in other words, to the thing-in-itself which reveals itself in our phenomenal appearance. Meanwhile we can only think of the *indestructibility* of this kernel of our appearance as a continuance of that kernel—a continuance according to the schema of *matter*, which matter persists in time under all changes of forms. Or if we deny continuance to this kernel, it means that we look upon our temporal end as an annihilation according to the schema of form, which form disappears when the matter supporting it is withdrawn. In both cases, however, there is a *μεταβασις εἰς ἀλλο γενοσ*[1]—in other words, a transference of the forms of the appearance to the thing-in-itself. But of an indestructibility which is not a continuance we can hardly form any abstract concept, because there is no percept to which we can appeal for its verification.

Really, however, the constant arising of new beings and the annihilation of those that at present exist is to be regarded as an illusion produced by the apparatus of the two polished glasses (functions of the brain), through which we are forced to look: they are called space and time, and, when they interpenetrate each other, causality. For everything we perceive under these conditions is

[1] Passing over into another kind.

mere appearance; and we can never know things as they are in themselves, *i.e.* independently of our perception. This is really the core of the Kantian philosophy, of the tenour and substance of which people cannot be too often reminded at the close of a period in which venal charlatanry[1] has, by its stultifying process, ejected philosophy from Germany — finding willing helpers among those[2] with whom truth and intellect count for nothing, and stipends and money-rewards are the all-important things.

§ 138.

How, at the sight of a man's *death*, can we possibly think, "Here a thing-in-itself has become nothing"? Surely everyone must perceive immediately and intuitively that only an appearance in time (that form of all appearances) here finds its end, and that the thing-in-itself is in no wise affected; and therefore in all ages people have endeavoured to express this knowledge—in the most different forms of speech, it is true, but all taken from the appearance and relating really to this alone. Everyone feels that he is something quite other than a being created once upon a time out of nothing by somebody else. Hence arises in him the assurance that, though death may be the end of his life, it is not the end of his existence. The man is something more than an animated nothing—aye, and the *beast* too. Anyone who believes that his existence is confined to his present life accounts himself an animated nothing; for thirty years ago he was nothing, and in thirty years more he will again be nothing.

[1] The Hegelian philosophy.
[2] The Professors of philosophy.

§ 139.

The more distinctly conscious a man is of the perishableness, vanity, and dreamlike character of all things, the more distinctly conscious will he be also of the eternity of his own inner essence, because the former quality of things is really known only by contrast with the latter; just as we perceive how swiftly our ship is moving only by glancing at the fixed shore, and not by looking at the ship itself.

§ 140.

The *present* consists of two complemental parts—one *objective*, the other *subjective*. The objective alone has the perceivance of *time* for its form, and therefore rolls unceasingly onwards; the subjective stands immovable, and is therefore always the same. Hence spring our vivid recollection of things long past, and the consciousness of our imperishableness notwithstanding the knowledge of the fleeting character of our existence.

Every man may think that his inmost kernel is something that contains the *present* and carries this about with it. At whatever period we may live, we always stand, with our consciousness, in the centre of time, never at its extremities, and may thence infer that everyone bears within himself the immovable centre of the whole of infinite time. It is this, at bottom, that gives him the confidence with which he goes on living without dreading death. But he who, through the strength of his memory and imagination, can most vividly represent to himself the long-past events of his own life, will be most clearly conscious of the *identity of the Now in all time*. If inverted, this proposition may perhaps be even truer. But be that as it may, this clear

consciousness of the identity of every Now is an essential requisite of the philosophical disposition. By means of it one grasps that most fleeting of all things, the Now, as the thing that alone persists. He who in this intuitive way becomes aware that the *present* (the sole form of all reality, in the narrowest sense) has its source *in us*—wells forth, that is, not from without but from within—cannot doubt the indestructibility of his own being. No; he will understand that though at his death the objective world, together with the intellect which is the medium of its representation, perishes for him, yet this does not affect his existence; for within there was just as much reality as without. Such a man will say with full understanding of its meaning: "I am all that has been, and is, and shall be" (*Stob. Floril.*, tit. 44, 42; vol. ii. p. 201).

He who does not admit this, must assert the contrary and say: "Time is something purely objective and real, which exists entirely independently of me. I am only accidentally thrown into it—have only got possession of a minute fragment of it, and have thus obtained a fleeting reality, like thousands of others before me who now no longer exist, and I too shall very soon be nothing. But time is real; it will go on without me." I think that the radical wrongheadedness and absurdity of this view must be apparent from the strong way in which I have here put it.

All this shows that life may certainly be regarded as a dream, and death as an awakening. But the personality, the individual, belongs to the dreaming and not to the waking consciousness, and to the latter death therefore looks like annihilation. But in any case, from this point of view, death is to be regarded not as a passing to a quite new and strange state, but rather as a return to the original state which is ours by nature, and of which life was merely a brief episode.

However, let no philosopher imagine that in dying he will have the peculiar consolation, or at least the diversion, of solving a problem that has so constantly occupied his thoughts; for the chances are, that he will be like a man whose lantern blows out just as he is on the point of finding what he is looking for.

For in death consciousness undoubtedly perishes; whereas that which produced consciousness most certainly does not perish. Consciousness, I say, depends immediately upon the intellect, which in its turn depends upon a physiological process. For it is evidently a function of the brain, and is therefore conditioned by the combined operation of the nervous and vascular systems, and more particularly by the agitation of the brain (which is nourished, quickened, and kept in constant motion by the heart), through whose elaborate and mysterious construction, which Anatomy describes but Physiology does not understand, there are brought about two effects—the phenomenon of the objective world and the working of our thoughts. *Individual consciousness*—any kind of consciousness, that is—cannot be imagined in an *incorporeal being;* for knowledge, which is the condition of every consciousness, is necessarily a cerebral function, seeing that the intellect exhibits itself objectively as a brain. Now as the intellect is thus physiologically—*i.e.* in empirical reality, in the phenomenal appearance—a secondary, a result of the life-process; so is it also psychologically secondary, as contrasted with the Will, which alone is the primary and aboriginal. The very organism itself is, however, really only the Will exhibiting itself perceptually and objectively in the brain, whose forms (space and time) it therefore assumes—as I have explained over and over, especially in the *Will in Nature*, and in chapter xx. of the Supplements to my chief work. Seeing, then, that

consciousness does not depend immediately upon the Will, but is conditioned by the intellect, which in its turn is conditioned by the organism, there can be no doubt that consciousness is extinguished by death, as it is by sleep and by every swoon.[1] But tell me, pray, what sort of consciousness is this of ours?—a cerebral and somewhat heightened animal-consciousness; for, as far as its essence is concerned, we share it with all the animals, although it reaches its highest point in us. In respect of its aim and origin it is, as I have sufficiently proved, a mere μηχανη[2] of Nature, an expedient for helping the animal existence to satisfy its wants; whereas the condition to which we revert at death is our original state, *i.e.* the natural state of the essence whose primitive force exhibits itself in the production and maintenance of the life which is just now ceasing. It is, I mean, the state of the thing-in-itself as contra-distinguished from the phenomenal appearance. Now in this aboriginal condition such a makeshift as cerebral knowledge, which is without doubt in the highest degree mediate, and therefore can yield only appearances, is entirely superfluous; and it is just for this reason that we lose it. Its falling away is indistinguishable from the ceasing for us of the world-as-appearance, whose mere medium it was—serving no other end. Even should we be allowed the option of retaining this animal consciousness in our aboriginal state, we should certainly reject it, as the patient cured of his lameness throws away his crutches. Thus the man who bewails the impending loss of this cerebral consciousness, which is suited to the phenomenal appearance alone and only

[1] It would certainly be delightful if the intellect did not perish at *death;* for we should then carry into the next world the Greek we have learnt in this.—Au.

[2] Device, contrivance.

capable of grasping this, would be like that Greenland convert who declined to go to heaven when he heard there were no seals there.

Besides, all that has here been said depends upon the assumption that *we* cannot possibly picture to ourselves a *not unconscious* state otherwise than as a state of *knowledge* containing the fundamental form of all knowledge, the partition into subject and object, a knower and a known. But we must remember that this whole form of knowing and being known is conditioned merely by our animal and therefore quite secondary and derivative nature, and that it is by no means the aboriginal state of all being and all existence, which may be of a totally different kind and yet *not unconscious*. Even our own present being is, so far as we can pierce to its core, mere *Will*, which in-itself is knowledgeless. And if death does rob us of our intellect, we shall only be put back into our original *knowledgeless* state, which, however, is not therefore absolutely *unconscious*, but will rather be a state raised above the aforesaid form—a state in which the opposition of subject and object ceases to exist; because here the thing to be known would become actually and immediately one with the knower, and so the fundamental condition of all knowing—which consists precisely in that opposition—is lacking. For the elucidation of this matter, compare *W. as W. & P.*, Supp., p. 310; and as another expression of what is said both here and there, take the words of Giordano Bruno (ed. Wagner, i. 287): "La divina mente, e la unità assoluta senza specie alcuna, è ella medesima lo che intende e lo ch'è inteso."[1]

In his heart of hearts, perhaps every man has at some time or other felt that quite another kind of

[1] The divine mind—the absolute identity without distinction of species—is that which understands and is understood.

existence would be really more suitable to him than this so inexpressibly scurvy, temporal, individual existence, with all its woes—and that death might lead him back to it.

§ 141.

If now, in contrast to this inwardly-directed way of looking at things, we once more look *outwards* and apprehend the world quite objectively, death certainly appears to us as a passing into nothing, and birth on the other hand as an issuing from nothing. Neither the one nor the other, however, can be unconditionally true, for each has only the reality of the phenomenal appearance. That we should in some sense outlive death is, moreover, no greater miracle than that of generation, which we witness daily. What dies passes away to the place from whence all life—one's own included—proceeds. In this sense the Egyptians called Orcus "Amenthes," which according to Plutarch (*De Is. et Osir.*, c. 29) signifies "the taker and giver"—meaning, that to the source from which all issues all will return. From this point of view our life should be regarded as a loan obtained from Death; and sleep would be the daily interest on this loan. Death proclaims itself without reserve as the end of the individual, but in this individual lies the germ of a new being. Accordingly nothing, of all that dies, dies for ever; but also, nothing that is born receives a perfectly new existence. That which dies perishes; but there remains a seed, from which proceeds a new being, which now steps into existence, without knowing whence it comes, and why it is as it is. This is the mystery of *Palingenesis*, as an explanation of which the reader may regard the forty-first chapter of the Supplements to my chief work. Hence it is evident that all beings alive at this moment

contain the real kernel of all those that are to live in the future, and these are therefore in a sense already existent. Thus every animal in the prime of life seems to cry to us: "Why do you bewail the transitoriness of living creatures? How could I exist, had not all the members of my species who preceded me died?" Great, therefore, as are the changes in the pieces and the masks on the stage of the world, the actors nevertheless remain the same always. We sit together and talk and excite each other, and eyes flash and voices grow loud; and just so did *others* sit thousands of years ago. All was the same, and *they* were *the same;* and so will it be thousands of years hence. It is *time* that prevents us from seeing all this.

We might define *Metempsychosis* as a transference of the whole so-called soul to another body, and *Palingenesis* as the *decomposition* and reconstitution of the individual, since his *Will* alone persists and, taking the form of a new being, receives a new intellect: thus the individual is decomposed after the manner of a neutral salt, whose base then unites with another acid to form a new salt. The distinction between Metempsychosis and Palingenesis as drawn by Servius, the commentator on Virgil, a *résumé* of which is given in *Wernsdorffii Dissertat. de metempsychosi*, p. 48, is obviously false and untenable.

From Spence Hardy's *Manual of Buddhism* (pp. 394–396; cf. also pp. 429, 440, and 445), Sangermano's *Burmese Empire*, p. 6, and *Asiatic Researches*, vi. 179 and ix. 256, we see that Buddhism has two doctrines with regard to continuance after death—one exoteric and the other esoteric. The former is simple Metempsychosis, as in Brahmanism, but the latter is a Palingenesis very much harder to understand: it is in close agreement with my doctrine of the

metaphysical continuance of the Will, as contrasted with the merely physical constitution and consequent perishableness of the intellect. The word παλιγγενεσια occurs in the New Testament.

If, in order to dive deeper into the mystery of Palingenesis, we here call to our aid the forty-third chapter of the Supplements to my chief work, this closer examination of the subject will show that throughout all time the male sex has been the preserver of the Will, and the female sex of the intellect of the human race, which thus continues to exist. In this way every person has one constituent derived from his father and one derived from his mother; and these constituents, which were united by generation, are dissociated by death, which is thus the end of the individual. It is this individual whose death we so grievously lament, feeling as we do that he is actually lost, since he was a mere combination, which now ceases and can never recur. However, we must never forget that the inheritance of the intellect from the mother is not so decided and unconditioned as the inheritance of the Will from the father, owing to the secondary and purely physical nature of the intellect and its complete dependence upon the organism, not only in respect of the brain, but in other respects also, as is set forth in the aforesaid chapter.

I may mention in passing, that while I agree with Plato's distinction between the mortal and immortal part of his so-called soul, he is nevertheless diametrically opposed to me and to truth in regarding the intellect—as did all his predecessors in philosophy—as the immortal, and the Will (*i.e.* the seat of the desires and passions) as the mortal part—as may be seen from the *Timæus*, pp. 386, 387, and 395, ed. Bip. And Aristotle lays down the same doctrine.

Strange and problematic, however, as is the influence

exerted by the physical element in generation and death, as well as in the evident composition of individuals from Will and intellect, and in the subsequent dissolution of this partnership; yet the underlying metaphysical element is of so completely heterogeneous a nature that it is not disturbed thereby, and we may rest consoled.

We may therefore contemplate every human being from two opposite points of view. From the one he is the fleeting, transitory individual with a temporal beginning and end, σκιας ὀναρ,[1] and sore laden into the bargain with faults and woes. From the other he is the indestructible primal-essence which objectifies itself in all that exists, and, as such, may say with the statue of Isis at Sais: ἐγω ειμι παν το γεγονος, και ὀν, και ἐσομενον.[2]

No doubt such a being might do better than exhibit itself in a world such as this of ours. For it is a world of finitude, suffering, and death. All that is in it and from it, must end and die. Only that which is not from it, and which will not be from it, shoots all-vanquishingly across it, like an upward flash of lightning, and knows neither time nor death. To reconcile all these contradictions is really the theme of philosophy.

§ 142.

A diverting Argument in the form of a brief Dialogue.

THRASYMACHUS.—Come, tell me in a word, What am I after my death? I want a plain answer.

PHILALETHES.—Everything and nothing.

THRAS.—Ah, there you are! By way of giving a solution, you state a contradiction. The dodge is as old as the hills.

PHIL.—To answer transcendent questions in speech

[1] The dream of a shadow. [2] I am all that was, and is, and is to be.

provided for immanent knowledge, cannot but lead to contradictions.

THRAS.—What do you mean by transcendent and immanent knowledge? My Professor, it is true, uses these terms, but only as predicates of Almighty God, with whom alone, as is right and proper, his philosophy is concerned. If God is hidden in the world, he is immanent; but if he sits somewhere up there, he is transcendent. Look now! that is clear, that is comprehensible! Here we know what we are talking about. But who in these days is going to understand your old-fashioned Kantian terms? Current opinion (*das Zeitbewusstseyn der Jetztzeit*),[1] issuing from the metropolis of German science—

PHIL. (*aside*).—German philosophical claptrap—

THRAS.—through a long line of eminent men, conspicuous among whom stand the great Schleiermacher and that gigantic intellect Hegel, has given up all that, or rather has made such an advance that it has left Kant behind it and knows him no longer. Well, fire away!

PHIL.—Transcendent knowledge is that which, passing beyond all possibility of experience, strives to determine the essence of things as they are in themselves; whereas immanent knowledge is that which keeps within the limits of the possibility of experience, but can therefore speak only of phenomenal appearances. You, as an individual, end with your death. The individual, however, is not your true and ultimate essence, but only its mere outward manifestation; not the thing-in-itself, but only its appearance, which exhibits itself in the form of time and accordingly has a beginning and end. Your essence-in-itself, on the contrary, knows neither time nor beginning, nor end, nor the limits of a given

[1] Schopenhauer had a horror of these cacophonous words—especially of the latter.—TR.

individuality; it can therefore be excluded from no individuality, but exists in each and all. Therefore in the first sense you will become nothing at your death; in the second, you are and will always be everything. Your question hardly admits of any more correct short answer than this one, which, however, of course contains a contradiction, because your life is in time, but your immortality in eternity. The latter may therefore also be termed an indestructibility without continuance—though this again amounts to a contradiction. But so it must ever be when things transcendent are brought into immanent knowledge; we do immanent knowledge a kind of violence, if we apply it to that for which it was never intended.

Phras.—Hark! If my individuality is not to continue, I would not give a farthing for all your immortality.

Phil.—Patience! and let's see if we can still do business together. Suppose I guaranteed you the continuance of your individuality, with the one proviso that, before awaking, you were to pass three months in a perfectly unconscious sleep of death.

Thras.—Well, I should agree to that.

Phil.—But as in a perfectly unconscious state there is no measure of time, it does not matter whether, while we are lying in this sleep of death, three months elapse in the world of consciousness or ten thousand years. Whichever it be, we have to take it on trust when we wake up. So it is all one to you whether your individuality is restored to you after three months, or after ten thousand years.

Thras.—Certainly; I can't deny it.

Phil.—Suppose, now, after ten thousand years, the person whose business it was to wake you clean forgot it. I think that you would have grown so much accustomed to this long non-existence, after your very short

period of existence, that this would be no great hardship. At any rate, you could not possibly know anything about it; and you would be entirely consoled, if you knew that the secret spring which keeps your present phenomenal-appearance going has never, throughout those ten thousand years, ceased to present and set in motion other appearances of the same kind.

THRAS.—Aha! and you think you are going to filch away my individuality, without my knowing anything about it. But you are not going to make a fool of *me* like that. I stipulate for the continuance of my individuality, and no springs and appearances will console me for the loss of it. It is very dear to me, and I mean to keep fast hold of it.

PHIL.—Do I understand you to say that you find your individuality so agreeable, excellent, perfect, and incomparable that there can be none better, and that therefore you would not exchange it for some other, of which it could be said that life in it would be preferable and easier?

THRAS.—My individuality, look you, be it what it may, is part and parcel of myself—it is myself:

> Mir geht nun auf der Welt nichts über mich:
> Denn Gott ist Gott, und ich bin ich.[1]

I, I, I will to exist! My heart is set upon *my own* existence, and not upon an existence which I must be reasoned into believing to be mine.

PHIL.—But just look a moment! That which calls out "I, I, I will to exist" is not you alone, but everything—yes, everything—that has the slightest trace of consciousness. Consequently this desire in you is precisely that which is *not* individual, but common to all

[1] Nothing can in the world above me lie:
For God is God, and I am I.

beings without exception. It springs not from individuality, but from existence in general—and is of the very essence of every being that exists—nay, is that *whereby* it exists and consequently receives satisfaction through existence *in general*, to which alone it has reference, and not simply through some one definite individual existence. For to such an individual existence it is not directed, although it always seems to be so, because it can come to consciousness only in an individual being, and so always appears to have reference to such a being alone. This, however, is a mere illusion, to which indeed the individual in his narrow prejudice clings, but which reflection can dispel and free us from. For what so vehemently desires existence is merely *mediately* the individual. Immediately and really it is the Will-to-live in general, which in all beings is one and the same. Now existence—which is itself its free work, and indeed its reflected image—it cannot evade; but it is provisionally satisfied by existence in general—as far satisfied, that is, as the ever-unsatisfiable can be. Individualities are a matter of indifference to it: it really does not speak of them, although to the individual who immediately perceives it only in himself it does seem to speak of individuals. Hence the extreme care with which it watches over its own existence (a care which otherwise would not be taken), and thus assures the maintenance of the species. And so we see that individuality is not a perfection, but a limitation; and to be relieved of it is not a loss, but rather a gain. Rid yourself, therefore, of a care which, if you only knew your own essence thoroughly—namely, as the universal Will-to-live, which you are—would seem to you childish and exceedingly absurd.

Thras.—It is you who are childish and exceedingly absurd—like all philosophers; and it is only for his own

amusement and pastime that a staid man like myself talks for a quarter of an hour with fools like you. I have got better things to do; goodbye!

Chapter XI.

CONCERNING THE VANITY OF EXISTENCE

[ii *Par.* Chapter xi.]

§ 144.

What *has been* exists no longer; it no more exists than that which has *never* been; but all that is, is past and gone the next moment. Hence the most insignificant present has over the most significant past the advantage of actuality, and is thus related to it as something to nothing.

After thousands upon thousands of years of non-existence we suddenly, to our great surprise, find ourselves existing, and after a short time pass once more into non-existence. This cannot be, says our heart; and even in the least cultured intellect considerations of this kind must awaken a suspicion of the ideality of time, which, together with the ideality of space, is the key to all true Metaphysics; because through it place is won for a quite other order of things than that of Nature. This is what makes Kant so great.

To every event of our lives "Is" attaches only for a moment; for ever after we must say "Was." Every evening we are the poorer by a day. The spectacle of

this running down of the sands of our brief life would, perhaps, drive us mad, were it not that in the depths of our inmost being there lies a secret consciousness that to us belongs the inexhaustible fount of eternity from which our life will be constantly replenished.

From considerations such as these it would appear to be a sound doctrine, that to enjoy the present and to make this the end of our life is the height of wisdom; for the present alone is real, and all else is chimerical. But it might just as well be called the height of *folly;* for that can never be worth seriously striving for, which the next moment no longer exists, but has vanished as completely as a dream.

§ 145.

Our existence is grounded upon the fleeting present. Hence constant *motion*, without a possibility of the repose for which we are always striving, is of the very essence of its form. It is like a man running down hill, who will fall if he stops and only keeps his feet by continuing to run; or like a rod balanced on the finger-tips; or like the planet, which would fall into its sun the moment it ceased its onward course. This unrest is the type of existence.

In such a world—where no stability of any kind, no enduring state, is possible, but all is involved in ceaseless whirl and change, all hurries, flies, keeps erect on its rope only by constant walking and motion—felicity is a thing not to be even thought of. It cannot dwell where Plato's "constant becoming and never being" alone finds place. For first: No one is happy, but every man strives his whole life long for some fancied happiness, which he seldom reaches, and, if he does, it is only to find it illusion; but the rule is, that he comes into harbour at last with his craft battered and dis-

masted. And, after all, what does it matter whether he has been fortunate or unfortunate in a life which consisted merely of a transient present, and is now at an end?

Meanwhile we cannot help wondering how, in the world of men and animals, all this manifold and ceaseless motion is produced and kept going by the two simple springs, hunger and the sexual instinct, aided, it is true, by a slight dash of ennui; and how these can serve as the *primum mobile*[1] of the infinitely complex machine that keeps the various puppets in motion.

But if we examine things more narrowly, we see the existence of the inorganic attacked every moment and finally destroyed by chemical forces; while that of organic beings is made possible only by that constant change of matter which demands a continual flow, and consequently help from without. Thus, in its very self, organic life resembles an upright rod, which, to preserve its balance on the hand, must be kept always moving; and it is therefore a constant need, an ever-recurring want, an endless trouble. Still, consciousness is made possible only by this organic life. So much for finite existence, the antithesis to which would be *infinite existence*, exposed to no attack from without and requiring no assistance from without, and therefore ἀει ὡσαυτως ὀν,[2] in everlasting peace, οὐτε γιγνομενον, οὐτε ἀπολλυμενον,[3] without change, without time, without multiplicity and diversity—the negative knowledge of which is the fundamental note of Plato's philosophy. It is surely an existence of this kind to which the dissent from the Will-to-live opens the way.

[1] First source of motion.
[2] Always existing thus.
[3] Neither becoming, nor passing away.

§ 146.

The scenes of our life are like pictures in coarse mosaic, which, to produce their effect, must be seen from a distance. Therefore the securing of some coveted possession leads only to the discovery that it is worthless, and we always live in the expectation of something better, while at the same time we often look with longing regret upon the past; whereas the present is put up with for a season only, and valued only as a means to an end. Hence most people, on reviewing their life at its close, find that they have all along been living *ad interim*, and are amazed to see that what they allowed to slip by unappreciated and unenjoyed was their very life—was precisely that in the expectation of which they were living. And so the experience of most men is this: that, dupes of hope throughout their lives, they leap at last into the arms of death.

Then there is the insatiability of the individual Will, as the result of which every satisfaction does but engender a new desire, and its infinite craving can never be stilled. This is because the Will is in-itself the Lord of the worlds, to whom everything belongs, and who therefore will not be satisfied with anything short of the infinite whole. But how it must move us to pity, to mark how uncommonly little this Lord of the worlds gets in his individual appearance—as a rule, no more than just suffices to maintain the individual body. Hence his deep woe.

§ 147.

In our day—distinguished as it is by impotence of thought and reverence for the bad of all kinds, and admirably as it is described by the word *Jetztzeit*,[1] a word

[1] Now time, period: as in the phrase "girl of the period."

not to be found in any dictionary, and as cacophonous as it is pretentious, for it implies that its "Now" is the now κατ' ἐξοχην,[1] the Now to produce which all previous Nows have existed—the Pantheists have the effrontery to say that life is what they call a *Selbstzweck* (end in itself). Now really, if this existence of ours is the final end and object of the world, it is the foolishest end that ever was, whosesoever's appointment it may be —our own or somebody else's.

Life presents itself primarily as a problem—viz. that of maintenance, *de gagner sa vie*. This solved, our possessions become a burden, and there arises this second problem—viz. how to ward off the ennui which pounces, like a lurking bird of prey, on every life of leisure. Thus the first problem is to get something, and the second, how, when it is got, to make our possessions imperceptible, so as to avoid their being a burden.

That human existence must be some kind of aberration, becomes plain enough on simply observing that man is a concrement of wants, the hard-won satisfaction of which procures him nothing but a painless state in which he infallibly falls a victim to ennui, thereby proving clearly that in itself existence is of no value, for it is nothing but the feeling of the emptiness of existence. Surely if life, in the desire for which our essence and existence consist, had any positive intrinsic value of its own, it could not possibly engender ennui, and mere existence would of itself satisfy us. But, as a matter of fact, we do not enjoy existence unless—(1) there is a struggle, and then the distance and the hindrances make the goal appear desirable—an illusion which disappears when it is reached; or (2) unless we engage in some purely intellectual occupation—in which

[1] *Par excellence.*

case, however, we are really stepping out of life in order to contemplate it from without, like spectators in the boxes of a theatre. Even sensual enjoyment consists in a perpetual striving, and ceases the moment its goal is attained. If we are in neither of these two cases, but are sent back to existence itself, we become convinced of its worthlessness and vanity, and that is ennui. The inborn and ineradicable craving for the marvellous, again, teaches us how welcome is the interruption of the insufferably tedious natural-order of the ordinary course of things.

The magnificent display of the great in their pompous fêtes is also at bottom nothing but a vain attempt to transcend the essential poverty of our existence. For what, when critically examined, are precious stones, pearls, feathers, crimson velvet, wax candles, the putting on and off of masks, &c. &c.?

§ 148.

The most perfect appearance of the Will-to-live, which exhibits itself in the wondrously complex machinery of the human organism, must crumble to dust, and thus its whole being and striving becomes at last the manifest victim of annihilation. This is the way in which Nature, who is always true and frank, naïvely announces that the whole striving of this Will is essentially futile. Had it anything of value in it—anything worthy of being unconditionally preserved—it would not have non-existence for its goal. The feeling of this it is, that gives the key-note to Goethe's beautiful song:

> Hoch auf dem alten Thurme steht
> Des Helden edler Geist.[1]

[1] High on the ancient tower stands
The hero's noble ghost.

Death is necessary, because man is a mere appearance and no thing-in-itself, no ὀντως ὀν.[1] If he were, he could not perish. That the basal thing-in-itself can exhibit itself only in appearances of this kind, is a consequence of its constitution.

But what a gulf there is between our beginning and our end!—the former in the frenzy of desire and the ecstasy of sensual bliss; the latter in the destruction of all the organs and in the musty odour of corpses. And the path from birth to death lies, in respect of well-being and pleasure, always down hill; blissfully dreaming childhood, blithesome youth, toilsome manhood, sickly and often pitiable old-age, the torture of the last illness, and finally the death-agony—is it not clear that existence is a false step, whose consequences became gradually plainer and plainer?

The truest view of life is to look upon it as a *disengaño*, a disillusionment; everything shows this clearly enough.

Chapter XII.

CONCERNING THE SUFFERING OF THE WORLD

[ii *Par.* Chapter xii.]

§ 149.

If suffering is not the immediate aim and object of life, I can only say that our existence is the most purposeless thing in the world. For it is absurd to suppose that the

[1] Real and true being.

infinite sorrow which pervades the whole world, and which springs from the troubles essential to life, could be aimless and purely accidental. Each particular misfortune does, indeed, appear to be an exception; but general misfortune is the rule.

§ 150.

As the brook forms no eddy unless it meets with some obstruction; so, in human as in animal life, we are hardly or not at all aware of what goes on in accordance with our Will. When we are conscious of something, it means that things are not going on in accordance with our Will, but are meeting with some obstacle.

On the other hand, what thwarts, crosses, opposes our Will—all that is disagreeable and painful in life—we feel at once and very plainly. As we do *not feel* the health of our own body, but only the small spot where the shoe pinches; so we do not think of all the things that go well with us, but only of some insignificant trifle that vexes us. On this rests the doctrine which I am always preaching—the negativity of well-being and happiness, as contrasted with the positivity of pain.

Nothing, therefore, is to me more absurd than the declaration of most metaphysical systems, that evil is negative; for it is most certainly positive—the thing that is making itself felt. There is no greater sinner in this matter than Leibnitz, who (*Théod.*, § 153) tries to make out his case by a palpable and pitiable sophism. No; the good—*i.e.* all happiness and all satisfaction—is the negative, viz. the mere removal of the desire, the ending of a pain. As a corroboration, observe that as a rule pleasures fall far below, and pains rise high above, our expectation.

To those who desire in the shortest way to test the assertion that pleasure outweighs pain in the world, or at least that they balance each other, let me say: Compare the feelings of the cat with those of the mouse under her claws.

§ 151.

The most effectual consolation in any misfortune, in any suffering, is to turn our thoughts to those who are still worse off than ourselves. Everyone can do this. But what is the nett result of it?

We are like lambs frisking in the meadows, while the butcher is selecting first one and then another. For we know not, in our happy days, what calamity Fate may at this very moment be preparing for us—sickness, persecution, poverty, mutilation, blindness, madness, &c.

Everything we touch resists, for it has a will of its own which must be overcome. History shows us the life of nations, and finds nothing to relate but wars and insurrections; the peaceable years appear only here and there as short pauses, *entr' actes*. And just so, the life of each individual is a perpetual battle—not merely metaphorically with want or ennui, but also actually with others. Not one of us but has his adversary—but lives a life of constant warfare, and dies weapon in hand.

§ 152.

It is no small addition to the worries of existence, that time is always hurrying us on, never giving us a moment to breathe, and standing behind us like an overseer with his whip. It only refrains from urging those whom it delivers over to ennui.

§ 153.

However, as our body would burst asunder if the pressure of the atmosphere were removed; so, if the pressure of want, toil, adversity, and frustration of our efforts were taken away from the life of men, their arrogance would rise, if not to bursting-point, yet at least to manifestations of the most unbridled folly and frenzy. Everyone requires a certain quantum of care, or pain, or trouble, to keep him steady—just as a ship requires ballast.

Work, *worry*, *toil*, and *trouble* are undoubtedly the lot of almost all men throughout their lives. But if all desires were satisfied the moment they arose, how would people employ their time? Translate them to a land of Cockaigne where everything grew of itself, where pigeons flew about ready roasted, and where every Jack at once found his Jill and had no difficulty in keeping her—and men would either die of ennui or hang themselves, or would fight, throttle, and murder each other, and so occasion more suffering than Nature now lays upon them. To such a race no other arena, no other existence, would be suitable.

§ 154.

A page or two back I reminded my readers once more of the negativity of well-being and pleasure, as contrasted with the positivity of pain. From this flows the corollary, that the happiness of any given life is not to be estimated from its joys and pleasures, but from the absence of suffering, the positive. Looked at in this way, however, the lot of the animals appears more bearable than that of man. Let us examine all this a little closer.

Multitudinous as are the forms under which man's happiness and unhappiness present themselves, inciting him to pursuit or flight, the material basis of them all is bodily enjoyment or pain. This basis is very narrow: it is either health, food, protection from wet and cold, and the satisfaction of the sexual impulse—or it is the want of these things. Man, therefore, has no more real physical enjoyments than the animal, except in so far as his more highly developed nervous-system heightens the feeling of every enjoyment—heightening, however, at the same time the susceptibility to pain. But how much stronger are the emotions and passions awakened in the man, than those of the animal! How far more deeply and keenly is his spirit stirred! and yet in the end there is only the same result to be attained: health, food, raiment, &c.

This is so, in the first place, because his outlook is so greatly extended by the thought of the absent and future, which introduce care, fear, and hope into existence—affections which now have far stronger influence upon him than the present reality of pleasures or sufferings to which the animal is restricted. Wanting reflection, the animal has no condenser of joys and sufferings, which therefore cannot accumulate (as they do with man) through memory and prevision. With the animal the suffering of the moment, even though it may have been repeated over and over, remains always what it was at first—the suffering of the moment, and is not cumulative. Hence the enviable freedom from care, the peace of mind, enjoyed by the animal; whereas, by means of reflection and all it entails, there is developed in man, from the very same elements of enjoyment and suffering which the animal has in common with him, an enhancement of the feeling of his happiness and unhappiness, which may lead to instantaneous and

at times even fatal ecstasy, or to the desperation of suicide. Looked at more closely, the process is as follows. Man's needs are originally but little harder to satisfy than those of the animal; but he intensifies them on purpose, so as to heighten the enjoyment. Hence luxury, dainties, tobacco, opium, spirituous liquors, display, and all that attaches thereto. Moreover, in consequence of his power of reflection, he alone taps a new source of pleasure—and consequently of suffering—which gives him more trouble perhaps than all the rest put together—viz. ambition, and a sensitiveness to honour and disgrace; in sober prose, his opinion of the opinion of others about him. This now becomes in a thousand shapes—and those often of the strangest—the aim of almost all his efforts, when these rise above considerations of mere physical enjoyment or pain. True, he certainly surpasses the animal in purely intellectual pleasures of many grades, from the most trivial games or ordinary conversation to the highest mental achievements. But as a makeweight to this on the side of suffering, he is liable to ennui, which the animal, in a state of nature at least, does not know, though domesticated animals of the cleverer kinds are subject to slight attacks of it. To man it becomes a veritable scourge; notably in the case of that crowd of pitiable beings whose whole thought is how to fill not their heads but their purses, and to whom affluence brings its own penalty, for it delivers them over to torturing ennui, to escape from which they drive about, dawdle about, or travel, and the moment they reach a new place, inquire anxiously about its *resources*, just as the tramp inquires about the *sources* from which he can get *help*; for, as we know, want and ennui are the two poles of human life. I must not forget to mention in conclusion that man, for the satisfaction of his sexual impulse, exercises a peculiar

and very fastidious choice, which rises at times to more or less passionate love—a subject to which I have devoted an exhaustive chapter in the Supplements to my chief work. This passionate love becomes to him a source of long sufferings and brief joys.

Very strange is it, meanwhile, how the addition of thought, which is not possessed by animals, should build, upon the selfsame narrow basis of sufferings and joys which the animal also has, the towering and extensive edifice of human weal and woe, making man's spirit the prey of emotions and passions so agitating and violent that their imprint is stamped indelibly upon his face for all to read; whereas in very truth he is dealing with precisely the same things which the animal secures with very much less expenditure of emotions and agonies. But the result of all this is, that man's capacity for pain is far greater than his capacity for pleasure—all the more because he alone actually *knows* death; while the animal merely flies from it instinctively, without really knowing and actually looking it in the face, as does man, who has it always before his eyes. Thus, although very few animals die a natural death, most of them only having time to propagate their kind, and then, if not earlier, becoming the prey of some other animal, whereas man alone contrives to make so-called natural death the rule—a rule, however, subject to considerable exceptions; yet the animals, for the reason given above, have the advantage. Besides, man attains his really normal term of life no oftener than they; for his unnatural way of living, his violent exertions and passions, and the racial degeneration resulting from all this, seldom allow him to reach it.

Mere existence satisfies animals far more than it does us. It satisfies the plant completely; the man, only in proportion to his stupidity. And so the life of the animal

contains less suffering, but also less pleasure, than ours; for although on the one hand it remains free from *care* and *apprehension*, and all their torment, yet on the other it has no real *hope*, and so cannot partake in that mental anticipation of a joyful future, with its accompanying inspiring phantasmagory added by the imagination, that source of the most and the greatest of our joys and pleasures, and in this sense is therefore without hope—its consciousness being limited to the perceptual, and therefore to the present. The animal is the incarnation of the present: hence it has only an exceedingly limited range of hopes and fears—viz. such as are connected with the objects of which it has perceptual knowledge at the moment; whereas human hopes and fears embrace the whole of life, and even go beyond it. But for this very reason animals, as compared with us, appear in one respect really wise—viz. in their quiet, undisturbed enjoyment of the present. The evident peace of mind hence arising often makes us blush for the unquiet and unsatisfied state in which our thoughts and cares constantly keep us. And even those pleasures of hope and anticipation that I spoke of just now, have to be paid for. I mean, that the satisfaction derived in advance from hope and expectation detracts afterwards from the actual enjoyment received; for when the pleasure comes, the satisfaction it affords is by so much the less. But the animal, who has no anticipatory enjoyment, has no deductions to make, and accordingly enjoys the real actual present in its entirety. So, too, evils press upon it with their own actual weight and nothing more, whereas with us this is often increased tenfold by our fear and prevision of misfortune.

It is just this *complete absorption in the present*—which is the mark of animals—that contributes so much to the pleasure we derive from our household pets. They are

the Present personified, and make us feel (in a kind of way) the value of every untroubled and unclouded hour, while the general practice with us thinking beings is to pass it over and leave it unheeded. But this aptitude of animals for finding more satisfaction than we in mere life is abused by egoistical and heartless man, and often so exploited as to leave them absolutely nothing but bare existence. For instance, the bird formed for flight across half the globe he pens up in a cubic foot of space, wherein it slowly pines to death lamenting; for "*l'uccello nella gabbia canta non di piacere, ma di rabbia.*"[1] Again, his most trusty friend, that marvel of intelligence, the dog, he chains up! Never do I see a chained dog without feeling heartfelt compassion for him and deep indignation against his master, and I think with satisfaction of a story I read in the *Times* some few years ago of Lord ——, who kept a big dog chained. One day, as he was walking through the yard where the animal was tied, he took it into his head to go up to him to pat him, whereupon the dog tore his arm from top to bottom—and quite right! What he meant to say was: "You're not my master, but my devil, who makes my brief existence a hell!" I should like to see this happen to everybody who keeps his dog chained. To confine birds in cages, too, is gross cruelty to animals. Fancy restricting these favourites of Nature, born to roam the heavens in swiftest flight, to a cubic foot of space, in order to feed our ears upon their plaints!

§ 155.

The above considerations have taught us, that it is man's heightened faculty of knowledge that makes his

[1] The caged bird sings from rage, not pleasure.

life more painful than that of the animal; but we may now appeal to a more general law, and thus gain a far wider view of the matter. Knowledge is of itself always painless. Pain concerns the *Will* alone, and consists in the checking, hindering, thwarting of the Will; but of course this checking must be accompanied by knowledge. For as light illuminates space only when there are objects there to reflect it; as a note requires a resonance-chamber, and sound in general will not carry far unless the waves of the vibrating air break upon hard bodies, as shown by the exceedingly weak effect produced by a song in the open, and especially on high and isolated mountain-peaks; just so must the checking of the *Will*, if it is to be felt as pain, be accompanied by *knowledge*, which, however, is of itself a stranger to all pain.

Hence *physical* pain is conditioned by nerves which connect with the brain; and this is why injury to a limb is not felt when the nerves that lead from it to the brain are severed, or the brain itself deprived of its powers by chloroform. For the very same reason we hold that the moment a dying man's consciousness is extinguished, the subsequent convulsions are all painless. It is almost superfluous to add that *mental* pain is conditioned by knowledge; and that it increases with the amount of this knowledge, is evident both from the foregoing and also from § 56 of my chief work.
The whole matter may be figuratively stated as follows: The Will is represented by the strings; its hindering or checking, by their vibrations; knowledge is the resonance-chamber; and pain, the note.

According to this the plant, as well as the inorganic body, is insensible to pain, however many may be the checks received by the Will in the case of both. On the other hand, every animal—an infusorian, even—feels

pain; because knowledge, however imperfect it may be, is the true distinguishing mark of animality. As knowledge rises on the animal scale, so also does susceptibility to pain rise with it. It is therefore very trifling in amount in the lowest animals; hence, for example, insects will still go on eating when the back part of their body is nearly torn off and hangs only by a thread of gut. But even in the highest animals the absence of concepts and thought makes pain a mere nothing as compared with that suffered by man. Indeed, the highest susceptibility to pain can be reached only when, owing to the reflectiveness of reason, the possibility of dissent from the Will is present. For without this possibility great susceptibility to pain would be mere aimless cruelty.

§ 156.

In early youth we sit before our life that is to be, as children do before the curtain of a theatre, in joyful and eager expectation of the events to come. Happy we, that we know not what is actually coming! For to one who should know, the children would look like innocent delinquents condemned not indeed to death but to life, and unaware at present of all that this sentence means. Nevertheless everyone wishes to live long—that is, to attain a state in which he will say: "To-day is bad, and every day things will get worse—until the worst of all happens."

§ 157.

When, so far as in us lies, we represent to ourselves the sum-total of distress, pain, and suffering of every kind that the sun shines upon in his course, we are driven to admit that it would be far better if he had been

unable to produce the phenomenon of life upon the earth, and if the surface of this globe were at this moment, like that of the moon, in a frozen state.—

We may also regard our life as a uselessly disturbing episode in the blessed repose of nothingness. Even the man whose position in the world is just tolerable will become every day more fully aware that life is on the whole a disappointment, nay a cheat; or, in other words, wears the character of a great mystification, if not of a fraud. When, after a protracted separation, two boy-friends meet again as greybeards, the feeling uppermost in their minds, as they look at each other and think of old times, is one of total disappointment *at the whole of life*, which in former years, under the rosy sunrise of youth, looked so fair in prospect, promised so much and performed so little. So strong is this feeling at the moment of meeting, that they do not even dream of putting it into words, but both tacitly take it for granted and on this basis proceed with their conversation.—

He who has outlived *two or three generations* feels like a man at a fair who keeps his seat in the juggler's booth and sees his tricks performed several times over. He feels, I mean, that here is a performance meant to be witnessed only once, and making no further impression when the illusion is seen through and the novelty has worn off.—

It is enough to drive one mad, to contemplate Nature's lavish arrangements — the countless flaming suns in infinite space, with nothing to do but to give light to worlds which are theatres of distress and misery, and which at best yield naught but ennui—to judge at least from the specimen that we know.—

No one is greatly to be envied, but myriads are greatly to be commiserated.—

Life is a *pensum* to be worked off; in this sense *defunctus*[1] is a beautiful expression.—

If, instead of being a need accompanied by intense pleasure, the act of procreation were a matter of purely rational deliberation, does anyone think the human race would continue? Would not every man rather feel such compassion for the coming generation, that he would be glad to spare it the burden of existence, or at least would for his part refuse to lay this burden upon it in cold blood?—

The world is itself *hell;* and men are partly the tortured souls, and partly the devils.—

I expect here once more to be told that my philosophy is dismal. Well, this is because I tell the truth, whereas people want to hear that the Lord God has made all things in the best way. Go to church, you who think so, and leave philosophers in peace. At any rate do not ask them to cut their doctrines to your pattern. That we leave to the scamps, the philosophasters, whom you can commission to say whatever you please. To put the Professors of philosophy out of conceit with their prescribed optimism, is as easy as it is delightful.[2]—

It is accounted a kind of Adam's Fall, or error, in Brahma that he created the world, and he has to pay for it by living in the world himself until such time as he can find redemption [Bravo!]. In Buddhism the world comes into being through an inexplicable troubling (after a long period of repose) of the crystal clearness of the penitentially-obtained blessed state, *Nirvana*—thus by a kind of fatality, which is, however, at bottom to be understood in a moral sense; although

[1] Discharged from the painful obligations of life.

[2] The Professors were appointed, according to Schopenhauer, on the understanding that they were to support the optimistic creed of Judæo-Christianity.

the matter has its exact physical analogue and counterpart in the inexplicable origin of a primitive nebula out of which a sun is formed. After its formation the world's moral failings produce a physical effect also, making it gradually worse and worse until it eventually arrives at its present sad state [Excellent!]. To the Greeks the world and the Gods were the work of an unfathomable necessity [That will do as a stopgap theory!].

Ormuzd lives at war with Ahriman [Well, I don't object to that!]. But that a God Jehovah should create this distressful and miserable world *animi causa* and *de gaieté de cœur*, and then applaud himself with a παντα καλα λιαν,[1]—that I cannot stand. In this respect we see Judaism standing lowest among the faiths of the civilised world; and another evidence of its low position is, that it is the only religion that shows not the slightest trace of a doctrine of immortality (see *Parerga*, i. 136 f.).

Even were Leibnitz's demonstration, that of all *possible* worlds this is the best, correct, this would be no vindication of God (*Théodicée*). For the Creator has made not only the world, but also its possibility; and he ought, therefore, to have made the possibility such as to admit of a better world.

But this notion of the world as the excellent work of an all-wise, all-good, and at the same time almighty Being, is too glaringly contradicted on the one hand by the misery of which it is full, and on the other by the evident imperfection and even burlesque distortion of the most perfect of its appearances, human beings. Here is a dissonance which can never be resolved. But these are the very instances that support my argument, which regards the world as the work of our own guilt, and

[1] A reference to the "Behold it is very good" of *Gen.* i. 31.

consequently as something which would be better away. While on the first assumption men are a tremendous indictment against the Creator and furnish material for sarcastic comments; on the second they appear as an indictment of our own being and willing—an indictment calculated to humble us. For they lead us to the conviction that we, as children of dissolute fathers, come into the world laden with guilt, and that it is because we have always to be working off the debt of this guilt, that our existence is so miserable and finally ends in death. Nothing is more certain than that, speaking generally, it is the deep *sin of the world* that causes the great *suffering of the world;* and when I say this, I am speaking not of the physical and empirical, but of the metaphysical, connexion. Holding this view, it is the story of the Fall alone that reconciles me to the Old Testament: indeed in my eyes this is the sole metaphysical truth—though clothed in allegorical dress—that it contains. For to nothing does our existence bear so close a resemblance as to the consequence of an error and of a guilty lust. I cannot refrain from commending to the thoughtful reader a popular but exceedingly soul-stirring dissertation on this subject by Claudius. It is to be found, under the heading "Cursed be the ground for thy sake," in the fourth part of the *Wandsbecker Bote*, and it clearly sets forth the essentially pessimistic spirit of Christianity.

If we would have a safe compass whereby to steer in life, and a right understanding of it, nothing is more to the purpose than the accustoming ourselves to regard this world as a place of penance, a kind of penal settlement, an ἐργαστηριον (penitentiary) as it was called by the oldest philosophers (see Clem. Alex.: *Strom.*, iii. 3, p. 399), and among the Christian Fathers by Origen (see Augustine: *De civ. Dei*, x. 23), whose boldness herein is worthy of all praise. This way of viewing things

finds its theoretical and objective justification not only in my philosophy, but in the wisdom of all ages—namely, in Brahmanism, in Buddhism, in Empedocles and Pythagoras. Cicero, too (*Fragm. de philosoph.*, xii. 316, ed. Bip.), tells us that by the ancient sages and at the initiation into the Mysteries it was taught "nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vita superiore, pœnarum luendarum causa natos esse."[1] Vanini—whom it was easier to burn than to refute—gives (*De admirandis naturæ arcanis*, dial L., p. 353) the strongest expression to this view in the following passage: "Tot, tantisque homo repletus miseriis, ut si Christianæ religioni non repugnaret, dicere auderem: si dæmones dantur, ipsi, in hominum corpora transmigrantes, sceleris pœnas luunt."[2] But even in genuine Christianity, when rightly understood, our existence is conceived as the consequence of a trespass, an error. If we accustom ourselves to look upon things in this way, we shall take a right view of life, and no longer regard its annoyances, sufferings, worries, and troubles, great and small, as something abnormal and unexpected, but shall find them quite right and proper, knowing full well that here everyone is punished for his existence, each in his own special way. The society we meet in the world is one of the necessary evils which attach to a penitentiary. What it is like, those who are worthy of better society will know without my telling them. Fine natures and geniuses will feel themselves in this world much in the position of a noble prisoner of State in the galleys among common criminals; and they will follow his example, and try to

[1] That we were born in order to expiate crimes committed in a former life.

[2] Surcharged as man is with so many and so great miseries, I would venture to say, if it be not repugnant to the Christian religion: If there are demons, surely it is they who, transmigrating into the bodies of men, are suffering the punishment of their crimes.

keep themselves to themselves. There is no doubt that the taking of this view will enable us to regard the so-called imperfections—that is, the vile constitution, moral and intellectual (which imprints itself upon their very faces) of most men—without astonishment, and certainly without indignation. For we shall always remember where we are, and consequently look upon every man primarily as a being who exists only by reason of his sinfulness, and whose life is the penalty he pays for the crime of his birth. This is just what constitutes that which Christianity calls the "sinful nature of man." It is thus the basis of the beings we meet as our fellows here; besides which, owing to the constitution of this world, they are almost all, more or less, in a state of suffering and discontent by no means calculated to make them more sympathetic and kind-hearted; and moreover their intellects are almost invariably such as barely suffice for the service of their Wills. This shows the extent of our claims upon society in this world. Those who firmly keep to this point of view might call the social instinct a pernicious inclination.

Indeed, the conviction that the world—thus man also—is something that really ought not to be, is calculated to fill us with indulgence towards each other; for what can one expect of beings of which this can be predicated? Nay, from this point of view it might even occur to us that the right form of address between man and man is not *Monsieur*, Sir, and the like, but *Leidensgefährte*, *Socî malorum*, *compagnon de misères*, my fellow-sufferer. Strange as this might sound, it nevertheless corresponds to the fact, throws upon others the properest light, and reminds us of that most pressing of necessities, tolerance, patience, forbearance, love of our neighbour, which we all need and therefore owe to all.

Appendix to the foregoing.

The distinguishing mark of the things of this world, especially the human section of it, is not so much imperfection (as we so constantly hear) as distortion in all departments, moral, intellectual, and physical.—

Vices are not uncommonly excused by saying, "Oh! that's human nature"; but this is really a very insufficient excuse, and the proper rejoinder is: "Yes, the action is *natural* just because it is bad, and it is bad just because it is *natural*." To understand this aright, we must have grasped the meaning of the doctrine of original sin.—

In judging a human being, we must always remember that the basis of this individual is something which ought never to have been, something sinful, wrong—that for which he incurs the penalty of death. No one can bear to have this fundamentally bad nature of his scrutinised closely, and touchiness on this head is characteristic. But what can we expect of such a being? The very fact, however, of his possessing such a nature will lead us to judge him more indulgently; we shall not be surprised when the devils who lurk within him awake and peep out, and shall be all the more appreciative of any good quality which, in spite of them—be it in consequence of his intellect or what not—is to be found in him. Moreover, we should consider his position, remembering that life is essentially a condition of distress and often of misery, and that each individual has to fight for his existence and cannot therefore always look amiable. But were man that which all optimistic religions and philosophies pretend, viz. the work or even the incarnation of a God—in fact, a being that in every sense ought to be, and to

be just as he is; what a totally different effect from that now experienced would be produced by the first sight of each of our fellows, and by nearer acquaintance and continued intercourse with them!—

Nothing can more conduce to patience in life, and to a quiet and contented endurance of evils and people, than a Buddhistic thought of the following kind: "This is *Sansara*, the world of carnal appetite and desire—a world, therefore, of birth, sickness, old age, and death; it is a world which ought not to be. And these are the people who live in this *Sansara*. What better things, then, could you expect of them?" I should like every one to repeat this four times a day, with full consciousness of what he is saying.—

In judging any man we must always remember that he is really a being who ought never to have existed—a being who is atoning for the sin of his existence by all kinds of suffering, and finally by death. What can we expect of such a being? And are we not all sinners condemned to death? We pay the penalty of birth, first by living, secondly by dying. This is allegorised by *original sin*.—

"Pardon's the word to all" (*Cymbeline*, v. 5). We should treat every human folly, failing, and vice with indulgence, remembering that these are our own follies, failings, and vices. For they are just the failings of humanity, to which we too belong and so have all its failings in us—among them those which are now arousing our anger, merely because they do not at this particular moment proceed from us. I mean, that they are not now on the surface with us; but, for all that, there they are, lying down below and ready to emerge at the first opportunity, just as we see them doing now in others; although in one person *this* failing is prominent, in another that failing, and though it is not to be denied

that the whole mass of bad qualities is greater in one than in another. For the difference in individualities is incalculably great.

Chapter XIV.

OF THE ASSENT TO AND DISSENT FROM THE WILL TO LIVE

[ii *Par.* Chapter xiv.]

§ 162.

In a certain sense it is evident *a priori*—*vulgo*, is a matter of course—that that which now produces the phenomenon of the world must also be able to refrain from producing it—able, that is, to remain at rest; in other words, to the present διαστολη[1] there must also be a συστολη.[2] Now if the first is the phenomenal appearance of the willing-to-live, the second must be the appearance of the not-willing-to-live. The latter is substantially identical with the *magnum Sakhepat* of the Vedic doctrine (*Oupnekhat*, i. 163), the Nirvana of the Buddhists, and also with the ἐπεκεινα[3] of the Neoplatonists.

To meet a certain class of silly objections, let me say that *dissent from the Will-to-live* by no means implies the annihilation of a substance: it means only the mere act of not-willing—that selfsame thing which previously *willed*, now *ceasing to will*. But as we know this essence, the Will, as thing-in-itself, merely in and by the act of *willing*, we are unable to say or to conceive what it may

[1] Diastole, expansion. [2] Systole, contraction. [3] Beyond.

be or do after relinquishment of this act. Dissent is therefore *for us*—who are the appearance of the willing—a passing over into nothing.

§ 163.

Between the ethics of the Greeks and the Hindus there is the sharpest of contrasts. Greek morality (Plato's excepted) aims at fitting us to live a happy life, *vita beata;* whereas Hindu morality aims at delivering us from life altogether, as may be seen from the opening words of the *Sankhya Karika.*

Allied to this is the contrast so strikingly brought home to us as we look, first at the fine antique sarcophagus in the Florence Gallery—with its *relievi* depicting all the ceremonies of a wedding, from the initial proposal to the escorting of the pair to the bridal couch by the light of Hymen's torch—and then at the *Christian* coffin, black-hung in token of mourning and surmounted by a crucifix. The contrast is a most significant one. Both are intended as a consolation under death; but both take opposite ways, and both are right. The one denotes the *assent* to the Will-to-live, to which assent life is assured throughout all time, notwithstanding the frequent changes of form. The other, with its symbols of suffering and death, marks the *dissent* from the Will-to-live and the deliverance from a world ruled over by death and the devil. Between the spirit of Greco-Roman heathendom and that of Christianity the contrast is in reality that of the assent to and dissent from the Will-to-live—and in the last resort Christianity is in the right.

§ 164.

My Ethics stands to that of European philosophy in

the relation of the New Testament to the Old, as this relation is understood by the Church. The Old Testament, namely, puts man under the dominion of the law, which, however, does not lead to salvation ; whereas the New Testament declares the law to be insufficient—nay, absolves man from it (Rom. vii. ; Gal. ii. and iii.). It preaches instead the kingdom of grace, to which one attains by faith, charity, and complete self-denial ; and declares this to be the way to obtain deliverance from evil and the world. For notwithstanding all the rationalistic distortions of Protestantism, the ascetic spirit is the true soul of the New Testament. But this is just the dissent from the Will-to-live ; and that transition from Old Testament to New, from the dominion of law to that of faith, from justification by works to redemption by the Mediator, from the dominion of sins and of death to the everlasting life in Christ, signifies, *sensu proprio*, the transition from the merely moral virtues to the dissent from the Will-to-live. Now it was in the spirit of the Old Testament that all philosophical systems antecedent to mine proceeded—with their absolute (*i.e.* based upon no ground, and aiming at no goal) ethical law, and their moral injunctions and prohibitions, for all of which a directorial Jehovah is tacitly assumed—however different may be their expression of the matter and the forms it takes in their writings. But my Ethics has a ground, an aim and object. It first points out theoretically the metaphysical ground of justice and brotherly love, and then shows the goal to which these must lead when perfectly carried out. At the same time it candidly confesses the reprehensibleness of the world, and declares that only on the path of dissent from the Will is deliverance from it to be obtained. It is therefore actually in the spirit of the New Testament, while all the other systems are in the spirit of the Old,

and accordingly amount theoretically also to mere Judaism (naked, despotic Theism). In this sense my doctrine might be termed the really Christian philosophy, paradoxical as this may sound to those who, instead of penetrating to the kernel of the matter, stop short at the shell.

§ 165.

Those who are capable of thinking still more deeply will soon see that human desires do not begin to be sinful only at the point where, happening accidentally to cross each other in the directions taken by them, they cause wickedness on the one side and suffering on the other ; but that they must moreover have been originally and of their very essence sinful and reprehensible, and consequently the whole Will-to-live is itself reprehensible. Aye, all the abomination and woe, of which the world is full, is merely the necessary result of the whole of the characters in which the Will-to-live objectifies itself under circumstances which hang upon the endless chain of necessity, and which supply the characters with motives—this is the mere commentary on the assent to the Will-to-live (cf. *Theologia Deutsch*, p. 93).—Death proves that our existence itself involves guilt.

§ 166.

A noble character will hardly bewail his own fate. Rather will that which Hamlet says in praise of Horatio—

> For thou hast been
> As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing

—be applicable to him ; the reason being, that a man of this stamp identifies himself with those around him, and, in his sympathy with them, almost always finds

their lot harder than his, and so will not bewail his own misfortunes. But an ignoble egoist, who confines reality to himself and regards others as mere masks and phantasms, will have no sympathy to spare for their fate, but will spend it all upon his own; hence his acute sensitiveness and his frequent complaints.

It is just from this recognition of ourselves in the phenomenal persons of others that justice and brotherly love proceed (as I have often shown), and it leads at length to the renunciation of the Will; because the phenomenal appearances in whom this Will exhibits itself are in such a decided condition of suffering that he who extends his own self to embrace them all can no longer will to exist—just as he who buys all the tickets in a lottery is bound to be a heavy loser. Assent to the Will confines the individual's consciousness to his own self, and builds upon the possibility of a prosperous career at the hands of Chance.

§ 169.

A *monastery* is an assemblage of men vowed to poverty, chastity, and obedience (*i.e.* renunciation of self-will), who, by living together, seek in part to lighten the burden of existence itself, but still more to mitigate that state of painful renunciation to which they are pledged. For, the sight of men of like mind, all renouncing the same things, strengthens their resolution and consoles them; besides which, the sociability of a life lived in common under certain restrictions suits human nature, and is an innocent refreshment where the privations are many and severe. Here we have the normal conception of the *monastery*. And how can such a society be dubbed an association of fools and madmen, as it is by all philosophies except mine?—

The inner spirit and meaning of genuine monastic life, as of asceticism in general, is this: we recognise that we are deserving and capable of a better existence than ours, and desire to strengthen and maintain this conviction by despising what this world offers, by rejecting all its pleasures as nothing worth, and by awaiting in peace and confidence the end of this life, whose false glamour can no longer deceive us, and welcoming the hour of death as the moment of deliverance. Sanyasism[1] has precisely the same tendency and significance, and so has the monachism of the Buddhists. I quite admit that there is nothing in which practice corresponds so little to theory as in monachism; and this, because its fundamental thought is so sublime—and *abusus optimi pessimus*.[2] A genuine monk is a being worthy of all honour; but in the majority of cases there is no more a real monk beneath the cowl than there is at a masked ball.

§ 170.

Psychically there is nothing that renders dissent from our own Will so easy, as the notion of subjecting ourselves wholly and unreservedly to the Will of another: this is therefore a suitable allegorical vehicle of the truth.

§ 171.

The number of professed Trappists is certainly not large; but perhaps half the people in the world are *involuntary Trappists*. For poverty, obedience, absence of all pleasures, nay, of the most necessary alleviations of the sufferings of life—and often also chastity bred of compulsion or want—are their lot. The only difference

[1] The doctrine and practices of *sanyasis* (Hindu ascetics).
[2] Nothing so bad as abuse of the superexcellent.

is, that the Trappists act voluntarily, methodically, and without hope of bettering themselves; whereas these others are actuated by what in my ascetic chapters I have called the δευτερος πλους,[1] which Nature has been sufficiently careful to introduce already by her very constitution—especially when to the evils directly springing from her we add those that proceed from the discord and malice of men in war and in peace. But it is just this necessity of sufferings involuntarily undergone for our eternal salvation, that the Saviour expresses in the words (Matt. xix. 24): It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of heaven. Therefore those who were most in earnest about their eternal salvation chose voluntary poverty, when Fate had denied it to them by placing them in easy circumstances. Thus Buddha Sakya Muni, born a prince, voluntarily grasped the pilgrim's staff; and Francis of Assisi, the founder of the mendicant orders, who, in his dandy days, when asked at a ball at which the daughters of all the notables were present, "Now, Mr. Francis, won't you soon be choosing one of these pretty girls?" replied: "I know a still prettier one." And when they said, "Tell us who?" answered "Poverty"—shortly after which he left all and went begging about the country.

Those who, by such considerations as these, have realised how necessary to our salvation trouble and suffering are in the great majority of cases, will not be slow to acknowledge that we should envy others rather for their bad than their good fortune.

For the same reason the Stoical disposition, which defies Fate, is an excellent coat of mail against the sufferings of life. But though it helps us to bear the

[1] Less desirable course; second string (to one's bow); *pis aller.*

present better, it is a hindrance to true salvation, for it hardens the heart. And how can the heart be improved by sufferings, when its stony covering prevents it from feeling them? For the rest, a certain degree of Stoicism is by no means uncommon. True, it may often be mere affectation, amounting to no more than "*bonne mine au mauvais jeu*";[1] but where it is genuine, it springs as a rule from simple want of feeling, from lack of energy, vivacity, sensibility, and imagination, without which no heart can suffer deeply. To this kind of Stoicism the phlegmatic stolidity of the Germans is especially favourable.

§ 172.

Unjust or wicked actions are, in respect of their perpetrator, a symptom of the strength of his assent to the Will-to-live, and therefore of the distance at which he stands from true salvation, the dissent from the Will, which would bring him deliverance from the world. They are consequently also an index of the long schooling in knowledge and suffering that he has still to go through before he can obtain deliverance. But in respect of the sufferer from these actions, though they are no doubt an evil physically, yet metaphysically they are a good, and at bottom are a benefit; for they help to lead him to his true salvation.

§ 173.

World-Spirit.—Here, then, is the *pensum* of your labours and sufferings. It is for this that you, like everything else, exist.

Man.—But what do I get out of existence? If

[1] Affected cheerfulness when the game is going against one.

occupied, I have trouble; if unoccupied, ennui. How can you offer me so beggarly a reward for so much labour and so much suffering?

World-Spirit.—And yet it is an equivalent for all your toil and all your suffering; and this it is, just because of its paltry character.

Man.—Yes? Well, I can't make that out at all.

World-Spirit.—No, I knew you couldn't;—(*aside*) Must I tell him that the whole value of life consists in the lesson it teaches him—that it should not be willed? No; for this most solemn of truths life itself must prepare him.

§ 174.

If from the exalted platform of considerations such as the foregoing the sufferings of humanity may possibly be justified; yet this justification would not extend to animals, whose sufferings—inflicted in great measure by man, but also proceeding from other causes—are considerable (cf. *W. as W. and P.*, Supp., p. 404 f.). And so there forces itself upon us this question: To what purpose does this harassed and tortured Will exist in these its thousand shapes, where there is no freedom born of reflection to lead it to deliverance? The suffering of the animal world can only be justified by supposing that the Will-to-live, finding nothing to devour—and it is a hungry Will—outside itself in the world of appearance, is forced to feed *upon its own flesh.* Hence the graduated series of its phenomenal appearances, each of which lives at the expense of another. Also, let me refer the reader back to §§ 154 and 155, which show that animals have far less capacity for suffering than men. Anything further on this head would be hypothetical and even mythical, and may therefore be left to the speculation of the reader himself.

Appendix to the foregoing.

Looking at *human life* as a whole, it betrays (as I have said) all the qualities of a tragedy; and we see that life is, as a rule, nothing but a series of unfulfilled hopes, of frustrated plans, and of errors recognised too late as such, and that to it these sad lines truthfully apply:—

> Then old age and experience, hand in hand,
> Lead him to death and make him understand,
> After a search so painful and so long,
> That all his life he has been in the wrong.

All this is in perfect agreement with my views as to the world, which regard existence as a thing which were better away—a kind of error from which the knowledge of what life is should bring us back. Man in general (ὁ ἀνθρῶπος) is in the wrong, simply because he exists and is man; and consequently every individual man (τις ἀνθρῶπος) will find, on looking back, that all his life he has been in the wrong. To discover this in the *general*, brings salvation; and if he is to win salvation, he must begin by recognising it in the *particular case*, *i.e.* in his own individual life. For "*quidquid valet de genere, valet et de specie.*"[1]

Life is throughout to be regarded as a *sharp scolding*, though with our forms of thought, which are calculated for quite other ends, we may not be able to understand why we need it. Accordingly we shall look upon our departed friends with satisfaction, regarding them as people who have weathered their scolding, and heartily hoping that it has been of profit to them; and from the same point of view we shall look forward to our own death as a desirable and satisfactory event, and not, as is generally the case, with fear and trembling.

[1] That which is true of the genus, is true also of the species.

A *happy life* is an impossibility: the best that any man can hope for is a *heroic life*, such as is lived by him who fights, in some way or other, against tremendous odds for some possession that will prove a benefit to all mankind, and wins at last, though he may get but a poor reward or none at all. Like the prince in Gozzi's *Re corvo*, he is turned to stone at life's close, looking magnificent with his noble bearing. His remembrance will be kept green and be celebrated as that of a *hero;* and his *Will*, mortified all his life by toil and labour, by failure in a thankless world, will be extinguished in Nirvana.—Carlyle has written in this sense in his *Heroes and Hero-worship*.

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§ 178.

OF CHRISTIANITY

[ii. *Par.* § 178.]

To judge this religion correctly, we must consider the preceding state of things, to which it put an end. First of all there was the Greco-Roman Paganism. This, considered as a Metaphysics of the people, had very little significance. It had no special dogmatic system, no decidedly expressed ethics, no real moral tendency, and no holy Scriptures; so that it hardly deserves to be called a religion, but is rather a mere play of fancy and a poetical fabrication out of fairy-tales, most of it consisting of an evident personification of the powers of Nature. We can hardly believe that grown men could ever have taken this childish religion seriously. That they did so, however, is shown by many passages in

ancient authors; notably by the First Book of Valerius Maximus, and even by Herodotus in several places, of which I will cite only c. 65 of the last Book, where he expresses his own opinion and talks like an old woman. As time went on and Philosophy made progress, this seriousness no doubt disappeared, and thus Christianity was enabled to thrust out Paganism, the established religion, notwithstanding its external supports. But even in the best Greek times Paganism was never held in such serious regard as was Christianity in later days, or Buddhism and Brahmanism in Asia, or even Islam; and that the Polytheism of the ancients was quite different from the mere plural of Monotheism is evident from the *Frogs* of Aristophanes, in which Dionysus is quizzed upon the stage, where he is represented as the most pitiful coxcomb and poltroon that can be conceived; and this play was publicly acted at his own festival, the Dionysia.

The second religion that Christianity had to dislodge was Judaism, whose gross dogmas were refined and tacitly allegorised by the Christian ones. Christianity is throughout of an allegorical nature; for that which in things profane is called allegory, is styled "mystery" in religions. No one can deny the superiority of Christianity over these two earlier religions, not only in *Ethics*, in which field the doctrines of *caritas*,[1] placability, love of our enemy, resignation, and denial of our own Will are—I speak, be it understood, of the West—exclusively its own, but also in Dogmatics. And to the masses, who are incapable of apprehending the truth directly, what better thing can be offered than a fine allegory fulfilling the purpose both of a compass to direct the practical voyage of life, and of an anchor of consolation and hope? A slight admixture of absurdity,

[1] Charity or brotherly love.

however, is a necessary ingredient in every allegory, just to show that it is an allegory. Taking the Christian dogmatics *sensu proprio*,[1] we must allow Voltaire's criticism; but taking it allegorically, it is a sacred myth, a vehicle for the conveyance to the people of truths which would otherwise be completely out of their reach. We may compare it to the arabesques of Raffaelle and Runge, which represent the palpably unnatural and impossible, and yet have a deep meaning. The very assertion of the Church, that in the dogmas of religion reason is wholly incompetent, blind, and inadmissible, means at bottom that these dogmas are of an allegorical nature, and are therefore not to be judged by the standard which reason, that takes everything *sensu proprio*, can alone apply. The absurdities in dogma are just the mark or sign of the allegorical and mythical; although sometimes — as, for instance, in Christian dogmatics—they arise from having to knit together two such heterogeneous systems as those of the Old and New Testaments. The great Christian allegory was only gradually built up out of materials supplied by external and chance circumstances, by expounding these under the steady influence of a deep-lying and only partially apprehended truth, and it was not distinctly grasped until the time of Augustine, who penetrated to its very core and succeeded in comprehending it as a systematic whole and in making good its defects. The Augustinian doctrines, therefore, reinforced by Luther's additions, are alone to be regarded as perfect Christianity; and primitive Christianity is not to be so regarded, despite the opinion of the Protestants of to-day, who take "revelation" *sensu proprio* and restrict it to a single individual; for it is not the seed that is good to eat, but the fruit.

[1] Literally.

However, the weak point in all religions is always this: that they dare not confess their allegorical nature openly, but only hint at it covertly, and so their doctrines are preached in all seriousness as *sensu proprio* true. Now as the absurdities are of the very essence of these doctrines, this introduces a continual imposture—which is a great drawback. And what is still worse, there comes a day when they are no longer true *sensu proprio;* and then they collapse. Thus it would be better for them to confess their allegorical nature at once. Only, how make the masses understand that something can at the same time be true and not true? But as all religions are in this case more or less, we must acknowledge that the absurd is in a certain degree an element suited to the human race—nay, an element necessary to man's life, and that delusions he must and will have—a conjecture which is confirmed by other circumstances.

As one corroborative example of the above-mentioned absurdity springing from the amalgamation of the Old and New Testaments, take the Christian doctrine of Predestination and Grace as elaborated by Augustine, Luther's guiding star. According to this doctrine one man has, in respect of Grace, an advantage over another which amounts to a ready-made privilege bestowed at birth, and that in the most important of all matters. But this doctrine is offensive and absurd only because of the Old Testament assumption, that man is the work of another's Will, and that he was created by this Will out of nothing. Whereas—remembering that genuine ethical superiority is actually innate—the matter has quite another and more rational significance under the Brahmanic and Buddhistic assumption of Metempsychosis, according to which any superiority that one man may have over another at birth he brings with

him from another world and a former life: it is not the gift of another's grace, but the fruit of his own good deeds in that other world. To this Augustinian dogma is further attached this one: that out of the corrupt mass of the human race, which for its corruption is destined to eternal damnation, excessively few, and those few only in consequence of Predestination and Election, will be found righteous and saved; the rest will go to the perdition they have deserved, *i.e.* the eternal torments of hell (see Wiggers' *Augustinismus und Pelagianismus*, p. 335). Taken *sensu proprio*, this dogma is revolting. For not only does it adjudge the eternal pains of hell to the lapses, or even the unbelief, of a person who may be scarce twenty years old; but this almost universal damnation is the result of original sin, and thus the necessary consequence of the Fall. Now this must have been foreseen by him who in the first place made men so evil and then set a trap for them, by which he knew full well they would be caught; for everything without exception is his work and nothing is hidden from him. He therefore called a weak, sin-ridden race into existence from the regions of nothingness, in order to hand them over to eternal torment. Added to which, here is the God who prescribes forbearance and forgiveness of every fault, and even says we must go the lengths of loving our enemies, and who himself does nothing of the kind—in fact does the exact opposite; for a punishment introduced at the end of things, when everything is over and done with for good, can aim neither at reformation nor deterrence, and is therefore vengeance pure and simple. But from this point of view it even appears that the whole race is destined to, and expressly created for, eternal torment and damnation—with the exception of those few who are to be saved, we know not why, by Election. But

putting these few persons aside, it looks as if Almighty God had created the world in order that the devil might get it; in which case he would have done far better to leave things alone. So much for dogmas when taken *sensu proprio;* whereas understood *sensu allegorico*, all this is capable of a sufficient explanation. In the first place (as I have said) the absurd, nay revolting element in this teaching comes simply from Jewish Theism, with its creation out of nothing, involving the denial—the really paradoxical and shocking denial—of the natural and in a measure self-evident doctrine of Metempsychosis, which has been held at all times by almost all nations except the Jews. In order to remove the gigantic evils that spring from this dogma and to make it less revolting, Pope Gregory I. in the sixth century very wisely perfected the doctrine of Purgatory —which in substance was already existent in Origen (*cf.* Bayle, article "Origène," note *b*)—and formally incorporated it in the tenets of the Church. This softened the thing down a great deal, and in a way took the place of Metempsychosis; for they are both processes of purification. With the same intention there was instituted the doctrine of the restitution or restoration of all things (ἀποκατασταστασις παντων), by means of which, in the last act of the world-comedy, even sinners, all and sundry, are to be restored *in integrum*.[1] It is only the Protestants who are so wedded to the Bible, that they will not give up their eternal punishment. "Much good may it do them," one might say, if spitefully inclined. The only consolation is, that they do not believe in it; but they let the thing rest as it is, thinking in their hearts: "Well, things won't be so bad as that."

In consequence of his rigid, systematic mind, which

[1] To the original state (*i.e.* of perfection).

forced Christianity into dogmas, and owing to the definite shape into which he moulded doctrines that in the Bible are only hinted at and dimly adumbrated, Augustine gave these doctrines such hard contours and put so harsh a construction upon Christianity, that his views become a stone of stumbling to us in these days and are now opposed by Rationalism, as in his own day they were by Pelagianism. For example, in his *De civit. Dei*, xi. 21, the argument *in abstracto* runs thus: A God *creates a being out of nothing*, lays inhibitory commands upon him, and, because these are not obeyed, torments him throughout eternity with all imaginable torments; for which purpose he binds soul and body together (*De civ. Dei*, xvii. 2, 11, 24), so that never by their falling apart may the torment of this being cease, but he must live on for ever to endure eternal torture—this poor fellow who comes from nothing, and has at least a right to his original *nothing*, which last retreat—not a bad one either—should be assured to him by all the laws of right as his inherited possession. I, at least, cannot help sympathising with him. But if we also take the rest of Augustine's teaching into account, viz. that all this depends not upon what the man himself does or leaves undone, but upon what Election determined beforehand—we hardly know what to say. Of course the matter presents no difficulty to our highly cultured rationalists, who dismiss it airily with: "Pooh! a mere bugbear; but we are always making progress and walking along the road to perfection."—"Well," I reply, "the pity is that we didn't begin earlier, for then we should have reached it already." Our perplexities on this head will not, however, be diminished by the following passage from the work of a heretic so wicked that he suffered death at the stake, Jul. Cæs. Vaninus: "If it were against the will of God that crimes and sins should flourish in the world,

no doubt he could with one nod banish them all beyond the limits of the world: for which of us can resist the divine will? How could crimes be committed in despite of God, if it is God who supplies the strength to sinners in each act of sin? Moreover, if man commits sin against the will of God, God will be inferior to man, who opposes him and prevails. Hence they [philosophers] come to this conclusion: God desires to have this world as it; if he wished it better, he would have it so" (*Amphith.*, exercit 16, p. 104). He had just been saying (*ibid.*, p. 103): "If God wills sins, he makes them; for it is written, He has made whatever he has willed. If he does not will them, they are committed notwithstanding. He must therefore be called improvident, or impotent, or cruel; since he neither knows how, nor is able, nor cares, to carry out his decree." Now we see why at the present day the dogma of free-will is clung to so frantically (*mordicus*), although all honest and upright thinkers, beginning with Hobbes and ending with myself, have rejected it as absurd.[1]

No doubt it was easier to burn Vanini than to refute him; and, after his tongue had been cut out, the former course was chosen. It is still open to any one to refute him: I should like to see the attempt made; but it must be seriously done—with thoughts, not with hollow verbiage.

In coming to the conclusion that sinners were in the vast majority, and that extremely few deserved eternal felicity, Augustine was right. Brahmanism and Buddhism make the same assertion, but, owing to the doctrine of Metempsychosis, we are not offended at it. Exceedingly few, it is said, attain the Brahmanic "final emancipation" or the Buddhistic "nirvana," both of

[1] See my essay on the Freedom of the Will.

which are equivalent to our "eternal felicity": those who do attain it are not, however, privileged persons, but they have come into this world with the merits won in former lives, and in this present life they continue to walk in the same way. As to the rest, they are not hurled into the lake of fire, but are merely translated into worlds that suit their conduct. If, then, we ask the teachers of these religions where and what those who have not attained emancipation are, they will reply: "Look about you, and you will see them; this is their scene of action and struggle; this is *Sansara*, *i.e.* the world of desire, birth, pain, old age, sickness, and death."

Now if we take the Augustinian dogma of the fewness of the elect and the enormous number of the damned, merely *sensu allegorico*, and explain it in the spirit of my philosophy, we see that it agrees with the truth that few arrive at dissent from the Will and consequent emancipation from this world—as few Buddhists reach Nirvana. *Per contra*, the reality underlying the dogma of eternal damnation is this very world of ours, to which those who are not saved are relegated. It is bad enough; it is purgatory; it is hell, and there is no lack of devils in it. Look and see what men do to men—how they sometimes torture each other slowly to death, and ask yourselves if devils could do more. And those who do not mend their ways, but persist in the assent to the Will-to-live, will sojourn in it for ever.

Really, if a denizen of Asia were to ask me what Europe is, I should have to reply: It is that quarter of the globe that labours under the unheard-of and incredible delusion that the birth of a human being is his absolute beginning, and that he has come out of nothing.

In substance and apart from the mythologies of the two Religions, Buddha's *Sansara* and *Nirvana* are

identical with Augustine's two *civitates* into which the world is divided, the *civitas terrena*[1] and the *civitas cœlestis*,[2] as may be seen from his *De civ. Dei*, especially xiii. 4 and 6, xiv. 1 and 43.

In *Christianity* the *Devil* is an absolutely necessary personage, as a foil to the all-good, all-wise, and almighty God. For if God has these attributes of infinite goodness, omniscience, and omnipotence, where could the preponderant, countless, and measureless evils of the world come from, unless there is a devil who will acknowledge responsibility for them? And since the rationalists have done away with the devil, we feel this difficulty more than ever, as was to be foreseen, and as was foreseen by the orthodox; for to take away a single pillar is to endanger the whole structure. We see from this again, as is also clear from other sources, that Jehovah is an alias for Ormuzd, and Satan for Ahriman who is his inseparable antipode; but Ormuzd himself is simply another Indra.

Christianity labours under this peculiar disadvantage: that it is not, like other religions, a pure *doctrine*, but is, in its chief and essential features, a *history*, a string of events, a complex of the facts, actions, and sufferings of individual beings; and this very history constitutes the dogma, faith in which procures salvation. Other religions—Buddhism notably—have indeed an historic adjunct in the life of their founders: this, however, is not a part of their dogma, but a mere supplemental feature. Their *Lalivistara*, for instance, resembles the Gospel in so far as it contains the life of Sakya Muni, the Buddha of the present world-period: but it has nothing whatever to do with dogma—that is to say, with Buddhism itself; simply because the lives of former

[1] Earthly city. [2] Heavenly city.

Buddhas were quite different, and those of the Buddhas to come will again be quite different. The dogma has not here grown up with the life of the founder, and does not depend upon individual persons and facts; but is general, and applies equally to all times. Thus the *Lalivistara* is no Gospel in the Christian sense of the word, no glad tidings of a fact of redemption, but merely the life of him who showed how every man may redeem himself. It is the historical character of Christianity that makes the Chinese jeer at the missionaries as so many tellers of fairy-tales.

Another fundamental defect of Christianity that must here be mentioned—a defect that is not to be explained away, and that manifests its disastrous consequences every day—is that it most unnaturally separates man forcibly from the *world of animals*, to which he nevertheless essentially belongs, putting man by himself and regarding animals as things; whereas Brahmanism and Buddhism, faithful to truth, distinctly recognise the evident kinship of man with the whole of Nature in general and with the animals in particular, and place him constantly, by Metempsychosis and otherwise, in the closest connexion with the animal world. The significant part played by animals in Brahmanism and Buddhism throughout, as compared with the disallowance of any part to them in Judæo-Christianity, pronounces sentence upon the latter in respect of perfection, however much we in Europe may be accustomed to the absurdity. To palliate this fundamental defect, though in reality it only brings it into more prominent relief, we adopt the artifice—an artifice as shameless as it is pitiable—which I have already censured in my *Ethics*, viz. the using of different terms to describe all the natural functions common to animals and ourselves—functions which bear witness to the identity of our nature and theirs—such

as eating, drinking, pregnancy, birth, death, the dead body, &c., from those we employ when speaking of human beings. This is really a contemptible trick. The fundamental defect referred to above is a consequence of the dogma of creation out of nothing, according to which the Creator (Gen., chaps. i. and ix.) gives all the animals—as if they were mere things, and without any recommendation of kind treatment, such as the seller of a dog will almost always suggest when he parts with the puppy he has reared—to man, who is to *have dominion over* them, *i.e.* to do what he likes with them; whereupon (in chap. ii.) he constitutes him the first Professor of Zoology, by bringing the animals to him that he may give them the names they are henceforth to bear; which again is a symbol of their total dependence upon him, *i.e.* of their having no rights of their own. Holy Ganga! mother of our race! stories such as these affect me as do Jew's-pitch[1] and *fœtor Judaicus*.[2] And alas! their consequences are felt even to-day; for they have passed over into Christianity, whose morality from this time forth is therefore no longer to be extolled as the most perfect. It is, I say, a most serious imperfection—this restriction of the precepts of Christian morality to human beings—this practical declaration that none of the animals have any rights; and the result is that, to protect them against those who oft-times are less feeling and more brutal than the brutes, the police have to take the place of religion. For Religion is insufficient here, and in these days societies for the protection of animals are being formed all over Europe and America—a thing that in *uncircumcised* Asia would be wholly superfluous, for there is no corner of it where Religion does not afford the animals sufficient protection. Not only so, but it

[1] Asphaltum. [2] The smell of the Jew.

even makes them the objects of positive beneficence, as witness, for example, the great veterinary hospital in Surat, to which Christians, Moslems, and Jews may also send their sick animals, though they very properly are not allowed to claim them when cured. Likewise, whenever a Brahmanist or a Buddhist meets with some piece of good fortune, he does not forthwith proceed to bawl out a *Te Deum*, but goes to the market, buys caged birds, and gives them their liberty at the city gates. This is constantly witnessed in Astrachan, where people of all religions collect; and they do many similar things. But see the sinful and utterly revolting way in which our Christian lower classes treat their animals, laughing as they kill them without aim or object, maiming and torturing them, and working the very marrow out of the bones of their poor old horses, till they lie down and die under the lash. We might truly say: Men are the devils of the earth, and the beasts are the tortured souls. Such are the consequences of that original scene in the garden of Eden. For the masses are to be controlled only by force or Religion; but here Christianity leaves us woefully in the lurch. I am assured on the best authority that a Protestant clergyman, who was invited to preach a sermon against cruelty to animals by a society for their protection, replied that, much as he would like to do so, he could not, for here Religion gave no sanction. The man was honest, and what he said was true. In a circular of the 27th November, 1852, the excellent Munich Society for the prevention of cruelty to animals attempts, with the best intentions, to put together passages from the Bible inculcating consideration for animals, and quotes Prov. xii. 10; Wisd. vii. 24; Ps. cxlvii. 9 and civ. 14; Job xxxviii. 41; Matt. x. 29. But this is only a pious fraud, which reckons upon the references not being looked up. Only the first well-

known passage is to the point, and that is somewhat weak. The rest do indeed speak of animals, but not of consideration for them. And what does that first passage say? "A righteous man is merciful to his beast."—Merciful! What an expression! One is merciful to a sinner, an evil-doer, but not to an innocent faithful beast, who often gains his master his daily bread and gets nothing for himself but a scanty allowance of fodder. Merciful, indeed! We owe not mercy, but justice, to the beasts—and the debt remains for the most part unpaid in Europe, the air of which is so thoroughly saturated with the *fœtor Judaicus* that the evident and simple truth, "A human being and a beast are to all intents and purposes the same," is a paradox and a stone of stumbling. The protection of animals is therefore left to the police, and to societies who make this their business, though neither can do much, in face of the widespread ruffianism of the masses, where poor animals who cannot complain are in question, and not one case of cruelty in a hundred is detected; besides which the penalties are too light. Flogging has lately been suggested in England, and this appears to me to be the exactly suitable penalty. And yet what can we expect of the masses, when we see savants and even zoologists, who, instead of recognising the essential and to them well-known identity of man and beast, are so bigoted and narrow-minded that they embark upon furious polemics against their honest and sensible colleagues, who rightly put man into the same class as the higher animals and point out how closely he resembles the chimpanzee and orang-outang? But how truly shocking it is to see Jung-Stilling, with his exceedingly Christian and pious bent of mind, coming out (see his *Scenen aus dem Geisterreich*, vol. ii., sc. 1, p. 15) with the following comparison: "Suddenly the skeleton

shrivelled up into an indescribably hideous dwarf; like a big garden-spider, whose pus-like blood hisses and boils when we bring it into the focus of a burning-glass." So this man of God committed or quietly watched—it matters not which—this monstrous experiment; and so little wrong does he deem it, that he introduces it as a casual illustration with perfect naïveté! Such are the fruits of the first chapter of Genesis and the whole Jewish way of looking at Nature. But the motto of the Hindus and Buddhists is the *Mahavakya* (the great word), "*Tat tvam asi*"—This thou art—which they pronounce over every animal, in order that we may keep the identity of its and our inner essence before us as a guide to our conduct. Don't talk to me, you Jew-Christians, of your most perfect of all Ethics!—

.....It is clearly time that an end were put to the Jewish views of Nature in Europe, at any rate as regards animals, and that *the eternal essence, which lives not only in us but in all animals*, should be recognised as such, be tenderly used and duly valued. Surely that man must be either bereft of his senses, or completely chloroformed by the *fœtor Judaicus*, who does not see that the *animal* is in all essential respects absolutely identical with us, and that the difference lies merely in the accident (the intellect), not in the substance (the Will). The world is not a piece of machinery, nor are the animals machine-made wares turned out for our use. Such views should be left to synagogues and philosophical lecture-rooms, which to all intents and purposes are the same thing. But the knowledge of the solidarity of the animal kingdom supplies the rule for the right treatment of animals. I advise the zealots and parsons not to say too much against it; for here not only is *truth* on our side, but morality as well.[1] The greatest benefit that

[1] They send *missionaries* to the Brahmans and Buddhists, to teach

railways have conferred is that they have spared millions of horses a miserable existence.

It is unfortunately the fact, that the human being who has been forced northwards, and whose skin is consequently bleached, requires animal food—although there are some vegetarians in England. But we ought to render the death of the animals we eat quite painless, by administering chloroform and dealing a swift blow in the lethal spot, and that not out of "mercy," as the Old Testament puts it, but as the bounden duty we owe to the eternal essence which lives in all animals as it does in us. Yes; animals should always be chloroformed before they are slaughtered. This would be a noble thing and an honour to mankind, and to do it would be to amalgamate the higher scientific knowledge of the West with the higher morality of the East, where Brahmanism and Buddhism do not limit their precepts to "our neighbour," but take "all living things" under their protection.

Not until this simple and indubitable truth, *that the animals are in all essential respects identical with us*, has saturated the minds of the masses, will animals cease to be regarded as creatures that have no rights, and thus cease to be exposed to the ill-temper and cruelty of every coarse ruffian. Not till then will the dabblers in Biology be prevented from horribly torturing numbers of animals, in the attempt to prove the wildly fantastic whims that fill their ignorant noddles. I am aware that animals are now chloroformed, as a rule, and thus spared pain during the operation, and that they are swiftly despatched when it is over. But this cannot be done in the investigations so common in these days, the object of which is

them the "true faith"; but when these Asiatics hear how we treat animals in Christian countries, they regard Europe and its religious doctrines with the utmost detestation.—Au.

to ascertain the activity and sensibility of the nervous system. And unfortunately the animal chiefly used in vivisection is the morally noblest of all, the dog, whose highly developed nervous system renders him peculiarly susceptible to pain.

In their exhortations the societies for the protection of animals are very fond of advancing the bad argument, that cruelty towards animals leads to cruelty towards human beings—as if man alone were an immediate object of moral obligation, and the animal only a mediate object, and of itself a mere thing. Oh, shame, shame!

Chapter XXII.

INDEPENDENT THINKING

[ii *Par.* § 251.]

Students and scholars of every kind and every age are bent as a rule upon amassing *information* alone, rather than upon gaining *insight*. They make it a point of honour to have information on every subject—stones, plants, battles, experiments; and not one of them but professes to have information about all books. It never occurs to them that information is a mere means to the gaining of insight, but that in itself it is of little or no value; whereas it is the manner of thinking that characterises the philosophical mind. When I see the imposing erudition of these omniscient people, I sometimes say to myself: How little they must have thought, to have had time to read so much! Of the elder Pliny it is related that he was always either reading or being read to—at table, on his travels, in the bath. And I

cannot help asking myself: Had the man, then, no thoughts of his own, that he required this constant stream of other people's thoughts? It reminds me of a consumptive patient, who has to be plied with beef-tea in order to keep him alive. Of his original thought I have no very high opinion, when I mark his want of judgment and credulousness, and his unspeakably repellent style, so hard to understand with its paper-sparing memorandum-like character.

[ii *Par.* § 267.]

To read is to think with another man's brains instead of one's own. Now nothing is more prejudicial to original thought, which is striving to develop a connected whole, a system as compact as it can contrive to make it, than that over-strong influence of the thoughts of others which comes of constant reading. For these foreign thoughts, belonging as they do to another system and wearing another colour, will never of themselves blend to form a whole of thinking, of knowledge, of insight and conviction, but will rather cause a Babylonish confusion of tongues in the brain, and will take all clear knowledge from the mind which has crammed itself with them, and throw it into almost complete disorder. This is the case with many of the learned, and it often renders them inferior in common sense, right judgment, and practical tact, to the comparatively ignorant man who has always subordinated to his own thoughts and incorporated with them the slender store of knowledge that has come to him from without through experience, conversation, and the small amount of reading he has done. The scientific *thinker* proceeds upon these very same lines, but on a larger scale. Although he is obliged to possess wide knowledge and

must therefore read much, yet his mind is strong enough to master all his reading, to assimilate it, to incorporate it in the system of his own thoughts, and thus to subordinate it to the organically-connected whole of his ever-growing magnificent insight. And so his own thinking, like the ground-bass of an organ, remains always dominant and is never drowned by the other voices, as is the case with mere polyhistors, in whose heads snatches of tunes, as it were, in all keys are jumbled together, and the ground-tone can no longer be distinguished.

[ii *Par.* § 268.]

People who spend their lives in reading and extract their wisdom from books are like those who get full particulars about some foreign country from many books of travel. These may give them a great deal of information, and yet they will have no coherent, distinct, thorough knowledge of the nature of the country. But people who spend their lives in thinking are like those who have visited the country themselves: they alone really know all about it, and are thoroughly at home there.

[ii *Par.* § 275.]

The presence of a thought is like the presence of our well-beloved. We imagine that these thoughts will never be forgotten, that this beloved can never be indifferent to us. But out of sight, out of mind! The finest thought runs the risk of being lost beyond hope of recovery, unless written down; and the beloved of being forsaken, unless tied to us in wedlock.

[ii *Par.* § 278.]

When we consider how great and how near is the

problem of existence—of this enigmatical, painful, fleeting, dreamlike existence—so great and so near-lying, that no sooner do we become aware of it than it forthwith overshadows and obscures all other problems and designs; and when we observe that only a very few seem to have any clear knowledge of the problem, while the majority are unaware that there is any problem at all, so that they pay attention to anything rather than to this, and live on, mindful only of the day and of their future span of life, which is hardly more than a day, for they either in so many words refuse to discuss the problem, or are only too glad to compound with it by adopting some system of people's-metaphysics[1] and so get out of the business—when, I say, we consider this carefully, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that it is only in a very wide sense of the term that man can be called a *thinking being*, and we shall henceforth be no longer surprised at any trait of thoughtlessness and stupidity, knowing perfectly well that the intellectual horizon of the normal man, though it certainly does surpass that of the animal —whose whole existence, ignorant as it is of the future and the past, is, as it were, a single present—yet does not surpass it by so much as we are wont to imagine.

This is why in conversation we find the thoughts of most people cut up as fine as chaff: they are incapable of pursuing any subject very far.

Again, if the world were peopled by beings who really thought, the hideous noises of all kinds that we hear around us—noises that have neither rhyme nor reason—would never be tolerated for a moment. If Nature had really meant men to think, she would have given them no ears, or at any rate would have provided them, as she does the bats—lucky animals!—with hermetically-

[1] *I.e.*, religion.

closing flaps. But in truth man is, like the other animals, but a poor creature, whose strength is calculated for the bare maintenance of his existence, for which reason he requires to keep his ears always open, and ready night and day to announce the approach of an enemy.

Chapter XXIII.

AUTHORSHIP AND STYLE

[ii *Par.* § 280.]

We may divide authors into three classes :—

(1) Those who write without thinking. They write from memory, from reminiscences, or straight from other books. This is the most numerous class.

(2) Those who think while they are writing. They think in order to write. These, too, form a numerous class.

(3) Those who have thought before they put pen to paper. They write simply because they have thought. They are rare.

Every writer of the second class—the man who puts off thinking until the pen is in his hand—is like the sportsman who goes out at a venture: his bag will be a light one. But the writing of an author of the third class is like a battue, in which the game is penned up and driven together into a paddock, from which it runs in crowds into another enclosure where it cannot escape the gunner, who has nothing to do but to aim and shoot (put his thoughts into words). A day of this sort will yield a heavy bag.

But even out of the small number of writers who

really and seriously think beforehand, there are again only a very few who think about *things themselves ;* the rest think merely about *books*, about what others have said. In order to think, they require to be well stimulated by the thoughts of others. These will be their immediate theme: they will always be under their influence, and so will never attain real originality. But the select few just referred to will be stimulated to think by *things themselves*, and their thought will be immediately directed to these. Among such alone shall we find the immortals. Of course I am here speaking of great literature, not of a dissertation on the distillation of brandy.

The only author worth reading is the man who takes his materials out of his own head. Book-makers, writers of compendiums, ordinary historians, and the like, take theirs straight out of books. Thence the materials pass at once into their fingers: they are not even examined by their brains, and as for working them up—why, they never think of such a thing. (What a learned man the author of many a book would be, if he only knew what was in it!) Hence they put things in so confused a way that we rack our brains in vain to discover *what* they really think themselves. Well, they think nothing. The book from which they copy is perhaps just as bad; and so this kind of writing is like a plaster-cast of a cast of a cast, and so on, and in the end the features of Antinous are hardly recognisable. Therefore we should very seldom read compilers. Very seldom, I say, for we can hardly avoid them altogether, seeing that the compendiums which contain in small compass the collective knowledge of centuries must be classed as compilations.

It is the greatest mistake to suppose that the last word spoken is always the truest, the last thing written an improvement upon previous writings, and every

change an advance. Thinkers, the men of right judgment, those who are in earnest about their work, are always exceptions. The most numerous class in the world is the lowest, and this is always actively engaged in "amending for the worse" in its own fashion that which has been said in the best way, after mature reflection, by eminent minds. Whoever desires information on any subject should, therefore, not take up the newest books, on the supposition that the sciences are always making progress, and that in the composition of the new books the old have been used. Used they have been, indeed, but how? It often happens that the writer does not thoroughly understand the old books; but then he does not like to employ their exact words, and he tinkers and alters for the worse that which they said much better and plainer, for they wrote from their own living knowledge of the subject. He often omits their finest passages, their best illustrations, their happiest remarks, because he does not recognise their value, does not feel how pregnant they are. To him the commonplace and shallow is alone homogeneous. Very often an excellent old book is supplanted by newer and worse books written for money, simply because they are introduced with a great flourish of trumpets and puffed by the colleagues of the writers. In the Sciences every one wants to make his mark, and so has some new theory to propound. Not infrequently he will upset some previous correct theory, in order to put his own flams in its place: these may stand for a short time, perhaps, but a return will be made in the end to the correct old theory. These modern writers take only one thing seriously—their own precious persons; their mind is bent upon establishing a reputation. At one time they will make a name in a moment by starting a paradox; the sterility of their minds suggesting to them

the way of negation. At another they will deny old-established verities, *e.g.* vital force, the sympathetic system, *generatio æquivoca*, Bichat's separation of the agency of the passions from that of the intellect; or they will go back to crass atomism, &c., &c. Thus *the march of Science is often a retrograde one.* Then there are translators who correct and touch up their author—to my mind a most impertinent proceeding. Write books yourself worthy of translation, if you will, but leave other people's works as you find them.

So, where possible, it is best to read the original authors, founders, and discoverers of things, or at any rate the acknowledged masters of their subject; and it is better to buy second-hand *books* than second-hand information. Since, however, *inventis aliquid addere facile est*,[1] it will not be inadvisable, if we see good reason, to acquaint ourselves with the more recent additions to science. On the whole let it be remembered, here as elsewhere, that the new is seldom the good, while the good does not long remain the new.

[ii *Par.* § 287.]

To be *immortal* a work must possess so many excellences that scarcely will any one person be found who can take them *all* in and appreciate them. By this one *this* excellence will be recognised and honoured; by that one, *that*. Hence the credit which the work enjoys throughout long centuries, with their varying interests, is maintained; for it is held in honour now for *this* quality, now for *that*, and is never exhausted.

But the author of such a work—he who has a claim to live and endure throughout the ages to come—must be

[1] It is easy to add to things already discovered.

not only a man who seeks his peer in vain among his contemporaries the wide world over, and who is patently and markedly different from all others, but also one who, even though he were to wander, like Ahasuerus, throughout several centuries, would always find himself in like case; in a word, one to whom Ariosto's line, "Lo fece natura, e poi ruppe lo stampo,"[1] really applies. Otherwise there would be no reason why his thoughts should live more than those of others.

[ii *Par.* § 289.]

The *literary journals* should act as a dam against the unconscionable ink-slinging of these days—the rising deluge of useless and bad books. It is their business to judge incorruptibly, justly, and strictly every piece of bungled work from the pen of a writer who has no justification for writing—every scribble turned off by the empty head for the sake of the empty purse—that is to say, nine-tenths of all books published. These they should scourge unsparingly, and thus fulfil the duty of resisting the *cacoethes scribendi*[2] and the cheating, instead of furthering this by a base tolerance which leagues itself with author and publisher to rob the public of time and money. Authors are usually Professors or men of letters, whose small merits and poor salaries lead them to write for money; and as their aim is a common one, they have a common interest in holding together and mutually supporting each other, and each backs the other up. Hence the laudatory notices of bad books which fill the pages of reviews, whose motto should therefore be "Live and let live"! (And the public is

[1] Dame Nature made him, and then broke the mould.
[2] Itch for writing.

so silly that it prefers the new to the good.) Is there, or was there, ever one of them that can honestly say it never praised unworthy scribbling, never craftily treated it as important? Is there one that conscientiously reviews books because of their importance, and not rather out of deference to the recommendations of patrons and colleagues, or because the publishers have greased its palm? Does not every one, except the veriest tyro, turn at once almost mechanically to the publisher's imprint, when he sees a book either greatly praised or much blamed? But if there was an honest review, of the kind I have sketched, every bad writer, every brainless compiler, every transcriber from the books of others, every rotten, incapable, office-seeking philosophaster, every colourless conceited poetaster, would be pilloried as he deserved, and would have his itching fingers paralysed, to the great gain of literature, in which the bad is not only useless but positively harmful. Now as the majority of books are bad and ought never to have been written, praise should be as rare as, owing to the influence of personal deference and the maxim "accedas socius, laudes lauderis ut absens,"[1] blame now is. To extend to literature the tolerance necessarily accorded to the stupid, brainless people who swarm in society everywhere, is the greatest mistake in the world. Here they are shameless intruders, and to suppress the bad here is only to fulfil one's duty to the good; for he who fails to see the bad will also fail to recognise the good. In fact, *courtesy*, which springs from social intercourse, is out of place and very often hurtful in literature; for it insists upon calling bad good, and so runs directly counter to the aims both of Science and Art. No doubt the contributors to such a

[1] Equivalent to "Scratch my back, and I'll scratch yours."

review as I want to see would have to be writers who combined incorruptible honesty with rare knowledge and still rarer judgment. The whole of Germany could at most—could hardly, even—establish *one* such review; but if established it would stand as a just Areopagus. I would have every member of its staff elected by all the others, whereas now reviews are run by University guilds or literary cliques, and even on the quiet by booksellers with an eye to trade, and there are almost always coalitions of inferior minds for the suppression of merit. "Nowhere is there more dishonesty than in literature": so said Goethe to me one day; for the occasion and the exact words, see my *Will in Nature*, p. 17.[1]

Before all things, therefore, must that badge of literary knavery, *Anonymity*, be discarded. In magazines it was introduced under the pretext of shielding the honest reviewer, the monitor of the public, from the ill-will of the author and his patrons. Only, for one case of this sort that might happen, there will be a hundred where it merely serves to absolve the reviewer from all responsibility for what he writes, or perhaps even to hide the shame of the man who is mercenary and base enough to accept a *douceur* from the publisher and recommend a bad book to the public. Often, also, it serves merely to hide the obscurity, incompetence, and insignificance of the critic. It is incredible what barefaced sharp-practice in matters literary is indulged in by those who know themselves to be safe under cover of anonymity. My readers have heard of "universal medicines" warranted to cure all ailments. Well, here is a "universal anti-critique" warranted to neutralise all anonymous reviews guilty either of praising the bad or censuring the good: "Your name, you

[1] Not included in the present volume.

scoundrel! For to mask yourself, and then to fall upon people who wear no disguise, is not the act of an honest man, but of knaves and rascals. Your name, you scoundrel—and again, your name, your name!"—*Probatum est* (I have tried it).

In the Preface to his *Nouvelle Héloïse*, Rousseau has already remarked: "Tout honnête homme doit avouer les livres qu'il publie"; in plain English, Every honest man signs his name to what he writes—and universal affirmative propositions may be inverted *per contrapositionem*. And how much more does this apply to polemical writings, which reviews for the most part are! So in his *Mittheilungen über Goethe* (p. xxix. of the Preface) Riemer says rightly: "An open opponent, who shows his face, is an honourable, reasonable man, with whom one can get on and come to terms; but a hidden foe is a *vile, cowardly rascal*, who has not the courage to confess himself the author of his own criticism. He is not giving expression to his opinions, but is taking a secret joy in the safe venting of his spleen from behind the hedge of anonymity." This was doubtless Goethe's opinion; for though it is Riemer that writes, it is generally Goethe that speaks. In fact, Rousseau's rule applies to every line of print. Should we allow a masked man to harangue the mob in the streets, or to speak in a lecture-room?—especially if he attacked and abused people. Would not kicks soon send him flying to the door?

One of the conditions of the freedom of the Press—which has at length been obtained in Germany, and no sooner obtained than most infamously abused—should certainly be the prohibition of every kind of anonymity and pseudonymity, so that any writer who publicly disseminates news through the powerful speaking-trumpet of the Press should at any rate be responsible for this

news with his honour, if he has any left; and if he has not, his name will neutralise his communications. An anonymous reviewer is a fellow who, *to avoid responsibility* for what he may choose to announce to—and, let us add, conceal from—the world concerning the persons or work of other people, withholds his name. All anonymous reviewing is dishonest. Therefore, as the authorities do not allow people to wear masks in the streets, neither should they suffer them to write anonymously. Where so well as in the pages of anonymous reviews can ignorance sit in judgment on scholarship—stupidity on understanding—and that with impunity? In what way can the public be so easily cozened—again with impunity—and cheated of its time and money, as by the puffing of bad books? And shall this be suffered to go on? Is not anonymity the stronghold of all literary, and especially publicistic, rascality? Let it then be razed, even to the ground—I mean, let every article, no matter what, be signed, and let the editor be made responsible, under heavy penalties, for the genuineness of the signature. Now, since even an unknown writer is nevertheless known in the little corner where he lives, two-thirds of the journalistic lies now current would then be disposed of, and the audacity of many a venomous tongue would be kept in check. In France they are already beginning to adopt this plan.

Until we get this prohibition, all honest writers should combine to proscribe anonymity by publicly branding it daily and hourly with the mark of the extremest contempt, and by making it felt on all hands that anonymous reviewing is an abomination and an infamy. To make anonymous attacks on those who have not written anonymously is clearly dishonourable. Of the writer of anonymous polemics the presumption is, *eo ipso*, that he wants either to impose upon the public, or to damage the

reputation of others without danger to himself. The right way, then, to treat the remarks, however innocent, of an anonymous reviewer is to refer to him in some such terms as the following: "The cowardly, anonymous rascal says in such and such a passage....."; or "In this magazine a scoundrel, wearing the mask of anonymity.....," etc., etc. This is really the right and becoming way in which to speak of such fellows, to put them out of conceit with their trade. For clearly no one has any claim to personal consideration unless he reveals his identity, so that we may know with whom we are dealing. We owe no courtesy whatever to the fellow who slinks along under a mask and is impertinent to us. No; he is, *ipso facto*, fair game. He is Ὀδυσσευς Οὐτις, Mr. Nobody (*Herr Niemand*), and everybody is at liberty to say that Mr. Nobody is a rascal. So, especially in replies to critiques, let us call every anonymous reviewer "a rascal and a scurvy knave," and not talk of "the honoured reviewer," as do some of the pack of authors at whom he has flung mud—because they are afraid of him. "A scurvy knave who conceals his name"—that is what all honourable writers should call him. And if anyone should go a little further, and distinguish himself by catching one of the gang by the ear and giving him a sound flogging—well, the little dog will laugh to see such sport. When a slander comes to our ears, our first indignant outburst is: "Who says that?" But anonymity precludes any answer.

One particularly absurd impertinence of these anonymous critics is the assumption of the royal "We"; whereas they ought only to talk, I won't say in the singular, but in the diminutive, or in some such humble strain as the following: "My pitiable littleness," "my cowardly craftiness," "my masked incompetence," "my wretched rascality," and the like. This is the way

masked blacklegs, adders who hiss from the dark purlieus of "hole-and-corner magazines," ought to speak of themselves. Their trade should really be put an end to; for anonymity in literature is what material swindling is in ordinary life. "Your name, knave, or hold your tongue!"—let that be the watchword. Meanwhile to every unsigned article we may append the signature "Blackleg." Money the business may bring in, but honour—no. For by his attacks we may be quite sure that Mr. Anonymous is Mr. Knave, and we may bet 100 to 1 that the critic who conceals his identity does so in order to impose upon the public. Anonymous books may be reviewed anonymously, but no others. There is no doubt that if anonymity were done away with, ninety-nine literary rascalities out of a hundred would never see the light. Until the business is proscribed, let us, whenever occasion offers, hold the man who carries it on (the head and principal of the Institute of Anonymous Reviewing) immediately responsible for the sins of those in his pay, adopting towards him the tone which the nature of his business warrants us in assuming. There is no lie too audacious to find place in the anonymous reviewer's article; for he is well aware that he is not responsible. I, for my part, would as lief be manager of a gambling-hell or a brothel, as of an Institute of Lies and Slander such as this.

[ii *Par.* § 290.]

Style is the physiognomy of the mind. It is a more infallible index than that of the body. To imitate the style of another is to wear a mask. Admirable as this may be, its lifelessness soon makes it insipid and unbearable, and even the ugliest living face is preferable. Those who adopt a Latin style, and write after the

manner of the ancients, are therefore really masks. We hear what they say perfectly, but we do not see their face, their style. We do see it, however, in the Latin writings of *original thinkers* who have not accustomed themselves to this imitation—of men, for instance, like Scotus Erigena, Petrarch, Bacon, Descartes, and Spinoza.

Affectation in style is like grimacing. The language in which we write is the national physiognomy, and how great a difference is here established—from Greek to Caribbean!

[ii *Par.* § 291.]

To form a preliminary estimate of a writer's mental calibre, it is by no means necessary to know what, and about what, he has thought; for this would entail reading all his books. No; to begin with, it suffices to know *how* he thinks. Now of this How, of this essential nature and prevailing *quality* of his thinking, his *style* is an exact replica. For the style indicates the *formal* constitution of the whole of a man's thoughts, and this will always be the same, whatever the subject-matter of his thoughts may be. We have here, as it were, the dough out of which all his thoughts, however different in character, are kneaded. The inquirer who asked Eulenspiegel how far[1] it was to the next village, received the apparently irrelevant answer "Walk"—the meaning being that Eulenspiegel would judge from his pace what distance he would cover in a given time. And just so, I have only to read two or three pages of an author to know pretty well whether he will be of any use to me.

It is because he is secretly aware of this that the mediocre writer seeks to mask his own natural

[1] In Germany distance is reckoned by time, not miles. Thus to the question, "How far is it to A.....?" the answer would be "two hours."

style. This compels him, in the first place, to forgo all *naïveté*—a quality which thus becomes the privilege of superior and sensitive writers, who therefore go to work with confidence. Ordinary people can never make up their minds to write as they think: they are afraid of their work looking silly. That, however, it will always be. If they would but tell us honestly and quite simply the little ordinary things they have actually thought, and just as they have thought them, they would be readable, and even in their small way instructive. But instead of this, they try to pretend that they have thought much more, and more deeply, than they really have. They accordingly set forth what they have to say in heavy laboured phraseology, in new-fangled words, and in long-winded periods which go all round their thoughts and conceal them. They waver between the endeavour to communicate it and the endeavour to hide it—their object being to give it an appearance of learning and depth of thought, and to lead us to suppose that more lies behind than we are aware of as we read. Accordingly, at one time, what they have to say is dashed off piecemeal in short, ambiguous, and paradoxical sentences, which appear to hint much more than they say: splendid examples of this kind are to be found in Schelling's writings on Natural Philosophy. At another, they put forth their thought amid a surge of words and are most intolerably prolix, as though it needed heaven knows what preparations to make its profound meaning intelligible—and all the time it is some quite simple, not to say trivial conceit. Fichte, in his popular writings, and a hundred miserable addle-pates who shall be nameless, in their philosophical text-books, afford examples in abundance. At another, they labour at some fanciful, would-be superior style of writing, *e.g.* a scientific style such as never was, and we have to submit to the narcotic

influences of excruciatingly long-winded periods containing not one grain of thought: here no examples are so good as the ones afforded by those most shameless of mortals the Hegelians, in their Hegel-journal, *vulgo* Annual Register of Scientific Literature. At another, they try an intellectual style, and here they look as if they were endeavouring to qualify for Bedlam. At another—but enough! All these attempts to defer the birth of their *ridiculus mus* often make it hard to discover from their goings-on what it is they would really be at. Then they write down words—whole periods, even, to which they themselves attach no meaning, though they hope that somebody else may. The real reason of all this is, that they are burning to discover some novel way of palming off words for thoughts, and by means of expressions that are either new or used in a new sense, of strange turns of speech and amazing grammatical constructions, to produce an appearance of intelligence[1] which may serve to supply the painfully-felt want of that article. It is amusing to see how, in this endeavour, first one mannerism and then another is tried. For a while this intellect-aping mask may perhaps deceive the uninitiated, until it is discovered to be a dead mask, whereupon amid laughter it is exchanged for another. These writers will first go on the dithyrambic tack and rant like men possessed,[2] and then, perhaps on the very next page, they will adopt the bombastic, serious, and deeply-learned tone, chewing the cud of their ultra-longwinded prolixity after the manner of the late Christian Wolf, only in more modern fashion. But the mask that wears longest is that of unintelligibility, although only in Germany, where, introduced by

[1] *Geist*, French *esprit*.

[2] Schopenhauer indulges his sarcastic humour by writing *besoffen* (tipsy) instead of *besessen* (possessed).

Fichte and improved by Schelling, it reached its climax in Hegel—always with the happiest results. And yet nothing is easier than to write unintelligibly; whereas nothing is harder than to express significant thoughts in language that no one can fail to understand. Where there is real intellect, however, there need be no resort to these artifices; for intellect allows a man to show himself as he is, and always confirms Horace's saying:

Scribendi recte sapere est et principium et fons.[1]

But the writers aforesaid are like certain workers in metal who try to substitute a hundred different compositions for the one and ever-unreplaceable gold. Now an author should do just the reverse, and his first care should be to avoid the visible endeavour to pose as a man possessed of more intellect than he really has, because this will awaken in the reader a suspicion that he is deficient in it; for we only affect qualities we do not possess. And so to call an author "naïve" is a commendation; for it means that he ventures to show himself as he is. Naïveté is always attractive, whereas nothing is more repellent than affectation. Every real thinker, therefore, endeavours to express himself as correctly, plainly, decisively, and shortly as possible. Accordingly simplicity has ever been the mark, not of truth[2] only, but also of genius. Style derives its beauty from the thought; but these sham-thinkers imagine that thoughts should be beautified by the style. Style, however, is just the silhouette of the thought; and writing that is hazy and bad argues dull, confused thinking.

The first—I might say, the only—rule of good style, therefore, is *the having something to say.* That is everything. And the neglect of it is the distinguishing mark

[1] To write correctly, wisdom is first required.

[2] In reference to Schopenhauer's favourite quotation: *simplex sigillum veri.*

of the philosophic, and indeed of all the reflecting[1] writers of Germany, especially since Fichte's day. For of all these writers it is to be remarked that, though they have nothing to say, they want to *appear* as if they were saying something. This fashion, introduced by the pseudo-philosophers of the Universities, can be detected everywhere, even in the foremost literary notabilities of the period. It is the mother of various styles: the vague, ambiguous, and doubly or trebly ambiguous; the prolix and long-winded; the prim, or *stile empesé;* the verbose, with its useless surge of words; and finally the style which hides the direct poverty of thought under an untiring clapper-mill-like,[2] narcotic twaddle, which one may read for hours together without gathering a single clear thought. Open the notorious *Halle Annual Register—German Annual Register*, as it is now called—and on every page almost you will find admirable examples of these styles. Meanwhile German composure has accustomed itself to read page after page of such stuff, without caring to ask what the writer really means. It thinks this is all as it should be, and never discovers that the author is writing for the mere sake of writing. A good and thoughtful writer, on the other hand, is soon credited by his reader with seriousness of purpose and with really *having something to say*, and this gives the intelligent reader patience to follow him attentively. Such a writer will always express himself in the simplest and directest way, just because he really has something to say; for he wants the reader to think the very thought he is himself thinking, and no other. And so he can say with Boileau:

[1] *Reffectirend*, probably in the sense of "not original."

[2] In allusion to the Spanish proverb: I hear the clappering of the mill, but I see no flour.

Ma pensée au grand jour partout s'offre et s'expose,
Et mon vers, bien ou mal, dit toujours quelque chose ;[1]

whereas the writers I was speaking of just now belong to the category of those "qui parlant beaucoup ne disent jamais vien,"[2] as the same Boileau has it. One of their characteristics is that they avoid *definite* utterances as much as possible, so that in case of need they may be able to slip the halter from their necks. So they always choose the more *abstract* expression, whereas men of genius prefer the more concrete, because it brings things nearer to perceptivity, which is the fount of all clearness.

[ii Par. § 295.]

The leading principle in the formation of style should be this: that a man can only clearly think *one* thought at a time, and therefore he should not be expected to carry two or three in his head at once. But this is just what the writer who designedly interrupts his chief period, in order to introduce other thoughts in a subsidiary clause, expects of his reader; though all that he does is to confuse him unnecessarily and wilfully. *German* writers are the chief sinners in this respect. That their language lends itself better to this practice than the other living languages, establishes the possibility, it is true, but not the laudability of the thing. No prose is so easy and agreeable to read as French, because it is free, as a rule, from this failing. The Frenchman strings his thoughts together in the most logical and natural sequence, and puts them successively before the reader for his convenient consideration, so that he can

[1] My thought is ever held up to the light of day,
And, well or ill, my verse will always something say.

[2] Who, talking much, yet never say a thing.

give his undivided attention to each of them in turn. The German, on the contrary, weaves them into an intricate, and still more intricate, and again more intricate sentence—and all because he wants to say half-a-dozen things at once, instead of bringing them out one after the other. Thus, while he should be trying to attract and hold the attention of his reader, he rather demands from him that, in opposition to the above law of the apprehension of one thing at a time, he shall think three or four different thoughts together, or, as this is impossible, shall think them in rapid alternation. He thus lays the foundation of his *stile empesé*, which he then completes by using finical, high-flown expressions to convey the simplest thoughts, and by other devices of the kind.

The true national-character of the Germans is *ponderosity*. We see it in their walk, their action and behaviour, their language, their talking, speechifying, understanding, and thinking—above all in their *style* of writing, in the delight they take in long unwieldy, involved periods, in the course of which the memory alone is patiently learning, for the space of five minutes, the lesson inflicted upon it, until finally, at the close of the sentence, the meaning flashes across one and the riddle is solved. This is their great pleasure, and if finicalness and bombast and affected σεμνοτης[1] can be brought in, the author revels in them—and may Heaven grant the reader patience! Their main care is to choose the most indefinite and indeterminate forms of expression, so that the whole thing looks as if in a fog—the object seeming to be, first, to leave open a back door to every proposition; secondly, to affect a superior air and pretend to say more than is thought. But the real fact is, that at the heart of this long-winded style lies drowsy

[1] Solemnity.

stupidity; and it is this that so disgusts foreigners with German writing, because they do not want to go groping about in the dark, which is what the inhabitants of Germany seem to love.

These long periods, lying one within the other like a nest of boxes, or like roast goose stuffed with apples, make demands in the first place upon the *memory;* whereas appeal should rather be made to the understanding and judgment—faculties whose activities are only impeded and weakened by this torrent of words. For such periods simply give the reader incomplete phrases, which have to be gathered up—like the fragments of a torn-up letter—by his memory, until in due course they receive their complemental halves which make sense of them. He must therefore read on for a time without thinking at all—must merely memorise everything, in the hope that at the close a light may dawn upon him and give him something to think about at last. There is a heap of matter to be learnt by heart, before he can get something to understand. Now this is manifestly wrong, and an abuse of the reader's patience. But why the unmistakable preference of ordinary minds for this style of writing? Clearly because it obliges the reader to devote time and trouble, in order to understand what he would otherwise have taken in at a glance; and this makes it look as though the writer had more depth and understanding than the reader. The same thing may be said of those artifices mentioned above, by means of which mediocre writers unconsciously and instinctively endeavour to hide their poverty of thought, and to produce the appearance of its contrary. Their ingenuity in this matter is really astonishing.

But it is manifestly contrary to all common sense to run one thought through another after the fashion of a wooden cross. And yet this is done whenever, after

beginning to say something, a writer breaks off and introduces something quite different, thus entrusting to the reader's keeping the commencement of a period which has no sense apart from its complemental ending. It is like handing one's guest an empty plate, which he may hope to see filled by and by. The commas which mark off periods are really cousins-german of footnotes and parentheses; indeed, there is between them only a difference of degree. Demosthenes and Cicero have at times made use of these periods within periods; but it would have been better had they not done so.

The most inelegant form of this manner of constructing phrases is where the subsidiary periods, instead of being organically connected with the rest of the sentence, are so wedged in as to break it to pieces. If it is an impertinence to interrupt others, it is no less so to interrupt oneself, as happens in a phrase-construction which for the last few years all bad, careless, hasty, bread-winning scribblers have used half-a-dozen times on every page to their evident delight. It consists in—rules and examples should be given if possible—breaking a phrase in two, in order to stick in another.[1] This they do, however, not only from laziness, but also from stupidity, regarding it as a charming *légèrete*[2] which enlivens the composition. There are certain rare occasions on which it may be excused.

[1] In this sentence Schopenhauer imitates the fashion he is condemning.
[2] Airiness, jauntiness.

Chapter XXIV.

OF LITERATURE

[ii *Par.* § 301.]

As the strata of the earth preserve in serial order the living beings of past epochs, so do the shelves of libraries preserve in serial order the errors of the past and their exposure—errors which, like those former living beings, were very lively in their time and made a great noise, but now lie stiff and fossilised in a place where nobody but the literary palæontologist ever looks at them.

[ii *Par.* § 302.]

As he surveyed his vast host—so Herodotus tells us—Xerxes wept to think that in a hundred years not one of his soldiers would be in the land of the living. And who, as he thumbs the bulky catalogue of the last publishing season, but must weep to think that in all probability at the end of ten years not one of these books will be alive!

[ii *Par.* § 303.]

It is in literature no otherwise than in life: whithersoever we turn, we encounter forthwith the incorrigible mob of humanity which swarms in its legions everywhere, fills every place, and befouls everything as do flies in summer. Hence the myriads of bad books, those rampant tares of literature which rob the wheat of its nourishment and choke it. For they monopolise the public's time, cash, and attention, which of right belong to the good books of noble aim, while these poor effusions are

penned simply to bring in money or to procure lucrative posts. They are thus not merely useless, but positively harmful. Nine-tenths of the books now written have no other aim but to conjure a few half-crowns out of the pockets of the public, and for this purpose author, publisher, and reviewer have banded themselves together in a solemn league.

The penny-a-liner writers have struck a still craftier, sorer, and withal more profitable stroke against good taste and true culture, in that they have managed to persuade the *fashionable world* into *reading a tempo*; I mean, that they have educated it into reading the same thing—viz. the latest book—at the same time, so that this may form the topic of conversation at its social gatherings. This end is subserved by bad novels and similar productions from pens as famous for the nonce as those of Spindler, Bulwer, Sue, etc., once were. But what can be more deplorable than the fate of a bellettristic public which holds itself pledged always to read the latest productions of third-rate people, who write simply for money, and whose name is therefore always legion, and which consequently knows the few really great writers of the world by name only. The bellettristic *Daily Press* is the cleverest of devices for robbing the æsthetic public of the time which, for the salvation of its culture, it ought to be devoting to great works, and which it is induced to spend instead upon the rubbish that dribbles day by day from mediocre pens.

Very important, therefore, in regard to our reading, is the art of *not* reading. It consists in not following the majority—in avoiding the literature of the moment, the political or ecclesiastical pamphlets, the novels, poems, etc., which are making so much stir and going through edition after edition in the first and last year of their life. Let us remember rather, that he who writes

for fools has always a numerous public ; and let us devote our time—the always too scanty time for reading—exclusively to the works of those great writers who tower above the rest of humanity, and who are proclaimed to be such by the voice of Fame. These alone are really improving and instructive.

Of the bad we can never read too little ; of the good never too much. Bad books are intellectual poison ; they ruin the mind. Instead of the best works of all ages, people prefer to read the *latest ;* and so authors remain in the narrow circle of current ideas, and the age gets ever deeper bemired in its own filth.

[ii *Par.* § 304.]

In every age there are always two antagonistic literatures running parallel to each other—a real and a sham. The former ripens into *permanent literature.* Pursued by men who live *for* science or poetry, it goes its way with grave, noiseless, and exceedingly slow steps, producing in Europe scarcely a dozen works in a century : these, however, *endure.* The latter, pursued by men who live *by* science or poetry, goes at a gallop amid the hurrahing of the persons concerned, and puts thousands of books every year upon the market. But in a few years we ask, Where are they ? Where is now their early and great fame ?—Evanescent literature we may therefore call the first kind ; stable literature, the second.

[ii *Par.* § 305.]

A half-century is a considerable period in world history, whose material keeps accumulating, for some new event is always taking place. But in the history of literature the same period may often be left altogether out of

account, for the simple reason that nothing happened in it; for bungling experiments are not to be reckoned, and, if there is no work of note produced, we remain where we were fifty years ago.

To illustrate this, let us think of the progress of knowledge in the world under the figure of a planetary orbit. The errors into which the human race so soon falls, as a rule, after any considerable advance, may be represented by the Ptolemaic epicycles, after the traversing of each of which the planet returns to its original position. Great thinkers, however, who are really helping the race along upon its planetary orbit, do not join in the epicyclic deviation of the moment. Hence we see why posthumous fame must be paid for by the loss of contemporary reputation, and *vice versa*.....

Those who wish to verify the truth of my epicyclic figure (*Schema*) from the history of art, need only turn to the success in the last century, especially in its French development, of Bernini's school of sculpture. There they will see not antique beauty, but common Nature; not antique simplicity and grace, but dancing-master's posturing. Berninism went bankrupt when, as Winckelmann correctly points out, a return was made to the school of the ancients. Again, take a case from the history of painting. In the first quarter of the present century Art was supposed to be a mere means and tool of medieval religiosity: sacred subjects were the only ones admitted, but these were now treated by painters who, though they lacked the true earnestness of the Christian faith, were nevertheless determined to imitate Francia, Perugino, Fra Angelico, and the rest of that school, whom they esteemed more highly than the really great masters who succeeded them. It was in reference to this error, which spread contemporaneously in the domain of poetry also, that Goethe wrote

the parable "*Pfaffenspiel.*" As soon as it was seen that this school depended upon mere whimsical caprice, it too went bankrupt, and a return was made to Nature—artists devoting themselves to *genre* pictures and scenes from life of all kinds, although they sometimes made the mistake of choosing vulgar subjects.

.....What I should very much like to see is a *tragic literary-history*, showing how the various nations treated in their lifetime those great writers and artists to whom they now so proudly point, thus bringing before our eyes the endless warfare always and everywhere waged by the good and genuine against the ever-prevailing wrong and bad; depicting the martyrdom endured by almost all the true lights of humanity, by almost all the great masters in every department; describing how, with but few exceptions, they remained unrecognised, gained no sympathy, made no disciples, lived a painful life of poverty and misery, while fame, honour, and riches were the meed of their unworthy fellow-craftsmen—so that it was with them as with Esau of old, who, while in quest of savoury meat for his father, had his blessing stolen from him by home-staying Jacob arrayed in his clothes; and yet, with all this, making us see how love for their work sustained them, till at length their hard fight was over, the immortal laurel in sight, and the hour striking wherein for them too

> Der schwere Panzer wird zum Flügelkleide,
> Kurz ist der Schmerz, unendlich ist die Freude.[1]

[ii *Par.* Appendix to Chap. xxiv.]

.....There are two kinds of *History*—the history of

[1] The heavy armour turns to robes of white;
Brief is the pain, unending the delight.

Politics, and that of Literature and Art. The former is the history of the *Will*; the latter that of the *intellect*. The former is therefore disquieting, afflictive, terrible: agony, distress, fraud, and hideous murder, *en masse*. The latter, on the contrary, is throughout gladsome and blithe—like the isolated[1] intellect—even where it describes errors. Its main branch is the History of Philosophy. This is really its ground-bass, which peals over into the other kind of history and guides opinion there too from beneath—and opinion rules the world. When rightly and truly understood, therefore, Philosophy is the mightiest material power; but it works very slowly.

The Philosophy of every period is the ground-bass of its History.

Chapter XXV.

WORDS AND LANGUAGES

[ii *Par.* § 308.]

No material is so durable as the word of man. When a poet has incarnated the most fleeting of his feelings in exactly appropriate words, it lies in these throughout the centuries, and stirs afresh in the breast of every susceptible reader.

[ii *Par.* § 311.]

We affect to despise the *Chinese written character*. But as it is the business of all writing to awaken concepts in the minds of others by *visible* symbols, it is manifestly a

[1] *I.e.* pure—apart from the Will.

very roundabout proceeding to put first before the eye the symbol of their *audible* symbol, and to make this the supporter of the concept—a proceeding that reduces our written character to a mere symbol of a symbol. Let us ask, then, What advantage has the audible symbol over the visible, that we should leave the straight path from eye to reason and go this long round of allowing the visible symbol to speak to the mind of the reader through the audible symbol only?—whereas it is clearly simpler to adopt the Chinese fashion of making the visible symbol the immediate supporter of the concept, and not the mere symbol of the sound;[1] all the more so, as the sense of sight is susceptible of more and finer modifications than that of hearing, and allows moreover of a concomitance of impressions, of which the affections of hearing, since they are given exclusively in time, are not capable. The reasons I am asking for would probably be stated as follows:—

(1) We naturally have recourse, to begin with, to audible symbols, in order to express, first, our emotions, and subsequently our thoughts also. We thus get a language for the ear, before we dream of constructing one for the eye. But by and by it is shorter to refer the visible language, where necessary, to the audible, than to devise, or say learn, a quite new and withal quite different kind of language for the eye; especially as we shall soon discover that all the words can be reduced to very few sounds, and therefore can be easily expressed by these.

(2) Though it is true that the eye can apprehend many more kinds of modifications than the ear, yet, in default of proper organs, we cannot *produce* them for the eye as

[1] Or read "the Chinese fashion of immediately supporting the concept not by the mere symbol of the sound, but by the visible symbol."

we can for the ear. Besides which we could never produce or change the visible symbols with such rapidity as, thanks to the mobility of the tongue, we can the audible—as witness the imperfection of the finger-language of deaf mutes. This is why the sense of hearing is so intrinsically and essentially the sense of language, and therefore of reason.

These, however, are not reasons sufficient to warrant a departure from that direct road which is always the best; for they are only external, accidental, and unessential. And so, if we look at the matter abstractly, purely theoretically, and *a priori*, the Chinese plan would be the really right one; and the only reproach that could lie at their door would be a certain pedantry in leaving out of account the empirical circumstances which make another way desirable. Meanwhile, experience has revealed one exceedingly conspicuous advantage of Chinese characters. It is this: that we can use them without understanding Chinese; for everybody can read them off in his own lauguage, just as we read figures, which are for concepts of numbers precisely what the Chinese characters are for all concepts, and what algebraical signs are even for abstract concepts of magnitude. Therefore—as an English tea-merchant, who has been five times in China, assures me—along the whole seaboard of the Indian Ocean the Chinese character is the usual medium of communication between merchants of various nations who have no language in common. My informant, who is corroborated by J. F. Davis (see *The Chinese*, London 1836, ch. xv.), even felt confident that for this purpose it would some day spread over the whole world.

§ 204.

MYTHOLOGY

[ii *Par.* § 204.]

I HAVE never been able to make out the fable of Pandora; it seems to me to have neither rhyme nor reason. My opinion is, that Hesiod himself misunderstood it and put it in the wrong way. Surely Pandora—her very name shows it—had all the excellent things of the world in her box, and not all the evils. Epimetheus opening it too hastily, out they all flew—all, that is, except Hope, who was saved and remains with us. It was with considerable satisfaction that in an Anthology (*Delectus epigr. græc.*, ed. Jacobs) I lighted upon two passages which support this view of mine. One is an epigram (*op. cit.* vii. ep. 84); and the other a passage quoted from Babrius (*Babr.* fab., 58) which opens with these words: Ζευς εν πιθῳ τα Χρηστα παντα συλλεξας[1].....

CHAPTER XXVI.

PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS

[ii *Par.* § 314.]

EVERY animal, and especially man, requires, if it is to exist and get on in the world, a certain correspondence and proportion between its Will and its intellect. The more exact and correct this correspondence is by nature, the

[1] Zeus, having collected all good things in a casket....

more easily, safely, and pleasantly will it get through life. Meanwhile, to preserve it from perishing, it suffices if the correspondence is merely approximative. There is therefore a certain range, within the limits of which the proportion or correspondence spoken of is sufficient and fairly suitable. The following considerations will give the rule for this proportion. The intellect's vocation being to serve as a lantern to guide the steps of the Will, it follows that the more vehement, impetuous, and passionate the inner stress of a Will, the more perfect and the brighter must be the intellect joined with it; so that the vehemence of the willing and striving, the heat of the passions, the violence of the emotions, may not lead the man astray and hurry him into inconsiderate, wrong, and injurious actions, as will inevitably be the case if his Will is very impetuous and his intellect very weak. On the other hand, a phlegmatic character, *i.e.* a weak and feeble Will, can manage to exist with an ordinary intellect, while the temperate Will requires a medium intellect. Speaking generally, any want of proportion between a Will and its intellect—*i.e.* any departure, whether by excess or defect, from the above-mentioned correspondence—tends to make a man unhappy. This unhappiness comes, as a rule, from excess of Will; but there may also be an abnormal and excessive development of intellect, whose consequent immense preponderance over the Will—which is the essential feature of real genius—will be, with regard to the needs and aims of life, not merely superfluous, but a direct hindrance. In such a case excessive energy of apprehension of the objective world, accompanied by vivid imagination and uncontrolled by experience, will easily make a young head susceptible to extravagant notions and fill it with chimeras, and, as a result, the youth's character will be eccentric and fantastic. Even

after correction by experience, the genius will never feel himself so much at home in the world and in civil life as an ordinary individual; indeed, he will often make the strangest blunders. For the normal man is so perfectly at home in the narrow circle of his concepts and apprehension that no one can get the better of him, and his knowledge always remains faithful to its original aim, viz. devotion to the service of the Will, to which it will continually apply itself without ever flying off to other things; whereas the genius is, as I have already explained elsewhere, in reality a *monstrum per excessum* (monster by excess), as contrariwise the man of violent passions without understanding, the brainless Nero,[1] is a *monstrum per defectum* (monster by defect).

[ii *Par.* § 315.]

The Will-to-live, as constituting the inmost kernel of every living being, discovers itself, so far as its essence is concerned, most plainly and unreservedly in the higher, cleverer animals. For *below* this grade it does not yet come so prominently forward—has a lesser degree of objectification; while above it—in man, that is—there comes in, together with reason, reflectiveness, and along with this the capacity for dissimulation, which forthwith throws a veil over it. Only when it breaks out into emotions and passions does the Will throw off this veil in man. Therefore every passion, of whatever kind, whenever it speaks, finds credence always—and rightly so. And this is why the passions form the main theme of the poet, and the *pièce de resistance* of the playwright.

It is the perfect naïveté of dogs, apes, cats, etc., in all their actions that delights us so much.

[1] *Wütherich:* maniacal tyrant; bloodthirsty slave to passion.

What a peculiar pleasure it affords us to watch the free and unconstrained action of any animal, as it procures its food, or tends its young, or goes about with others of its species, etc., showing exactly what it wants to be and can be! If it is but a tiny bird, I can watch it for a length of time with pleasure—aye, even a water-rat, a frog; though I prefer to look at a hedgehog, a weasel, a roe-deer, or a stag. The main part of our pleasure in contemplating an animal is, that we love to have our own essence shown to us under this very much *simplified* aspect.

There is in the world only *one* lying creature—*man*. Every other being is true and sincere, giving itself out unreservedly for what it is, and showing what it feels. An emblematic or allegorical expression of this fundamental distinction is, that all animals go about in a state of nature, and this makes them so delightful to look at, that, especially when they are free, my whole heart goes out to them; while man, with his clothes, has become a fright, a monster, a repulsive creature to the sight—all the more so, owing to his unnatural white colouring, and all the disgusting consequences of his unnatural flesh-diet, spirit-drinking, tobacco, debaucheries, and diseases. He stands there as a blot on Nature! The Greeks felt this, and reduced their clothing to a minimum.

[ii *Par.* § 316.]

Disquietude of mind causes palpitation of the heart; and palpitation of the heart perturbs the mind. Grief, care, uneasiness of mind, have an inhibitory effect upon the vital processes, and render the due performance of the organic functions difficult, affecting either the circulation, or the secretions, or the digestion. And, conversely, if the machinery of the body—in heart, bowels,

vena portarum, seminal vesicles, or any other part—be clogged, obstructed or otherwise disturbed, owing to physical causes, there then arise uneasiness of mind, apprehension, fancifulness, and groundless melancholy—in a word, the state called hypochondria. Just so, again, anger causes a man to shout, stamp, and gesticulate violently; while on the other hand these outward bodily manifestations increase anger, or kindle it upon very small provocation. I need hardly say how strongly all this confirms my doctrine of the unity and identity of Will and body, according to which doctrine the body is nothing but the Will exhibiting itself in the spatial perceivance of the brain.

[ii *Par.* § 318.]

Viva muchos años! is a common greeting in Spain, and in every quarter of the globe it is usual to wish people a long life. This, however, is to be explained, not from the knowledge of what life is, but of what man in his inmost essence is—viz., Will-to-live.

The universal desire to be *remembered* after death—a desire which with the ambitious rises to the *wish for posthumous fame*—appears to me to spring from that attachment to life, which, when it sees itself cut off from the possibility of real existence, clutches at that which alone is still present, although only ideal—clutches, that is, at a shadow.

[ii *Par.* § 323.]

The reason why the sudden announcement of some extraordinary piece of good fortune may easily prove fatal to life, is as follows: Our happiness and unhappiness are merely an affair of the proportion between our claims and receipts, and so the good things we possess, or which we know we shall one day possess, are not felt to

be blessings; because all pleasure is really only negative, acting merely as the removal of pain, whereas pain or evil is the really positive which is immediately felt. With possession, or the certain prospect of it, our claims rise at once and increase our capacity for further possessions and wider prospects. But if continued misfortune has compressed our heart and reduced our claims to a minimum, the heart has then no room to accommodate sudden tidings of good fortune, which, now that it is neutralised by no previous claims, has an apparently positive effect, and consequently works with its full force, so that it breaks our heart, *i.e.* proves fatal. Hence the well-known precautions that have to be adopted in disclosing the news of unprecedented good fortune. At first we put it as a mere possibility, then show that there is a prospect of it, and so reveal it gradually piece by piece; for thus each new piece, being anticipated by a claim, produces no staggering effect and prepares the heart to bear more. So we may say: Our stomach for happiness is indeed of infinite extent, but it has a narrow neck.

The same thing is not true of sudden misfortunes: besides, Hope always lends its weight here, and so they much seldomer prove fatal. The reason why Fear does not act in an analagous way in cases of good fortune is this: that we are instinctively inclined more to hope than to apprehension; just as our eyes turn of themselves to the light, and not to the dark.

[ii *Par.* § 326.]

There is an unconscious appropriateness in the use, in all European languages, of the word "person" to denote the human individual. For *persona* really signifies an actor's mask, and, of course, no one shows himself as he is, but everybody wears a mask and plays a part. In

fact, the whole of social life is nothing but the perpetual acting of a comedy. This makes it insipid to people with anything in them; but the dullards find it pleasant enough.

[ii *Par.* § 328.]

Unjust treatment causes the natural man to thirst for *revenge*, and it is often said that revenge is sweet. This is confirmed by the many sacrifices made merely in order to enjoy it, and without any notion of obtaining indemnification. The painful death of the Centaur Nessus was made sweet by the exceedingly clever revenge planned by him in his last moments—a revenge which he foresaw would not fail; and the same thought, in modern and more plausible dress, forms the theme of Bertolotti's novel *Le due sorelle*, which has been translated into three languages. Sir Walter Scott gives expression to this propensity of man in words at once forcible and appropriate: "Revenge is the sweetest morsel to the mouth that ever was cooked in hell." I will now attempt to give a psychological explanation of it.

Suffering laid upon us by Nature, or Chance, or Fate, is, *ceteris paribus*, not so painful as that wilfully inflicted by our fellow-man. This is because we recognise Nature and Chance as the original masters of the world, and know that what befals us through them might equally have befallen any one else; and so, in suffering that proceeds from this source, we rather bewail the common lot of humanity than our own. But suffering deliberately inflicted by another adds to the pain or damage itself this quite peculiar and bitter grief, viz. the consciousness of his superiority, through power or craft, and of our own weakness. Damage done is remedied by indemnification where possible; but this bitter addition, this "and must I bear this from you?" which is often more painful

than the damage itself, is only to be neutralised by revenge. For if, by power or craft, we in our turn can inflict damage upon the man who has injured us, we then show our superiority over him, and so annul the proof of his. This gives our soul the satisfaction for which it thirsted. Accordingly, where there is much pride or vanity, there will the passion of revenge be strong. But as every fulfilled desire is apt to turn out more or less disappointing, so with revenge. The pleasure hoped for from it will generally be turned by compassion into gall: aye, very often the vengeance taken will afterwards wring our heart and oppress our conscience; for that which led us to it operates no longer, and we are left with the sense of our own wickedness.

[ii *Par.* § 337.]

What makes people *hard-hearted* is this: they have, or think they have, worries enough of their own to bear. Hence an unusual state of happiness makes most people sympathetic and charitable. But when such state is long continued, it often produces a contrary effect; for they are now so far from suffering that they can no longer be sympathetic. This is why the poor are often more forward in helping others than the rich.

On the other hand, what makes people so *inquisitive*—and that they are inquisitive, we see by their peeping and prying into the affairs of others—is ennui, the pole of life opposite to suffering—though there is often some envy mixed up with it as well.

[ii *Par.* § 338.]

To discover your real feeling towards a person, observe

what impression an unexpected letter from him or her makes upon you when you first catch sight of it.

[ii *Par.* § 341.]

The course and events of our individual life are, as regards their true sense and connexion, like coarse mosaic-work. As long as we stand close to a piece of coarse mosaic, we can hardly tell what it is meant to represent, and perceive neither its significance nor its beauty: only by removing to a distance do both become plain to us. And just so, we often fail to understand the true connexion of important events in our own life while these are happening or shortly after, and only apprehend it when some considerable time has elapsed.

Is this because we need the magnifying-glass of imagination? Or because a comprehensive view is only to be obtained from a distance? Or because the passions must be allowed to cool? Or because the school of experience ripens our judgment?—Perhaps for all these reasons together. But there is no doubt that, with regard to the actions of others in many cases, and in some cases even with regard to our own, the true light does not dawn upon us till after the lapse of many years. And as with our own life, so is it also with history.

[ii *Par.* § 344.]

No one knows his own faculties for suffering and acting until some exciting cause sets them in activity—just as no one, looking at the peaceful mirror of smooth water in a pond, would deem it capable of roaring down over rocks or soaring aloft in a fountain—or as no one would suspect that in ice-cold water there lurks latent heat.

[ii *Par.* § 346.]

Though Ovid's line,

Pronaque cum spectent animalia cetera terram,[1]

holds good, in its proper physical sense, of animals alone, yet it is unfortunately true also of most men in a figurative and intellectual sense. Their thoughts and aims are all directed to the attainment of physical pleasure and well-being, or to their personal interests, the circle of which but too often includes all sorts of things that ultimately derive their importance from enjoyment only, and never extend further. This we see, not only from their conversation and mode of life, but even from their very look—from their faces, expression, gait, and gestures. Everything about them cries aloud: *in terram prona!* Not to them, therefore, but only to the nobler and more highly gifted natures—to those exceptional people who think and really look about them, do the lines that follow the one just quoted apply:

Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri
Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.[2]

[ii *Par.* § 348.]

The Will, as thing-in-itself, is the substance common to all beings, the universal element in things. We accordingly share it with every man and animal, and even with beings still lower on the scale. In the Will, as such, we are therefore like everything else; for there is nothing, nothing, that is not filled to the brim with Will.

[1] While on the earth
The other creatures bend their eyes.

[2] To man he gave a face sublime,
And bade us look to heav'n and lift
Our upturned faces to the stars.

On the other hand, that which lifts being above being, man above man, is knowledge. Therefore on the outside we should show, as far as possible, knowledge alone, and only this should come to the surface. For the Will, which is common to all things, is for that very reason "common" also in the other sense. Every violent outbreak of it, therefore, is *common*, *i.e.* degrades us to a mere sample of the species, for we then show the specific character only. Common, then, is all anger, inordinate joy, all hate, fear—in a word, every affect,[1] *i.e.* every stirring of the Will, when so strong that it decidedly outweighs knowledge in consciousness and reveals the man more as a willing than a knowing being. When given over to such an affect, the greatest genius is like the man of commonest clay; whereas he who wants to be absolutely uncommon, *i.e.* great, must never allow his consciousness to be monopolised by the stirrings of the Will, however strongly he may be solicited in this direction. He must be able, for example, to perceive the odious disposition of others, without having his own feelings stirred at the sight; indeed, there is no surer mark of greatness than quiet disregard of wounding or insulting expressions, which, if at once attributed, like all other errors, to the weak knowledge of the speaker, are merely perceived but not felt. This is what Gracian means when he says: *El mayor desdoro de un hombre es dar muestras de que es hombre* (Nothing is more unbecoming than for a man to show that he is a man).

[ii *Par.* § 349.]

When the energy of the intellect is highly strung, life appears so short, so petty, so fleeting, that nothing in

[1] Perturbation of the soul.

it—pleasure, riches, fame even—seems able to move us, but all looks insignificant; so much so that even where we have failed, it does not seem that we have lost much. But on the other hand, when the energy of the intellect is slack, life appears to it so long, so important, so all-in-all, so momentous, that we fling ourselves eagerly upon it in order to be partakers in its good things, to secure its prizes, and to carry out our plans. This latter view of life is the immanent view: Gracian alludes to it when he talks of taking life seriously (*tomar muy de veras el vivir*); whereas to the first, the transcendent, view, Ovid's *non est tanti*[1] applies—though, still better, Plato's *οὐδέ τι των ἀνθρωπινων ἀξιον ἐστι μεγαλης σπουδης*.[2]

The former way of regarding life proceeds from the preponderance of *knowledge* in consciousness: tearing itself free from its service to the *Will* alone, it objectively contemplates the phenomenon of life, whose vanity and futility it thus cannot fail to see. In the latter way, on the contrary, *willing* is pre-eminent, and knowing is present merely to illuminate the objects of willing and to throw light upon the path that leads to them.

A man is great or small according as the one or other view of life predominates.

[ii *Par.* § 353.]

Many a man undoubtedly owes his success in life merely to his pleasant smile, which wins hearts. Hearts, however, would do well to be on their guard: let them remember what Hamlet set upon his tables, That one may smile, and smile, and be a villain.

[1] Not of much account.
[2] Nothing in the world is of much consequence.

[ii *Par.* § 357.]

The physician sees man at his weakest; the lawyer sees him at his worst; the theologian, at his stupidest.

[ii *Par.* § 361.]

As, in Space, distance diminishes every object by contracting it, whereby its failings and blemishes disappear, on which account things look far more beautiful in a diminishing glass, or in a *camera obscura*, than they do in Nature; so are things past improved by lapse of time. The scenes, events, and persons of long ago look charming in remembrance, which leaves out of sight every unessential and disturbing element; whereas the present, which has not this advantage, always looks faulty.

And as, in Space, small objects look large when brought close, and, if brought very near, may even occupy our whole field of view, while removal to a distance reduces them to insignificance; so, in Time, the petty incidents, accidents, and events of our daily life loom large, so long as they are present and before our very eyes, and they accordingly arouse our emotions, cares, indignation, passions: but, when the unremitting stream of Time has carried them to a distance, they lose their hold on our attention and are soon forgotten, for their magnitude was due merely to their proximity.

[ii *Par.* § 363.]

Though there is danger that what we have learnt may become confused and disordered in our *memory*, we need not be afraid of overstocking it. Its capacity can no more be diminished by new acquisitions than can the forms into which we successively mould sand diminish

its capacity for new forms. In this sense the memory is infinitely receptive (*bodenlos*, bottomless). Of course, the greater and more varied our knowledge, the longer will it take us to hit upon exactly what we want. We are here in the case of a merchant, who has to hunt through his great storehouses for some particular article; or, to speak more correctly, we have, out of all possible trains of thought, to call forth precisely *that* one which, in consequence of previous practice, will lead us to what we require. For memory is no repository in which things are stored, but a mere ability to exercise the powers of the mind; and the mind possesses its knowledge not *actu*, but only *potentia*, as I have explained in § 45 of my *Fourfold Root*.

Sometimes my memory refuses to reproduce a foreign word, or a name, or some technical term, although I know it perfectly well. After having tormented myself over it fruitlessly for some time, I dismiss the whole thing from my mind. Then within an hour or two, though sometimes later, and it may not be till after a month or six weeks, the word I want suddenly occurs to me in the midst of other thoughts, as if it had been whispered to me from without. (It is then a good plan to fix it for the time being by some mnemonic device, until it has become stamped once more upon the memory proper.) The following seems to me the proper explanation of this phenomenon, which I have often observed and wondered over. After the painful and unsuccessful search, my Will maintains its desire for the word, and posts a spy in the intellect to look for it. Then the moment, in the course and play of my thoughts, there chances to occur some word which begins with the same letter or has some other similarity to the one I want, up jumps the spy and completes it; having done which, he pounces upon it and drags it triumphantly up, without my

knowing where or how he has captured it: this is why it comes as though whispered. It is much like the suggestion to the boy of the first letter or two of the word he is halting at in his repetition: this brings the word to him.

Another plan is to search methodically for the word through all the letters of the alphabet.

[ii *Par.* § 365.]

We only learn something now and then; but all day long we are forgetting.

So our memory is like a sieve, the holes of which get wider with time and use. For the older we grow, the quicker does memory part with what we have just entrusted to it; whereas that which was lodged in it long ago remains. Thus the farther events go back, the clearer is the recollection that old people have of them, and the more recent they are, the less they remember them; so that, like their eyes, their memory too becomes far-sighted (πρεσβυς).

[ii *Par.* § 367.]

That sometimes—for no reason at all, apparently—scenes of long ago suddenly come vividly before us, may in many cases be due to a slight odour, which reaches us now as it did then, though we may not be clearly conscious of it. For it is notorious that odours very easily awake recollections, and the *nexus idearum*[1] never requires more than the merest trifle to arouse it. I may remark, in passing, that sight is the sense of the understanding (*Fourfold Root*, § 21); hearing, the sense of the

[1] Association of ideas.

reason (see § 311 above); and smell, that of the memory, as we see here. Touch and taste are realists, bound to contact, and have no ideal side.

[ii *Par.* § 369.]

As a rule, geniuses get on better with perfect fools than with people of ordinary stamp; and this for the same reason that makes the despot and the *plebs*,[1] the grandparents and grandchildren, natural allies.

[ii *Par.* § 370.]

People require to be stirred from without, because they have so little within. But those who are possessed of inner activity find outer activity a very troublesome interruption, or, to speak plainly, a confounded nuisance. The restlessness and objectless travelling-mania of leisured people are due to their lack of mental activity. What they are trying to chase away, as they rush through foreign lands, is that very ennui which at home drives them to herd and squeeze together in a fashion that is really laughable. A signal confirmation of what I say was once afforded me by a man of about fifty that I chanced to meet. He told me of his two years' wanderings to the extremities of the earth. On my remarking that in such remote regions he must have undergone great hardships, privations, and dangers, he gave me at once and without preface—taking the premisses for granted—this enthymematical and most naïve answer: "I was never dull for a moment."

[1] The common people.

[ii *Par.* § 373.]

He who does not frequent the theatre is like a man who dresses without looking in the glass—but worse still is he who forms a resolution without consulting a friend. For a man may have admirable judgment in everything save that which concerns himself; because here the Will instantly warps the intellect. We should therefore seek advice from others, on the same principle that a doctor treats everybody else, but not himself: when ill, he calls in a colleague.

[ii *Par.* § 379.]

.....In difficult circumstances, to admit women to consultation, as the ancient Germans did, is by no means to be condemned; for their manner of apprehending things differs from ours entirely—the chief point of difference being, that they prefer to go the shortest way to the goal and always look at what lies nearest, which we, just because it lies under our very noses, generally overlook, and we afterwards have to come back in order to get the near and simple view. Then women's judgment is decidedly more sober than ours; they do not see more in things than they really contain, whereas we, if our passions are aroused, are apt to magnify them or to add something imaginary.

Chapter XXVIII.

OF EDUCATION

[ii *Par.* § 385.]

The consitution of our intellect is such that *concepts* must arise by abstraction from *percepts*, and these must therefore precede those. When our mind actually takes this course, as it does with people who make their own experience serve them as teacher and book, we know quite well which percepts belong to which concepts, and which concepts represent which percepts. We know them both perfectly, and accordingly treat everything that comes before us in the right way. This may be called natural education.

In artificial education, on the contrary, which consists of talking, teaching, and reading, the mind is stuffed with concepts before it is allowed to make any extensive acquaintance with the perceptual world. The percepts corresponding to all these concepts are brought in later by experience; but meanwhile the concepts are wrongly applied, and consequently men and things are wrongly judged, wrongly seen, wrongly treated. It is thus that education warps minds, and hence it is that after long years of learning and reading we sally forth into the world half simpletons and half cranks, and alternate between nervous fear and presumption, because our heads are full of concepts, which we want to apply, but almost always put to the wrong things. Such are the consequences of that ὕστερον προτερον[1] which causes us to run directly counter to the natural development of the mind, and makes us acquire concepts first and percepts

[1] Cart before the horse; inversion of the natural order.

last, because the teacher, instead of developing the boy's capacity for knowing, judging, and thinking, tries merely to stuff his head full of other people's ready-made thoughts. It subsequently needs long experience to correct all those judgments that have arisen from a wrong application of concepts. The correction is seldom complete, and this is why so few of the learned are possessed of that common-sense which is almost universal among the quite unlearned.

[ii *Par.* § 386.]

According to this, the main point in education would be *to make acquaintance with the world*, which we may call the aim and object of all education, *from the right end*. To do this depends, as shown above, mainly upon allowing the *percept* to precede the *concept*: further, the narrower concept must precede the wider. In this way instruction would follow the *natural* order of the concepts. The moment we skip any link in this series, there arise defective and thence wrong concepts, ending finally in a view of the world distorted in a way peculiar to the individual. Such a view almost every one carries about in his head for a long time, and in most cases for ever. Self-examination will show that about many perfectly simple things we do not acquire a right or clear understanding until a late period of our lives, at which time it often flashes upon us suddenly. We had missed this point by skipping some link in our early education—an education which may either have been of the artificial kind given by preceptors, or of the natural sort through our own experience.

We should therefore try to discover the really natural sequence of cognitions, and should then methodically proceed to make children acquainted with the things of

the world in their proper order, so as to prevent their taking into their heads wrong notions, which it may afterwards be almost impossible to drive out. The first point about which we must be careful, is to allow them to use no words with which they do not connect some clear notion.[1] The main thing, however, should always be to let percepts precede concepts, and not *vice versa* as is ordinarily done—a topsy-turvy plan, which is as bad as bringing a child into the world feet foremost, or creating the rhyme of a verse before its sense. While the child's mind is still poor in percepts, we impress upon it concepts and opinions (*Urtheile*), or I should rather say "prejudices" (*Vorurtheile*); and it afterwards brings this ready-made apparatus to perceivance and experience, instead of having derived it from these. Perceivance is many-sided and rich, and cannot therefore match the short, quick abstract-concept, which has done with everything in a moment; and to make it square with such preconceived concepts will be a long business, if indeed it can ever be accomplished. For when we perceive that in some point or other the percept is in contradiction with the concept, we may temporarily reject what it tells us as one-sided, or may even deny it and shut our eyes to it, so that the preconceived concept may not come to grief. Thus it is that many a man goes through life with his head full of whims, crotchets, false notions, fancies, and prejudices, which at length become fixed ideas. And if he has never himself tried to derive basal concepts from his perceivances and experiences, but has taken them all ready-made, it will make him—it has made millions—to the

[1] Instead of trying to understand a thing, most children have a dreadful way of contenting themselves with words, which they learn by heart as a stand-by on future occasions. This propensity remains with them, and hence in after life the knowledge of many a savant consists of mere verbiage.—Au.

last degree superficial and shallow. Instead of this, then, the natural course of instruction in knowledge should be kept to with children. No concept should be introduced otherwise than through perceivance, or at any rate not without being verified by the percept. The child would then have few concepts, it may be, but these would be thorough and correct. It would learn to measure things by its own standard, instead of adopting the standard of others. It would then never get into its head the thousand crotchets and prejudices, to the expulsion of which so great a part of its subsequent experience and world-schooling has to be devoted ; and its mind would for ever be accustomed to judge of things by itself, thoroughly, clearly, and without prejudice.

In a word, children should make acquaintance with life in its every aspect from the original, first, and not from the copy. Instead, therefore, of being in a hurry to put books, and only books, into their hands, let them be made acquainted step by step with things and the ways of men. Above all let care be taken to train them to a pure apprehension of Nature, and to lead them to take their concepts directly from the actual world and to fashion them upon actuality, and not to fetch them from other sources, from books, fairy tales, and the mouths of others, and afterwards bring these ready-made concepts to the real world, which, with their heads full of chimeras, they would then in part wrongly apprehend, and in part would fruitlessly endeavour to re-model in accordance with these chimeras, and thus go astray not in theory only, but in practice as well. For it is incredible what great disadvantages early-imprinted chimeras, and the prejudices resulting therefrom, bring. When once imbibed, the later education given by the world and actual life will have mainly to be spent upon their eradication. This is the meaning of the answer given by Antisthenes,

as reported by Diogenes Laertius (vi. 7) : " To the question, What is the most necessary part of education? he replied: To unlearn the wrong."

[ii *Par.* § 389.]

For practical men the prime necessity is the acquirement of an exact and thorough knowledge of *how things really go on in the world.* Though so necessary a study, it is also the most protracted; for it continues into old age, and even then is not finished, whereas we may master the chief points in the sciences in our youth. The boy, fresh to the study of the world, has the first and hardest lessons to learn, but the adult too has often much leeway to make up. This difficulty, already so considerable in itself, is made doubly difficult by *novels*, which represent a state of things quite foreign to actuality. Credulous youth will, however, accept it all as true and incorporate it with its mind, and thus, instead of mere negative ignorance, there enters a whole tissue of false assumptions, introducing positive error, which afterwards causes confusion even in the school of experience itself and puts its lessons in a false light. The youth, hitherto in the dark, is now led by will-o'-the-wisps—and what shall we say of the girl? Novels foist upon them a quite false view of life, and expectations are aroused which can never be fulfilled. This usually has a most prejudicial influence upon their whole life. Men, such as artisans, etc., who in their youth had neither time nor opportunity for novel-reading, have here a decided advantage. There are a few novels against which this reproach cannot be urged; indeed, their influence is all the other way. First and above all, *Gil Blas* and the other works of Lesage (or rather their Spanish originals); also *The Vicar of Wake-*

field, and to a certain extent Scott's novels. *Don Quixote* may be regarded as a satirical description of this mistaken view of life.

Chapter XXIX.

OF PHYSIOGNOMICS

[ii *Par.* § 390.]

That the outside reflects the in, and that the face expresses and reveals the man's whole nature, is an assumption whose apriority, and consequent certainty, announces itself in the universal desire to *see* the man who is notorious for anything good or bad that he has done, or who has produced some extraordinary work; or, in default of this, to hear from others *what he looks like*. This desire finds its expression in the flocking of people to the places where they think he is to be found; in the attempts of the newspapers, especially the English ones, to give a minute description of him, until such time as painters and etchers shall have produced his portrait; and in Daguerre's discovery, which for this very reason is so greatly prized. In ordinary life, too, every person scrutinises the face of every other, in the secret hope of divining his moral and intellectual nature from his features. Now all this would not be so if, as some foolish people imagine, a man's outward appearance had no significance, seeing that—so they say—the soul is one thing, and the body (which is related to the soul as the man's coat to himself) another.

No; every human face is a hieroglyph, which can very well be deciphered—whose key, indeed, lies ready to hand

within us. In truth, as a rule, a man's face says more, and more interesting things, than his mouth; for it is a compendium of everything that his mouth can ever say, seeing that it is the monogram[1] of all this man's thoughts and aims. The mouth speaks only the thoughts of a human being; the face expresses a thought of Nature's. Every one is therefore worthy of our attentive consideration, though everyone is not worth talking to.

And if every individual, as a special thought of Nature's, is worthy of being looked at, how much more worthy of contemplation is beauty; for it is a higher and more general concept of Nature's, viz. her thought of the species. This is why it so powerfully rivets our gaze. Beauty is a basal and fundamental thought of Nature's, whereas the individual is only a subsidiary thought, a corollary.

We all tacitly start from the assumption, that every one *is* what he *looks*. And here we are right; but the difficulty lies in the practical application of this principle, the capacity for which application is partly innate, partly a matter of experience. No one has completely mastered the art of reading faces, and even the greatest adept is liable to make mistakes. Not that faces lie—whatever Figaro may say—but it is we who read from them what is not written there. Yes, the reading of faces is certainly a great and difficult art. Its principles are never to be learnt *in abstracto;* but the first condition is, that we look *purely objectively* at the man we are studying—and this is no easy matter. For the moment there is the slightest trace of aversion, or liking, or fear, or hope; or if the thought of what effect we are making upon *him* occurs to us—in a word, if there is any admixture of the subjective element, the hieroglyph becomes blurred and

[1] Outline sketch.

marred. As the sound of a language is heard only by one unacquainted with it—for, if we know it, the attention we pay to the meaning of the words drives the sound, as such, at once out of consciousness; so a man's face is seen only by him who is still a stranger to it, *i.e.* has not become accustomed to it by often seeing, or, worse still, speaking to the man. Accordingly we only get a purely objective impression of a face, and consequently the power of reading it, on the first occasion of meeting. As odours are perceived only at first, and wine can really be tasted only in the first glass; so faces make their full impression, only when seen the first time. Let us, then, pay careful attention to first impressions, keep them in mind, and, of men with whom we have important relations, even write them down—that is, if we can trust our instinct for faces. Subsequent acquaintance, familiar intercourse, will efface these impressions; but they will one day be confirmed.

Meanwhile let us confess that the first sight of a man is usually most unsatisfactory and disagreeable—for what miserable creatures the majority of men are!
Save in the case of the handsome, kind, and clever faces—*i.e.* of the few exceptions—every person of keen instincts will experience, I think, at the sight of a new face, a feeling allied to terror, for it offers the spectacle of the disagreeable in a new and astonishing combination. It is, as a rule, a sorry sight. There are people on whose countenances are stamped such a naïve commonness and baseness of disposition, and also such an animal scantness of understanding, that one cannot help wondering how they can walk about with such a face and not rather prefer to wear a mask. Aye, and there are faces the bare sight of which make us feel defiled. We can therefore not blame those whose fortunate star allows them to retire from the world and shut themselves up, so that

they are altogether spared the painful sensation of "seeing new faces." In explaining this *metaphysically*, we have to remember that the individuality of a man is just that from which he should be brought back by his existence itself—that fault of which his very existence should correct him. But let those who are content with a *psychological* explanation ask: What sort of faces, then, can we expect from people whose heart of hearts throughout a long life has rarely harboured any but petty, base, miserable thoughts, and common, selfish, envious, bad, and wicked desires? Every one of these thoughts and desires has, for the time it lasts, set its mark upon the countenance, and by frequent repetition they have worn deep furrows, or, to change the metaphor, have "broken out," as people say, upon the face. Hence at first sight the average man presents an appearance that appals us, and only gradually do we become accustomed to his face—*i.e.* become so insensible to the impression made by it that it produces no further effect.

But it is just because of this slow building up of the permanent facial expression from countless fleeting characteristic tensions of the features, that thoughtful faces only gradually become so and do not acquire their noble expression until late in life, while portraits of them in early years show only the first traces of it. On the other hand, what I said just now about the terror inspired by a new face tallies with the remark also made above, that it is only at first sight that a face makes its due and full impression. I mean, that in order to receive a purely objective and genuine impression of it, we must stand in no kind of relation to the person in question, and it is better to have exchanged no word with him. For conversation is apt to lead to friendship and brings about a certain *rapport*, a mutual subjective relation, and this at once militates against objectivity of apprehension.

Besides which, as everybody is anxious to secure esteem or friendship, the person under observation will at once practise arts of dissimulation of all kinds—for to these he will be no stranger—and with his feigning, fawning manner will so delude us, that we soon shall cease to see what was so evident at first sight. In the old proverb, "People improve on nearer acquaintance," for "improve" we should read "dupe us"; and when afterwards misfortunes happen, the judgment of the first glance is usually justified, and often mockingly bids us remember its warning. If, on the other hand, "nearer acquaintance" should lead promptly to hostility, then again we shall find that the proverb is wrong. Another cause of the supposed improvement on nearer acquaintance is, that the moment we begin to converse with the man, the first sight of whom warned us against him, he no longer shows his own nature and character merely, but also his culture—*i.e.* not only what he really and by nature is, but also what he has appropriated to himself out of the common property of all mankind. Three-quarters of his conversation is not his, but has come to him from without, and it often surprises us to hear such a Minotaur talking like a human being. But if we advance now from "nearer" to still nearer acquaintance, "the bestiality" written on his countenance "will reveal itself right gloriously." He, then, who is endowed with the power of reading faces, should pay careful attention to that genuine and unadulterated facial expression that precedes "nearer acquaintance." For a man's face declares openly *what he is;* and if he deceives us, the fault is ours, not his. A man's words, on the other hand, say merely what he thinks, or more often what he has learnt, or even what he merely pretends to think. Then, too, when we talk to him, or even only hear him talk to others, we leave his face out of account,

for we set it aside as the substratum, the absolutely given, and attend merely to the pathognomic element in it—his play of features in speaking; and this he so arranges as to turn its best side outwards.

So when Socrates said to the youth who was brought to him to have his abilities tested, "Speak, so that I may see you," he was right (if by "seeing" he did not merely mean hearing) to this extent: that it is only in talking that the features—the eyes especially—become animated, and that a man's mental qualities, setting their seal upon his play of features, enable us to form a provisional judgment as to the degree and capacity of his intelligence—which was Socrates' object here. But against the plan he adopted, there is this to be urged: first, that it is no test of a man's *moral* qualities, which lie deeper; secondly, that what we gain objectively, as we converse with a man, by the clear view we obtain of his facial lineaments through the play of features, we lose subjectively through the personal relation to us into which he immediately falls—this relation producing a slight fascination, which gives us a bias as explained above. From this last point of view, therefore, Socrates would have done better to say: "Keep silence, so that I may see you."

For, to get a thorough grasp and a pure understanding of a man's face, we must observe him when he is alone and occupied with his own thoughts. Companionship and conversation throw a reflex from without upon him, generally to his advantage, for he is influenced by the action and reaction, and thus elevated; whereas it is only when he is alone and left to himself, only when he is stewing in the juice of his own thoughts and feelings, that he is altogether himself. At such a time the penetrative gaze of a reader of faces can grasp his whole nature in general in a flash. For upon his face, in and

for itself, is stamped the fundamental note of all his thoughts and aspirations, the *arrêt irrévocable*[1] of that which he has to be, and which he is only thoroughly conscious of when alone.

Physiognomics is therefore a chief means of knowing men, because the physiognomy—in the narrower sense of the word[2]—is the sole thing exempt from the influence of their arts of dissimulation, in whose sphere alone lies the pathognomic, the mimetic. Hence my advice, that a man be studied while he is by himself and occupied with his own thoughts, and before we have entered into conversation with him: partly because only then have we his physiognomy before us in its pure and unadulterated state, whereas in conversation the pathognomic at once makes its influence felt, and he then employs his acquired arts of dissimulation; partly because any, even the most fleeting, personal relation renders us biassed, and thus subjectively corrupts our judgment.

I have still to remark that it is far easier to read a man's intellectual qualities from his face than his moral character. The former are more on the surface. They appear not only on the face and in the play of feature, but also in the gait, and in every movement, no matter how small. Even from behind we can hardly fail to distinguish between a blockhead, a fool, and a clever man. The leaden ponderosity of all his movements marks the first; folly is stamped on every gesture of the second; thoughtfulness on the bearing of the third. Hence La Bruyère says: "Il n'y a rien de si délié, de si simple, et de si imperceptible, où il n'y entrent des manières, qui nous décèlent: un sot ni n'entre, ni ne sort, ni ne s'assied, ni ne se lève, ni ne se

[1] Irrevocable decree.
[2] *I.e.* the face in repose.

tait, ni n'est sur ses jambes, comme un homme d'esprit."[1] This explains, I may say in passing, that *instinct sûr et prompt*[2] which, according to Helvétius, leads the ordinary man to recognise and flee from clever people. But the reason of the fact itself is primarily this: that the larger and more developed the brain, and the thinner in relation thereto the spinal marrow and the nerves, the greater is, not only the intelligence, but also the mobility and pliancy of all the limbs; because these are then more immediately and decidedly under cerebral control, and so everything is moved more by a single thread, as it were, and therefore the intention is exactly stamped on every movement. The whole thing finds its analogy in, and, indeed, is all of a piece with, the circumstance that the higher an animal stands on the scale of beings, the more easily can it be killed by an injury to a particular spot. Take, for example, the Batrachians: see how clumsy, sluggish, and slow they are in their movements, how unintelligent, and withal how exceedingly tenacious of life; the explanation of all which is, that they have very little brain, but very thick spinal-cord and nerves. But the gait and the motion of the arms are in every case mainly a function of the brain; because the limbs receive their motion and every, even the slightest, modification thereof from the brain by way of the spinal nerves. It is just for this reason that voluntary movements tire us; which tiredness, as likewise the pain, has its seat in the brain, and not (as we imagine) in the limbs, and so it makes us sleepy; whereas the involuntary movements of organic life—of the heart, lungs, &c.—which are not initiated in the

[1] In the slightest, simplest action we stand revealed. A stupid man neither comes into a room nor leaves it, neither sits nor rises from his chair, neither holds his peace nor stands, in the same way as a clever one.

[2] Sure and prompt instinct.

brain continue without ever leading to tiredness. Now, as it is the business of this same brain both to think and to move the limbs, the character of its activity will be stamped alike upon the thought and the gesture of the individual: stupid people move like lay-figures, while in the quick-witted every joint speaks. Though gestures and movements tell us something of the mental qualities, these are far better determined from the face, from the form and size of the brow, the alertness and mobility of the features, the eyes especially—from the small, dim, weak pig's eyes, through all the intermediate grades, up to the gleaming, flashing eyes of the genius.

The look of *cleverness*, even at its highest, differs from that of *genius* in this: that it bears the impress of the Will's service from which the other is free. To me, therefore, there is nothing incredible about the anecdote which Squarzafichi, in his life of Petrarch, takes from his contemporary, Joseph Brivius. The story is this: One day, at a gathering in the Palazzo Visconti, Petrarch was standing among a group of noblemen and gentlemen, when Galeazzo Visconti bade his young son—afterwards first Duke of Milan—to pick out *the wisest man* of the company. The boy looked at them all for a time, and then took Petrarch by the hand and led him to his father, to the great amazement of the bystanders. I believe this, I say, because so clearly does Nature set her hall-mark upon the elect of mankind that a child can recognise it. So let me advise my sharp-sighted compatriots, if they should ever again take it into their heads to trumpet the praises of another mediocrity for the space of thirty years, not to choose a man with the face of a publican, like Hegel—a face upon which Nature had written "common fellow" in her most legible handwriting.

Moral qualities, however, are not, like the intellectual,

so easy to read from the face; because character is metaphysical and lies far deeper, and, though it has a connexion with the bodily conformation, with the organism, is not so immediately connected therewith and linked to a particular part and system thereof, as the intellect is. Besides, while everyone wears his understanding—with which he is always satisfied—on his sleeve for all to see, and takes every opportunity of showing it, scarcely anybody will flaunt his moral qualities, but will rather do all he can to hide them—in which art long practice has made him an adept. Meanwhile, as already remarked, evil thoughts and ignoble strivings gradually impress their traces upon the face—especially the eyes. To sum up: We can easily judge from a man's face that he will never produce an immortal work, but we cannot undertake to say that he will never commit a great crime.

Chapter XXX.

OF NOISE

[ii *Par.* § 391.]

Kant has written a treatise on *living forces*, but I would write a nenia and threnody upon them; for their universal employment in knocking, hammering, and pounding has been a daily torture to me all my life long. I know there are people—many people—who will laugh at this, because they are not susceptible to noise: but they are just the people who are insensible to arguments, thoughts, poems, and works of art—in a word, to mental impressions of any kind; for their insensibility is due to

the tough fibre and coarse texture of their brains. But I find complaints of the pain caused to thinkers by noise in the biographies, or other notices, of almost all great writers, *e.g.* Kant, Goethe, Lichtenburg, Jean Paul; indeed, where nothing of the kind is mentioned, it is only because this topic could not be conveniently introduced. My explanation of the matter is as follows. As a big diamond loses enormously in value when broken up into a number of small ones; or as an army, split up into small bands, loses all its effectiveness; so a great mind can do no more than one of ordinary stamp, when it is interrupted, disturbed, distracted, diverted: for it cannot think unless all its powers are concentrated, like the rays of a concave mirror, upon a *single* point and object; and this concentration is prevented by noisy interruptions. This is why eminent minds so greatly dislike any kind of disturbance and interruption, anything which diverts their thoughts, and above all that violent diversion caused by noise, whereas other people are not particularly affected by it. The most intellectual and clever nation[1] in Europe has even formulated this in the words "Never interrupt," which it calls the eleventh commandment. But noise is the most impertinent of all interruptions, for it interrupts, and indeed shatters, our very thoughts. Where, however, there is nothing to interrupt, I can understand that it will not be particularly felt. I am sometimes disturbed and tormented by some slight and constantly-repeated noise, before I am clearly conscious of it: I only feel that something is making it difficult for me to think—that there is a clog on the leg of my mind—until at last I become aware what it is.

Passing now from the genus to the species, I have to

[1] The English are meant.

denounce, as the most inexcusable and scandalous of noises, that truly infernal cracking of whips in our noisy streets, which robs life of all repose and all thoughtfulness. Nothing gives me so clear a conception of the obtuseness and empty-headedness of men as the allowing of whips to be cracked. This sudden, sharp, brain-paralysing, sense-shattering, thought-murdering detonation cannot but make a painful impression upon every one who carries in his head anything that approaches to thought. Every such detonation must therefore disturb hundreds in their intellectual activity, of however low an order this may be; but through the meditations of a thinker it cuts with as painful and disastrous an effect as an executioner's sword through the neck. No noise cuts so sharply through the head as this cursed whip-cracking: one feels the point of the lash in one's very brain, and its touch there produces the same effect as touching a sensitive-plant—an effect, too, which lasts just as long. With all respect for most holy utility, I cannot see that a fellow who is moving a load of sand or dung should therefore be privileged to nip in the bud all the thoughts successively arising in ten thousand heads, as he pursues his way along a couple of miles of streets. Knocking of hammers, barking of dogs, and crying of children are bad enough; but the real murderer of thought is the crack of a whip. There is nothing like it for shattering any fine thought that may chance to occur to us. If there were no other method of hastening the steps of draught animals than this most abominable of all sounds, it might be excused. But the fact is, this cursed whip-cracking is not only unnecessary, but even useless. For the physical effect it is intended to have upon the animal is simply *nil*, as, owing to the misuse continually made of it, the creature ceases to pay any attention. He does not move one whit the faster, as may be seen by

looking at the crawling cabs, whose drivers attempt to attract fares by ceaseless cracking of their whips, and their horses never break their slow walk: the slightest touch of the whip would have more effect. But assuming that it is absolutely necessary to remind the horse by a crack that the whip is there, a far less noisy detonation would serve the purpose; for it is well known that animals pay attention to the slightest signal, visible or audible. We have astonishing examples of this in trained dogs and canary-birds who respond to signals that we cannot detect. The whole thing, therefore, is pure wantonness, and is an impudent defiance flung by that part of society which works with its hands at that part which works with its head. To suffer such an infamy in towns is barbarous and unjust; all the more, as an edict compelling a knot at the end of the lash would at once put an end to the nuisance. There could be no harm in forcing the proletariat to have some consideration for the head-work of the superior classes; for they have themselves a mortal terror of all head-work. But that a fellow who rides through the narrow streets of a populous town with a relay of horses, or on one single sorry jade, and keeps on cracking his six-foot whip with all his might, does not deserve, on dismounting, to receive five lashes well laid on, is a thing that all the philanthropists in the world, and all the legislative assemblies (with their schemes for the total abolition of corporal punishment, for which they give the best of reasons) to boot, will never persuade me of. But we may see even worse than that; viz. a carter, walking through the streets with no horses at all, and cracking his whip all the time, so much accustomed to whip-cracking has this class become in consequence of the unpardonable forbearance of the authorities. In the universal tenderness for the body and its comforts, is the thinker, then, to be the

only person who is never to have the smallest consideration and protection—to say nothing of respect—accorded to him? Carters, coal-heavers, porters, and the like, are the Gibeonites of society: by all means let them be treated with humanity, justice, equity, consideration, and attention; but they should not be allowed to hinder the higher endeavours of the human race with their wanton noise. I should like to know how many great and fine thoughts have been cracked out of the world by these whips. If I had my way, I would establish in carters' heads an indissoluble *nexus idearum* between cracks of the whip and lashes on their own backs. Let us hope that the nations of finer feeling and intelligence will give us a lead here, and the Germans may then likewise be brought to follow their example. I may remark in passing, that, in his *Up the Rhine*, Thomas Hood says of them: "For a musical people, they are the most noisy I ever met with." And why are they so noisy? Not because they are more inclined to noise than other people, but because of the stolid insensibility of those who have to listen to it, and who are not disturbed in thinking or reading, simply because they do not think, but only smoke—smoking with them doing duty for thinking. Universal tolerance of unnecessary noise, *e.g.* of the ill-bred and common habit of slamming doors, is the plainest evidence of general obtuseness and empty-headedness. It would seem as if in Germany express pains had been taken that noise should prevent people from thinking: look, for instance, at the objectless drumming.

Chapter XXXI.

SIMILES, PARABLES, AND FABLES

[ii *Par.* § 393.]

Switzerland is like a genius: beautiful and elevated, but ill-adapted for bearing nutritious fruits. Pomerania and the fens of Holstein, on the other hand, are exceedingly fruitful and productive, but flat and uninteresting, like useful Philistines.

[ii *Par.* § 394.]

In a field of ripening corn, I stood at a spot where some heedless foot had trampled a gap. And there, amid the countless heavy-eared corn-stalks, all exactly alike and mathematically level, I beheld a wealth of wild flowers (blue, red, and violet) and foliage, beautiful exceedingly to look upon. But, thought I, they are useless, unfruitful, mere weeds, and only suffered here because they could not be got rid of. And yet it is they alone that lend beauty and charm to the scene. Thus in every respect they play the part which poetry and the fine arts play in serious, useful, profitable civic life, and of these they may be taken as an emblem.

[ii *Par.* § 397.]

As a symbol of brazen aggressiveness, I would choose the fly. For while all other creatures have a horror of man and get as far as possible from him, this one settles on his nose.

[ii *Par.* § 402.]

Behind an Apple-tree in the full pride of blossom a

straight Fir reared its dark tapering head. To it the Apple-tree thus: "Look at the thousands of pretty, gay flowers with which I am covered! What have you got to show in comparison? Only dark green needles."—"Very true," replied the Fir, "but when the winter comes you will be leafless, while I shall be as I am now."

[ii *Par.* § 403.]

Botanising one day under an oak, I found a plant no higher than the rest—a little dark-coloured thing with wrinkled leaves and a straight, rigid stem. As I touched it, it said to me with firm voice: "Let me alone! I am no weed for your herbarium, like these others to whom Nature has allotted but a year of life. My life is measured by centuries; I am a little oak."—So he, whose influence is to extend over centuries, may, as a child, as a youth, often as a man, and sometimes his whole life long, resemble all the rest and seem no more than they; but give him time, and with time appreciative judges—and he does not die like the rest.

[ii *Par.* § 406.]

A beautifully green and blooming Oasis looked around and saw nothing but desert. In vain she searched for another like herself. Then she broke out into this lament: "Unfortunate, lonely Oasis that I am!—condemned to solitude—with never a companion, never an eye even to rejoice in my meadows, springs, palm-trees, and thickets! Surrounded as I am by this dreary, sandy, rocky, lifeless desert, of what use in my abandonment are all my privileges, beauties, and riches?"

Then the old grey mother Desert answered: "My child, if things were otherwise; if I, instead of being the

dreary, arid Desert, were blooming, verdant, and covered with life, you would be no Oasis, no favoured spot, of whom the traveller speaks in terms of commendation while still a great way off—but only a small part of me, and, as such, insignificantly small and unheeded. Therefore suffer in patience that which is the necessary condition of your distinction and your renown."

[ii *Par.* § 413.]

One cold winter day a party of Porcupines huddled close up together, to keep each other warm and prevent themselves from freezing. But they soon found that they were pricking each other, and this made them move apart. When the need of warmth brought them together again, this second drawback made itself felt once more, and between these two woes they were driven like a shuttlecock between two battledores, until they discovered that the way out of the difficulty was, to keep close, but not too close. So the need of companionship, arising from the emptiness and monotony of their inner existence, drives men together; but their many repellent qualities and unbearable failings drive them apart once more. The medium position, which they discover at last, in which they can endure to be together, is Civility and Good Manners. Any one who transgresses against these, will be told to keep his distance. Though the need of mutual warmth will in this way be only imperfectly satisfied, yet the prick of the quills will not be felt. He, however, who has much inner warmth of his own, will prefer to keep out of society, and will thus neither cause nor suffer inconvenience.

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